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Introduction: The role of private health insurance (PHI) in efforts to achieve Universal 
Health Coverage (UHC) is a matter of intense academic and policy debate. The 
government of the People’s Republic of China has sought to encourage the take-up 
of PHI at the same time as expanding the scope of social health insurance (SHI). This 
study investigates the role that PHI has played in the attainment of UHC goals in 
China, focusing on its prevalence, impacts on access to healthcare and financial 
protection, and inequalities in these outcomes. 
Methods: The study is based on longitudinal, stratified-sampling data from the China 
Health and Nutrition Survey. It employs multilevel logistic models to examine PHI 
prevalence and distribution in the population, and its effects on the utilisation of 
healthcare, while Heckman selection models and the zero-inflated count models are 
used to examine its effects on financial protection. It disaggregates the study 
population to explore inequalities in determinants of PHI prevalence, and access and 
financial protection attributable to PHI.   
Results: Coverage under PHI is unequally distributed, with enrolment higher among 
individuals of higher socioeconomic status and, at the aggregate level, in the more 
affluent east and urban areas than in the poorer inland and rural areas. As SHI 
coverage expanded to cover more of the population against more of the cost of 
healthcare, and for more treatment types, individuals with coverage under SHI in 
general became less associated with PHI enrolment than those without SHI. 
Compared to those without PHI, those with PHI and in need of healthcare was 
associated with higher utilisation of healthcare, especially in the east and urban areas. 
However, further analysis finds that this effect PHI was only present where individuals 
were also covered under SHI. Enrolment under PHI did not confer lower healthcare-
vi 
 
related financial risk than those without PHI but covered under SHI, while both PHI 
and SHI were associated with higher living standards. The effects of PHI on the 
community varied by geography. In the more developed east of China, higher PHI 
prevalence was associated with increasingly higher average utilisation for healthcare 
given increasing need. However, in the less developed inland regions, higher 
prevalence of PHI was associated with increasingly lower average utilisation given 
increasing need, and no significant effects on OOP payments.  
Conclusions: The study generates several policy-relevant insights. PHI has an 
inequitable distribution, with socioeconomically advantaged individuals and those 
resident in more affluent areas more likely to be enrolled. It confers greater access to 
healthcare for individuals in need of healthcare, from which those living in more 
affluent areas benefit more. It does not lower financial risk. Since 2004 its prevalence 
has increased only gradually over time, and as the scope of SHI has expanded, PHI 
has remained a relatively marginal source of coverage. These conclusions can inform 
analysis of the appropriate role of PHI in UHC efforts both in China and elsewhere, 
suggesting that if PHI is identified as a promising route forward, government 
subsidisations are needed to promote its coverage and strict regulations are required 












This study investigates the role of private health insurance (PHI) in China’s efforts to 
achieve universal health coverage (UHC). Since 2000, China has adopted social 
health insurance (SHI), a publicly-funded health insurance model, as a means of 
expanding coverage, but has also sought to encourage the take-up of PHI as a 
complementary approach. This study uses data from the China Health and Nutrition 
Survey to examine PHI’s prevalence and distribution in the population, its effects on 
the utilisation of healthcare, and on financial protection. It divides the population into 
four subpopulations by geo-economic status in China to explore how PHI is distributed 
across areas with different levels of economic resources.  
This study finds that coverage under PHI is unequally distributed, with individuals of 
higher socioeconomic status and residents in more affluent east and urban areas 
more likely to be enrolled than others. As coverage under SHI expanded, individuals 
with coverage under SHI became less likely to have PHI than others. Those enrolled 
in a PHI scheme were more likely to utilise needed healthcare, especially in the east 
and urban areas, but only where individuals were also covered under SHI. PHI did 
not reduce the extent of healthcare-related financial risk faced by enrolees, in contrast 
to SHI, while enrolment into both forms of insurance was associated with higher living 
standards. A higher level of PHI enrolment was associated with higher average use 
of healthcare in communities in the more affluent and economically developed east of 
the country, but decreased this in the poorer, less urbanised inland areas.  
The findings provide information that is useful for the analysis of the appropriate role 
of PHI in the pursuit of UHC – an important topic in scholarly and policy debates in 
China and many other low- and middle-income countries. For individuals, coverage 
under PHI is unequally distributed, and joint coverage under PHI and SHI confers 
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benefits in terms of higher utilisation of needed healthcare (though not in terms of 
financial protection). At the community level, it is the more affluent and economically 
developed east of the country that sees the benefits of PHI in terms of higher overall 
utilisation. These results suggest that a PHI market is unlikely to generate the broadly 
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CCA: Complete case analysis. The default modelling approach in many statistical 
packages in which units with missing values are excluded listwise. 
CHNS: China Health and Nutrition Survey. An ongoing longitudinal household survey 
that commenced in 1989. This is the main data source of this study. 
CHARLS: China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study. Another longitudinal 
study focusing on people aged 45 or over, starting the nationwide survey in 2011.  
CII: Critical Illness Insurance. A complementary public insurance programme to 
existing SHI schemes in China announced in 2012.  
CLHLS: Chinese Longitudinal Healthy Longevity Survey. Another longitudinal 
household survey focusing on people aged 65 or over, ongoing since 1998. 
CMS: Cooperative Medical Scheme. An outdated commune-based rural health 
insurance scheme in China, updated as New Cooperative Medical Scheme since the 
2000s. 
CNKI: China National Knowledge Infrastructure. The largest Chinese online 
academic databases. 
CPCCC: Communist Party of China Central Committee. The highest authority of the 
ruling party in China.  
CPI: Consumer price index. A measure of inflation indicating changes in the price 
level of market basket of consumer goods and services.  
FMS: Free Medical Scheme. A government employees’ health insurance scheme in 
China financed by general taxation.  
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GDP: Gross domestic product.  
ICE/FCS: Imputation by chained equations or full conditional specification. A popular 
algorithm for performing multiple imputation, able to specify different model types for 
each variable and handle non-monotone missing data. 
IIT: Individual income tax. A payroll tax in China. 
IPW: Inverse probability weighting. A method to handle unit missingness by weighting 
units with different propensities for missing.  
LIS: Labour Insurance Scheme. An outdated public health insurance in China, 
covering workers of state-owned enterprises.  
LOCF: Last Observation Carried Forward. An ad hoc method of handling missing 
values.  
MAR: Missing At Random. One of three types of missing mechanisms, where the 
cause of missingness is independent of the unobserved values, given the 
corresponding observed variables.  
MCAR: Missing Completely At Random. One of three types of missing mechanisms, 
where the cause of missingness is absolutely unrelated to the research questions.  
MI: Multiple imputation. A method of handling missing data, based on the assumption 
of MAR under which the CCA model for the variable with incomplete observations 
regressed on other conditioning variables is unbiased, applicable to arbitrary missing 
data patterns, with methods such as data augmentation and ICE/FCS.     
MNAR: Missing Not At Random. One of three types of missing mechanisms, where 
the cause of missingness is absolutely unrelated to the research questions. 
MSA: Medical savings account. An individual account of the social health insurance 
in China for paying the deductible or co-payments, being gradually phased out.  
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NCMS: New Cooperative Medical Scheme. One of social health insurance schemes 
in China, covering rurally registered people.      
NHSS: National Health Services Survey. An official nationwide survey implemented 
every five years since 1993. 
OECD: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. An 
intergovernmental economic organisation with 36 members, mostly affluent countries. 
OLS: Ordinary least square. The estimator used for linear models. 
OOP: Out-of-pocket. Used about money that you have to spend yourself rather than 
having it paid for you, for example by your employer or insurance company, according 
to Cambridge Dictionary.  
PHI: Private health insurance. Insurance operated by commercial insurance agencies 
to pay indemnity for loss caused by health reasons and medical care. 
PPP: Public private partnership. A modality in which governments purchase 
insurance products from commercial insurers through contracts in the case of this 
study. 
PRISMA: Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses. A 
guideline for systematic review.  
PSU: Primary sampling unit. The sampling unit used in the China Health and Nutrition 
Survey.    
SARS: Severe acute respiratory syndrome. A communicable disease, causing a 
serious epidemic that happened in China in 2002-2003, forcing the Minister of Health 
and the Mayor of Beijing to resign. 
SCHIP: State Children's Health Insurance Program. The children's health insurance 
programme in the United States.  
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SDG: Sustainable Development Goal. The United Nation’s global goals of ending 
poverty, protecting the planet and ensuring that all people enjoy peace and prosperity.  
SHI: Social health insurance. A modality of public health financing, characterised by 
funds contributed through compulsory or semi-compulsory membership for all, with 
the premium paid or shared by enrolees themselves, their employers and/or the 
government; the dominant health insurance in China.   
SOE: State-owned enterprise.  
UEBMI: Urban Employees’ Basic Medical Insurance. One of social health insurance 
schemes in China, covering urban employees.   
UHC: Universal health coverage. Access to quality essential healthcare with financial 
protection for all, a target of the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals.   
URBMI: Urban Residents’ Basic Medical Insurance. One of social health insurance 
schemes in China, covering urban registrants without the Urban Employees’ Basic 
Medical Insurance. 
VCE: Variance component estimation. Estimation of variance component of a model, 
in which the data structure can be specified.  
VPC: Variance partition coefficients. An index indicating the proportion of residual 
variation attributed to a certain level in the multilevel model.  
WHO: World Health Organisation. A specialised agency of the United Nations that is 
concerned with international public health. 
ZINB: Zero-inflated negative binomial model. A count model taking into account the 
chance of zero, based on the negative binomial distribution.    
ZIP: Zero-inflated Poisson model. A count model taking into account the chance of 
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Universal health coverage (UHC), which means access to high-quality essential 
healthcare with financial protection for all, is a target of the United Nation’s 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for global prosperity (United Nations, 2016). 
Social health insurance (SHI) is a widely-adopted mechanism for reducing financial 
barriers to care and providing financial protection against the costs, and is commonly 
framed by governments as a means of achieving the UHC ideal. 
Since the beginning of this century, China has experienced a considerable increase 
in the proportion of the population that has insurance coverage, predominantly under 
one of a range of SHI mechanisms. This proportion increased from 29.7% in 2003 to 
95.7% of the whole population in 2011 (Meng et al., 2012). However, the depth and 
height of coverage is still well short of the UHC ideal (with large co-payments and 
limited benefit packages the norm) (Li et al., 2014) and, in the context of stricter control 
of the public finances, the government is interested in evaluating the potential for 
alternative funding strategies such as engaging the private sector to play a larger role 
in providing insurance coverage (Yip et al., 2012). 
In healthcare, private financing generally comes in two forms: private health insurance 
(PHI) and individual out-of-pocket (OOP) payments1 (Gu, 2009b). The latter is a key 
cause of catastrophic health expenditure, the avoidance of which is a key objective of 
UHC (WHO, 2010a). Thus, the government is interested in encouraging the 
development of the PHI market, at the same time as expanding the dimensions of 
coverage under the SHI schemes, in order to reduce OOP payments. Given the lack 





of a defined blueprint for advancing UHC, how to define the role of the private sector 
in health financing is an area of substantial, and polarised, debate (Kutzin, 2008). 
Advocates of greater private financing for low- and middle-income countries 
emphasise the weak administrative capability of the public sector (Preker et al., 2013: 
9), the limited public fiscal space for SHI (Scheil-Adlung, 2013: 36), and the greater 
willingness and ability of individuals to pay for healthcare, compared with those of the 
government (Preker, 2007: 5). They argue that PHI is, by definition, affordable for 
those who already find the money for OOP payments for healthcare (Pauly, 2007: 26), 
and point out that subsidies can help those who cannot afford PHI to access it (Preker, 
2007: 5). Thus, they point to the potential for the private sector to increase overall 
fiscal space (Scheil-Adlung, 2013: 36), reduce OOP payments (Sekhri and Savedoff, 
2006) and thereby become a “critical pillar of a robust health financing system” to 
realise equity, reduce risk and smooth over variations in household income (Preker, 
2007: 6). 
Contrarily, critics of PHI question private insurers’ efficiency due to their relatively high 
administrative costs, their lack of bargaining power vis-à-vis service providers, and 
the tendency for such markets to be highly concentrated (Thomson, 2010). They point 
out that PHI may actually decrease fiscal space for healthcare, since the requirements 
for subsidisation of privately financed services may compromise the state’s focus on 
the delivery of essential healthcare (Colombo, 2007: 224-226, Pascall, 2012: 276). 
They also warn that PHI may not reduce, and can even increase, OOP payments for 
healthcare due to co-payments and the deductible policies of many products (Bos and 
Waters, 2008). 
Most importantly, concerns regarding equity – in terms of coverage, utilisation, and 
financial protection – are core to the scepticism around PHI in some scholarly and 
policy communities (Kutzin, 2013, Thomson, 2010). PHI can be a major source of 
inequity in countries that rely heavily on PHI (Kutzin et al., 2016). In theory, PHI 
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purchasers are more likely to people with a relatively high income, level of education 
and employment status. The concentration of PHI among the more affluent may lead 
to an equivalent concentration of health system resources, to the detriment of equity 
in service use (Colombo, 2007: 223, 232).  
In spite of the international debate, in China policy makers have been keen to explore 
how best to expand the private sector’s role in healthcare financing (State Council, 
2014b, China Insurance Regulatory Commission, 2002). As population coverage 
under SHI has gradually expanded since 2000 (Meng et al., 2012), the PHI market 
has adapted itself to the new healthcare financing environment by trying to ‘fill the 
gaps’ in SHI coverage. As a result, PHI products range from substitutive - for those 
without SHI as an alternative - to complementary or supplementary for those with SHI 
(EY, 2016b). The latter (complementary and supplementary), which focus on 
increasing the range of treatments covered and/or the proportion of the payment to 
be paid by those in receipt of such products, are of particular interest to policy makers, 
given the expansion of SHI coverage nationwide (Xiang, 2014).  
In the specific context of China, there are two fundamental concerns about PHI. First, 
as SHI has been the principal source of the effort to achieve UHC, the additional role 
played by PHI is a critical question about the role and future of PHI. Policy makers 
hope that SHI and PHI can be mutually reinforcing (so that, for example, an increase 
in enrolment under SHI does not decrease enrolment under PHI) (Xiang, 2014, Liu et 
al., 2011b). Whether this has proven to the case, however, has not been 
comprehensively evaluated (Liu et al., 2011b).   
Second, while it seems likely that PHI confers benefits for individuals (e.g. in terms of 
better access to healthcare and financial protection), its impact at the population level 
is unknown. Enrolment in PHI is determined by factors such as household wealth and 
education as well as insurers’ preference for wealthier (and thus healthier) enrolees 
(Van de Ven, 2013: 52-53), both of which favour the rich and not those in greatest 
4 
 
need. The unequal prevalence of PHI can in turn result in unequal access to 
healthcare and financial protection across individuals and, in a geo-economically 
unequal country such as China, across geographies.   
in 2015 the government began regional pilot programmes to provide tax incentives to 
encourage people to purchase PHI (EY, 2016b). Before that, it advocated PHI but did 
not offer support by using public money (Ng et al., 2012). It is therefore a timely 
moment to examine the operation of PHI in China and appraise its role in addressing 
UHC goals. After more than a decade of experimentation with new healthcare 
financing institutions, much data, including longitudinal data, about SHI and PHI has 
been accumulated in China. These data provide a key opportunity to conduct such an 
appraisal.  
Accordingly, the primary aim of this study is to contribute to the academic debate on 
the role of PHI in efforts to achieve UHC objectives, such as more comprehensive 
and equitable coverage, access to healthcare and financial protection. The study 
consists in a multi-faceted examination of PHI’s effects on these dimensions of 
coverage in China. It begins by investigating the prevalence of PHI and how this has 
been shaped by important variables, notably the expansion of SHI, and examines how 
enrolment is distributed across different socioeconomic strata. The study proceeds to 
examine how PHI enrolment impacts on access to healthcare and financial protection; 
in other words, whether and to what extent PHI benefits the enrolees. In addition, the 
study also examines these impacts at the aggregate level, disaggregating the 
population by geo-economic region, so that the factors influencing distribution of PHI 
across regions, and its impacts on coverage, access and financial protection, can be 
compared.  
The following part of this chapter provides more details of the background to this study, 
locating this in its policy context. The first section presents a brief history of China’s 
changing healthcare institutions. Following this, the key characteristics of the current 
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health financing system (at the time of writing), are outlined, focusing on health 
insurance, and recent proposals for reform. In the third section, concerns about PHI’s 
effectiveness and inequities are discussed, as a foundation for the literature reviews 
reported in chapter 2. Then, the research questions are presented. Finally, the 
structure of the thesis is outlined. 
 
1.1 The modern history of healthcare financing in China 
Since 1949, when the People’s Republic of China was founded, the health financing 
system has experienced a number of key transitions linked to broader changes in the 
nature of economic policies pursued by government. Therefore, three distinctive 
models can be seen: an initial period of collectivism (1950s – 1970s), followed by a 
period of rapid marketization (1980s – 1990s), and a final, contemporary, period of 
social insurance (2000s – present). The brief summary of key developments below is 
the result of a review of documented administrative regulations, published by relevant 
government departments such as the Ministry of Health2, the State Council (the 
central government), or the Communist Party of China Central Committee (CPCCC), 
the highest authority of the ruling party in China. 
1.1.1 Collectivistic healthcare in Mao’s China 
Mao Zedong ruled China for 27 years until his death in 1976. Although in his later 
reign, China experienced a period of social and political upheaval and economic 
stagnation, the government under his leadership had prioritised social services such 
as healthcare. In the late 1970s, the share of total healthcare expenditure that came 
from public spending was always more than 80% (National Health and Family 





Planning Commission, 2013). Most of the population were covered by public health 
insurance schemes of some form (Liang and Langenbrunner, 2013). The first public 
health insurance scheme was introduced in 1951 by the Labour Insurance 
Regulations (State Council, 1951), which required state-owned enterprises, or SOEs, 
to fully subsidise workers to join the Labour Insurance Scheme (LIS), run by the All 
China Federation of Trade Unions. A year later, the State Council announced the 
Direction of Providing Free Medical Care to Staff in Governments, Parties, 
Organizations and Affiliated Institutions to mainly cover government officials, public 
employees and college students (State Council, 1952), which is the precursor of the 
current government’s Free Medical Scheme (FMS). Since all private enterprises were 
nationalised by government between 1953 and 1956, the state in effect provided all 
urban employees (and their families in many cases) with public health insurance. 
On the supply side, doctors’ salaries in all urban hospitals were fully funded by the 
government. In turn, public hospitals were required to provide healthcare services at 
very low prices. Due to a shortage of public funding, the government permitted public 
hospitals to earn extra income by charging a 15% mark-up on prescription drugs and 
diagnostic tests. At that time, as a result of broadly equitable health insurance 
coverage, and limited use of expensive medicine and technologies, complaints about 
the affordability of healthcare were rarely reported (Liang and Langenbrunner, 2013, 
Blumenthal and Hsiao, 2005). 
Things were very different in rural settings, however. The rural health insurance 
scheme was named the Cooperative Medical Scheme (CMS), which emerged out of 
village (or commune)-based mutual schemes in the mid-1950s (Li, 2007). In the 1960 
policy note, Direction of Health Services, this model was formally acknowledged and 
there were proposals for its expansion (CPCCC, 1960). Financing the CMS therefore 
relied on numerous small risk funds pooled at the commune level. Every commune 
member contributed a little to the collective fund in order to access free healthcare 
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afterwards. On the supply side, following the Report on Focusing Health Services on 
Rural Areas (Ministry of Health, 1965), many “barefoot doctors”, who provided primary 
care while still doing agriculture work, were trained, and commune-funded clinics with 
one or two formally-trained doctors and 10 – 30 beds were established as a secondary 
tier of rural healthcare (Daemmrich, 2013). 
As a consequence of the degree of state intervention in healthcare financing and 
delivery, healthcare in China was relatively affordable (individuals only paid about 20% 
of healthcare costs on average (National Health and Family Planning Commission, 
2013)), and there were remarkable improvements in health in the period. Using the 
common indicators of health outcomes, from the early 1950s to the early 1980s, infant 
mortality reduced from 200 to 34 per 1000 live births, and average life expectancy 
increased from 35 to 68 years (Blumenthal and Hsiao, 2005). For its comprehensive 
coverage and efficiency, the rural CMS was regarded by international agencies to be 
exemplary – for example, it was recognised as such by the WHO campaign ‘Health 
for All by the Year 2000’ (Sidel, 1993, Blumenthal and Hsiao, 2015). However, the 
clinical quality of much of the healthcare provided, especially in rural areas, was often 
questioned. In particular, rural barefoot doctors were frequently criticised for their very 
simple techniques and lack of access to modern medical equipment (Li et al., 2012b). 
1.1.2 Marketisation of healthcare in the 1980s and 1990s   
During the 1980s and 1990s, China initiated a bold programme of economic reforms, 
with the aim of moving the country’s economic away from central planning towards a 
more decentralised market-based economy. Its impacts on healthcare included 
structural reforms, including marketisation and privatisation, along with a significant 
retrenchment in the role of the state in financing (Blomqvist and Qian, 2008). During 
this period, central government’s share of total health expenditure in the country fell 
to just 15%, one of the lowest proportions in the world (Blumenthal and Hsiao, 2005). 
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On the purchaser side, established insurance schemes were deprived of government 
financial assistance. In urban areas, the role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as 
the main source of employment for the population diminished, while the role of private 
enterprises grew. Many SOEs could not afford insurance premiums for their 
employees, or went bankrupt, while emerging private enterprises rarely purchased 
insurance for their employees (Blumenthal and Hsiao, 2005). Simultaneously, the 
collapse of rural communes radically undermined the CMS. By 1993, coverage under 
the CMS had dropped from about 80% in the 1970s to 6.6% of the population (Liang 
et al., 2012, Sidel, 1993). The only exception to this trend related to the FMS, the 
government employees’ scheme, which continued to receive stable financing 
(Ministry of Health and Ministry of Finance, 1989). 
On the provider side, the Opinion on Strengthening Hospital Economic Management 
Pilots (Ministry of Health et al., 1979) led to hospital payments based on the number 
of registered beds rather than the number of registered doctors, as was the case 
previously. It also required hospitals to focus on financial management. Additionally, 
the following Report on Several Policy Issues of Health Reform (Ministry of Health, 
1985) allowed hospitals to charge for services using new equipment or new 
technologies according to real costs rather than regulated prices. These policies in 
effect reduced government subsidies to hospitals but granted them greater powers to 
raise revenues from patients. Since then, prescribing expensive drugs and providing 
costly services became key channels for increasing hospital revenue, and doctors 
have received bonuses proportionate to their contributions in these respects 
(Blomqvist and Qian, 2008). To maximise profits, hospitals encouraged the over-
prescription of drugs and the use of expensive diagnostic tests, further increasing 
patients’ financial burden (World Bank et al., 2016). Consequently, in that period, drug 
bills increased above inflation, and eventually came to account for almost half of total 
healthcare expenditure in China (Bumgarner, 1992), while lucrative medical 
technologies such as CT scans became more common (David Banta, 1990).  
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In rural areas, the government phased out support for “barefoot doctors”, only half of 
whom were awarded the rural doctor certificate by passing the assessment in the 
early 1980s. Only trained doctors were allowed to receive income from the CMS 
(Ministry of Health, 1985), while “barefoot doctors” who had not obtained the 
certificate turned to selling drugs or quitting medical practice altogether, resulting in a 
shortage of medical professionals in many villages (Blumenthal and Hsiao, 2005). As 
coverage under the CMS diminished, healthcare provision shifted from village settings 
to urban or peri-urban hospitals, most of which charged for services directly, raising 
financial barriers for many rural residents. As a result, the disparity in healthcare 
expenditure between urban and rural areas grew from 3:1 in 1981 to 5:1 in 1992 
(Hesketh and Zhu, 1997). 
In effect, the old public health financing system was dismantled in this period. By 2000, 
health insurance coverage had fallen to 40% in urban and 5% in rural areas (Yang 
and Wu, 2014). Simultaneously, the percentage of private healthcare expenditure 
increased from 20% in 1978 to 60% of total healthcare expenditure in 2001 
(Daemmrich, 2013). A process of decentralisation shifted accountability for health 
financing to the local authorities, while deregulation decreased the authority of state 
administrations and weakened the capacity of regulators, increasing the influence of 
healthcare providers who had an incentive to maximise healthcare expenditure (Bork 
et al., 2011). 
In 2003, 50% of people reporting an illness did not visit outpatient care settings, and 
30% of patients who were advised by a doctor to receive inpatient treatment did not 
do so (Yip and Mahal, 2008). In addition, 23.3% of rural households were 
impoverished by medical expenses in 2004 (Li et al., 2012d). In this context, social 
discontent and distrust towards healthcare providers increased, leading to public 




In 1997, the announcement of Decisions on Health Reform and Development 
(CPCCC and State Council, 1997) marked the new wave of China’s SHI institutions. 
Following the decree, the first scheme, the Urban Employee Basic Medical Insurance 
(UEBMI), was formally introduced by the Decisions on Establishment of UEBMI 
Institution (State Council, 1998) as a substitute for the former LIS, which had 
diminished in enrolment and the package of benefits covered over the previous 20 
year period. However, the UEBMI expanded slowly in its early stages, until regulations 
were tightened, especially the introduction of the Labour Contract Law in 2008, which 
enforced the obligation of employers to purchase social insurance for their employees. 
According to the 2003 National Health Services Survey (NHSS), only 30.4% of the 
urban population was covered by the UEBMI, while 4% and 4.6% were covered by 
the FMS and the LIS, respectively (Ministry of Health, 2003). 
In January of 2003, the rural New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS), as a new 
version of the outdated CMS, began its nationwide pilot projects, according to the 
public document Opinions on Establishment of NCMS Institution (Ministry of Health 
et al., 2003). In conjunction with the NCMS, the government-subsidised Medical 
Assistance programme for the poorest population, including helping them join SHI, 
was introduced in rural areas (Ministry of Civil Affairs et al., 2003), and later in urban 
areas (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2003). A major catalyst for reform was the severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic in 2002 – 2003, which killed hundreds of 
people and caused a nationwide panic, forcing the Minister of Health and the Mayor 
of Beijing to resign, and increasing the pressure on the central government to address 
weaknesses in the healthcare system and make serious efforts to strengthen it (Liu, 
2004). 
The Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance (URBMI) scheme was introduced by 
the 2007 administrative regulation Guidance on Carrying out Pilot Projects of URBMI 
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(State Council, 2007), as the final brick of the social medical security system to cover 
the rest of the population uncovered by the UEBMI, the NCMS and the FMS. Thanks 
to significant government subsidies, the expansion of the URBMI and the NCMS was 
much quicker than that of the early UEBMI. In 2008, 12.5% of the urban population 
and 89.7% of the rural population were covered by the URBMI and the NCMS, 
respectively (Ministry of Health, 2008). 
Despite the high rate of coverage, however, in 2008 the inpatient reimbursement rate 
was only 35.2%, and 14% of households still experienced catastrophic health 
expenses in a given year (Meng et al., 2012), very high even by developing countries’ 
standards (Li et al., 2014). Partly thanks to an unprecedented stimulus package of 
$585 billion (13.3% of GDP) to address the 2008 financial crisis (Ruckert and Labone, 
2012), China’s health system reform programme was upgraded in 2009, with an extra 
$125 billion earmarked for investing in healthcare in the ensuing three years (Yip et 
al., 2012). Government health funding doubled to about $157.6 billion between 2009 
and 2013, 46% of which went into the SHI or the Medical Assistance programmes 
(Meng et al., 2015). 
Published by the top authority, the Opinions on Deepening Health Reforms (CPCCC 
and State Council, 2009) documents the key tasks of the significant 2009 reform. In it 
the government acknowledged that contemporary healthcare still failed to satisfy 
public expectations, due to inequity in resource allocation, weak regulations on 
medical security, pharmaceutical markets and healthcare providers, insufficient 
government investment and high OOP payments. Therefore, it notes that future 
reforms would concentrate on five goals: 1) expanding SHI; 2) increasing public health 
spending and decreasing regional disparities; 3) building primary care facilities; 4) 




After the 2009 reform, China’s public spending as the share of total healthcare 
expenditure reached 56% and public healthcare expenditure as the share of GDP 
reached 3% in 2012, compared to 36.2% and 1.8% in 2003 (World Bank, 2018b, 
World Bank, 2018a). The breadth of coverage increased to 95.7% of the population 
in 2011 (Meng et al., 2012). The three main SHI schemes, i.e. UEBMI, NCMS and 
URBMI, cover close to around 87% of the population (Meng and Xu, 2014). The 2009 
health reform significantly increased government subsidies for SHI. In 2008, the 
minimum average government subsidy for the URBMI was ¥80 per capita (¥1≈ £0.11 
or $0.14). By 2011, it had reached ¥200 (Yip et al., 2012). The inpatient 
reimbursement rate rose from 35.2% in 2008 to 46.9% in 2011 (Meng et al., 2012). 
The above developments have led to increases in the utilisation of healthcare. From 
2003 to 2011, as a percentage of the population, use of outpatient care increased 
from 13.4% to 14.8%; hospital admissions increased from 3.6% to 8.8%; hospital 
delivery increased from 73.3% to 95.8%; and the number of self-discharges reduced 
from 43.3% to 31.8% (Meng et al., 2012). However, unequal access is still evident in 
some important respects. Taking antenatal visits as an example, an important 
indicator of maternal and children healthcare, in 2011, 76.8% of urban pregnant 
women had five or more antenatal visits, compared to 59.0% of their rural 
counterparts; 78.5% did so in the East, compared to 57.1% in the west and 52.6% in 
the central regions (Meng et al., 2012). The annual incidence of catastrophic health 
expenditure also increased over this period, standing at 12.9% compared to 12.2% in 
2003 (Meng et al., 2012), suggesting that expanding the depth and height of coverage 





In China’s official statistics, the sources of healthcare financing are divided into three: 
individual OOP payments, collective payments from all kinds of health insurance, and 
direct funding by government. Individual OOP payments once dominated total 
healthcare expenditure in the early 2000s, as noted above. As health reforms 
proceeded, the shares of the latter two gradually increased (Figure 1.1). In the current 
years, each of the three sources accounts for roughly one third of total healthcare 
expenditure. We focus here on expenditure through the insurance mechanisms – 







Until 2011, the UEBMI, as a compulsory scheme for urban workers, provided 
coverage for approximately 265 million people (National Health and Family Planning 
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Commission, 2013), with an effective average reimbursement rate for inpatient care 
of 81% (Ministry of Human Resource and Social Security, 2012) (Table 1.1). The 
employer contributes 6% and the employee contributes 2% of salary, of which all of 
the employee’s contribution and 30% of the employer’s contribution go to an individual 
medical savings account (MSA) while the rest goes to a municipal pool, managed by 
the local bureau of the Ministry of Human Resource and Social Security (State Council, 
1998). In 2011, the annual deductible and cap of reimbursement were 10% and 600% 
(no less than ¥60,000) of the local average salary, respectively (Liang and 
Langenbrunner, 2013). Healthcare costs under the deductible or over the cap and co-
payment can be paid by individual savings in the MSA, and otherwise direct OOP 
payments. In recent years, the MSA, which has been long criticised for its low 
efficiency and misuse of funds (enrolees reportedly often draw out surpluses or spend 
MSA funds on non-healthcare related products), is being gradually phased out (Wu 
and Wei, 2014). 
The NCMS is a voluntary rural health insurance programme, covering 805 million 
(98.26%) of rural residents by 2012 (National Health and Family Planning 
Commission, 2013) (Table 1.1). Funding is shared by the enrolee, the local 
government and the central government, which disproportionately subsidises the 
NCMS in favour of the poor inland areas (Ministry of Health et al., 2003, Yip et al., 
2012). The collected funds are pooled at the county level and managed by local health 
authorities. MSAs had almost been abolished by 2011. The cap of compensation was 
800% of the annual average income of villagers and no less than ¥60,000 (Liang and 
Langenbrunner, 2013). However, the NCMS is often criticised for its low effective 
reimbursement rate (<50%) (Liang and Langenbrunner, 2013, Li et al., 2012d), 
because its compensation policy tilts towards low-tier care providers. In other words, 
villagers enjoy the highest reimbursement in local village clinics but encounter the 
highest deductible and co-payments in urban tertiary hospitals. The unequal 
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distribution of high-quality resources often forces rural patients to seek healthcare in 
urban hospitals, going beyond the NCMS’s protection (Liang et al., 2012). 
The URBMI is the NCMS’s urban counterpart3, and shares many characteristics. For 
example, the enrolees are from informal sectors, there is voluntary enrolment and tri-
funding comes from enrolees, and local and central governments. There are no MSAs, 
and so all of the premiums from the URBMI are pooled at the municipal level. The 
manager is the same as the UEBMI, i.e. the Ministry of Human Resource and Social 
Security and its local bureaux, but pooled separately. By 2011, the URBMI had 
covered 272 million people and its compensation cap was defined to be no less than 
600% of local residents’ annual disposable income and no less than ¥60,000 (Ministry 
of Human Resource and Social Security, 2012) (Table 1.1). Likewise, its policy is also 
biased against high-tier services. For example, the annual deductible rose from ¥100 
to ¥1000, as the tier of the provider rose from primary to tertiary (Liang and 
Langenbrunner, 2013). Nevertheless, because health resources are concentrated in 
urban areas, the effective reimbursement rate of the URBMI (64%) is higher than the 
NCMS (<50%) (Ministry of Human Resource and Social Security, 2012). 
The government’s FMS scheme is financed by general taxation, and is not strictly SHI 
since there are no formal enrolee contributions. Dating back to the 1950s, qualified 
FMS members are limited to government employees and retirees (employees of many 
public institutions were also included before 2010), who receive healthcare in 
appointed hospitals without directly contributing to a medical fund (State Council, 
1952). In terms of the compensation rate, the FMS is more generous than other SHI 
schemes, although this varies across regions and even between employers (Table 
1.1). Since the introduction of three SHI schemes, the FMS has gradually been 





phased out, as more and more government and public institution employees are 
transferred to the UEBMI (Liang and Langenbrunner, 2013). 
 
Table 1.1 Summary of current public health insurance institutions 
  UEBMI  NCMS  URBMI  FMS† 



















Pooling level  Prefecture  County  Prefecture  Not Available 
Number of pools  333  2852  333  Not Available 
Enrolment  Compulsory  Voluntary  Voluntary  Automatic 
Number of members  265 million  805 million  272 million  49 million 
Individual contribution    2‐3% of salary  ¥30‐50  ¥30‐50  0 
Employer/government 
contribution 
6‐8% of salary  ¥200  ¥200  Not Available 
Inpatient 
reimbursement rate 
















Cooperative Medical  Scheme;  URBMI  =  Urban  Residents’  Basic Medical  Insurance;  FMS  =  Free 
Medical Scheme; MSA = UEBMI’s individual medical savings account.   
* An approximate estimate as the coverage of NCMS and URBMI gradually expanded and varied 
spatially;  †  compensations  varied  across  regions.  These  estimates  come  from  some  of  Beijing’s 








In China, PHI, along with other private institutions, was introduced during the 
economic reforms in the 1980s. Since then, the Chinese PHI market has developed 
through three stages, which have been referred to as germination (before 1994), 
transition (1994-2003) and specialisation (after 2003) (Duan, 2008). In the first stage, 
due to low income, lack of knowledge of insurance and the remaining coverage of 
public schemes, PHI prevalence was very low and limited to corporate customers, 
who bought PHI for their employees. In the second stage, demand for PHI increased 
and more commercial insurers entered the market. Many products sold in this period 
provided a one-off indemnity for enrolees after being diagnosed with a critical illness, 
resembling life insurance (Ng et al., 2012). In 2003, so called ‘participating health 
insurance’ 4 was banned by the regulation that aimed at encouraging the PHI market 
to focus on its core function and played a catalytic role in developing a more 
specialised market. In 2004, four new specialist PHI companies established 
businesses in the market (Duan, 2008). 
During the 2000s, PHI premiums income steadily increased, while PHI indemnities as 
a share of total healthcare expenditure increased from 0.3% in 2000 to 1.3% in 2013, 
and the market over this period also became much more diverse. In 2003, there were 
only around three hundred PHI products in the market and no specialised PHI 
companies (Duan, 2008), whereas in 2013, more than one hundred commercial 
insurers and five specialised companies operated PHI business, providing thousands 
of products (EY, 2016b). 
 
                                                








In the context of expanding coverage under SHI, many PHI plans provide 
complementary or supplementary coverage,5 particularly focused on addressing the 
caps and co-payment limitations of the main schemes, as described above (EY, 
2016b). In this sense, the package of benefits provided by most insurers are similar, 
usually including protection for critical diseases, compensation for hospitalisation and 
access to superior amenities. Products are graded and priced according to the array 
of covered diseases, services and caps, in addition to individual health risks (Ng et 
al., 2012). The sales of PHI rely heavily on in-house sales staff in local branches of 
insurance companies, as well as PHI brokers, to facilitate distribution channels. 
Recent years have also seen increasing sales online (EY, 2016b). 






Government subsidies for the URBMI and the NCMS increased from ¥120 in 2010 to 
¥320 in 2014 (Dai et al., 2011, Liang and Langenbrunner, 2013), with the aim of 
increasing the reimbursement rate of the NCMS and the URBMI to 75% (State Council, 
2014a). 
To handle the insufficient protection from catastrophic health expenditure (Meng et 
al., 2012), in August 2012, the central government announced a complementary 
public insurance, Critical Illness Insurance (CII) (National Development and Reform 
Commission, 2012). According to its primary design, CII covers no less than 50% of 
OOP payments exceeding the cap of SHI compensation, generally capped at an 
annual ¥100,000 at least, though it still has restrictions on certain types of diseases, 
drugs and services (National Development and Reform Commission, 2012). 
Interestingly, the plan was to base CII on a public private partnership (PPP), in which 
governments purchase insurance products from commercial insurers through 
contracts. The latter gain profits or lose by operating the fund, strictly subject to 
governments’ regulation (Zhao and Ning, 2011). As this programme is still being 
developed, the related data are too scarce to make effective assessments at the time 
of writing. 
In any case, the gaps in the coverage provided by SHI are likely to remain. In total, 
OOP payments for healthcare accounted for 33.88% of total healthcare expenditure 
in 2013 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2014). According to the WHO (2010a), this 
proportion needs to be reduced to at most 15-20% in order to effectively prevent 
financial catastrophe and impoverishment. In the last ten years, the absolute value of 
OOP payments tripled, approximately equal to the pace of increases in disposable 
income (National Bureau of Statistics, 2014), implying that the financial risk from 
healthcare has never been mitigated despite enhancements to coverage mechanisms. 
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As the guideline to current health policy making in China, the 2009 Opinions on 
Deepening Health Reforms proposes a long-term plan to be completed by 2020 with 
the following essential targets: everyone to receive basic healthcare; multilevel 
demands in healthcare to be generally satisfied; population health status to improve 
further (Yip et al., 2012, Meng et al., 2015). To this end, it frames the principal role of 
SHI as providing “basic coverage”, starting with reducing financial risk from critical 
illnesses, and gradually extending to covering outpatient minor illnesses. However, 
SHI packages only partially cover outpatient services, with high deductibles, and 
insufficiently compensate the costs of inpatient care for critical illnesses - with co-
payments, caps and limited covered services and medicines (Yip et al., 2012, Meng 
et al., 2012, Meng and Xu, 2014). PHI is therefore explicitly framed as providing an 
important complement to SHI, which is expected to remain a partial source of 
coverage. 
To accelerate the development of PHI, the State Council published Opinions on 
Speeding up Development of The Modern Insurance Service Industry and Opinions 
on Promoting Development of Private Health Insurance in late 2014. According to the 
interpretation of then Chairman of the China Insurance Regulatory Commission 
(Xiang, 2014), PHI’s complementary and supplementary role in the national health 
financing system has been confirmed again by the central government, and a series 
of preferential policies for PHI are forthcoming. Based on the domestic policy trend 
and international experiences, he predicted that in 2020 the total PHI indemnity would 
increase to ¥400 billion, while it was only ¥41 billion in 2013 (Xiang, 2014). 
The individual-income-tax (IIT) break policy for purchasing PHI has been piloted in 
some megacities. This policy provides individuals who buy eligible PHI plans with an 
annual IIT deduction of up to ¥2400 (usually through the way that employers 
collectively purchase PHI for employees) (EY, 2016b). Although the effect of this is 
still too new to assess, a study on the willingness to buy PHI among residents of 
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Tianjin city showed that higher tax breaks are positively associated with demand for 




In his seminal paper “Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care”, 
Kenneth Arrow points out market failures in healthcare and raises several “problems 
of insurance” (Arrow, 1963). From then on, a vast theoretical literature on health 
insurance has been produced (Savedoff, 2004). In addition to basic insurance 
theories, this research aims to investigate PHI in the context of the UHC movement, 
progress of which is generally measured in three dimensions: breadth (population 
coverage), depth (services coverage) and height (costs coverage) (WHO, 2008: 23-
28). This section therefore reviews the relevant theoretical research, and make some 
basic predictions about PHI’s operation and impacts in China from the perspectives 
of the three coverage dimensions. 
1.3.1 The difficulties of achieving universal coverage through private insurance markets 
Market failures in insurance markets 
Expanding coverage breadth is key to health insurance schemes that aim to help UHC. 
Arrow (1963) argues that individuals are normally risk-averse, and would like to insure 
against the financial risks posed by illness. However, markets in health insurance 
often fail due to imperfect and asymmetric information between the ‘buyers’ and 
‘sellers’ in the market, undermining the welfare-enhancing potential of such coverage. 
In a market for voluntary health insurance, PHI products are bought by consumers on 
the basis of their willingness and ability to pay the market prices (i.e. their demand) 
(Van de Ven, 2013: 51). In a perfect market (one in which market prices are equal to 
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the social costs of production), the price of PHI is determined by the risk premium plus 
administrative costs plus a margin for insurers’ expected profit. All else being equal, 
low-income people are likely to have lower (or zero) demand for PHI at this market 
price due to their lower (or zero) willingness and ability to pay it. Therefore, even in a 
perfect market, there is likely to be a socio-economic gradient to insurance coverage.  
These problems are aggravated in the presence of market failures. In his paper, Arrow 
initially raised the concept of moral hazard in this context (Arrow, 1963, Einav and 
Finkelstein, 2018). He hints a situation in which patients make use of sub-optimally 
high levels of care, knowing that the direct costs to them of care is limited (or zero); a 
situation in which physicians prescribe more expensive medication and more 
intensive treatments knowing the patients under insurance coverage; and a situation 
in which the insured care less about their health due to their coverage status (knowing 
that if they fall ill, the financial consequences will be moderated by their insurance 
contracts) (Arrow, 1963, Einav and Finkelstein, 2018).These types of market failure 
create upward pressure on risk premiums, thereby reducing demand (Einav and 
Finkelstein, 2018). There is compelling evidence supports the existence of moral 
hazard, and insurers usually respond to this through co-payments or deductibles 
(Einav and Finkelstein, 2018, Sekhri and Savedoff, 2006). 
In addition, because insurers have less accurate information about the health status 
of enrolees than the enrolees themselves, they may set premiums based on average 
risks across the population (the community rating). However, this premium will be 
worth paying only for those with above average health risks. Therefore, to ensure that 
premium income is sufficient to bear the required payments for healthcare, insurers 
must set the higher premium than the community rating. In practice, to manage 
adverse selection, insurers instead seek to improve their information about enrolees’ 
health, and engage in risk selection (or cream skimming), providing insurance at 
different prices to people with different health status (insofar as this can be 
ascertained) and/or refusing to provide insurance to those with the worst health status 
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(i.e. those with the highest need of it) (Sekhri and Savedoff, 2006). Therefore, the 
main problem of adverse selection, from the point of view of UHC, is the nature of 
insurers’ responses to it, which have the effect of limiting coverage even further than 
would be the case in a free market in which information asymmetries were absent. 
System‐level concerns over coverage of PHI 
In theory, the design features of health insurance schemes with objectives set at the 
system level usually involve large-scale, compulsory contributions to increase 
revenues, performance-related payments to healthcare providers to improve 
efficiency, a trend towards larger pooling to enable greater financial security and 
promote equity, and simplification of benefit packages to increase awareness of 
entitlements (Kutzin, 2013). However, voluntary, for-profit health insurance schemes 
that focus their members’ attainment of coverage, typically PHI plans, are intrinsically 
different from those mentioned above in design, and thus may not contribute to UHC 
objectives, or even undermine equity, at the system level (Kutzin, 2013).   
Particularly, in the setting of developing countries, given these differences in design 
noted above (especially the fact that demand for, and supply of insurance, is likely to 
be lower for poorer, sicker people due to voluntary purchase), PHI cannot realise 
comprehensive coverage on its own, and may even compromise the goal of UHC 
even where an SHI fund is in place (Zweifel and Pauly, 2007: 117). Additionally, a 
part of the population may be unaware of health insurance due to limited education 
and insufficient dissemination of insurance information (Van de Ven, 2013: 50). They 
may also not be able to access it because of geographical factors (Gu, 2009b). Even 
where it is available, people may be unwilling to trust local commercial insurers 
because of imperfections in national legislation and a lack of inclusive market 
institutions and the clear property rights (Pauly, 2007). For commercial insurers, they 
may find difficulties in operating because of poor licensing standards and regulations 
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for healthcare providers causing the high risk of overtreatment and fraudulent claims 
(Hsiao et al., 2013: 282). 
Despite these problems, in China, PHI is widely regarded in both academic and policy 
communities as a solution for addressing gaps in SHI coverage (Gu, 2009a, Xiang, 
2014). This notion is also popular with developing countries where public funding is 
limited and the proportion of total health expenditure attributed to OOP payments is 
high (WHO, 2010b) (suggesting that there should be demand for PHI, given 
individuals’ risk-aversion) (Pauly et al., 2009). Considering some consumers are 
willing to make high OOP payments, as the alternative insurance is affordable to them 
in principle (Pauly, 2007: 26).  
Possibly as a result of these problems, PHI in China has experienced very slow 
growth in prevalence, even if the high share of OOP payments in total health 
expenditure implies the coverage of PHI could have been larger. Theoretically, 
provided there is no substantial improvement in regulation, the prevalence of PHI is 
not likely to be sizable enough to complement SHI coverage at the system level.         
1.3.2 Health insurance and access to healthcare 
In terms of coverage depth, health insurance is expected to promote enrolees’ 
access 6  to expensive care that otherwise would be unaffordable or financially 
catastrophic (Van de Ven, 2013: 51-52), and the access promotion associated with 
health insurance is theoretically surer than financial protection. Welfare gain from 
access generated by health insurance has represented the main explanation for the 
demand for health insurance empirically (Nyman, 2006).        
To explore the mechanisms, according to the classic access and utilisation models 
developed by Aday and Andersen (1974) and Andersen and Newman (1973), access 
to healthcare is determined by health policies, characteristics of healthcare delivery 




system, characteristics of the population as risk, utilisation of services, and consumer 
satisfaction. At the individual level, insurance coverage influences access as a 
population characteristic, which financially enable the covered individuals to use 
additional healthcare.7 Enabling utilisation of high-quality healthcare and creating 
stable healthcare demand, health insurance may also benefit healthcare delivery 
systems through injecting new income streams and thereby helping healthcare 
providers to improve their supply chains, which lowers costs and raises quality. As a 
result of improvement of healthcare delivery, individuals’ willingness to pay increases 
(Schellekens et al., 2013: 552).   
However, there is a long argument that the enabling power of health insurance may 
be inefficient because of the moral hazard which generates additional utilisation of 
healthcare due to price reduction but not need (Pauly, 1968, Einav and Finkelstein, 
2018). A debatable point concerns whether, or the extent to which, the additional 
healthcare used is completely attributable to the moral hazard. Notwithstanding the 
debate, healthcare is not like common commodities, so the price reduction is effective 
only for those in need of healthcare. If the additional consumption of healthcare is 
predominately consumed by those who are ill, it is more likely to result from a transfer 
of income from healthy to ill – which increasing social welfare – rather than pure price 
effect (Nyman, 2006).     
In China, the high rates of giving up treatment and premature discharge suggest 
enormous unmet needs (Yip and Mahal, 2008, Meng et al., 2012), while the 
widespread fee-for-service payment method and persistent incentives for over-
prescription among physicians (Blomqvist and Qian, 2008) ensure the existence of 
the supply-side moral hazard. Thus, the promotion of access can result from either 
PHI making needed healthcare affordable, or the moral hazard due to price reduction 




of PHI. It is worth for the policy maker to distinguish satisfied need from inefficient 
consumption associated with PHI, if it would like to promote the PHI market. 
In practice, access is commonly indicated by utilisation, as an external validation of 
the former (Aday and Andersen, 1974). The measurement of utilisation comes in the 
general forms of frequency and intensity (Hou et al., 2014). The frequency indicator, 
such as visiting a doctor, may be affected less by the moral hazard than the intensity 
indicator, such as hospitalisation and the length of stay. This is because the literature 
indicates that the moral hazard mainly happens when consumer demand for 
healthcare responds to the price (Einav and Finkelstein, 2018); the price reduction 
effective only for those who are ill represents an efficient income transfer that satisfies 
need, and the inefficient portion is the costs that ensue (Nyman, 2006). This suggests 
that the moral hazard usually happens after medical procedures start, when the 
patient clearly know the price reduction and their real need. Thus, the moral hazard 
affects utilisation intensity more than frequency.   
In addition to the moral hazard, in empirical research, the selection of enrolees may 
confound the correlation between PHI coverage and access, particularly in China 
where regulations to restrict risk selection are limited. If adverse selection dominates 
the enrolment, PHI enrolees would be at higher risk of illness than the general 
population and thus more likely to use healthcare per se. On the contrary, if risk 
selection dominates, most of high-risk individuals would be rejected or priced out and 
hence PHI may be associated with less utilisation. The selection principles on insurers’ 
side may be difficult to measure and control for. But on enrolees’ side, because PHI 
purchase is based on capacity to pay and attitude towards insurance, factors that may 
affect the decision of purchasing PHI such as wealth, education, age and health 
should be taken into account when investigating PHI’s effect on access. Taken all 
together, should these individual characteristics be well controlled for, in theory, we 
are likely to observe a positive correlation between PHI coverage and utilisation.   
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On top of these, it is worth noting that the access gain of the insured may be achieved 
at the expense of the rest of the population, in effect undermining the equity objective 
of UHC and aggravated as healthcare resource become scarcer. For example, this 
problem happens in countries that rely greatly on PHI, such as South Africa and the 
United States, severer for the former than for the latter (Kutzin, 2013). In terms of 
China, though insofar there is little evidence about this type of inequity, PHI could 
bring about the same problem in theory.   
1.3.3 Health insurance and financial protection 
Relating to coverage height, financial protection is regarded as a crucial function of 
health insurance, because health insurance programmes are basically prepayment 
mechanisms which pool risks so as to reduce reliance on direct OOP payments for 
healthcare (Van Doorslaer et al., 2007).  
The determinants of total health expenditure and OOP payments are different and 
vary across countries (Xu et al., 2011). In theory, coverage of health insurance is likely 
to increase total health expenditure because of utilisation of additional healthcare 
(Pauly, 1968, De Meza, 1983). Compared to SHI, PHI is even more likely to increase 
total health expenditure, not only because PHI is more likely to cover higher-cost 
services, but also because commercial insurers have relatively high administrative 
costs and a lack of bargaining power against service providers due to their relatively 
small scale (Thomson, 2010). This inference has been proved by abundant empirical 
evidence (Colombo and Tapay, 2004, Einav and Finkelstein, 2018).  
By contrast, the impact of health insurance coverage on OOP payments is not so 
clear. Across countries, there is a general trend that OOP payments as a percentage 
of total health expenditure reduce as average income increases, as wealthier 
countries rely more on prepayment (WHO, 2010b). However, this does not mean 
coverage of health insurance absolutely reduces OOP payments, since both total 
health expenditure and OOP payments could increase as the average income 
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increases (Xu et al., 2011). Some empirical studies report no correlation between 
insurance coverage structure and OOP payments at the system level (Xu et al., 2011, 
Colombo, 2007: 218-219).  
For individuals, health insurance usually comes in the form of deductibles and varies 
in benefit packages, which decide the OOP payments that the scheme enrolees must 
pay (WHO, 2010b) and make the relationship between insurance coverage and OOP 
payments complex. Additional to OOP payments, the broader concept of financial 
protection accounts for the living standard as a reflection of the impact of the OOP 
payments (WHO, 2018). Therefore, some academics apply the ratio of the (OOP) 
health expenditure to the household (non-food) consumption (or income) as an 
indicator of the risk of catastrophic health expenditure or inversely the level of financial 
protection of a health system or a health insurance programme (Xu et al., 2003, 
Wagstaff, 2008).8     
It is not uncommon to see failures of financial protection of health insurance schemes. 
For example, more than one studies reported that the NCMS, China’s rural SHI 
scheme, has not reduced the financial risk (Wagstaff et al., 2007, Hou et al., 2014). 
So has PHI. One reason is that many PHI policies only compensate costs of 
hospitalisation, while expenditure on drugs accounts for a big share of total OOP 
payments (Pauly et al., 2009). Additionally, commercial insurers may exclude high-
value treatments from the benefit packages of PHI in order to avoid risks, even 
resulting in an increase of financial risk correlated to PHI coverage, taking Brazil as 
an example (Bos and Waters, 2008). PHI may also facilitate use of very luxury 
services with co-payment, effectively increasing OOP payments, like in Yemen, where 
insurers compete by offering out-of-country treatments (Holst and Gericke, 2012).  





As stated in the earlier section, China’s PHI supplies concentrate on complementary 
and supplementary coverage for SHI and compensation for critical diseases, with 
caps and co-payment policies (EY, 2016b, Ng et al., 2012). However, reportedly less 
than one fourth of the inpatient care costs of PHI enrolees are in effect reimbursed 
(Qiu and Chen, 2012). The insufficient coverage of drugs is indeed a problem in China 
as well (Pauly, 2008). Going back to statistics in Figure 1.2, the increasingly larger 
gap between income and indemnity of PHI implies that a considerable proportion of 
PHI money does not go to fund healthcare but become administrative costs and 
insurers’ profits. Taken together, it is possible to observe that PHI fails to reduce 
financial risk for enrolees.    
   
1.4 The research framework and questions 
Given the theoretical problems of PHI in the three perspectives, it is necessary for the 
policy maker to ask whether shifting a part of the funds that could have been invested 
in the public sector into the private sector will save money and achieve core UHC 
objectives (of enhanced coverage, access to healthcare and improved financial 
protection) more effectively than would be achievable with public delivery alone 
(Musgrove, 2007: 174). Despite debates over the appropriate role of PHI in the UHC 
agenda, one point of consensus is that, to meet these goals, PHI needs to highly 
regulated (Zweifel and Pauly, 2007: 117, Sekhri and Savedoff, 2006). To achieve 
effective regulation of PHI and a sensible balance between SHI and PHI requires a 
systematic examination of PHI’s role in the health system. 
1.4.1 The framework for examining PHI 
This study sets out in the basis of the insurance theories reviewed above, the three-
dimension coverage model that describes UHC objectives (WHO, 2008: 23-28), and 
the principle of equity that the WHO and the World Bank emphasise in monitoring the 
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progress towards UHC (i.e. these coverage benefits should be distributed equally in 
the health system (Boerma et al., 2014)).  
A primary focus, therefore, concerns the prevalence of PHI studies, i.e. the proportion 
of the population with such coverage, since the theory predicts the difficulty in its 
expansion. It may be argued that the higher the level of coverage under PHI, the 
greater its contribution to the UHC ideal. However, the distribution of PHI across 
individuals and geographies with different levels of economic resources is also of 
crucial policy significance. For example, if there is a concentration of PHI coverage 
among the more affluent, this may result in a concentration of health spending – and 
thus healthcare resources (staff, supplies, medicines etc) – among the better off and 
at the expense of the poor. In South Africa, for example, the prevalence of PHI is just 
16%, yet PHI expenditure accounts for 42% of total health expenditure (Kutzin et al., 
2016). The entire population is entitled to use public facilities, but these are over-
crowded and under-resourced in comparison with the providers who serve insured 
patients. Hence, both the prevalence and distribution of PHI are important 
considerations for policy makers. 
Other crucial concerns are the impact of PHI on utilisation of healthcare (which can 
be taken as an indicator of the more abstract concept of ‘access’) (Gulliford et al., 
2002) and financial protection. The significance of the findings on the prevalence and 
distribution of PHI depends, in large part, on what benefits, in terms of access and 
financial protection, enrolment under a PHI plan actually affords to the enrolee. 
However, the theory raises questions about realisation of these benefits, especially 
financial protection. In addition, if enrolment is concentrated among the wealthy then, 
from an equity point of view, it is clearly more problematic if, as in South Africa, this 
leads to greater inequity in the allocation of resources (Kutzin et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, because of the concentration of China’s wealth in the large urban 
centres and the east of the country, it is also important to consider how the distribution 
and the effects of PHI, in terms of resource allocation, vary across regions (Liu, 2005, 
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Yip et al., 2012). It is therefore important to consider the impacts of PHI at the 
aggregate level. 
1.4.2 Gaps in the literature and the research questions 
This thesis is founded on a review, underpinned by a systematic search strategy, of 
the literature on PHI in China. This review is presented in the second chapter of this 
thesis and focuses, in line with the above, on the prevalence and distribution of PHI, 
and its impacts on utilisation of healthcare and financial protection. It is shown in this 
review that the evidence base is weak, especially in relation to the issue of inequity 
(in coverage, access, financial protection) that is so core to the UHC agenda. The 
evidence is especially limited in terms of aggregate-level analysis, despite the fact 
that spatial disparities in economic resources are acknowledged to be one of most 
serious social problems in the country (Liu, 2005, Liu et al., 2003, Shi et al., 2010). In 
addition, only a few studies examine the development of the PHI market in the context 
of SHI expansion, and thus the interactions between public and private sources of 
insurance coverage are understudied. To address these key gaps, the current study 
systematically investigates the distribution of PHI across individuals and regions with 
different levels of economic resources, and the impacts of this on the distribution of 
healthcare resources in the country – i.e. measured by the impact of PHI on the 
utilisation of and financial protection from the costs of, healthcare. Therefore, the over-
arching research question is: 
What role has private health insurance played in meeting universal health 
coverage goals in China during the period of the scale up of social health 
insurance? 
This study sets out to answer this question by looking at the prevalence and 
distribution of PHI (Chapter 5), and the effects of enrolment on access to healthcare 
(Chapter 6) and financial protection (Chapter 7). Inequities are a key focus of the 
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study and, as the literature review suggests (Section 2.4.2), a multilevel examination 
and disaggregation of the research population is required to explore inequity properly. 
Consequently, the following subsidiary research questions are addressed in the thesis: 
Prevalence and distribution 
1. How has the prevalence of PHI changed over time? 
2. What are the individual and regional determinants of the prevalence of PHI 
and how have they impacted on the distribution of PHI? 
3. How have the effects of these determinants varied across different regions in 
China? 
4. What are the relationships between enrolment under an SHI scheme and PHI 
enrolment, and how have these relationships changed with the growth of SHI? 
Access to healthcare  
5. How has PHI impacted on access to healthcare among its enrolees? 
6. How has PHI ‘complemented’ SHI in terms of providing additional access to 
healthcare for covered individuals? 
7. How do the effects of PHI on healthcare access vary across regions? 
8. What is the impact of PHI on average access to healthcare in each local 
context? 
Financial protection 
9. How has PHI affected the level of direct out of pocket payments incurred by 
healthcare users among its enrolees? 
10. How has PHI ‘complemented’ SHI in terms of providing additional financial 
protection for covered individuals? 
11. How do the effects of PHI on financial protection vary across regions? 
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This thesis consists of eight chapters. Chapter Two presents the findings of a literature 
review, underpinned by a systematic search methodology, on PHI’s prevalence, 
effects on access to healthcare and financial protection, echoing the WHO’s coverage 
model (Section 1.3.2). This literature review shows that, since the early 2000s, 
premium income for PHI providers and the overall prevalence of PHI have gradually 
increased over time. The evidence about the impact of SHI on PHI prevalence and 
the impacts of PHI on access and financial protection is limited, and the results are 
mostly mixed. The evidence on inequalities in PHI coverage or the effects of those 
inequalities on access and financial protection are particularly limited. At the end of 
the literature review, the research gaps are identified, and the research questions are 
stated again.  
Chapter Three outlines the conceptual framework for the study. In this chapter, the 
key concepts of the study are specified and their translation into operational variables 
is explained. This consists of 1) the conceptualisation of outcome measures and 
determinants (or controls), 2) a description of the selected dataset, the China Health 
and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), and 3) details of how variables have been 
operationalised. 
Chapter Four outlines the analytic strategies of the thesis, based on the statistical 
package Stata. Initially, this provides a brief description of the approach to data 
manipulation, in which the raw data and the original variables from the CHNS were 
operated by merging, recoding and transforming to generate the key variables. 
Following data manipulation, there is a section on missing data – a serious problem 
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for the CHNS as well as many other datasets. The method of handling missing data 
is explained, and the parameters of its application are presented. Finally, the statistical 
methods are stated. 
The remaining parts of the thesis consists in three results chapters and one discussion 
chapter. 
Chapter Five investigates PHI prevalence and how this has been shaped by the 
expansion of the SHI programmes. There are two key findings. First, the study finds 
that, after a reduction between 2000 and 2004, the prevalence of PHI gradually 
increased. As the breadth and depth of SHI coverage expanded, individuals with 
coverage under SHI became less likely to have PHI than those without SHI. Second, 
the study finds that coverage under PHI is unequally distributed, with enrolment higher 
among individuals of higher socioeconomic status and, at the aggregate level, in the 
more affluent east and urban areas than in poorer inland and rural areas. 
Chapter Six investigates PHI’s effect on healthcare utilisation (as an indicator of 
access). It finds that, compared to those without PHI, those with PHI and in need of 
healthcare have a higher utilisation of healthcare. However, further analysis finds that 
this effect of PHI is only present where individuals were also covered under SHI. This 
effect tends to be weaker in the poorer inland and rural areas than the richer east and 
urban areas. Furthermore, for a whole community, in the more developed east of 
China, higher PHI prevalence was associated with higher average utilisation of 
healthcare as the level of need increased, but in the less developed inland regions, 
the higher PHI prevalence was associated with increasingly lower average utilisation 
as the level of need increased. 
Chapter Seven investigates the effect of PHI on OOP payments for healthcare. It 
shows that enrolment in a PHI scheme is associated with neither reduced nor 
increased OOP payments. By contrast, enrolment into some SHI schemes, such as 
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the government’s FMS and the rural NCMS, reduced OOP payments for healthcare 
to some extent. There is no evidence that PHI and SHI impacted each other’s 
performance on financial protection. For a whole community, a greater PHI 
prevalence was positively associated with a higher average chance of zero OOP 
spending on healthcare in the most affluent urban east, while there was no such 
correlation in other areas. 
Chapter Eight, the final chapter, summarises the main findings. It concludes that PHI 
has an unequal distribution, which is also reflected in inequality in utilisation and 
financial protection. This study therefore provides new insights into the inequalities 
that arise from PHI, including by extending the scope of analysis from the individual 
to the aggregate level. Practically, these issues call for new regulatory actions from 
government to protect health equity. The findings also indicate that PHI’s 




























This chapter presents a review of the empirical literature on private health insurance 
(PHI) in China, with a focus on studies of its prevalence, distribution, and effects on 
utilisation and financial protection during the period of the scale up of social health 
insurance (SHI). The review is based on a systematic search of all empirical studies 
published on these topics between 2000 and 2017. Section 1 (below) describes the 
methods adopted of the review. Section 2 presents the results of the review9, and 




PHI refers to “insurance operated by commercial insurance agencies to pay indemnity 
for loss caused by health reasons and medical care” (State Council, 2014b). In this 
review, ‘prevalence’ refers to the proportion of people in a population covered by PHI. 
Most previous studies of prevalence have framed this as an indicator of “demand” – 
i.e. the willingness and ability to pay for PHI. Many studies have examined the 
determinants of demand – including SHI insurance status and socioeconomic 
characteristics – which speak to our interest in the interaction between PHI and SHI 
and distribution of prevalence, respectively. Other studies have used insurers’ income 
from PHI plans as the main indicator of demand, which is clearly different to 
prevalence. As a multifaceted concept, ‘access to healthcare’ is difficult to measure, 
                                                
9  The literature review does not present the results about the traditional  individual socioeconomic 
determinants of PHI such as wealth and education, because evidence for the correlation between PHI 




and therefore ‘utilisation of healthcare’ is the main indicator used. At the individual 
level, utilisation mostly refers to an individual’s use of particular kinds of healthcare, 
though in some studies it is measured by length of hospitalisation. At the aggregate 
level, utilisation is measured by the total number of visits to healthcare settings among 
a certain population, and/or, again, the average length of hospitalisation. The concept 
of ‘financial protection’ is measured in a wide range of different ways. The incidence 
of catastrophic health expenditure (which examines the impact of household health 
expenditures on their ability to pay for other basic needs, such as food, housing or 
education) is commonly studied (Xu et al., 2007). The scale of out-of-pocket (OOP) 
payments is also a frequently used indicator of financial protection (Van Doorslaer et 
al., 2007). Some studies investigated the impact of PHI on total healthcare 
expenditure before compensation from health insurance, for which better data is 
sometimes available, and which should, in principle, be interpreted separately from 
data for OOP payments.        
2.1.2 Search strategy 
The PRISMA guidelines for systematic reviews (Moher et al., 2009) were adopted in 
designing the search for peer-reviewed literature in both English and Chinese, using 
the digital library of the University of Edinburgh. Three databases were selected: Web 
of Science (all databases), PubMed, and the China Knowledge Resource Integrated 
Database (CNKI), which is the largest, and most frequently updated database of 
Chinese-language academic publications. The commonly-used medical literature 
database, Medline, has been included in both Web of Science and PubMed. The 
search in CNKI was limited to the core journal database, which is a group of peer-
reviewed Chinese journals that have been certified as being of high academic quality 
by one of most authoritative standards developed by the Peking University Library 
(Peking University Library, 2015, CNKI).  
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The phenomenon referred to as ‘private health insurance’ in this thesis has three 
synonyms in English: private medical insurance, commercial health insurance, and 
commercial medical insurance. Accordingly, in searching the Web of Science and 
PubMed, all four were used. In Chinese, the terms shangye Jiankang baoxian and 
shangye yiliao baoxian are used to refer to PHI, and both were included in searches 
of the CNKI database. For the two English-language databases, the keyword “China” 
was combined with each of the four search terms; while for CNKI this was 
unnecessary.  
For prevalence, the search terms were “prevalence”, “demand” and “coverage” in 
English, and “xuqiu” (demand) or “fugai” (coverage) in Chinese.10 For access, the 
search terms were “access” or “utilisation/utilization” in English, and “keji” (access), 
“fuwu shiyong/liyong)” (service utilisation), “fuwu xuqiu” (service demand), “jiuyi” 
(using medical care) or “zhiliao” (treatment) were used on the CNKI.11 For financial 
protection, the search terms “expenditure”, “expense”, “spending”, “payment” or “cost” 
were used on the English language databases, while “zhichu” (expenditure), “huafei” 
(a less formal synonym of expenditure), “feiyong” (cost), and “jingjifudan” (financial 
burden) were used on the CNKI.12  
Because there were too many search terms to be applied together in a single inquiry, 
this task was divided into three parts according to the key research foci identified 
                                                
10  The translation of “prevalence” into Chinese is rarely used on PHI in the literature. Nearly all papers 
used “xuqiu” (demand).       
11  “Utilisation” is translated as “shiyong/liyong” in Chinese. However, they are used too broadly and 




One study used “fuwu xuqiu”  (demand)  to  refer  to  the use of healthcare. More commonly, “jiuyi” 
(using  medical  care)  and  “zhiliao”  (treatment)  are  formal  words  in  health‐related  literature. 
Consequently, I used all of them in the search.             
12  The choice of Chinese search terms referred to my first‐year board review as well.       
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above, i.e. 1) the prevalence of PHI in China, 2) the effect of PHI on access to 
healthcare in China, and 3) the financial protection afforded by PHI in China. The 
search strings used in Web of Science are presented here as an example of the 
searches used across the listed databases: 
Search One: TS = ((health OR medical) AND (private OR commercial) AND 
(insurance china) AND (prevalence OR demand OR coverage)); 
Search Two: TS = ((health OR medical) AND (private OR commercial) AND 
(insurance china) AND (utilization OR utilisation OR access)); 
Search Three: TS = ((health OR medical) AND (private OR commercial) AND 
(insurance china) AND (expenditure OR expense OR spending OR payment OR 
cost)). 
In addition, the citations of the included papers were scanned. If an article with a 
relevant title was cited but not identified in this search, it was added to the final review 
list after checking its eligibility using the criteria below. 
2.1.3 Inclusion criteria 
The titles and abstracts of all of the studies identified by these search strings were 
scanned. The first criterion for inclusion of a study was that it reported empirical data 
in relation to at least one of the key research foci, as outlined above (i.e. the 
prevalence, or related effects of PHI in China). In addition, only outputs that provided 
full information about the methods employed by the study were included. Studies 
based on tertiary data (i.e. those derived from other studies’ outcomes of analysing 
primary or secondary data) were not included, in order to avoid evidence from the 
same study being cited repeatedly. Due to the focus on empirical data, editorials, 
commentaries, meeting abstracts, book chapters and discursive articles were not 
included. After removing duplicates, a group of 46 studies were included in the review. 









Of the 46 reviewed studies, 24 examined the prevalence of PHI, 14 examined the 
effect of PHI on health access, and 15 examined the financial impacts of PHI. 
Obviously, some studies were cross-identified by these searches. 18 were published 
in English journals, and 28 were published in Chinese journals.   
35 were focused on the individual level, and most used secondary data extracted from 
large nationwide-sampled surveys. Among them, nine used the China Health and 
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Nutrition Survey (CHNS), an ongoing longitudinal household survey that commenced 
in 1989; five used the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS), a 
longitudinal study focusing on people aged 45 or over, ongoing since 2008 (the 
nationwide survey started in 2011); four used the Nation Health Service Survey 
(NHSS) data, an official nationwide survey implemented every five years since 1993 
(but only in relation to one province); two selected the State Council URBMI 
Household Survey 13 , ranging from 2007 to 2010; one selected the Chinese 
Longitudinal Healthy Longevity Survey (CLHLS), another longitudinal household 
survey focusing on people aged 65 or over, ongoing since 1998. The other individual-
level studies used data from ad hoc, one-off surveys, most of which gave primary data.  
Eleven studies were based on data at the aggregate level. The most popular data 
source, used by ten reviewed studies, was the state administrative statistics provided 
by the official statistics department focusing on provincial-level data. Another used 
aggregate data from the NHSS, which provides the county-level data summarised 
from the individual data.   
In terms of the time and scope of data, except for one study looking at the 2003 NHSS 
county data, all other aggregate-level studies examined longitudinal data. By contrast, 
13 individual-level studies examined longitudinal data, and the other 22 examined 
single cross-sectional data. Except for the four which only investigated one province 
of the NHSS data, the open survey databases, including CHNS, CHARLS, NHSS, the 
URBMI survey and CLHLS as well as the provincial-level administrative statistics, 
conducted sampling in multiple provinces of China. For these one-off surveys, the 
scope of data collection varied depending on the objectives of the studies. In principle, 
those results that rely on nationwide data have higher reliability and generalisability 
than those rely on small-scale surveys, and those that rely on longitudinal data have 





more power than cross-sectional studies, because they can better control 
endogeneity caused by time-invariants and unobserved individual differences.   
Methodologically, a majority of extracted results are from 37 studies that employed 
regression models as their principal methods of data analysis, adjusting individual 
or/and aggregate background factors to various extents. Generally, these regression 
models include basic logistic/probit or linear models for cross-sectional data, and fixed 
effects, random effects or dynamic models for longitudinal data. Some studies 
introduced instrumental variables to treat endogeneity. Some studies added 
difference in difference estimators to extract policy effects by comparing treatment 
and control groups. A few studies used the Heckman models or Two-part models to 
handle sample selection. In principle, those that used these techniques should be 
better at controlling endogeneity problems than others that did not use any. 
The other few results that are not derived from regression models are mainly based 
on calculation of some previously established indexes, such as the Kakwani index, to 
measure financial inequity. A small number of results are given by comparing 
population groups with the simple Chi-square tests, which may be biased because of 
unmatched or uncontrolled individual characteristics correlated to the outcome 
measures. 
In sum, as analysed above, these studies seem to differ in the reliability of data and 
the validity of methods. Additionally, the measurements that they used, even for the 
same theme, are so varied. This suggests that it is difficult to extract the results and 
aggregate them like meta-analysis, which is also not the purpose of this literature 
review, which aims to identify research gaps for the overall study. Thus, instead, I 
present them in a narrative way and add my evaluation of their quality based on data 
and methodologies that they used, referencing relevant previous literature (Acharya 
et al., 2013). Because few of these studies examined experimental data, and most of 
them relied on regression models, this literature review primarily uses associational 
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language to describe the results. Causal inferences based on them needs to be 
cautious. Generally, those that are methodologically superior and hence can control 
for other variables better should be better at implying causality. For the full 
bibliographic information, see Appendix A.        
2.2.2 Prevalence 
Overall trend 
The estimated prevalence as the sample mean of people covered by PHI varies 
among studies using different datasets, and few studies explored this over long time 
scales such as a decade. In general, those that used data sampling multiple provinces 
including both urban and rural areas in China reported the mean ranges from about 
4% to 12%, and there is a trend that the PHI prevalence was moderately increasing 
since 2004 (Hou and Zhang, 2017, Jin et al., 2016, Yuan et al., 2014, Liu and Wang, 
2012). Additionally, many studies refer to the total PHI premium income, a 
measurement in state administrative statistics, which was gradually increasing 
through the 2000s in absolute terms (China Insurance Regulatory Commission, 2014) 
(also see Figure 1.2).  
It is worth noting that rather than describing these statistics above, these related 
studies paid most attention to the determinants of PHI prevalence and their model 
adjusted effects, which are elaborated as follows.           
Distribution 
There is weak evidence that the prevalence of PHI is greater in affluent eastern 
provinces than in poorer inland provinces (see Table 2.1). The only explicit evidence 
is from the study that examined the 2006 CHNS data and showed that rural residents 
in eastern provinces were more associated with having PHI than their inland 
counterparts (Qu and Wang, 2010). But it could have given a more reliable result by 
analysing more waves of CHNS data. Other evidence is indirect. A study based on 
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2007-2013 administrative statistics showed that the income from PHI premiums per 
capita was greater in eastern provinces than in central or west inland provinces (Wang 
et al., 2015). In addition to the two above, a different analysis based on the 2004-2013 
administrative data showed that the development of the PHI market, indicated by an 
index derived from PHI income per GDP, PHI income per capita, and market 
concentration, was more positively correlated with healthcare resources, indicated by 
an index derived from densities of healthcare facilities, personnel and beds, in eastern 
provinces than inland provinces. The authors explained that this means that as 
healthcare resources became richer during this period, the PHI market developed 
faster in the east than the inland of China (Suo et al., 2015). 
There is weak evidence for a greater prevalence of PHI in urban areas than rural 
areas, too (see Table 2.1). One study demonstrated that urban registrants were more 
associated with PHI coverage than rural registrants based on the 2011 CHALRS data 
(Yue and Zou, 2014). Analysing the 2011 and 2013 data from the same dataset, 
another likewise reported that rural registered were less associated with coverage of 
PHI or both SHI and PHI than their urban counterparts (Jin et al., 2016). Another study, 
however, based on the 2012 data of a telephone survey in the three eastern cities of 
Beijing, Shanghai, and Xiamen (Fang et al., 2012), reported no significant difference. 
As well as these, one study that separately investigated the effects of urban SHI 
schemes and the rural NCMS, based on the 2000, 2004 and 2006 data from the 
CHNS (Liu and Wang, 2012) showed that in urban areas students were more 
associated with having PHI than non-students, while in rural areas this effect 
disappeared, possibly because commercial insurers offered urban schools group 
insurance but did not offer it in rural areas.  
However, it is noted that three of the four studies mentioned in the above paragraph 
used official registrations rather than actual residences to indicate urban/rural 
differences, therefore weakening the evidence. This is because the registrations are 
highly correlated with but are not necessarily equal to actual residences due to 
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migration without change in hukou registration (the official residency registration 
system in China). Hukou status is often associated with entitlements to local benefits, 
and hence changing hukou registration is often be difficult (for detail see Section 
3.2.2).      
The evidence for a greater prevalence of PHI among immigrants than locals in urban 
areas seems stronger than the two above, triangulated by three studies looking at 
longitudinal nationwide data and cross-sectional data from a southern city and a 
northern city, respectively (see Table 2.1). One study based on the 2011 and 2013 
data of the CHARLS, showed that immigrants were either more associated with being 
insured by PHI, or completely uninsured, than locals (Jin et al., 2016). Based on data 
from the 2010 questionnaire survey in Shenzhen, an affluent coastal city, another 
study also found that immigrants without local official residency registration (hukou) 
were more associated with being insured by PHI and less associated with being 
insured by SHI than local registrants (Lam and Johnston, 2012). Under the incentive 
of income tax breaks, immigrants were less willing to buy PHI than local residents, as 
was shown by a study based on the 2010 data from Tianjin, a northern coastal 
provincial municipality (Zhu and Yu, 2015). This is possibly because immigrants tend 
to work in informal sectors with lower income and thus would be less likely than locals 
to meet conditions for tax breaks. 
Finally, a few studies found a greater prevalence of PHI among those working in the 
private, informal sector than public, formal sector employees (see Table 2.1). A study 
on the willingness to buy PHI based on household survey data from four provinces, 
showed that employees in the private sector or the self-employed were more willing 
to buy complementary PHI, relative to employees in government or state-run 
institutions (Ying et al., 2007). Another study, using the 2012-2013 data from a survey 
in five cities of five provinces, found that those working in the informal sector was 
associated with being covered by PHI relative to those working in the formal sector 
(Dong and Zhao, 2013). One study mentioned above also found that government 
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officials were less willing to buy PHI than others (Zhu and Yu, 2015). However, the 
evidence is compromised, because the indicators in two of the three studies are 
willingness to buy instead of real enrolment.      
It is worth considering the unequal prevalence of PHI in the context of inequalities in 
SHI coverage. SHI schemes in affluent eastern provinces are generally more 
generous in benefit coverage and compensation than those in the less-affluent inland 
areas (Meng et al., 2012, Suo et al., 2015, Liang and Langenbrunner, 2013). Rural 
residents are more likely than their urban counterparts to face financial and other 
barriers to access when they need healthcare, the provision of which is 
disproportionately concentrated in cities (Liang and Langenbrunner, 2013). Rural-to-
urban migrants may find that their SHI coverage does not provide access to an 
adequate package of benefits in the cities (Cheng et al., 2014, Zhao et al., 2011, Qin 
et al., 2014, Zhao et al., 2014). Coverage under the government FMS is more 
generous than the UEBMI for employees in formal sectors, which are in turn more 
generous than other SHI schemes (Liang and Langenbrunner, 2013, Yip and Hsiao, 
2009a). In theory, for groups disadvantaged by limited SHI coverage, greater 
prevalence of PHI among them than among the advantaged groups would help to 
reduce the inequalities related to SHI coverage, otherwise increase the inequalities.   




































Some studies focused on the correlation of PHI premium income with SHI coverage 
(with different indicators) (see Table 2.2). Although these studies examined a range 
of different regions, time periods and SHI schemes, and vary in quality in terms of 
methods that they used, all of them led to the conclusion that PHI premium income 
had a positive correlation with SHI expansion, which was indicated by such diverse 
indicators as covered population, funding, and compensation (Li, 2009, Wang, 2009, 
Wang, 2011, Zhu and Gui, 2014, Wang et al., 2015, Zheng and Hua, 2013, Lv, 2013). 
Overall, this seems to be very strong evidence.  
Specifically, five studies applied regression models to control for background factors 
such as average age, gender, affluence and education. One examined the correlation 
between the percentage of enrolment in all SHI schemes and PHI income using the 
2007-2013 data from 31 provinces (all provincial regions in China except Hong Kong, 
Macao and Taiwan) (Wang et al., 2015), while another one carried out a similar 
analysis but using the 2002-2007 data from three provincial regions (Beijing, 
Shanghai, and Hubei) (Li, 2009). Three studies focused on urban SHI schemes. One 
examined the impact on PHI income from the fund income of two urban SHI schemes, 
i.e. the UEBMI and the URBMI14, using the 2000-2007 data from 31 provinces (Wang, 





2009). One used the same indicator but only examined the UEBMI with the 2002-
2009 data from 30 provinces (Wang, 2011). Another focused on both the UEBMI and 
the URBMI, but used the average compensation from SHI as the indicator of SHI 
coverage, based on the 2003-2012 provincial data from 30 provinces (Zhu and Gui, 
2014).  
Among the five regression studies above, three used fixed effects models (with or 
without an instrumental variable) or dynamic models to deal with panel data (Wang et 
al., 2015, Wang, 2011, Zhu and Gui, 2014). The remaining two are less valid 
methodologically, because they only used linear models on pooled data (Li, 2009, 
Wang, 2009), failing to take advantage of the longitudinal data structure, and are thus 
more vulnerable to endogeneity problems. However, because of the consistency of 
findings across methodologies, the variation in quality does not compromise the 
strength of the evidence.   
The two studies that did not use regression models also reached the same conclusion. 
The first used a measurement model in a composite system to calculate the degree 
of coordination between total SHI fund income and PHI income, and found that it was 
fair or excellent in most of 31 provinces from 2005 to 2010 (Zheng and Hua, 2013). 
The second introduced the ‘coupling theory’ to investigate collaborative development 
levels between PHI and the rural SHI scheme, NCMS15, based on 2005-2011 national 
statistics (Lv, 2013). There was a coupling relationship with moderate strength 
between the PHI market (indicated by income, expenditure, claim ratio, etc.) and the 
NCMS development (indicated by income, expenditure, ratio of income and 
expenditure, etc.), suggesting that NCMS and PHI coverage were mutually reinforcing.  
 















Positive  All  2007‐2013  31 provinces 
(Li, 2009)  Income  Population of 
enrolees 
Positive  All  2002‐2007  3 provinces 
(Wang, 2009)  Income  Fund income  Positive  UEBMI & 
URBMI 
2000‐2007  31 provinces 















Positive  NCMS  2005‐2011  Nationwide ‡ 
*  index  generated  by  income,  expenditure,  claim  ratio,  etc;  †  index  generated  by  income, 
expenditure,  ratio  of  income  and  expenditure,  etc.;  ‡  the  national  statistics were  used without 
reporting the number of provinces.   
UEBMI  =  Urban  Employees’  Basic Medical  Insurance;  URBMI  =  Urban  Residents’  Basic Medical 
Insurance; NCMS = New Cooperative Medical Scheme. 
All  presented  positive  or  negative  correlations  passed  the  significance  test,  otherwise  neutral 
correlation was reported.     
 
PHI’s total premium income is determined by enrolment and the price; and studies of 
premium income do not disaggregate these two determinants (Li, 2009, Wang et al., 
2015). The positive association between SHI coverage and PHI premium income is 
possibly because SHI increases healthcare prices and thus PHI premium prices, 
rather than PHI prevalence. Some studies examined individual-level enrolment into 
PHI to focus on prevalence directly. Unlike the studies of premium income data, these 
studies paint a mixed picture in terms of the relationship between SHI coverage and 
the enrolment into PHI. In general, the number of reviewed studies that support the 
positive impact of SHI coverage on PHI enrolment (Liu and Wang, 2012, Qu and 
Wang, 2010, Zhu and Yu, 2015, Zhu and Wang, 2016) slightly exceeds those that 
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show the opposite effect (Yuan et al., 2014, Liu et al., 2014, Jin et al., 2016), in 
addition to one study that reported a neutral (insignificant) impact (Hou and Zhang, 
2017), but the overall effect is ambiguous (see Table 2.3).  
For more details, among these studies above, those based on data collected between 
2000 and 2010 tended to report a positive relationship between PHI and SHI, 
regardless of the particular scheme (see Table 2.3). They included one previously 
mentioned study based on the 2000, 2004, and 2006 data from the CHNS (Liu and 
Wang, 2012); one that analysed the NCMS using the 2006 CHNS data (Qu and Wang, 
2010); and one that also focused on the NCMS by comparing the 2006 and 2009 
CHNS data (Xu et al., 2013). In addition, the study that used the willingness to buy 
PHI rather than the real enrolment16 based on the 2010 data from Tianjin also found 
a positive correlation (Zhu and Yu, 2015). Another study using the same dataset led 
to the same conclusion (Zhu and Wang, 2016). In sum, they all used methodologically 
justifiable regression techniques (see Appendix A), but the latter two are less reliable 
in drawing a relationship between PHI enrolment and SHI coverage because they 
used willingness to buy rather than real enrolment as the indicator.  
The negative impact was reported mainly by studies examining later data, or those 
taking into account very early data (see Table 2.3). For example, the study based on 
the 2011 and 2013 data of the CHARLS, reported that enrolment into SHI, including 
the NCMS, the URBMI and the UEBMI, was negatively associated with enrolment into 
PHI based on the whole population. However, after disaggregation the negative 
correlation was only significant in urban areas (Jin et al., 2016). Additionally, a 
retrospective study, which employed the Chi-square test based on the 2010-2013 
data of 681 myocardial infarction patients in Shanghai, a provincial municipality, found 
that the non-SHI group had a significantly higher percentage of PHI coverage than 





SHI groups (Liu et al., 2014). However, this finding is less convincing because this 
study did not try to match individual characteristics among the compared groups. On 
top of these two, another study looking at a long span of CHNS data, from 1989 to 
2009, reported that public insurance programmes had a negative association with PHI 
enrolment (Yuan et al., 2014). The study comparing the 2004 and 2006 CHNS data, 
demonstrated that enrolment into NCMS had a negative association with PHI 
enrolment (Xu et al., 2013).  
Other studies suggested that the association varied among different groups (Table 
2.3). One found that the NCMS membership was positively associated with adult PHI 
enrolment but negatively associated with children’s, especially in lower income groups, 
based on the 2000, 2004, and 2006 CHNS data (Liu et al., 2011b). Using the 2006 
data from Shanghai, one study found that in the low-income group and middle-high-
income group, SHI (as a whole) enrolment was negatively associated with PHI 




Ref. ID  Population  Correlation  SHI schemes  Period  Area 
(Liu and Wang, 2012)  Urban  Positive  Urban schemes  2000‐2006  9 provinces 
(Liu et al., 2011b)  Adult  Positive  NCMS  2000‐2006  9 provinces 
Child  Negative 
(Xu et al., 2013)  Rural  Negative  NCMS  2004‐2006  9 provinces 
Positive  2006‐2009 








(Yuan et al., 2014)  Mixed  Negative  All  1989‐2009  9 provinces 
(Zhu and Yu, 2015)  Mixed  Positive  All  2010  Tianjin 
(Zhu and Wang, 2016)  Mixed  Positive  All  2010  Tianjin 
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(Jin et al., 2016)  Mixed  Negative  All  2011‐2013  28 provinces 
Urban  Negative 
Rural  Neutral 
(Liu et al., 2014)  Mixed  Negative  All  2010‐2013  Shanghai 
(Hou and Zhang, 2017)  Urban  Neutral  URBMI  2004‐2011  9 provinces 
UEBMI  =  Urban  Employees’  Basic Medical  Insurance;  URBMI  =  Urban  Residents’  Basic Medical 
Insurance; NCMS = New Cooperative Medical Scheme. All usually include government officials’ FMS. 





In the literature, access to healthcare is mainly indicated by utilisation. Generic 
utilisation is a common indicator; that is, using healthcare during a certain period, 
regardless of the kind of healthcare utilised. The reviewed studies that used this 
indicator report mixed results (Table 2.4). Specifically, a study based on the 2004 
CHNS data, which particularly focused on those who had reported being ill in the last 
four week period (You and Kobayashi, 2011), and a study based on the 2000, 2004, 
2006, and 2009 CHNS data (Jiao, 2015), both reported that PHI had an insignificant 
association with utilisation. Contrarily, a study using the 2008 two-province CHARLS 
data, reported that having PHI is more associated with utilisation compared to not 
having PHI (Chai, 2013). The same author, based on the same data, reported that 
having PHI is more associated with utilisation compared to the NCMS (Chai, 2014). 
However, a study looking at the data collected in 2010 in Shenzhen, found 
insignificant effects (Lam and Johnston, 2012).     
Critically, it is worth noting that some of the above studies may be methodologically 
questionable. To estimate the effect of having PHI for the general population, only 
modelling the reporters of illness may be problematic in generalisation of the finding, 
considering classic sample selection bias (Heckman, 1979). Furthermore, referring to 
NCMS members rather than those without PHI may be also problematic, since this 
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has in effect ruled out the possibility that individuals are covered by both PHI and 
NCMS.  
Impact on utilisation of inpatient care 
Two studies that specially investigated the effect of PHI on the utilisation of inpatient 
care demonstrated a positive correlation (see Table 2.4). Among them, one study 
based on the 2007 and 2008 data of State Council URBMI Household Survey (Zang 
et al., 2012) and one based on the 2014 data of a household survey in three cities in 
Sichuan province, a populous southwest province (Li et al., 2016), reported that 
enrolment of PHI had a positive relationship with the probability of using inpatient care 
in the last year. Another study, based on the CHNS data from 2000, 2004, 2006 and 
2009, reported that the enrolment of PHI was associated with increasing lengths of 
hospitalisation between 2000 and 2004, but such an association was not significant 
between 2006 and 2009 (Jiao, 2015). Only one study that focused on rural-to-urban 
migrants using 2007-2010 URBMI survey data reported PHI as having no effect on 
inpatient utilisation (Qin et al., 2014).   
However, from the aggregate perspective, no significant relationship was reported. A 
study that analysed administrative statistics found an insignificant relationship 
between the regional depth of PHI coverage – the total premium income of PHI 
insurers over GDP in the province – and the average length of hospitalisation (Wang, 
2012). Another aggregate-level study using county-level data also found an 
insignificant relationship between the percentage of PHI enrolees in a rural county 
and the number of inpatient visits per 1000 in the last 52 weeks (about a year) (Chau, 
2010).  
Overall, all these studies used methodologically justifiable regression models (see 
Appendix A). Interestingly, those based on data of wider scope tend to report an 
insignificant or mixed result (Qin et al., 2014, Wang, 2012, Chau, 2010, Jiao, 2015). 
It is also noted that the indicators of inpatient utilisation are not identical. In addition 
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to the different levels of measurements, the length of hospitalisation represents the 
intensity of utilisation more than the frequency of utilisation, as other measures in 
effect imply. This may be another reason for the mixed outcomes.           
Impact on utilisation of outpatient care 
There is modest evidence that at the individual level there was no significant positive 
relationship between PHI enrolment and using outpatient care in a certain period 
(usually four weeks prior to the survey) (Table 2.4). The evidence is supported by the 
study using the 2004, 2006 and 2009 CHNS data (Yang, 2013), the study using the 
2007-2010 data of the State Council URBMI Household Survey (focusing on rural-to-
urban migrants) (Qin et al., 2014), the study using the 2007 and 2008 data of the State 
Council URBMI Household Survey (Zang et al., 2012), the study focusing on school 
pupils in a district of Beijing (Zhu et al., 2008), and the study focusing on the utilisation 
of community health services in Dongguan, a southern city (Yao et al., 2012). The 
simple possible explanation of these consistent outcomes is that most PHI plans do 
not reimburse payments for outpatient care to any great extent (Ng et al., 2012). 
However, the quality of the findings from the latter two is relatively low, because they 
are only derived from the Chi-square tests without controlling individual characteristics. 
In contrast, only one individual-level study, using the 2011 and 2013 CHARLS data, 
reported a positive relationship between PHI enrolment and use of outpatient care 
(Wang et al., 2016). However, in this study, the PHI was restricted to working as 
substitutive health insurance, in other words an alternative to a SHI scheme. The 
authors also examined the effect of complementary health insurance on outpatient 
utilisation, but found no significant correlation.  
The only reviewed aggregate-level study that analysed the 2003 NHSS county-level 
data reported that the percentage of PHI enrolees in a rural county had a positive 
relationship with the number of outpatient visits per 1000 population during a two week 
period (Chau, 2010). Its difference from the individual-level outcomes may result from 
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the different measures of utilisation. Like premium income, visit frequency can be 
influenced by extreme values. In this sense, it not only reflects the probability of each 
utilisation but also their intensity. In addition, counties may have considerable 
endogenous factors that influence both outpatient visits and PHI enrolments. 
Longitudinal modelling can solve this problem, but it was not applied in this aggregate 
study.  
Impact on utilisation of preventative care 
In China few PHI policies cover preventative care (EY, 2016b), which usually refers 
to health services for the generally healthy who are aiming to prevent illness, mainly 
through vaccinations and physical examination. Unexpectedly, all three related 
studies reported that PHI enrolment had a significantly positive relationship with the 
probability of using preventative services (see Table 2.4). These studies are: the one 
with the 2004, 2006 and 2009 CHNS data (Yang, 2013), one with the 2007-2010 data 
of the State Council URBMI Household Survey focusing on rural-to-urban migrants 
(Qin et al., 2014), and one examining the CHNS data from 2000, 2004, 2006 and 
2009 (Jiao, 2015). One possible explanation for this positive relationship is that 
enrolment into PHI sometimes requires a physical examination, since insurers try to 
prevent themselves from adverse selection. Another factor is the association between 
buying PHI and concern with self-health, increasing the use of preventative services.   
The dual insurance effects 
Three reviewed studies investigated the effect of dual insurance (i.e. of both SHI and 
PHI), reporting mixed outcomes (see Table 2.4). Two were focused in the individual 
level. One looking at data from Shenzhen (Lam and Johnston, 2012), and another 
using the 2008 two-province CHARLS data, both reported that dual insurance of SHI 
and PHI did not have an additional effect on the generic utilisation of healthcare (Chai, 
2013). Unlike the individual-level evidence, the study of the 2006-2010 administrative 
statistics showed a positive interactive effect on the average length of hospitalisation 
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between the depth of PHI (premium income over GDP) and the coverage of urban 
SHI (the percentage of regional SHI enrolees), suggesting an additional effect of dual 
insurance on inpatient utilisation (Wang, 2012). However, it is noted again that PHI 
premium income does not directly represent its coverage prevalence.  
Unequal impacts on access 
Three studies examined unequal access to healthcare across the population 
associated with PHI, but they focused on different aspects, not mutually supported 
(see Table 2.4). The study on the 2008 two-province CHARLS data also modelled 
urban data and rural data separately, in addition to models of the whole population 
(Chai, 2013). For the urban population, the positive associations of SHI and PHI with 
generic utilisation were significant and mutually-reinforcing, while for the rural 
population, all effects were insignificant. This suggests that SHI and PHI as well as 
dual insurance, performed better at promoting utilisation in urban areas than in rural 
areas. Another study found higher income earners were more associated with having 
PHI and using preventative health services than lower income earners (Yang, 2013). 
Nonetheless, as previously stated, the increased use of preventative care may not 
relate to PHI directly. The third study using the 2010 Shenzhen data compared the 
associations of SHI, PHI and dual insurance with the generic utilisation of healthcare 
between migrants and local registrants (through the hukou system). However, it did 














Ref. ID  Area  Period  About  Level  Results 
(You and 
Kobayashi, 2011) 
9 provinces  2004  Generic utilisation  Individual    No correlation 
(Chai, 2014)  2 provinces  2008  Generic utilisation  Individual  Positive (referring to the NCMS) 
(Chai, 2013)  2 provinces  2008  Generic utilisation  Individual  Positive for the whole and urban areas; no correlation in rural 




Shenzhen city  2010  Generic utilisation  Individual  No  correlation;  no  difference  existed  between migrants  and 
local registrants 
(Li et al., 2016)  3  cities  in  Sichuan 
province 









9  cities  in  different 
provinces 
2007, 2008  Inpatient  and  outpatient 
utilisation 
Individual  Only positive with inpatient utilisation 
(Wang, 2012)  31 provinces  2006‐2010  Inpatient utilisation  Provincial  No  correlation;  SHI  and  PHI  had  an  additional  effect  on 
utilisation 
(Chau, 2010)  31 provinces  2003  Inpatient  and  outpatient 
utilisation 
County  Only positive with outpatient utilisation 
(Qin et al., 2014)  9  cities  in  different 
provinces (migrants only) 












(Zhu et al., 2008)  Pinggu  county  of  Beijing 
(school pupils only) 
2005  Outpatient utilisation  Individual    No correlation 



















The effect of PHI on the incidence of catastrophic health expenditure is unclear 
because the relevant studies give mixed results (see Table 2.5). The study based on 
the 2008 and 2013 Shaanxi NHSS data found that in both 2008 and 2013 an absence 
of PHI was correlated with the higher incidence of catastrophic health expenditure. 
The same relationship was found between the absence of SHI and catastrophic health 
expenditure as well (Xu et al., 2015). However, another study of data sampled from 
eight provinces in 2014 reported that there was no significant difference in the 
incidence of catastrophic health expenditure between PHI status (Wang and Wang, 
2017). In addition to the mixed results, the first study only examined data from one 
province, and second one simply used Chi-square tests that did not control individual 
characteristics, compromising reliability and validity of the findings.    
Impact on OOP payments for healthcare 
Four studies looking at the relationship between PHI and OOP payments for 
healthcare found little evidence that PHI reduced OOP payments (see Table 2.5). 
Among them, one based on the 2004 CHNS data reported that PHI had no significant 
association with OOP payments (You and Kobayashi, 2011). Another study using the 
2011-2012 CLHLS data found the same (Zeng et al., 2017). A study using the 2000, 
2004, 2006 and 2009 CHNS data even found that PHI was associated with increased 
OOP payments as a share of total expenditure on treatment in 2000-2004, but had 
no effect in 2006-2009 (Jiao, 2015). Likewise, the study analysing survey data 
sampled from three eastern cities (Beijing, Shanghai and Xiamen) in 2011 reported 
that PHI was correlated with the higher probabilities of OOP payments of over ¥1000 
and over ¥5000, respectively (¥1≈ £0.11 or $0.14) (Fang et al., 2012). It is interesting 
that the second study found that using PHI as the main health financing method was 
associated with reduced OOP payments (Zeng et al., 2017), implying that it was 
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complementary PHI (as the secondary financing method) that failed to reduce OOP 
payments.  
However, some of these studies seem problematic in modelling (OOP) health 
expenditure (and these on total health expenditure in the following section likewise), 
such as using linear regression (Jiao, 2015, Zeng et al., 2017), which is not suitable 
for heavily-skewed data with most of observations being zero due to inclination of 
violation of error normality (Wooldridge, 2015: 47, Wooldridge, 2002: 560-566), or 
only including the selected population (those who were self-reported ill or injured) 
(You and Kobayashi, 2011), so as to compromise generalisability of the findings. The 
one that transformed the OOP payments into binary variables (Fang et al., 2012) 
avoid such problems, but at the expenses of losing information.     
Impact on total healthcare expenditure   
All four related studies reported that PHI was associated with increased total individual 
expenditure on healthcare – gross payments before insurance reimbursement (see 
Table 2.5). These studies are: one analysing patients’ data from an affiliated hospital 
of Peking University collected in 2003 (Wang et al., 2010); the aforementioned one 
examining three-city data (Fang et al., 2012); the one using the 2008 two-province 
CHARLS data (Chai, 2013), and the one using the 1989-2009 CHNS data (Yuan et 
al., 2014). This is not surprising, because PHI members tended to use healthcare 
more intensively, and hence incur higher total individual health expenditure, as the 
theory indicates in Section 1.3 (Pauly, 1968, De Meza, 1983).  
It is worth noting that rising total healthcare expenditure does not necessarily increase 
financial risk, since it can be reimbursed by health insurance. Rather, it could indirectly 
indicate the enhanced individual utilisation of healthcare (Chai, 2013, Wang et al., 
2010). However, at the aggregate level, increased total expenditure on healthcare has 
other implications. On the one hand, it signifies an increasing average cost of 
healthcare, warning the commercial insurers of moral hazard (Yuan et al., 2014). On 
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the other hand, this suggests that PHI may intensify the financial burden of the health 
system, thus concerning the government (Fang et al., 2012). 
At the aggregate level, one, which analysed the 2003 NHSS county data, reported 
that the percentage of PHI coverage in the county had no significant correlation with 
the per-capita annual medical expenditure of this region (Chau, 2010) (see Table 2.5). 
The other, which investigated administrative statistics from 2006 to 2012, found that 
per-capita PHI premium spending had a significant relationship with lower per-capita 
medical expenditure at the provincial level (Cui et al., 2016). The former study’s 
indicator of PHI is more relevant to the sense of insurance coverage than the latter’s, 
as previously discussed (Wang, 2011, Li, 2009).  
Inequity in financing of PHI 
Most reviewed studies on the vertical equity of PHI financing used the Kakwani index 
to evaluate its financing distribution across income quintiles (see Table 2.5). 
Specifically, a study based on the rural NHSS data of Xinjiang, a northwest border 
province, reported that PHI financing was progressive (i.e. those with higher incomes 
contributed disproportionately more) in 2003 and 2008 (Li et al., 2012c). Another study 
researching the 2010 survey data in an independent administrative region in Xinjiang 
reported that PHI had little impact on financial redistribution (Liu et al., 2013). Two 
studies examined data from Gansu, a northwest province, and Heilongjiang, a 
northeast province, respectively. In Gansu, PHI was slightly progressive in both urban 
and rural areas in 2002 and 2007 (Chen et al., 2012); in Heilongjiang, PHI in urban 
areas was regressive (the poorer contributed more) in 2002 but became progressive 
in 2007, while PHI in rural areas was progressive in 2002 but became regressive in 
2007 (Chen et al., 2014).  
All of the above outcomes are insignificant, however. Additionally, unlike SHI or 
general taxes, PHI only covers a small number of people, so the outcomes of studies 
based on the Kakwani index are not informative about its impact on equity from the 
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perspective of the whole healthcare financing system. Except for these above, the 
study on the 2000-2009 CHNS data found that between 2000 and 2004 PHI 
significantly increased the share of OOP health payment for treatment in the high-
income group but not in the low-income group. However, the study did not report that 
whether it was just because the former used more services and medicines than the 





Ref. ID  Area  Period  About  Level  Results 
(Xu et al., 2015)  31 provinces  2008, 2013  Catastrophic health expenditure  Individual  Negative 
(Wang and Wang, 
2017) 
8 provinces  2014  Catastrophic health expenditure  Individual  No correlation 
(You and Kobayashi, 
2011) 
9 provinces  2004  OOP payments  Individual  No correlation 




















Total health expenditure    Individual  Positive (comparing to regular insurance, an outdated 
insurance with limited coverage of medicine and services) 




Total health expenditure  Individual  Positive   









2003, 2008  Financial inequity  Individual  Progressive* 
(Liu et al., 2013)  The Corps in 
Xinjiang province 
2010  Financial inequity  Individual  Little redistributive effect 
(Chen et al., 2012)  Gansu province  2002, 2007  Financial inequity  Individual  Progressive for both urban and rural areas*   
(Chen et al., 2014)  Heilongjiang 
province 












In China, descriptive statistics show that the overall prevalence of PHI moderately 
increased over time since the early 2000s. However, weak evidence hints that the 
distribution of PHI may be unequal. Spatially, those living in the more affluent east 
provinces and urban areas appear to be more associated with PHI coverage than 
those living in laggard inland provinces and rural areas. Additionally, urban 
immigrants appear to be more associated with PHI coverage than urban locals, and 
those working in the private sector or individual business appear to be associated with  
PHI coverage than employees of public, formal sectors, possibly because the former 
have poorer access to SHI coverage than the latter (Liang and Langenbrunner, 2013, 
Yip and Hsiao, 2009a) and thus more need PHI to complement. Most related studies 
focused on the impact of SHI. There is strong evidence that as SHI expands, PHI 
premium income also increases, controlling for economic growth and population 
characteristics. In contrast, the relationship between individual SHI enrolment and PHI 
enrolment is ambiguous. Weak evidence suggests that this relationship may vary 
among different populations, especially changing over time, with a negative 
relationship found in more studies focusing on a more recent period.  
In terms of access to healthcare, the evidence about the relationship between PHI 
enrolment and the generic utilisation of healthcare is mixed. For the utilisation of 
specific types of care, there is weak evidence for a positive correlation between PHI 
enrolment and the utilisation of inpatient care, and modest evidence for a neutral 
correlation between PHI enrolment and the utilisation of outpatient care. The 
compensation policies of the majority of PHI products which focus on critical illnesses 
and inpatient care may explain this difference (EY, 2016b). Additionally, the reviewed 
studies show a positive correlation between PHI enrolment and the utilisation of 
preventative services, though little information shows that mainstream PHI products 
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include such benefits. This may correlate with some PHI providers’ preference for 
those who take advantage of preventative services, or higher levels of motivation 
among PHI buyers to look after their health. Few studies paid attention to unequal 
impact of PHI on access. Among them one suggests that PHI as well as the dual 
insurance of PHI and SHI appear more likely to increase utilisation in urban areas 
than in rural areas.  
Financially, the OOP payment for healthcare, which deducts insurance compensation 
from the gross payment, is a popular indicator of individual financial risk, but there is 
little evidence to show that PHI impacts OOP payments for healthcare. There is also 
insufficient evidence to support a relationship between PHI and the incidence of 
catastrophic health expenditure, another indicator of financial risk taking both OOP 
payments and the living standard into account. Instead, PHI enrolment is convincingly 
associated with an increased individual total expenditure on healthcare, the gross 
payments for the utilisation of healthcare before insurance compensation. However, 
this correlates more with the financial burden of the system and the moral hazard that 
concerns governments and insurers, than direct financial risk to the healthcare users, 
because the expenditure may be substantially reimbursed by insurance. Additionally, 
no conclusion on PHI’s impact on inequity in terms of the healthcare financing overall 
can be drawn from this review, because the reviewed studies on this issue are limited 
in their scope, and their outcomes are mostly insignificant.  
2.3.2 Conclusion 
The literature review concludes that as PHI prevalence and total premium income are 
gradually increasing since the early 2000s, there is weak evidence that the distribution 
of PHI is unequal in favour of eastern and urban residents, urban immigrants and 
private, informal sector employees, compared to their counterparts. As the key 
element of health reforms, SHI has an unclear impact on PHI take-up, possibly 
changing over time, due to conflicting evidence, although overwhelming evidence 
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shows that the scaling-up of SHI has boosted total PHI premium income. The 
evidence about the effect PHI on the generic utilisation of healthcare is mixed, while 
fairly consistent evidence supports that PHI enrolment increases the utilisation of 
inpatient care but has little impact on the utilisation of outpatient care. There is little 
evidence for the correlation of PHI with reduction in OOP payments for healthcare or 
the falling risk of catastrophic health expenditure, while sufficient evidence shows that 
PHI enrolment increases gross expenditure on healthcare. Finally, inequalities in the 
effects of PHI and interaction of dual-insurance on access and financial protection are 
under-researched.         
2.3.3 Research gaps in the literature 
The unequal distribution of PHI is a potential source of health inequity, because PHI 
is likely to influence health resource allocation in favour of its enrolees rather than 
those in need (Kutzin et al., 2016). It has been well-documented that PHI has a 
socioeconomically unequal distribution under laissez-faire regulations, due to its 
voluntary enrolment dependent on economic demand, risk-related pricing and 
information asymmetry (Sekhri and Savedoff, 2006, Pauly et al., 2012). In addition to 
having a relatively deregulated PHI market, China is a country with notable regional 
disparities in economy and development (Liu, 2005, Liu et al., 2003, Shi et al., 2010), 
which may intensify the unequal distribution of PHI, because in theory PHI sellers may 
be concentrated in affluent areas and absent from remote, economically backward 
areas, where more socioeconomically disadvantaged people reside (Zweifel et al., 
2007: 94). The literature only gives a hint with weak evidence that people living in 
more affluent east, urban areas may be more likely to be enrolled into PHI than those 
living in inland, rural areas, controlling for their individual characteristics. A multilevel 
analysis taking both individual-level variables and aggregate-level variables to explore 
the distribution of PHI would help to address this gap in empirical evidence.   
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Furthermore, whether PHI prevalence is enhanced or undermined by SHI expansion 
has been extensively debated internationally. According to a popular theory, the PHI 
market is decided by coverage of SHI due to the duplication of benefits, and thus SHI 
expansion crowds out PHI (Barros and Siciliani, 2012: 955-956). This may explain the 
higher prevalence of PHI among urban immigrants and private, informal sector 
employees than urban locals and public, formal sector employees, because the 
former are relatively poorly covered by SHI (Liang and Langenbrunner, 2013, Yip and 
Hsiao, 2009a). However, as SHI in China focuses on expanding coverage breadth 
(Yip et al., 2012), the government encourages PHI to complement SHI in depth and 
height, and hopefully thereby PHI enrolment and SHI enrolment can mutually 
reinforcing (Xiang, 2014). The evidence from this review is too mixed, but implies an 
over-time change in the relationship between SHI and PHI, plausibly echoing waves 
of health reform policies that steadily promoted the coverage of SHI in population and 
benefits (Yip et al., 2012, Meng et al., 2015). Accordingly, a study looking at data 
across a relatively long period would help to clarify the potential changes SHI could 
make on PHI.  
In terms of the impacts of PHI on healthcare access and financial protection, there is 
moderate evidence that PHI facilitates the utilisation of inpatient care and thereby 
results in an increase of gross payments for healthcare, but after compensation this 
does not change financial risk caused by using healthcare. Apart from the 
effectiveness, equality is an important measure in appraisal of PHI’s contribution to 
the progress towards UHC (Kutzin, 2013). Hopefully, the effects of PHI on utilisation 
and financial protection should be equal across different populations, whereas this is 
questionable in China, a large, spatially unequal country in economy and 
development. The literature review finds little evidence about inequities in health 
access or financial protection related to unequal impacts of PHI, because although a 
few studies tried to explore these questions, their data and results are insufficient, 
fragmented and inconsistent. For future research, as the WHO and the World Bank 
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recommend, appropriate disaggregation of the population would be helpful to address 
the research gap (Boerma et al., 2014).  
Another question is whether PHI has benefited its enrolees at the expense of others 
(Colombo, 2007: 230-231, Kutzin, 2013). To this end, the focus of examining a health 
insurance programme’s effect should be shifted from enrolees of the programme to 
the system in which the programme operates. In other words, it would be required to 
examine the contextual effect of the programme. Additionally, since the government 
advocates the complementary role of PHI in the SHI-dominated system (Xiang, 2014, 
Liu et al., 2011b), whether dual-insurance of SHI and PHI mutually reinforce or 
weaken in terms of facilitating healthcare access and financial protection concerns 
policy makers. However, the literature review finds very little evidence about the two 
questions.     
On top of these, many previous studies on financial protection of PHI may be 
methodologically questionable. In a general population, a large part of health 
expenditure, regardless of whether it is OOP or gross, is commonly unobserved 
simply because there is no need and hence no utilisation. Under these conditions, 
linear models are vulnerable to violating the assumption of error normality 
(Wooldridge, 2015: 47, Wooldridge, 2002: 560-566), and hurdle models or count 
models that are immune from normality assumptions are superior (O'Donnell et al., 
2008: 131-145, Min and Agresti, 2002). In this review, only two studies adopted hurdle 
models such as the Two-Part model and the Heckman selection model (You and 
Kobayashi, 2011, Chai, 2013), and one study transformed expenditure data into 
binary variables to circumvent this issue(Fang et al., 2012). Thus, the literature is in 
need of more related studies modelling health expenditure with more appropriate 
techniques.    
Finally, no study systematically analysed all coverage dimensions of PHI and tried to 
associate them to the frame of UHC principles. These reviewed studies relied on more 
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than ten data sources altogether, collected in various places, and in different time 
periods, and many of them only looked at a very limited period and examined one or 
two aspects about PHI, presenting a challenge to cross-reference.  
In sum, the literature cannot produce a comprehensive understanding of PHI’s role in 
China’s UHC progress in terms of the three important dimensions, i.e. prevalence and 
distribution, access to healthcare, and financial protection, especially in respect of the 
inequities related to unequal distribution and unequal effects of PHI, and the 
relationship between PHI and SHI. It would be valuable to conduct a relevant 
investigation on the basis of consistent data with nationwide stratified sampling that 
cover a long enough period to reflect policy impacts, with methodologically proper 
analyses proceeding at both the individual and aggregate levels and disaggregation 














This chapter outlines the conceptual framework through which the study proceeds. 
The first three sections present the conceptualisation of the three outcome variables, 
and independent variables, drawing on the literature review. The following section 
relates to the rationale of the choice of dataset and basic information about the data 
source, the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS). The last section presents the 
operationalisation of these concepts, related to the CHNS data, to generate variables 
for analyses. The following diagram shows the processes used to make the decisions 







The theoretical literature suggests that coverage and benefits of voluntary private 
health insurance (PHI) may be limited in really existing markets. First, the demand for 
PHI is likely to have a socioeconomic gradient in even perfect markets; and in real 
markets, market failures linked to information asymmetries are likely to increase 
prices, further reducing demand for PHI, and supply of PHI may also be limited for 
some consumers (e.g. the chronically sick) (Arrow, 1963, Pauly, 1968, Cutler and 
Reber, 1998, Sekhri and Savedoff, 2006). Second, coverage of health insurance may 
increase additional utilisation beyond an optimal level, e.g. increasing expenditure on 
non-needed products and services (Pauly, 1968, De Meza, 1983), due to the problem 
of demand-side or supply-side moral hazard (Pauly, 1968). Third, the relationship of 
health insurance coverage and out-of-pocket (OOP) health expenditure is a complex 
one, e.g. if higher coverage drives increases in the demand for, and therefore the 
price of, healthcare (Pauly et al., 2009).  
Relating to the research gaps identified by the literature review and the structured 
subsidiary research questions (Section 1.4.2),  outcome measures that need to be 
conceptualised consist of 1) the proportion of the population that is covered under 
PHI, 2) the access that PHI has facilitated, and 3) the extent of financial protection 
that has been afforded by PHI. 
3.1.1 The concept of prevalence 
The concept of prevalence refers to the population that the scheme covers. In the 
preceding literature review, prevalence was commonly applied to indicate the demand 
for PHI by previous studies (Liu and Wang, 2012, Liu et al., 2011b, Xu et al., 2013, 
Qu and Wang, 2010, Xu, 2007, Yuan et al., 2014, Jin et al., 2016, Liu et al., 2014, 
Hou and Zhang, 2017), because of the relationship between demand and prevalence. 
Theoretically, demand refers to the combination of the willingness to purchase and 
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the ability to pay (Morris et al., 2012: 8), resulting in actual enrolment. Unlike previous 
studies, this study directly uses prevalence rather than demand in its terminology, as 
the focus of interest is PHI’s contribution to universal health coverage (UHC) 
objectives (prevalence of insurance coverage is one of them), rather than its market 
performance. This may be a more comprehensive perspective to study PHI.  
Under this concept, whether the individual has been enrolled in PHI is a 
straightforward measure of prevalence at the individual level, which was widely 
adopted by the reviewed studies (Liu and Wang, 2012, Liu et al., 2011b, Xu et al., 
2013, Qu and Wang, 2010, Xu, 2007, Yuan et al., 2014, Jin et al., 2016, Liu et al., 
2014, Hou and Zhang, 2017). The aggregation of individual enrolment in a population 
forms the corresponding aggregative measure of prevalence, the percentage of 
enrolees in the population. However, in practice, due to the lack of such data in 
Chinese state statistics, on which these macro studies would rely, insurers’ total 
income from PHI is often used instead (Liu and Wang, 2012, Liu et al., 2011b, Xu et 
al., 2013, Qu and Wang, 2010, Xu, 2007, Yuan et al., 2014, Jin et al., 2016, Liu et al., 
2014, Hou and Zhang, 2017). The drawback to this is that income can be determined 
by not only the number of enrolees, but also the price of PHI and the average amount 
of products the enrolees buy, and therefore it does not exactly represent prevalence. 
Focusing on PHI, this study needs to measure its prevalence at both the individual 
and aggregate levels. At the individual level, this concerns whether the individual has 
been enrolled in PHI (the most popular choice in the literature). At the aggregate level, 
the percentage of PHI enrolees (derived from the averages of individual data) would 
be selected. Especially, the two levels of measurements are compatible with the 
multilevel structure.  
3.1.2 The concept of access to healthcare 
According to the WHO, access refers to the opportunity or ability to obtain needed 
healthcare with financial protection (Evans et al., 2013). However, when measuring it, 
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the concept of access is so complex that it has been conceptualised in several ways 
in the literature. 
In the aforementioned literature, Aday and Andersen (1974) divided measures of 
access into process indicators, including characteristics of the health system and 
population, and outcome indicators, including utilisation and satisfaction. Later, 
Gulliford et al. (2002)  continued to develop a four-dimension system of measuring 
access, in which service availability and utilisation of services were explicitly inherited 
from Aday and Andersen’s model, while they added relevance and effectiveness, and 
equity as another two dimensions. Recently, Levesque et al. (2013) increased the 
number of measurable dimensions of access to five, including approachability, 
acceptability, availability and accommodation, affordability and appropriateness. 
Meanwhile, some WHO authors proposed three-dimensional access, including 
physical accessibility, financial affordability and acceptability (Evans et al., 2013). 
Despite the conceptual complexity, the core relationship between the access and 
utilisation of healthcare has been long highlighted (Donabedian, 1972, Aday and 
Andersen, 1974). Penchansky and Thomas (1981) argued that the utilisation of 
healthcare – which means people in need of healthcare must overcome the personal, 
financial and organisational barriers to it – is the proof of access. In effect, utilisation, 
compared with the multi-dimensional measures, has been a practically popular 
indicator of access in the literature (Gulliford et al., 2002). For instance, though they 
suggest the five-dimension system, Levesque et al. (2013: 5), in reviewing past 
literature, admitted that “for some, under the broad domain, the study of access 
relates to similar aspects as the study of utilisation”, and variations in utilisation are 
good markers of inequalities in access.  
Additionally, the review of the relevant theories (Section 1.3) shows that it is utilisation 
rather than other dimensions of access that is theoretically strongly influenced by 
coverage of health insurance (Pauly, 1968, Einav and Finkelstein, 2018, Nyman, 
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2006). In reality, the related empirical studies in the literature review of this thesis all 
adopt utilisation as the indicator of access. As a consequence of theoretical feasibility 
and practical convenience, this study also uses utilisation to indicate access, reducing 
the multi-dimensional concept of access to a single aspect. 
Nonetheless, there is more than one way to measure utilisation. According to the 
literature review, the concept of utilisation refers to the use of healthcare in a certain 
period in most studies (You and Kobayashi, 2011, Jiao, 2015, Chai, 2014, Chai, 2013, 
Lam and Johnston, 2012, Li et al., 2016, Yang, 2013, Qin et al., 2014, Wang et al., 
2016, Yao et al., 2012, Zhu et al., 2008, Zang et al., 2012), and the length of 
hospitalisation in one study (Jiao, 2015). In addition, healthcare consists of several 
fundamental categories, such as outpatient care, inpatient care, preventative services 
and self-care. Due to the irrelevance of the last two to the functions of PHI, this study 
only places focus on the former two. In some studies, the use of either outpatient care 
or inpatient care is treated the same as the generic utilisation of healthcare. In other 
studies, they are examined separately. 
In terms of this study, primarily, whether the individual has used healthcare in a certain 
period, the most popular measure in the related studies has been selected as the 
measure of the utilisation of healthcare, and hence access to healthcare. As 
previously mentioned, this indicates utilisation frequency, which is theoretically 
affected by the moral hazard less than intensity indicators such as the length of 
hospitalisation or total health expenditure (Nyman, 2006). The choices of healthcare 
types and the recall period will be discussed in more detail in the later section 
pertaining to operationalisation. 
3.1.3 The concept of financial protection 
Financial protection is “achieved when direct payments made to obtain health 
services do not expose people to financial hardship and do not threaten living 
standards” (WHO, 2018). Although it is sometimes regarded as a component of the 
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concept of access (Evans et al., 2013), in practice it is measured independently from 
the access indicators (Boerma et al., 2014). 
At the core of financial hardship is out-of-pocket (OOP) health expenditure, which 
happens at the point of health service delivery, strongly correlated with the incidence 
of financial risk caused by the use of healthcare (Van Doorslaer et al., 2007). The 
level of OOP payments for healthcare is also a direct reflection of the shortage of 
prepayment methods, an effective means to prevent health-related financial 
catastrophe (Xu et al., 2003). Accordingly, the amount of OOP payments for 
healthcare in a certain period is commonly applied to indicate financial risk caused by 
the utilisation of healthcare, and in turn reduction in OOP payments indicates the 
degree of financial protection of a health programme. In the literature review, this 
measurement was used by many included studies to measure PHI’s financial 
protection (You and Kobayashi, 2011, Zeng et al., 2017, Jiao, 2015, Fang et al., 2012). 
Nonetheless, OOP health expenditure does not sufficiently reflect the impact on a 
household’s living level, because this measure does not involve the economic 
condition of the household. Consequently, another measure is created – the incidence 
of catastrophic health expenditure, relating (OOP) health expenditure to the 
household’s (non-food) consumption with a threshold 17 , indicating whether the 
household’s living standard has been reduced by using healthcare (Wagstaff, 2008). 
Two previously reviewed studies in this thesis selected catastrophic health 
expenditure (Xu et al., 2015, Wang and Wang, 2017), defining this as annual OOP 
healthcare payments exceeding 40% of capacity to pay – i.e. total household 
expenditure minus subsistence needs (represented by food consumption) (Xu et al., 
2007). However, more generally, the working definition of catastrophic health 
expenditure varies. In addition to capacity to pay, some studies simply use total 
                                                
17  The measures of health expenditure and household consumption, and the choice of the threshold 
vary among studies.       
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expenditure (You and Kobayashi, 2011, Zeng et al., 2017, Jiao, 2015, Fang et al., 
2012), while many others use total income to indicate living standards (Holst and 
Gericke, 2012, Zoidze et al., 2013, Bauhoff et al., 2011, Hajizadeh and Nghiem, 2011). 
In fact, availability of data largely determines the choice: income data tend to be more 
available than expenditure data, while both are more measurable than capacity to pay 
(Limwattananon et al., 2007). Moreover, the cut-off ratio of healthcare expenditure to 
the living standard measure also ranges from 5% to 40%, largely depending on 
countries (Krutilova and Yaya, 2012, Bos and Waters, 2008, Barros et al., 2011, 
Alvarez-Hernandez et al., 2012, Mills et al., 2012). 
The two types of measurements both would work for the purpose of this study. By 
comparison, the incidence of catastrophic health expenditure provides information 
about the impact on living standards that the payments make. However, OOP 
payments capture an essential element of the financial evaluation: the extent to which 
insurance reduces direct payments for healthcare, and as a continuous measure, 
OOP payments provide more variation to be examined than a dummy measure. 
Practically, data constraints play a part in this choice, so more details will be presented 
in the section on operationalisation, associated with the available data (Section 3.5.3). 
 
3.2 Individual factors 
The determinants of outcome measures generally pertain to either the individual level 
or the aggregate level. This section sets out the conceptualisation of the individual-
level determinants alone. The most important one is social health insurance (SHI), 
the public counterpart of PHI, as the literature review repeatedly highlights SHI’s 
substantial impact on PHI, especially in prevalence (Section 2.3.2). Other individual 
determinants include demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, and need 




China’s current national health insurance system is mainly based on the SHI modality 
(Yip et al., 2012). As one of the two general approaches towards UHC, along with the 
general-taxation-funded National Health Service (NHS) model, SHI is characterised 
by funds contributed through compulsory or semi-compulsory membership for all, with 
the premium paid or shared by enrolees themselves, their employers and/or the 
government (Carrin and James, 2005). 
SHI in China was introduced in detail previously (Section 1.1.3 and 1.2.1). In brief, 
institutions include the Urban Employees’ Basic Medical Insurance (UEBMI) (since 
1998), the New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS) for rural residents (since 2003), 
and the Urban Residents’ Basic Medical Insurance (URBMI) for the urban 
unemployed (since 2007). In addition, the Free Medical Scheme (FMS) (since 1952) 
continues to cover some government employees and retirees. 
It is worth noting that the introduction of SHI is a gradual process, occurring at different 
speeds across the country. Old public health schemes such as the urban Labour 
Insurance Scheme (LIS), the rural Cooperative Medical Scheme (CMS) and some 
fragmented urban welfare schemes once co-existed with, but eventually were 
replaced by, the new schemes. There are some corresponding relationships between 
the old schemes and the new ones. The NCMS is a new version of the old CMS. The 
UEBMI replaced the LIS, extending the target population from state-owned enterprise 
(SOE) workers to theoretically all kinds of working people (Liang and Langenbrunner, 
2013). Additionally, the URBMI can be regarded as the integration of the earlier urban 
welfare schemes. In this study, these related schemes are counted together to avoid 
using an SHI variable that includes too many fragmented items to be effectively 
analysed. 
Moreover, in this study’s terminology, for simplicity, all such public insurance schemes 
are called SHI schemes. Strictly speaking, the FMS, solely funded by government, 
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does not belong to the SHI modality (Carrin and James, 2005). However, public health 
insurance versus PHI will be investigated by this study, rather than comparisons 
between insurance with different contribution mechanisms. Given that both the FMS 
and other SHI schemes are essentially public insurance, it is not necessary for this 
study to classify them so elaborately in wording as to increase the burden of 
interpretation.   
Enrolment into an SHI scheme is the natural choice for measurement, which was used 
in all previously reviewed individual-level studies. In the analytical model, the measure 
is an on/off dummy, assuming that the effect of membership of an SHI scheme is the 
same for all.18 However, the literature review has suggested that variations in SHI’s 
effects are very likely in China. In fact, the local SHI policies do vary across regions, 
despite the uniform guidelines and baselines set by the central government (Meng et 
al., 2015). Regarding the potential variations, the reviewed studies made insufficient 
effort to address this aspect, reasonably so, as it is extremely difficult for a study in 
China, especially one assessing nationwide data, to include such detailed information 
as the measurement of SHI benefits region by region. While also being constrained 
by data, this study nevertheless attempts to reflect the regional disparities to some 
degree by stratifying population by regions, which are explicitly different in 
geographical and economic terms. This will be elaborated upon later. 
3.2.2 Other individual determinants 
There are, in theory, very similar individual-level determinants of PHI prevalence, 
healthcare utilisation and OOP health payments, because the demand for PHI is 
largely based on the aversion to the potential risk of  financial loss (i.e. OOP 
payments for healthcare) due to using healthcare (Pauly, 2007: 31) and the expected 
welfare gain from additional access generated by health insurance (Nyman, 2006). In 





this sense, healthcare utilisation is the cause of the other two, and central to the 
identification of the determinants of this trio. 
As previously mentioned, Aday and Andersen (1974) developed the classic 
framework for the study of access, in which at the individual level they refer to the 
individual utilisation determinant model developed by Andersen and Newman (1973), 
(2005), based on the situations in the United States. Some studies of healthcare 
utilisation in China referred to this model (Chai, 2014, Liu et al., 2003). Under their 
framework, the individual determinants of utilising healthcare are categorised to three 
groups. The first group is called predisposing factors, including demographic 
characteristics such as age, gender and past illness, social structure such as 
education, race, occupation, household size and religion, and beliefs such as attitudes 
towards health services and knowledge about health and illness. The second group 
is enabling factors, including household conditions such as income and health 
insurance, and community conditions such as health resources in the neighbourhood, 
the price of health services, and regions. The third group is illness level (or needs-
based) factors, including perceived and evaluated health status (Andersen and 
Newman, 2005). 
Furthermore, the framework requires slight adaption to fit China’s situation. According 
to the literature review of empirical studies, the popular determinants in models 
usually include the predisposing factors, such as age, gender, education, occupation 
and household size; the enabling factors, such as household income, health 
insurance coverage and local health facilities availability; and the needs-based factors, 
such as self-reported health status and the diagnosis of chronic diseases (Chai, 2014, 
Liu and Wang, 2012, Liu et al., 2011b, You and Kobayashi, 2011, Zang et al., 2012). 
In addition, the domiciles registered in hukou – a distinctive household registration 
system in China, considered in some but not all reviewed studies (Zang et al., 2012, 
Qin et al., 2014, Yang, 2013, Fang et al., 2012) – are also included in this study, 
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representing a determinant. As a remainder of the planned-economy era, hukou 
primarily divides individuals into agricultural (rural) residents and non-agricultural 
(urban) residents in favour of rationing rural land, staple foods and urban welfare. 
Conversion of rural and urban hukou is restricted to a few channels in order to control 
domestic migration (Liu, 2005). Nowadays, the ration system has been long abolished, 
but hukou persists and plays a role in the entitlement to some benefits, sometimes 
including health services (Liang and Langenbrunner, 2013). Particularly, the 
registered place in hukou (rural) and the actual residence (urban) represent good tools 
to identify (rural-to-urban) migrants, who tend to be socioeconomically disadvantaged 
and may face difficulty in accessing urban SHI and hence healthcare in cities. A 
considerable number of rural-to-urban migrants may continue to be members of the 
rural NCMS, which faces a reduction in compensation in urban hospitals, if they 
cannot find a job in formal sectors to entitle them to the UEBMI (Cheng et al., 2014). 
 
3.3 Aggregate factors 
The outcome variables are influenced by not only individual characteristics, but also 
aggregate factors, which are important to examine as reducing regional disparities is 
highlighted as a key target by the current health reform policies (Yip and Hsiao, 
2009a). The first part of this section focuses on the conceptualisation of the broad 
features that capture the key factors of regional disparities in China, and the second 
part attempts to provide a deeper analysis into the concrete local conditions that may 
influence the outcome measures. 
3.3.1 Geographies and urban/rural classification 
The introductory chapter briefly outlined the persistent regional disparities in the 
health system, which can be traced back to its early stages in the 1950s and the 
1960s, when distinctly separate institutions were established in urban areas and 
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villages (Section 1.1.1). The following economic reforms enlarged the economic gap 
across China (Sun and Dutta, 1997), which in turn affected local health financing and 
delivery (Liang and Langenbrunner, 2013), due to the decentralised health system 
that resulted from the economic reforms in the 1980s and 1990s (Daemmrich, 2013). 
Economic disparities between the east coastal provinces and inland provinces, and 
between the urban areas and rural areas, are evident. According to state statistics 
(National Bureau of Statistics, 2013), in 2012, the urban individual average disposable 
income in the east coastal provinces was ¥29,622 (¥1≈ £0.11 or $0.14), while inland 
figures, i.e. for the central, west and northeast provinces, were ¥20,697, ¥20,600 and 
¥20,759, respectively. In terms of rural individuals’ average net income, this was 
¥10,817 for the east coast, and ¥7,435, ¥6,027 and ¥8,846 for the central, west and 
northeast provinces, respectively. 
Extending to health, according to official statistics in 2014, there were 10.63 urban 
health practitioners per 1,000 people in the east, 9.01 in the central provinces and 
8.73 in the west provinces, while in rural areas, there were 4.11, 3.44 and 3.8 in the 
east, central and west provinces, respectively (National Health and Family Planning 
Commission, 2015b). The disparity between urban and rural areas is also embodied 
in the numbers of hospital beds: 7.84 in urban areas and 3.54 in rural areas per 1,000 
people. In terms of individual health expenditure, urban residents spent approximately 
twice as much as rural residents, but the disparity was smaller as a percentage of 
their total consumption. East coastal provinces showed significantly higher health 
expenditure per capita than inland provinces (National Health and Family Planning 
Commission, 2015b). According to the National Health Service Survey (NHSS) in 
2013, residents in east or urban areas were less likely to report health problems than 
inland or rural residents (National Health and Family Planning Commission, 2015a). 
Weak evidence from the literature review supports the impacts of these regional 
factors on the prevalence of PHI. It generally shows that east and urban residents are 
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more likely to buy PHI than their inland and rural counterparts, basic individual 
characteristics being equal. Some authors attributed the difference to regionally 
unequal accessibility of PHI due to commercial insurers’ bias against undeveloped 
regions (Liu and Wang, 2012, Qu and Wang, 2010), and one author suggested that 
PHI sellers may market their products more intensively in more affluent regions (Liu 
and Wang, 2012). 
The literature review finds a few reviewed studies considered geographical and 
urban/rural variables in their research models for healthcare utilisation or healthcare 
expenditure, but their outcomes are too vague and too inconsistent to extract an 
explicit conclusion (Section 2.3.3 and Section 2.3.4). Notwithstanding this, the related 
spatial inequalities are potential. As the 2013 NHSS suggested, in terms of healthcare 
utilisation in the last two weeks prior to taking the survey, in the east, the disparity 
between urban and rural areas in healthcare utilisation is tiny (15.4% versus 16.1%), 
while in the west it is significant (15.8% versus 11.0%) (National Health and Family 
Planning Commission, 2015a). Another official report showed that residents in east 
provinces or urban areas spent more per capita than those in inland provinces or rural 
areas, respectively, but it lacks data about OOP health expenditure (National Health 
and Family Planning Commission, 2015b). 
In conclusion, though the literature review provides partial evidence about the regional 
impacts on the conceptualised outcome measures, plenty of data from other sources, 
as presented above, has suggested that there are sound reasons for including a 
geographical variable, particularly indicating the east and inland division, and a 
variable indicating the urban and rural division in this study, and hence multilevel 
models that take account of these may be a good choice. In another sense, this is 





Although geographies and the urban rural division represent an element of the 
variation, they are too crude to capture more detailed variation. In the classic model 
of healthcare access, apart from individual determinants, healthcare utilisation is also 
theoretically influenced by the characteristics of the health delivery system, which 
consists of available resources in, and organisation of, the health system (Aday and 
Andersen, 1974). In other words, they involve the quality, availability and accessibility 
of health facilities and services in the region where the individual resides. The UHC 
monitoring project in China also shows that utilisation relies partly on availability and 
density of local health services, in addition to individual factors such as health status 
and health insurance coverage (Meng and Xu, 2014). 
On top of these, utilisation of healthcare interacts with the consumer satisfaction, 
which is decided by convenience, costs, coordination, courtesy, information and 
quality (Aday and Andersen, 1974). Since the satisfaction as an outcome measure is 
not within the scope of this study, I only pay attention to the influence of the 
satisfaction on utilisation. On the one hand, the satisfaction itself is an individual 
experience and perception, which, if measurable, could be added into the analytical 
models. On the other hand, as suggested above, it can be disaggregated into some 
environmental factors that influence consumer satisfaction, such as the amenity of 
facilities and quality of services, and thereby impact the demand for healthcare 
utilisation. 
Unlike individual determinants, which are conceptualised together for the three 
outcome measures, the aggregate determinants of the prevalence of PHI may be to 
some extent distinct from those of utilisation and expenditure. For example, the 
regional availability of PHI supply, which influences its prevalence, may have little 
direct impact on utilisation and hence expenditure. Contrarily, the local transportation 
conditions may influence the accessibility of health facilities and hence utilisation of 
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healthcare, but hardly affect PHI purchase. Very few reviewed studies associated the 
prevalence of PHI with concrete local factors. Only one study showed that PHI density 
(indicated by provincial PHI premium income per person, related to prevalence, as 
discussed before) is correlated to the availability and quality of health facilities and 
population density (Suo et al., 2015). Good facilities may encourage utilisation so as 
to increase the need for financial security, and high population density could reduce 
the cost of marketing PHI and hence increase sales (Suo et al., 2015). 
Empirically, a few studies associated individual utilisation with the accessibility and 
quality of local health facilities (Chai, 2014, Yao et al., 2012). These factors may partly 
explain the regional variation in utilisation. As the NHSS report showed, in the east, 
72.1% of urban households and 63.2% of rural households are in places where the 
nearest health facilities are located within less than one kilometre. By contrast, in the 
west, while 66.3% of urban households are less than one kilometre from health 
facilities, in rural areas the percentage is only 47.0%. Additionally, 19.4% of western 
rural households require more than twenty minutes to travel from their home to the 
nearest health facilities, while only 3.5% of east rural households and 9.5% of west 
urban households do so (National Health and Family Planning Commission, 2015a). 
This echoes the aforementioned greater urban–rural utilisation disparities found in the 
west than the east. In addition, it has been well documented that the local economy, 
which determines the average income and price, influences total health expenditure 
(related to utilisation, as discussed in the literature review) (Newhouse, 1977, Roberts, 
1999). Finally, OOP payments have a strong correlation with utilisation and health 
insurance coverage as framed in the theory review (Section 1.3.3). Those aggregate 
determinants applying to utilisation and PHI enrolment ought to apply to OOP 





This study relies mainly on data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), 
a collaboration of the Carolina Population Centre at the University of North Carolina 
at Chapel Hill and the National Institute for Nutrition and Health at the Chinese Centre 
for Disease Control and Prevention. Apart from the CHNS, some other datasets, 
potentially applicable to this study, were identified by the literature review as well. In 
this section, these candidate datasets are briefly compared in order to explain why 
the CHNS was ultimately selected, followed by a detailed introduction of the CHNS’s 
survey design, data collection, data extraction, ethics and weights. 
3.4.1 Rationale of dataset choice 
This study requires longitudinal data properly representative of China. According to 
the literature review, and as far as I know, there are four datasets that potentially meet 
this need. They are the CHNS, the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study 
(CHARLS), the NHSS and the Chinese Longitudinal Healthy Longevity Survey 
(CLHLS). The CLHLS sampled only those aged 65 or more, which is not a 
representative group of a general population, and hence is ruled out from the start. 
Each remaining dataset has its own merits. The CHNS is a long-lasting longitudinal 
study since 1989 and it provides open access to its data. In addition, it has been 
widely used by previous studies, contributing greatly to literature. The CHARLS is a 
brand-new project with open access. It has a larger sampling scope and size than the 
CHNS, and generates data stably every two years. The NHSS is official as a result of 
its government background and has the largest sample size, covering 31 provinces. 
However, each dataset has disadvantages as well. The CHNS has lasted so long that 
it is characterised by imbalanced panel data. Furthermore, its latest publication is the 
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2011 survey wave.19 Regarding the CHARLS, its nationwide survey did not start until 
2011, and so did not cover the early stages of the scale up of SHI. Additionally, its 
omission of those aged below 45 would be a problem for certain studies. In terms of 
the NHSS, access is a serious problem. In theory, academics can gain access to it in 
the lab of the National Health and Family Planning Commission (previous Ministry of 
Health) by applying and reporting variables of interest. However, according to the 
earlier literature review, the NHSS was used rarely, and those who used the NHSS 
individual data had affiliations to some extent with government institutions, suggesting 
that this theoretical channel may present difficulties due to bureaucracy. 
This study finally selected the CHNS. Open access was one of the reasons. By 
contrast, selecting the NHSS would have presented the risk of failing to access the 
necessary data. Apart from this, the CHNS effectively covers data in the 2000s, the 
key stage of health reform and the development of SHI, satisfying the purpose of this 
study, which considers SHI to play a key role in determining the three outcome 
measures. At the beginning of my PhD project (2014–2015), I expected to gain access 
to the 2013 data in 2016, after the organiser of the CHNS replied to me via email that 
this would be the case. Unfortunately, there appears to be no 2013 data, and the 2015 
data was released in April 2018, when the thesis had almost been completed. 
Nonetheless, the 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009 and 2011 data covered the crucial period 
of health reform, and this was sufficient for the research. 
It is worth noting that while the CHARLS is an excellent dataset with an increasing 
number of users, it is not suitable for this study due to a lack of data before 2011. 
Since SHI’s population coverage reached more than 95% of the population in 2011 
(Meng et al., 2012), non-enrolees of SHI after 2011 would be too few to make effective 
comparisons with enrolees of SHI. Moreover, from 2000 to 2011, the composition of 





enrolees and non-enrolees of SHI might have undergone such a considerable change 
that it would become valuable for investigation, while after 2011 there appears to be 
little variation left for analysis. 
3.4.2 Introduction of the CHNS 
The following information is mostly derived from the official website of the data source 
(CHNS, 2017). 
Survey design   
The survey used a multistage, random cluster design. Between 2000 and 2009, nine 
provinces out of 31 provinces in China were sampled, geographically covering the 
east coastal areas and the central-west inland areas, and economically covering 
affluent provinces such as Jiangsu and Shandong, and poor provinces such as 
Guizhou and Guangxi (Figure 3.2). The 2011 wave of the survey added three 
provincial municipalities: Shanghai, Beijing and Chongqing. However, this study only 
includes the former nine provinces for analysis, because the newly added provinces 











Counties in provinces were stratified by income (low, middle and high), and four in 
each province were randomly selected with a weighted sampling scheme. Additionally, 
the provincial capital and a lower-income city were selected, except in two provinces, 
where other large cities were selected, rather than provincial capitals. Villages and 
townships within the counties and urban/suburban neighbourhoods (communities) 
within the cities were selected randomly as the primary sampling unit (PSU). The total 
number of PSUs ranges from 190 in 1989 to 291 in 2011, with the proportion of urban 
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neighbourhoods, suburban neighbourhoods, townships and villages being 1:1:1:3, 
following the real contemporary distribution of the population. Within each PSU, 20 
households were randomly selected. In 1989, the CHNS included 15,917 individuals 
from 3,795 households. In the following waves of the survey, despite attrition, the 
numbers of individuals and households were basically maintained by adding new 
households. 
Data collection 
The data of the CHNS was basically collected through individual, household and 
community (neighbourhood) interviews over a seven-day period. For individual 
interviews, all individuals within a selected household were interviewed with a series 
of designed questionnaires, including health and nutrition for all members, physical 
activity for children, occupation for adults, and activities of daily living and cognition 
for the elderly. For household interviews, the master of the household was asked 
questions on demographic, economic, time-use and labour force participation 
information. In addition, in the health section, information was collected about 
insurance coverage, the availability of medical facilities, curative care and illness 
information with associated time and money costs, preventative care with a focus on 
immunisation, and the use of family planning and other preventative services. For 
community interviews, a knowledgeable respondent of the community was asked 
information on community infrastructure, services, population, prevailing wages and 
related variables. 
Data extraction 
The downloadable data of the CHNS was contained in 48 datasets of longitudinal files 
of various themes, including one master ID file, two master physical exam and 
physical activity files, six master diet and infant feeding files, nine agricultural files, ten 
income-related files, one time-use file, two childcare files, five ever-married women 
files, one child/parent relationship file and three health services files. 
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For the purpose of this research, the datasets involving health-related, socioeconomic 
and demographic information were selected. The themes used were individual ID, 
survey sample information, healthcare, medical insurance, education, individual 
income, household income, jobs, physical exam, roster file and urban index, 
respectively. Within these selected longitudinal sets of data, only the 2000, 2004, 
2006, 2009 and 2011 waves of data were extracted. In addition, I only included cases 
aged 18 or over for analyses, where the cause of variation in PHI purchase, 
healthcare utilisation and expenditure between adults and children would be 
fundamentally different, even if all other factors were accounted for. The cases of 
children, which in fact only account for a small portion of the sample, however, would 
not be relevant for general discussions of determinants for PHI enrolment, utilisation 
of healthcare and related payments.     
Ethics 
The CHNS project was approved by the ethics committee of the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill. Using its data with registration and proper citation is legal and 
ethical. The only potential issue was that, according to the CHNS notification, the use 
of any data that could be used to deduce the survey location requires the approval of 
the local institutional review board or ethics committee. However, extracted data in 
this research did not involve community identifiers. Thus, there was no ethical concern 
at all. 
Weights 
There are no special variables of weights to make data representative of China or 
those included provinces in the CHNS, according to the project organisers, who 
provided two reasons (Popkin, 2014). One reason is that the State Statistical Office 
of China does not share its sample frame with the CHNS survey team. The second 
reason is that they do not believe they can create even cross-sectional sampling 
weights, let alone longitudinal ones. The survey design used extant census data for 
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the multilevel random sampling. The project organisers gave two suggestions. The 
first suggestion was to include community-level measures as controls. The second 
recommended clustering data at the community level so as to adjust the standard 
errors and variance of estimates. This study has followed these suggestions. 
 
3.5 Operationalisation 
This section sets out to transform the conceptualised outcome measures and their 
determinants to operational variables, in relation to available data from the CHNS. 
3.5.1 Health insurance variables 
Health insurance variables include one outcome variable – enrolment in PHI20, and 
several independent variables – enrolment in one of SHI schemes. According to the 
questionnaire of the CHNS survey, the respondents were asked two questions about 
their health insurance coverage status: (1) “Do you have medical insurance?” (2) 
“Which of the following types of medical insurance do you have?” Only those who 
gave a positive answer to the first question were required to answer the second one, 
where multiple responses were allowed. These insurance variables are binary, 
indicating whether the individual was covered by the specific scheme. 
The PHI variable is easy to generate, as its concept and corresponding option in the 
survey’s questionnaire remains the same throughout the five waves. By contrast, as 
health reform proceeded, public schemes in the questionnaire partly changed, with 
the generation of more than ten options between 2000 and 2011 altogether. As 
previously mentioned, those public schemes are conceptualised together with their 
respective successor scheme (Section 3.2.1) to reduce data fragmentation for the 
model analyses. As a result, four (new) variables arise. Specifically, the urban 




employees’ scheme represents any of the worker’s compensation schemes in 2000–
2004, three models of urban employee medical insurance in 2006 and the UEBMI in 
2009–2011. The urban residents’ SHI scheme represents any of urban fragmented 
welfare schemes. The NCMS represents any of the rural CMS or succeeding NCMS. 
The governmental FMS remains intact. 
Furthermore, the two urban SHI schemes are combined to form one urban SHI 
variable. The combination results primarily from a technical difficulty; that is, the 
insufficient number of members of the urban residents’ scheme, which would cause 
computing techniques such as multiple imputation and multilevel modelling to struggle. 
Since this study is more interested in urban/rural disparities than those between the 
urban employees’ SHI scheme and urban residents’ SHI scheme, combining the two 
urban schemes to be one can increase observations, which is especially crucial for 
models with a multilevel structure. 
It is worth noting that individuals can be enrolled in only one of these SHI schemes in 
theory. However, in the CHNS, a small number of individuals reported being covered 
by more than one SHI scheme, cases probably due to mistakes of recall or 
administrative errors. For such cases, only one membership was kept, according 
principally to their actual residence. For example, only the membership of the urban 
SHI was retained for those who lived in the urban area and reported enrolment of both 
urban and rural SHI, and vice versa. Moreover, for very few cases, where individuals 
reported enrolment of both FMS and one other SHI scheme, FMS membership was 
retained for its outstanding generosity. Consequently, the SHI variable is in effect a 
categorical variable with four responses: none, government officials’ FMS, urban SHI 
and rural NCMS. 
In the previous review, the theoretical literature suggests that the degree of financial 
protection of health insurance, and likely utilisation, are influenced by the concrete 
compensation policies of health insurance (WHO, 2010b, Pauly et al., 2009, Aday and 
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Andersen, 1974). However, the CHNS dataset does not include any variable that give 
information about benefit coverage of health insurance. Our relevant analysis can only 
proceed by comparing types of health insurance and associate the results to 
background knowledge about their benefit packages. This, after all, is a limitation of 
the study.   
3.5.2 The utilisation variable 
In terms of utilisation, the CHNS respondents were first asked “During the past four 
weeks, were you sick or injured?” Those who gave “yes” answers were further asked 
“What did you do when you felt ill?” with the choices of self-care, seeing the local 
health worker, seeing a doctor, paying no attention, or “unknown”. For those who did 
not feel ill, they moved on to a simpler question: “Did you seek care from a formal 
medical provider during the past four weeks?” This was asked because they might 
have still used health services for other purposes, such as chronic disease 
management. 
Based on the answers to the three questions, one binary variable – whether the 
individual had used formal healthcare in the past four weeks – was generated. Those 
who felt ill and saw a health professional (either the local health worker or a doctor), 
and those who did not feel ill but still sought care from a professional, are considered 
together as those who used formal healthcare. Those who did not see a health 
professional and those who did not feel ill, and consequently did not answer the 
following questions, are considered together with those who did not use formal 
healthcare. 
It is worth noting that the CHNS includes a question that distinguishes outpatient and 
inpatient utilisation, based on the answers to which this study could have divided 
formal healthcare into outpatient and inpatient care. However, the frequency of the 
use of inpatient care from the dataset was too low (611 observations) to be fit for 
disaggregation. This problem, to a large degree, relates to a rule of the CHNS 
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measurement, which only counts events such as illness or injury and use of 
healthcare occurring in the four weeks before the interview. This approach is common 
in health surveys, with the advantage being that respondents are likely to recall details 
precisely in this short period, as opposed to a long recall period such as one year. 
However, this short-term measurement tends to miss infrequent events such as the 
use of inpatient care, and this is admittedly a limitation of the CHNS dataset as well 
as this study. 
3.5.3 The financial protection variable 
OOP expenditure on healthcare, i.e. total health expenditure minus compensation 
from health insurance, was primarily selected in this study. The theoretical reason for 
this was presented in the conceptualisation; the practical reason was that, in relation 
to the CHNS data, OOP payments data are accessible.  
In the CHNS questionnaire, questions such as “How much did you spend on the 
illness or injury?” and “What percentage of these costs was paid by insurance or may 
be paid by insurance?” follow a question about the utilisation of a certain type of 
healthcare, if any. Accordingly, in this study, the total OOP payment for healthcare is 
computed through summing all types of gross health payments multiplied by one 
minus their corresponding percentage of compensation. The formula is presented as 
follows: 
Total OOP payments = gross formal care cost * (1 − compensation rate for formal 
treatment) + gross self-treatment cost + gross preventative cost * (1 − 
compensation rate for preventative care) + additional health payment 
For cross-year comparison, the amounts of OOP payments are then inflated to the 
2011 consumer price index (CPI), provided by the CHNS project as well, referring to 
the State Statistics Bureau. The CPI data vary between provinces and between rural 
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and urban areas. Taking the 2009 data as an example, the formula is presented as 
follows: 
Inflated OOP payments = OOP payments * the 2011 CPI / the 2009 CPI 
It is noted that the first formula uses gross payment for self-treatment rather than 
payment after compensation. The reason for this is that both SHI and PHI 
compensation policies focus on hospital or clinical treatment, and data about the 
compensation rate for self-treatment was incompletely collected in the CHNS. 
Looking through the available data, the average compensation rate for self-treatment 
was only 6.7%, and the average gross self-treatment payment was between ¥142 in 
2000 and ¥312 in 2011. The compensation appears relatively negligible, with little 
impact on the total payment. Thus, it is not worth including this rate at the expense of 
losing cases. 
Notwithstanding the widespread use of OOP payments data, this variable cannot give 
a comprehensive measurement of financial protection, because it does not reflect the 
impact of the direct healthcare spending on living standards, as the indicator of 
catastrophic health expenditure does. However, calculation of the incidence of 
catastrophic health expenditure requires a set of annual data, including household 
total income or expenditure, food consumption and spending on health (Xu et al., 
2007), while the CHNS only provides health payment data for the last four weeks. 
Due to this mismatch, it was infeasible to generate the variable of catastrophic health 
expenditure with the CHNS data. Indeed, according to the literature review of this 
study, no study based on the CHNS data used catastrophic health expenditure. 
To complement the insufficiency in the measurement of financial protection, I 
considered to add an additional analysis of the impacts on living standards, which, in 
literature, are commonly indicated by cutting back on a variety of consumption or 
selling assets (Grosh and Glewwe, 1998, Xu et al., 2003, Van Doorslaer et al., 2007). 
However, there is no relevant data about consumption or selling assets, possibly 
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because this survey project emphasises health and nutrition rather than economic 
measurements as its name suggests.21  
After scrutinising the CHNS dataset, I selected the variable of the individual daily 
protein intake as the indicator of living standards. The logic is that measurement of 
the living standard includes the quality of food consumption and nutrition status 
(Grosh and Glewwe, 1998), which in turn can be effectively indicated by protein intake. 
This is supported by the literature which states that Asian developing countries have 
lower daily protein intake than the world average and improvement of living standards 
in Asia is correlated to an increase of protein intake (Zhu et al., 2005); in China per-
capita protein intake increases along with the economic growth and a further increase 
is projected as the current level is still relatively low (Zhen et al., 2010).   
3.5.4 Aggregate‐level variables 
Geographies and residence 
Succinct geographies are preferred to a number of provinces for interpreting 
outcomes well. The tradition of Chinese statistics groups 31 provinces (excluding 
Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan) into four geo-economic regions, i.e. the northeast22, 
east (coastal provinces), centre and west (National Bureau of Statistics, 2013). There 
is an evident multi-faceted gap between the rich east and the three inland regions, as 
shown in the conceptualisation (Section 3.3.1). To divide urban and rural residence, 
in the CHNS, PSUs were classified into cities, suburbs, towns or villages. Meanwhile, 
it also provided a simpler variable, which grouped communities of cities and towns 
                                                
21 The CHNS data  include a household expenses variable. However, this variable  is the sum of five 








into urban communities, and communities of suburbs and villages into rural 
communities. This study selected the simpler binary variables for both geographies 
and residence. Consequently, while the urban/rural variable is the original in the 
CHNS, the newly-generated geography variable categorises sampled Liaoning 
province, Jiangsu province and Shandong province to the east, and Heilongjiang 
province, Henan province, Hubei province, Hunan province, Guangxi autonomous 
region and Guizhou province to the inland. 
There are three reasons for this choice. First, economic and health disparities 
between coastal and inland regions, and between urban and rural areas, are evident 
in official statistics as previously stated (Sun and Dutta, 1997, National Health and 
Family Planning Commission, 2015b, National Health and Family Planning 
Commission, 2015a). By contrast, such statistics among inland regions are mostly 
closer than in comparisons between them and the east (Meng et al., 2012, National 
Bureau of Statistics, 2013). Thus, the binary variables would be effective enough to 
capture the essence of the geo-economic differences. Greater fragmentation would 
potentially increase difficulty in interpretation. Second, this study could disaggregate 
the population by using the two dummies simultaneously, in effect generating four 
subpopulations to reveal regional disparities. Third, this study relied greatly on the 
multilevel models, which can effectively distinguish regional effects. 
Community development indexes 
In the CHNS, except provinces, the community (PSU) and the city or county to which 
the individual belongs is not named, so it is impossible for users to bring external 
regional-level data in this research. Nevertheless, the CHNS organisers have 
developed a scale to measure the development of communities in multiple facets, 
referring to psychometric methodology, which measures subtle variations on a 
continuum (Vlahov and Galea, 2002). The CHNS organisers suggested using the 
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community-level measures as a complement to the simple urban/rural classification 
to describe community characteristics (Jones-Smith and Popkin, 2010). 
The scale contains twelve components, including population density, social services, 
health infrastructure, modern markets, traditional markets, transportation 
infrastructure, communications, housing infrastructure, sanitation, economic activity, 
education and income diversity (Jones-Smith and Popkin, 2010). As a variable, each 
component was marked from zero to ten. The higher the score is, the higher the level 
is achieved by the community. The information used to generate these components 
was drawn from the CHNS household survey and the community survey. The 
reliability and validity of the scale were evaluated by the organisers (Jones-Smith and 
Popkin, 2010, Attard et al., 2012) and other academics, including a systematic review 
(Cyril et al., 2013), demonstrating that it does effectively indicate the community’s 
development level. 
According to the conceptualisation of local factors (Section 3.3.2), the prevalence of 
PHI can be influenced by aggregate factors, such as local population density, 
availability of insurance sellers and quality of health services. Therefore, in relation to 
this available community data, the population density component, the social services 
component and the health infrastructure component were included as the aggregate 
variables in the models for the prevalence of PHI. Meanwhile, the aggregate 
determinants of health utilisation were conceptualised to be the quality, accessibility 
and costs of health services, corresponding to the health infrastructure component, 
the transportation infrastructure component and the economic activity component, 
respectively. Finally, all these aggregate determinants of PHI prevalence and health 
utilisation apply to OOP health expenditure, and hence the models take into account 
all five community development components. 
Theoretically, the models should have included more detailed aggregate variables 
indicating the volume of local healthcare resources, the forms of organisation of 
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healthcare delivery, as well as the local price level, convenience and amenity of health 
services (Aday and Andersen, 1974). However, they are not available in the CHNS 
data.  
3.5.5 Other variables 
The remaining variables were mostly derived from other conceptualised individual-
level determinants of utilisation (Section 3.2.2), basically following the classic 
utilisation determinant model (Andersen and Newman, 1973, Andersen and Newman, 
2005). This study adapted them to the context of China and categorised them into 
new groups. 
The first group contains demographic characteristics such as age, gender and 
household size, similar to the predisposing factors in the classic model. The second 
group contains socioeconomic factors such as household income, education level, 
hukou status and occupation, similar to the enabling factors in the classic model. The 
third group are, likewise, need or illness level variables such as chronic disease 
history and current health status. Most of them have corresponding variables in the 
CHNS, while a few were transformed from the original variables. 
There are some determinants identified by the classic model that should have been 
included in the analytical models, but unavailable in the CHNS data. They are mainly 
the predisposing factors including values concerning health and illness, attitudes 
toward health services and knowledge about diseases. What an individual thinks 
about health may result in differences in inclination toward use of healthcare 
(Andersen and Newman, 2005), and thereby influence the expected expenditure on 
health and the demand for PHI.  
Furthermore, since this study used longitudinal data, it considered the year of data 
collection a categorical variable, indicating 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009 and 2011, 
respectively. Basically, it was used to capture unobserved changes in variation over 
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time, for the sake of the explanatory power of the models. It can also be used to mark 
the occurrence of important events in health policy during the period under study. This 
makes it possible to compare data before and after a certain time point. As a result, 




































































In the end, it is worth noting the potential selection into health insurance, as the review 
of the relevant theories suggests that enrolment into PHI could be influenced by 
adverse selection, risk selection, capacity to pay, and even knowledge about 
insurance (see Section 1.3.2). Enrolment into SHI is also determined by regional 
implementation of the decrees of the central government (Liang and Langenbrunner, 
2013). As a result, the characteristics of health insurance enrolees may differ from 
non-enrolees and differ among types of health insurance, undermining the estimation 
of the beneficial effects of health insurance coverage. Following the class framework 
of studying access and utilisation (Aday and Andersen, 1974, Andersen and Newman, 
1973, Andersen and Newman, 2005), the identification and inclusion of model 
variables should help to control for these characteristics to some extent. In addition, 
the multilevel models for analysing utilisation and the hurdle models for analysing 
financial risks would help to deal with the clustering of insurance take-up and the 
utilisation selection problem (more details will be presented in the next chapter).  
Despite these efforts, since this study is based on non-experimental data, it is still 
possible that enrolment into health insurance is not exogenous. This may imply the 
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instrumental variable approach. However, on the one hand, in practice, the 
instrumental variable regression is incompatible with multilevel structure and hurdle 
models in common statistic software. On the other hand, because the theories 
indicate that the selection mechanisms of enrolment into insurance, especially PHI, 
are complex, choosing the instrumental variable could be very difficult. Therefore, this 
study does not use the instrumental variable approach. In fact, most of the reviewed 
empirical studies did not introduce instrument variables (see Appendix A). For this 






















This is the second methodology chapter of this study, comprising three sections: the 
manipulation of data extracted from the CHNS dataset, handling missing data, and 
modelling strategies. Most processes were realised in the statistic software Stata, 
provided by the School of Social and Political Science at the University of Edinburgh. 
The short first section introduces the routine process of data manipulation, in order to 
generate the variables for analyses, including data exploration, variable generation 
and recoding. The second section is the largest part of this chapter, focusing on 
handling missing data. Although ad hoc strategies have been widely used in earlier 
studies, this study employed an algorithm-based method called multiple imputation to 
address missing data. The rationale, procedure and outcome test of multiple 
imputation of data are elaborated. The third section outlines specifications of models 
for the research questions and the disaggregation of the population. 
 
4.1 Data manipulation 
Generating computable variables requires several steps of data manipulation, 
because data downloaded from the CHNS website are raw and segmented into 
several datasets. As this process is routine but long and labour-consuming, only its 
key components are briefly outlined here for simplicity. 
4.1.1 Merging datasets 
In the CHNS, as aforementioned, downloadable data are packed and compressed in 
the longitudinal form, segmented into 48 datasets according to themes. It is necessary 
to select relevant datasets and merge them together into one dataset for ease of 
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computer analysis. In this study, eleven original datasets of the CHNS were merged, 
with themes corresponding to individual ID, survey sample information, healthcare, 
medical insurance, education, individual income, household income, jobs, physical 
examination, roster file and urban index. There are in total 157,286 observations in 
this merged dataset, without duplicate cases, by reference to individual ID and wave. 
4.1.2 Recoding and transformation 
There are mainly three types of recoding in this study. In the first and simplest of these, 
categories in some original categorical variables were combined for reasons of 
simplicity. For example, the six categories of the original variable – the highest level 
of education – were reduced to three, by combining non-schooling and primary school 
education together, lower middle school education, upper middle school education 
and technical or vocational school education together, and university or college 
education and master’s degree or higher together. This type of recoding was also 
applied to the utilisation variable, the geography variable, the community type variable 
and the employment variable. 
Second, a group of original variables was combined to form one variable. Taking the 
generation of the SHI variable as a typical example, the four-response categorical 
variable was formed by integrating four binary variables, which in turn were derived 
from various original variables about enrolment in a particular SHI scheme (for details 
see section 3.5.1). This type of recoding also applied to the chronic-disease variable 
and the utilisation variable in part. In addition, the expenditure variable was also 
derived from a group of original variables, but the recoding method involved 
calculation, unlike the method used for categorical variables (see section 3.5.3). 
Third, some missing values were filled in by recoding, by reference to other variables. 
For example, the original variable of PHI suffers serious item missingness, that is, 
cases with a value for this variable are missing but values for some other variables 
are available. After checking the values for another original variable (whether they 
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had health insurance), it could be seen that those who reported that they did not have 
health insurance at all contributed to nearly all the missing values of the original PHI 
variable. This makes sense, because respondents reporting no health insurance at 
all would not be further asked to select the types of health insurance that covered 
them. Thus, these missing values of the PHI variable could be confidently recoded to 
“no PHI”. Apart from PHI, this type of recoding applied to the original SHI variables 
and the utilisation variable. 
On top of recoding, as aforementioned in the operationalisation section, the health 
expenditure variable and the household income variable were adjusted by inflation so 
that longitudinal comparisons across years were feasible. In addition, the household 
incomes were log-transformed to deal with the skewed distribution, but the health 
expenses were not. Because they are closely related to the requirements of modelling, 
the details of transforming the health expenditure variable are presented in the later 
modelling section of this chapter (section 4.3.3), and the reasons are elaborated in 
the third results chapter (see section 7.1). 
 
4.2 Handling missing data 
The missing values that can be filled in by recoding in the way mentioned above are 
in effect not missing. However, there are many missing values in the CHNS that 
cannot be addressed in this way. This is a common problem for many datasets, 
especially large-scale, longitudinal surveys. A report of the National Research Council 
of the United States notes the detriment of missing data to the scientific credibility of 
causal conclusion and it highlights that it is unjustifiable to assume that analysis 
methods can compensate for this (Little et al., 2012). 
However, the significance of missingness tends to be ignored. A recent review shows 
that cohort studies with missing data report the issue in an inconsistent manner and 
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most simply excluded units with missing data from the analysis (listwise deletion). 
Among those trying to handle missing data, a considerable number used ad hoc 
methods that have been known to produce bias, not to mention some that did not 
state their strategies (Karahalios et al., 2012). With considerably unbalanced panel 
data, the missing values in the CHNS need to be taken seriously. 
The US National Research Council recommends six principles for drawing inferences 
from incomplete data. First, determine whether the missingness is relevant to the 
research. Second, formulate a causal primary measure of the treatment effect. Third, 
investigate the reason for missingness. Fourth, decide a primary set of assumptions 
about the missingness mechanism. Fifth, carry out statistical analysis following the 
missingness mechanism assumption. Sixth, perform a sensitivity analysis to assess 
the robustness of inferences under the missingness mechanism assumption (Little et 
al., 2012). For quantitative studies with clear research purposes, a plausible approach 
to handling missing data usually begins by exploring missingness mechanisms 
(Carpenter and Plewis, 2011), as follows. 
4.2.1 An overview of missingness mechanisms 
A popular classification of missingness mechanisms was originally developed by 
Donald B. Robin (1976), under whose framework, mechanisms causing missingness 
are categorised into three types: Missing Completely At Random (MCAR), Missing At 
Random (MAR) and Missing Not At Random (MNAR). When data are MCAR, the 
cause of missingness is absolutely unrelated to the research questions. When data 
are MAR, the cause of missingness is independent of the unobserved values, given 
the corresponding observed variables. Finally, when data are MNAR, it means that 
the chance of observing values of the variable depends on the values themselves, 
even after conditioning on corresponding observed variables. 
If data are MCAR, complete case analysis (CCA), the default analysis method in the 
statistic software in which units with missing data are excluded listwise, can apply to 
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inferential estimation with unbiased results, though information loss compromises 
preciseness. However, if data are MAR/MNAR, CCA tends to lead to a biased 
inference (Carpenter and Plewis, 2011). Still, the CCA can be valid under certain 
MAR/MNAR mechanisms, where the data missingness of the variable is independent 
of the values of the variables themselves. In other words, in a regression model, CCA 
is valid only if missingness is caused by the independent variables, and given these, 
not the outcome variable. However, this is a very strong assumption (White and Carlin, 
2010). Compared to MCAR and MAR, sometimes referred to as non-informative or 
ignorable missingness, MNAR is informative or non-ignorable and much more difficult 
to handle, perhaps requiring contextual knowledge (Carpenter and Plewis, 2011). 
Related to survey studies, missingness is commonly caused by participants’ non-
responses to certain questions. Longitudinal surveys, which have multiple survey 
waves, possibly include units (individuals) with all the values missing across one or 
several waves of the survey. In terms of characteristics, non-responses can be 
subdivided into four conditions (Carpenter and Plewis, 2011). First, item non-
responses occur when a participant generates incomplete data by only partly 
answering survey questions. Second, unit non-responses occur when few data 
related to participant are collected, except for basic (roster) information such as ID, 
gender and date of birth. Third, wave non-responses occur when a participant moves 
out of certain waves, giving no data at all, but may re-enter in later waves. Fourth, 
attritions occur when a participant drops out of the survey and no longer comes back. 
The last two conditions are exclusive issues for longitudinal studies. 
In practice, it is often infeasible and unnecessary to make clear whether a missing 
participant will come back, for example. Thus, a simpler classification of missingness 
arises, based on a key difference – whether missingness happens to all the variables 
across a whole wave. Accordingly, item non-responses are called within-wave 
missingness or item missingness, because in this case the variable values of a unit 
within a wave are merely partially missing. However, when unit non-responses, wave 
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non-responses or attritions happen, all of the values of a unit are missing (except the 
basic information). The latter three conditions are therefore categorised into whole-
wave missingness or unit missingness (Young and Johnson, 2015). 
There are some experiential reasons for these issues in a survey. For example, item 
non-responses may result from the participants not knowing the answer or refusing to 
answer, or from the survey operator not asking some questions due to forgetting or 
procedurally omitting them. Unit non-responses arise as a result of non-contact, non-
cooperation or refusal; wave non-responses and attrition can be attributed to 
participants’ residential mobility, non-contact and refusal (Lepkowski and Couper, 
2002). In the analysis of missing data, especially if the possibility of MNAR is high, it 
would be better to explore the missingness mechanisms in the light of such 
background knowledge (Carpenter and Plewis, 2011). 
4.2.2 Analysis of missing data in the CHNS 
This section analyses mechanisms of missing data in the CHNS, using the theory 
mentioned above. The analysis begins with unit missingness, which includes unit non-
responses, wave non-responses or attritions, and then examines item missingness. 
Unit missingness 
The CHNS dataset provided nine-wave longitudinal data from 1989 to 2011 until early 
2018, with a total of 157,286 observations in the dataset, each decided by a unique 
combination of an ID (individual) and time (the wave of the survey). However, there 
are 35,703 unique IDs in the roster file, suggesting that there should have been 
321,327 (35,703 IDs × 9 waves) observations if the panel data are completely 
balanced. Minus 157,286, 164,041 observations are de facto missing due to wave 
non-responses or attritions. Furthermore, regarding the 157,286 existing observations, 
there are 31,073 observations missing for most values except the basic information 
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such ID, age, gender and communities they belong to, making these fall into the 
category of unit non-responses. 
Because I focus on the five waves between 2000 and 2011 in this research, narrowing 
scope to this period, the number of unique IDs falls to 31,369, which means the 
theoretically full number of observations of the panel data should be 156,845 (31,369 
IDs × 5 waves). The number of the valid observations in the dataset reduces to 67,239, 
and 27,071 observations suffer unit non-responses (Table 4.1). From another 
perspective, there are 62,535 wave non-responses/attritions or 12,507 individuals 
missing for all the five waves, although their IDs were once recorded in this survey. 
For the units not missing for all, the numbers of valid observations vary from one to 
five. Almost all of the units with only one valid observation belong to the three newly-













Exploring the pattern of unit missingness, for either all waves or the latest five waves, 
the unit missingness in the dataset is not monotone, because some participants 
moved out of this survey and returned. This suggests that the unit missingness 
derives from not only attrition but also from wave non-responses. Although non-
monotone missingness is common in survey datasets, it makes handling missing data 
more complex (Robins and Gill, 1997). I will talk more about this later. 
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Though attrition and wave non-responses are different technically, it is effectively 
impossible for data users to confidently distinguish them if the longitudinal survey is 
still ongoing, because we never know whether those who dropped out in some waves 
will return in the future, unless the survey organisers explicitly declare that. Instead of 
the data users, the survey organisers who manage the follow-up strategy may be 
interested in distinguishing between unit non-responses and wave non-responses 
because of their different causes (the former tend to be due to non-cooperation and 
the latter tend to be due to non-contact), which can influence the cost of the survey 
(Carpenter and Plewis, 2011).  
Moreover, containing the basic information is a key difference between unit non-
responses and wave non-responses/attrition. However, the basic-information 
variables are either invariant, such as ID and gender, or highly predictable, such as 
age. Therefore, referring to the roster file and the survey wave, they are in effect easy 
to be imputed for units of wave non-responses/attritions, where they are originally 
absent. Finally, the three types of non-responses de facto generate units providing 
little data for analysis, except the basic information. For the reasons above, this study 
adopts the simpler classification method – treating unit non-responses and wave non-
responses/attritions equally as unit missingness (Young and Johnson, 2015). 
Item missingness 
Exploring these valid observations, item non-response occurs among most variables 
of interest, causing item missingness. Because my analysis is interested in data after 
2000 and values in some variables are seriously missing in the early waves due to 
some systematic change in the survey questionnaires across the long time period, I 
only explore the last five waves of data since 2000. Additionally, as discussed in a 
previous document, considerable missing values are associated with those aged 
under eighteen. As a result, when focusing on the data that I will use, item 




Variables    Missing values  Observations 
Dependent variables 
PHI  1,140  66,099 
Healthcare utilisation    1,191  66,048 



















To explore missingness mechanisms based on observed data, we are only able to 
ensure that data are not MCAR statistically; we cannot ensure that they are MCAR. 
We also cannot check whether data are MAR or MNAR on this basis (Marston et al., 
2010). Instead, what we need to do is make an assumption before using any methods 
to handle missingness, followed by a sensitivity test. Consequently, in this research, 
I checked whether the data were not MCAR first. Because there are possibly different 
methods to treat unit missingness and item missingness, I examined them separately. 
First, considering unit missingness, as aforementioned, information about waves, 
residence and urbanisation indexes, as well as sex and age, is de facto known for 
these units as the basic information. I investigated the relationship between unit 
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missingness and these variables with statistical methods. As a result, Chi square tests 
show that there are significant correlations between unit missingness and survey 
waves, geographies and gender (for all three correlations, p<0.001). Specifically, 
between unit missingness and waves, Cramer’s V = 0.09; between unit missingness 
and geographies, Cramer’s V = 0.09; and between unit missingness and gender, 
Cramer’s V = -0.03. This suggests that the correlations are all weak. Likewise, T-test 
shows that the average ages between missing units and non-missing units are 
significantly different (p<0.001), but that the two averages are close to each other, as 
are average urbanisation scores. 
Next, looking at item missingness, I used three outcome variables (PHI enrolment, 
healthcare utilisation and OOP health payment) to check that whether their 
missingness was not independent of a selection of explanatory variables. As a result, 
missingness for all three outcome variables is significantly associated to survey 
waves (for all p<0.001). The correlation strengths between waves and missingness 
for PHI enrolment, and between waves and missingness for healthcare utilisation, are 
both moderate (both Cramer’s V=0.10), while for missing values for OOP health 
payment, the correlation is weak (Cramer’s V=0.04). Significant correlations between 
geographies and the community type and missingness for outcome variables were 
found as well (p<0.001), but all were weak in strength (Cramer’s V<0.10). Community 
development indexes are also significantly different between units with missing values 
and non-missing values for outcome variables (p<0.01). 
Similarly, statistically significant correlations were found between missingness for 
outcome variables and some individual explanatory variables such as hukou, SHI 
enrolment, education levels, occupation, and health status, but most were weak in 
strength (Cramer’s V<0.10). Significant differences in age, household sizes and 
household income also existed between missingness and non-missingness units 
(p<0.05). No significant correlation was found between them in gender and chronic 
diseases (except between missingness for OOP payment and chronic diseases). 
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Consequently, these results strongly suggest that, in terms of both unit and item 
missingness, missing data are not MCAR statistically, because of significant 
correlations between missingness and the values of some other variables in this study, 
although most correlations are weak in strength. Under the condition of non-MCAR, 
as discussed above, the ordinary CCA method is not likely to give an unbiased 
estimation. Instead, some mathematical methods for handling missing data may be 
necessary to prevent inference from bias (Little et al., 2012). 
Next, as aforementioned, it is infeasible to check MAR/MNAR with observed data 
statistically; instead, I have to make assumptions based on contextual knowledge 
(Marston et al., 2010). Considering the condition of MNAR first, it means that 
missingness is contingent on its own values, even given other related observed 
variables (Rubin, 1976), and thus it is a serious problem that undermines research 
validity (Carpenter and Plewis, 2011). The CHNS organisers provide little information 
about missing data, except stating that missingness is mainly caused by residential 
mobility (CHNS, 2017), a very common problem for many longitudinal datasets 
(Lepkowski and Couper, 2002). Empirically, mobility may happen randomly at the 
individual level and is influenced by local policies at the aggregate level. Anyhow, it 
seems unlikely to cause the key variables of this study, such as PHI enrolment, health 
utilisation and the OOP health payment, to particularly lose observations with a certain 
range of values. 
Comparatively, it seems more plausible to assume that the missingness mechanism 
is MAR, in which missingness is not relevant to its values given other included 
variables (such as factors causing residential mobility). In other words, there appears 
no systematic mechanism in the survey that selectively causes some data missing, 
depending on the values of these data themselves. Although for a variable the missing 
values may be significantly different from the observed values, the difference is not 




The analysis above suggests that CCA is likely to cause biased inference, because 
the MCAR assumption barely holds for the CHNS data. Ad hoc methods that fill in 
missing data, such as mean value imputation, regression mean imputation and Last 
Observation Carried Forward (LOCF), as aforementioned, are known to lead to 
biased conclusions as well. Instead, more sophisticated methods such as inverse 
probability weighting (IPW) and multiple imputation (MI) are recommended (Seaman 
et al., 2008). They both work with the assumption of MAR. 
IPW rests on the idea that the propensity of responses can be predicted from other 
corresponding characteristics. Using this method, a logit or probit model is fitted to 
estimate the probabilities of responding for all units, and then these units are weighted 
by the inverse of the probabilities (Li et al., 2013). Although IPW is easy to apply, its 
efficiency would suffer from item missingness and a non-monotone mode of missing 
data (Carpenter and Plewis, 2011). The meaning of MAR is very complicated, 
requiring a missingness pattern to occur only depending on observed data under this 
pattern (Robins and Gill, 1997). When MAR holds, the common strategy in IPW that 
uses data from previous waves to predict probabilities of responding is problematic 
under non-monotone missingness (Sun and Tchetgen Tchetgen, 2016), which, 
however, occurs for the CHNS data. 
Multiple imputation (MI) is another popular method of handling missing data, 
applicable to both unit missingness and item missingness. Its idea stems from the 
assumption of MAR under which the CCA model for the variable with incomplete 
observations regressed on other conditioning variables is unbiased. In turn, using this 
model, we can impute these missing values in the outcome variable. Moreover, using 
this method, multiply-imputed datasets, say ten, rather than one, are created to 
reduce the error introduced in the simulation, and for ease of estimating the variance 
and confidence intervals (Kenward and Carpenter, 2007). In contrast with IPW, MI 
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can apply to arbitrary missing data patterns, with state-of-the-art methods such as 
data augmentation and imputation by chained equations or full conditional 
specification (ICE/FCS) (Twisk et al., 2013, Donneau et al., 2015). 
However, whether MI can improve analysis is still controversial, especially for 
longitudinal data analysis (White and Carlin, 2010, Cummings, 2013). For example, a 
simulation study finds that MI reduces bias compared to fixed effect regression using 
CCA (Young and Johnson, 2015). On the contrary, another simulation study reports 
that MI makes little improvement to the model but produces unstable results and is 
computationally inefficient (Twisk et al., 2013). Additionally, some authors argue that 
longitudinal models using pooled time-series methods can handle whole-wave 
missing data in the same way as MI does, and hence imputing whole waves may 
contribute little to the efficiency of analysis; it may even increase the standard error 
(Young and Johnson, 2015, Young and Johnson, 2013, Von Hippel, 2007). 
Nonetheless, these arguments rely greatly on the outcomes of simulation studies, 
which only include analytical variables. In real-world surveys, apart from analytical 
variables, plenty of auxiliary variables are measured as well, which can be added into 
equations for predicting the missing data but excluded from analytical models. In this 
case, MI could increase efficiency by exploiting more information from data excluded 
from the analytical models (Donneau et al., 2015, Young and Johnson, 2015, Twisk 
et al., 2013). 
In sum, it is very clear that there are missing data in the CHNS dataset, including both 
unit missingness and item missingness. The pattern of unit missingness is non-
monotone and statistically the missingness mechanisms for many of them are not 
MCAR. It is plausible to assume that their missingness mechanisms are MAR, rather 
than MNAR, with contextual knowledge. Under this assumption, proper methods for 
handling missing data, rather than ad hoc methods or CCA, should be applied to 
reduce bias, as the authoritative institution suggests (Little et al., 2012). As discussed, 
IPW is a potential solution but issues from the non-monotone missingness restrict its 
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application. Alternatively, MI is applicable and may improve the models, although its 
efficiency in longitudinal mixed models is debatable. 
4.2.4 Multiple imputation parameters 
Weighing up the options presented above, the MI method was applied to impute 
missing data in the last five waves of the CHNS, from 2000 to 2011. The multiply-
imputed data were then checked by the sensitivity tests for suitability. 
The popular long-form format of data analysis can lead to problematic simulations in 
MI, when observations are nested within individuals, where observations are 
correlated to each other, because these correlations are prone to being ignored by 
the MI process. The solution of this study is to impute the missing data with the wide 
form, but to then transform them back into the long form for analysis (Lloyd et al., 
2013). Under the wide form, all observations of individuals aged under 18 in wave 
2000 were removed due to their irrelevance to the research interests, as I discussed 
in previous chapters. This approach can completely rule out the mechanism of 
censoring data by age, which the imputation models cannot precisely reflect. 
Individuals with all five waves of observations missing were excluded, since they de 
facto provided no information for analysis regardless of imputation. 
Because the MI method takes the mean and variation of all imputations, the number 
of imputations is essential for stability. The early suggestion is five imputations to 
obtain valid inference (Kenward and Carpenter, 2007), while some argue that more 
imputations are required (Graham, 2009). In this research, the number of imputations 
is twenty, as has been commonly adopted in many recent studies (Donneau et al., 
2015, Young and Johnson, 2015, White and Carlin, 2010). The joint model (with data 
augmentation) and ICE/FCS are two methods in MI to handle non-monotone missing 
data. Because the joint model commonly applies to continuous variables (Donneau et 
al., 2015), I selected ICE/FCS, which circularly specifies a series of conditional models 
for variables with different distributions (White et al., 2011). To check the convergence 
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of the ICE/FCS algorithm, I used the chainonly option to try a single imputation for 
100 cycles. As a result, it showed that the default ten burn-in iterations were enough 
to achieve stationary distributions for the imputed data. 
For two reasons, I did not add the variable of education levels into the imputation 
model, although it has missing values. First, due to historical causes in China, 
individuals with a university or higher degree, a category of this variable, were very 
scarce relative to individuals with middle level or primary level education, especially 
in wave 2000. As a multinomial variable, it would incur insufficient observations in 
estimation for multiple imputation. Second, it may be plausible to impute the missing 
data with the highest level of education within five observations of an individual 
(although this is an ad hoc method like LOCF), since education levels are not likely to 
change for adults, and it is especially impossible to move downward. By contrast, the 
algorithm in the multiple imputation is theoretically possible to generate unrealistic 
predictions in some cases. 
The continuous variable of out-of-pocket spending includes considerable zeros and a 
long tail on the right. It would be questionable to assume that it is either a normal 
distribution or a negative binomial distribution. To solve this problem, I divided it into 
two. One is a binary variable indicating that the spending is non-zero and the other is 
a continuous variable of natural logged non-zero spending, in the logistic distribution 
and the normal distribution respectively. 
I only conducted MI once, including all the variables of interest for all my research 
questions, rather than conducting one for each dependent variable, because the 
inclusions of variables for these models are mutually applicable to each other. In 
addition, as aforementioned, an advantage of MI is that it can bring in information from 
auxiliary variables that are included in MI but excluded from the analysis. In principle, 
these auxiliary variables should be related to unit missingness (Young and Johnson, 
2015), while they should not bring in too many new missing values for technical 
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reasons. In this sense, some community variables in the CHNS that have not been 
included in the analytical models are satisfactory. Consequently, the community 
indexes of communication development and education level are included in MI as 
auxiliary variables, considering that local levels of communication and education may 
influence the follow-ups of the survey and hence determine missingness, but are not 
relevant to the research questions. 
4.2.5 Selection of imputed data 
After imputing the missing values and transforming them to the long form, there were 
a total of 98,170 (19634×5) observations, with 20 imputations for each included 
variable in MI. Some observations were whole-wave imputations, which means that 
all of the values except basic ones like ID, gender and age were computationally 
generated. Although, as aforementioned, the efficiency of whole-wave imputations is 
contested because they increase computing complexity (Young and Johnson, 2015, 
Young and Johnson, 2013, Von Hippel, 2007, Twisk et al., 2013), it is possible to gain 
efficiency as long as they bring in new information from auxiliary variables (Donneau 
et al., 2015, Young and Johnson, 2015, Twisk et al., 2013). 
This study basically kept these whole-wave imputations for the potential information 
gain. Except for possible inefficiency, few studies have reported that whole-wave 
imputations introduce bias; only one argued that it may increase individual-level 
standard errors (Von Hippel, 2007), which, however, is not the key concern of this 
research. In effect, imputing data in the wide form, as this study did, can reduce the 
inefficiency of whole-wave imputations, because it allows information to be precisely 
shared within one individual (Young and Johnson, 2015).  
However, extreme cases deserve special discussion. In the dataset, there are some 
individuals missing in up to four waves of observations. If only one-wave information 
can be referred to, it would be problematic to make inferences about over-time change. 
Exploring these units, many of them are distributed in communities from which all 
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observations came from a single wave. In fact, most of these communities belong to 
three provincial municipalities, Beijing, Shanghai and Chongqing, which were only 
sampled in 2011. Therefore, for these individuals in communities that have been 
sampled only once, neither individual variables nor community-level variables have 
more than one observation. 
Accordingly, I dropped all units in the communities that only appeared in one wave of 
the survey. As a result, all observations in 76 communities were removed among the 
total of 297 communities, including all 72 communities of the three provincial 
municipalities. This method hopes to mitigate possible trouble in aggregate-level 
inference and maintain information for analytical models as much as possible. Though 
some real observations were excluded from the analysis, full information has been 
exploited through MI and stored in the imputed values. On the other hand, I kept the 
individuals who had only one observation but the communities that they belonged to 
had data of more than one wave. One reason for this is that in this dataset there are 
several community-level variables, which can provide the vacancies of individual data 
with external information through the process of MI. As discussed previously, this 
could make an improvement to the efficiency of inference (Donneau et al., 2015, 
Young and Johnson, 2015, Twisk et al., 2013). Another reason is that the number of 
these individuals is very small, meaning that this is no real issue with longitudinal 
models. 
4.2.6 Sensitivity tests for imputed data 
A sensitivity test was conducted by fitting full-variable three-level models using 
maximum likelihood estimation for PHI enrolment using CCA (Model 1), all 
imputations (Model 2), imputations excluding single-observation units (Model 3) and 
imputations excluding single-observation communities (Model 4) (Table 4.3). The 
dataset used in Model 4 is the very dataset that has been described above and it will 
be used in following research. Model 1 and Model 2 represent two extreme cases of 
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handling missingness. Model 3 is a more conservative method, alternative to that 
used in Model 4. 
As a result, despite the different numbers of included observations, individuals and 
communities, the outcome profiles of all four models appear consistent. Except minor 
variations for a few items, there is little difference in sign, significance or magnitude 
of fixed effects among the four models. This suggests that the fixed-effect part of the 
model is robust, regardless of how many imputed data are included. In terms of the 
random-effect part, counting in imputed data predictably increases individual-level 
variance (Von Hippel, 2007). Compared to the CCA model (Model 1), where the 
individual-level variance is far less than the community-level variance, in Model 2 the 
individual-level variance rises to as much as the community-level variance. Expansion 
of observations is a reason. As some observations are removed in Model 3 and Model 
4, the individual-level variances reduce to be explicitly less than community-level 
variance. 
Accordingly, there would be little difference between the inferences drawn from these 
models, except that based on the random effects of Model 2, the model with all 
imputations. Using different strategies for screening data, Model 3 and Model 4 would 
lead to similar inferences, while Model 4 takes more information into account than 
Model 3. As discussed above, with the notion of exploiting information as much as 
possible, the dataset used in Model 4 is preferable to that in Model 3. 
 
Table 4.3 The sensitivity test for selection of imputed data     











Communities  297  297  221  221 
Individuals  17,985  19,634  12,019  16,351 
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Observations  46,765  97,120  60,095  80,471 
Coefficient (S.D.) 
Cons  ‐4.96(0.59)***  ‐4.85(0.57)***  ‐4.72(0.60)***  ‐3.96(0.60)*** 
Year  Reference = 2000 
2004  ‐2.19(0.10)***  ‐1.98(0.11)***  ‐2.14(0.12)***  ‐2.08(0.11)*** 
2006  ‐2.27(0.10)***  ‐2.05(0.14)***  ‐2.20(0.11)***  ‐2.07(0.11)*** 
2009  ‐2.05(0.10)***  ‐2.12(0.13)***  ‐2.11(0.11)***  ‐2.04(0.10)*** 
2011 (Post‐2009)  ‐1.86(0.10)***  ‐1.92(0.10)***  ‐1.90(0.11)***  ‐1.85(0.11)*** 
Age  0.06(0.01)***  0.04(0.01)***  0.06(0.01)***  0.05(0.01)*** 
Age2  0.00(0.00)***  ‐0.00(0.00)***  ‐0.00(0.00)***  ‐0.00(0.00)*** 
Gender  ‐0.04(0.05)  ‐0.06(0.06)  ‐0.05(0.06)  ‐0.05(0.06) 
Chronic diseases  0.08(0.07)  0.05(0.07)  0.10(0.07)  0.05(0.07) 
Household income  0.22(0.03)***  0.24(0.03)***  0.19(0.04)***  0.20(0.03)*** 
Household size  ‐0.08(0.02)**  ‐0.10(0.02)***  ‐0.08(0.03)**  ‐0.08(0.02)** 
Education    Reference = no or primary school 
Middle or tech  0.28(0.07)***  0.18(0.06)**  0.30(0.07)***  0.21(0.07)** 
University  0.46(0.11)***  0.40(0.10)***  0.45(0.12)***  0.38(0.10)*** 
Working  0.10(0.07)  0.23(0.07)**  0.20(0.07)**  0.20(0.07)** 
Hukou  ‐0.42(0.10)***  ‐0.45(0.12)**  ‐0.46(0.13)**  ‐0.47(0.12)*** 
SHI    Reference = no SHI 
FMS  1.79(0.09)***  1.70(0.08)***  1.84(0.09)***  1.80(0.08)*** 
Urban SHI    0.41(0.09)***  0.60(0.13)***  0.63(0.12)***  0.59(0.11)*** 
NCMS  1.07(0.10)***  1.47(0.10)***  1.38(0.11)***  1.31(0.09)*** 
Aggregate variables 
Geographies‡    Reference = east 
Northeast  ‐0.45(0.22)*  ‐0.39(0.16)*  ‐0.41(0.21) Ɨ  ‐0.45 (0.20)* 
Midland  ‐0.87(0.20)***  ‐0.77(0.15)***  ‐0.81(0.19)***  ‐0.83(0.18)*** 
West  ‐0.95(0.21)***  ‐0.81(0.16)***  ‐0.79(0.22)***  ‐0.85(0.21)*** 
Community types ‡  Reference = city 
Suburb  ‐0.30(0.24)  ‐0.47(0.18)*  ‐0.52(0.24)*  ‐0.60(0.23)** 
Town  ‐0.64(0.22)**  ‐0.67(0.17)***  ‐0.70(0.24)**  ‐0.76(0.22)** 
Village  ‐1.59(0.23)***  ‐1.59(0.20)***  ‐1.76(0.26)***  ‐1.78(0.23)*** 
Population  0.01(0.04)  0.04(0.04)  ‐0.01(0.05)  ‐0.03(0.04) 
Social services    ‐0.04(0.01)**  ‐0.02(0.01) Ɨ  ‐0.02(0.01) Ɨ  ‐0.02(0.01) Ɨ 
Health infrastructure  0.05(0.02)**  0.05(0.01)**  0.06(0.02)**  0.04(0.02)* 
Random effect: Variance (S.D.) 
Community‐level  1.13(0.15)***  0.53(0.07)***  0.81(0.13)***  0.70(0.11)*** 










This section outlines the statistical strategies for the multiply-imputed data. Generally, 
multilevel models were applied to the prevalence of PHI and PHI’s impact on 
healthcare utilisation. Nonetheless, for analyses of financial protection, other methods 
were employed due to the trade-off between the suitable analytical models for health 
expenditure data and the technical limitations of the statistical techniques. This 
section focuses on presenting the rationales for the choice of these analytical 
strategies and the basic processes of modelling the data. Some details of these 
processes are specified in the corresponding results chapters. 
4.3.1 Basic framework of modelling 
The choice of multilevel modelling was basically determined by the structure of the 
data, which is longitudinal rather than multiple cross-sectional. After multiple 
imputation, the panel data become balanced. That means that each individual has 
five observations. The observations within one individual cannot be assumed to be 
independent of each other. Likewise, individuals cannot be considered to be randomly 
sampled from the entire population, but instead they are actually nested in 
communities selected with the stratification method. Thus, it would be better to treat 
the individuals and communities as levels rather than to ignore their inner structure. 
Accordingly, in the multilevel models, observations are the primary units, placed at 
the first level. The time variable, indicating when the observation was collected (2000, 
2004, 2006, 2009 or 2011) is the sole first-level variable. Furthermore, every five 
observations are nested in one individual, at the second level. All the individual and 
household variables identified by the last chapter belong to this level. The 
communities (neighbourhoods) are defined to be the third and the highest level, 
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because communities are primary sampling units (PSUs) of the CHNS, a multistage, 
stratified-sampling survey. Most of the aggregate variables in effect describe the 
characteristics of the communities, including the variable of urban and rural 
classification and the selected community development indexes. 
Theoretically, provinces could have been the fourth level of this model. However, 
adding a level to a model would dramatically increase computation complexity on the 
one hand, and the number of provinces (nine) in CHNS is not theoretically sufficient 
to form the level of a multilevel model on the other (Centre for Multilevel Modelling, 
2017). Instead, this study used the geography of the province as an aggregate 
variable to capture variance between coastal provinces and inland provinces. 






The structure above means that the longitudinal data are pooled across five time-
points, with an additional level of communities. This is a common approach to 
analysing longitudinal data with a hierarchical structure (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 
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2012: 385), where the random effects estimator is applied to the estimation of both 
the individual and the community-level variations. 
It is worth justifying the application of random effects estimator to modelling 
longitudinal data at first, because either random effects models or fixed effects models 
are possible, with different assumptions on the unobserved unit (individual) specific 
effects. By comparison, fixed effects models relax the assumption of exogeneity 
(covariates are uncorrelated with the unobserved unit specific effects), which random 
effects models stick to. The Hausman test can test this assumption (Hausman, 1978). 
The outcome of the Hausman test is either no systematic difference between the 
estimates of the fixed effects model and the random effects model (the null 
hypothesis), or the fixed effects model is preferred to the random effects model, 
because the fixed effects model is based on a looser assumption. 
Notwithstanding the different assumptions, we could not rush to the conclusion that 
the fixed effects model is a safer choice than the random effects model in all 
circumstances. The first and primary advantage of the random effects model over the 
fixed effects model is that the random effects model can estimate effects of unit-level 
covariates, although a much greater number of units is required. The second 
advantage of the random effects model is that it has a loose requirement of the 
minimum number of observations within one unit, while the fixed effects model needs 
at least two (and the larger the better) within-unit observations to estimate the 
intercepts of units (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012: 159). 
For the CHNS data, the number of units (individuals) is far more than sufficient for the 
requirement of the random effects model, whereas there are only five observations 
within each individual, not quite ideal for the fixed effects model. In addition, this data 
structure implies within-individual variation is modest, relative to between-individual 
variation, under which circumstances choosing the random effect model may be 
advisable (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012: 158). More importantly, the within-
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individual effects, as well as the between-individual effects, are of interest to this study. 
Nonetheless, the fixed effects model would prevent this study from investigating the 
effects of the variables without over-time change within the individual, particularly 
aggregate variables. 
Finally, due to multiply-imputed data and the limitations of the statistical software’s 
algorithms, the Hausman test is not applied in this study. After multiple imputation, 
twenty imputations were created, but the command built in Stata, hausman, is not 
compatible with multiply-imputed data so far. Although carrying out such a test for 
each imputation of the data is feasible, it would be challenging to interpret the 
outcomes of twenty imputations together. After all, despite the absence of the 
Hausman test, after the discussion above, it may be justifiable enough to use random 
effect models, instead of fixed effects models, because the need of the study far 
outweighs the outcome of a simple test. In fact, while fixed effects models are popular 
in economics, many studies on health, education, psychology, etc. emphasising 
between-individual variation, simply select random effects models without reporting 
the outcome of the Hausman test (Hong and Raudenbush, 2006, Kim et al., 2006, 
Quene and van den Bergh, 2008, Yang and Land, 2006).  
4.3.3 Model specifications 
The specification involves the basic components of modelling, such as the type of the 
model, the link of the equation, and the inclusion of variables. To avoid repetition in 
presentation, more delicate operations are elaborated in the corresponding results 
chapters, near their outcomes. It is worth noting that wording in the following results 
chapters, where if “effect”, “impact” or “chance” is mentioned, it refers to a statistical 




Following the brief descriptive analyses of the over-time change of PHI enrolment 
data and the composition of PHI policy-holders, the multivariate regression models 
with the dependent variable of PHI enrolment were fitted. Because the dependent 
variable is a binary variable, the link of the equation is the logit estimator. For random 
effects, only the interval was allowed to vary between communities, because adding 
random slopes would increase the complexity of computation so dramatically that the 
model would struggle to converge, and this study has no particular interest in the 
individual-level or community-level random effects of any independent variable since 
the focus is PHI. 
In terms of the inclusion of independent variables, the SHI variable is the most 
important explanatory variable. Besides, the time variable and most of the defined 
individual variables in the last chapter were included, except the variable of health 
status (whether ill or injured in the past four weeks of the survey), which appears 
irrelevant to PHI enrolment. Regarding the aggregate variables, as stated in the 
conceptualisation, in addition to the variables of geography and community type 
(urban/rural), three indexes of the population density, the availability of social services 
and the health infrastructure in the community were included. 
Models for healthcare utilisation 
Because the dependent variable is also a binary variable, like that in the models on 
the prevalence of PHI, the logit model was also applied. Based on the structure of 
multilevel modelling, unlike modelling PHI prevalence using solely the random-interval 
models, for healthcare utilisation, both the random-interval models and the random-
slope models with the effect of the variable of PHI enrolment varying among 
communities were tried, depending on the specific question being answered. 
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In terms of the inclusion of independent variables, most independent variables of the 
models for PHI prevalence and the models for healthcare utilisation are alike. The 
difference is that, first and most importantly, the variable of PHI enrolment, the 
dependent variable of the former models, is included as a key independent variable 
in the latter ones. Second, the variable of health status was included, because it is an 
indicator of the need for healthcare, theoretically correlated with the use of healthcare. 
Furthermore, this variable was used to interact with the variables of PHI enrolment 
and SHI enrolment, respectively and simultaneously, to examine the effects of these 
health insurance schemes and their combination on healthcare utilisation at different 
conditions of need. Third, the group of aggregate variables indicating development of 
the community were changed to the three indexes of the quality of health facilities, 
the transportation infrastructure and economy. 
Models for financial protection 
The dependent variable, OOP payment for healthcare, is a heavily skewed and 
censored continuous variable with many zeros, making the choice of models and 
estimators sophisticated. After weighing up various options and balancing their pros 
and cons, the sample-selection Heckman-probit model and the zero-inflated negative 
binomial (ZINB) model were selected, in order to overcome the issues of data 
selection, heteroskedasticity and normality. Due to technical restrictions, the method 
of multilevel modelling did not apply to these models. Instead, variance component 
estimation (VCE) in which observations were specified to be clustered in the individual, 
was used, in order to deal with the longitudinal structure of the data. The justification 
for this is elaborated in the corresponding results chapter (see section 7.1). 
The two types of models both require transformations of the dependent variable. For 
the Heckman model, the original dependent variable was transformed into two 
variables – whether the OOP payments were more than the median of all OOP 
payments and whether the OOP payments were more than the 90th percentile of all 
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OOP payments – to indicate moderate and high financial risks, respectively. 
Admittedly, transforming the continuous variable to the binary variables inevitably led 
to information loss. The ZINB model, where the dependent variable was merely 
rounded into integers as counts by taking the ceilings from the original continuous 
variable, was applied to complement the Heckman model. 
For the inclusion of the independent variables, both the Heckman model and the ZINB 
model involve two equations. Regarding the Heckman model, the first equation, or 
the selection equation on utilisation, is effectively the same as the previous model for 
healthcare utilisation, and hence the inclusion of independent variables should be 
basically identical. Mathematically the first equation of the Heckman model must 
include at least one variable that is not included in the second equation (Heckman, 
1979). Except this one, other independent variables in the equation on OOP payments 
and those in the equation on the utilisation can be the same, as the two dependent 
variables share very similar determinants (Liu et al., 2011a, You and Kobayashi, 
2011). Consequently, the variable of health status was only included in the first 
equation, because it is supposed to determine seeing a doctor, but it has relatively 
little influence on OOP payments, which are more likely to be determined by the 
doctor’s decision, affluence and insurance coverage, instead. This assumption is 
supported by the correlation analysis presented in the results chapter (see section 
7.3). 
The ZINB model’s first equation estimates the occurrence of zero OOP payment and 
the second equation estimates the positive OOP payments as counts. The occurrence 
of zero OOP payment as the dependent variable of the first equation resembles the 
model for healthcare utilisation, because the latter to a great extent determines 
whether the OOP payment is zero. In this study the ZINB model’s independent 
variables are exactly the same as the Heckman model for easy cross-reference, 
although it has no such requirement for different numbers of independent variables 
between two equations as the Heckman model does (Min and Agresti, 2002). On top 
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of these, aggregate community indexes included in both the models for the prevalence 
of PHI and healthcare utilisation were included in the models for the OOP health 
payment, for the reason that has been presented previously (section 3.3.2). The 
included variables are summarised in the following table (Table 4.4). 
Finally, the analysis of daily protein intake to examine the impacts on living standards 
was introduced to complement the aspect of financial protection that OOP payments 
do not reflect. Because the grams of protein that individuals consume daily basically 
follow a normal distribution, three-level linear models are selected, using the same 
structure described as above. As a part of analysis of financial protection, inclusion of 






















Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Prevalence  Utilisation  Financial protection 
Dependent variable 
PHI  81,755  0.05  0.31  0  1  +     
Healthcare utilisation  81,755  0.13  0.50  0  1    +  +* 
OOP payments > 50%  10,099†  0.50  0.56  0  1      +‡ 
OOP payments > 90%  10,099  0.10  0.31  0  1      +‡ 
OOP payment = 0  81,755  0.16  0.53  0  1      +§ 
OOP payments as counts  81,755  155.53  2982.43  0  90543      +‖ 






Geography  81,755  East = 21.94%; Inland = 78.06%  +  +  + 
Community type  81,755  Urban = 35.41%; Rural = 64.59%  +  +  + 
Population  80,471  6.01  1.45  0.5  10  +    + 
Social services  80,471  3.16  2.77  0  10  +    + 
Health infrastructure  80,471  5.63  2.46  0  10  +  +  + 
Transportation  80,300  5.65  2.39  0  10    +  + 
Economic activity  80,471  6.29  3.29  0  10    +  + 
Individual variables 
Demographic variables 





Gender  81,755  0.48  0.50  0  1  +  +  + 
Household size  81,755  3.96  1.89  1  13  +  +  + 
Socioeconomic variables 




Hukou  81,755  0.55  0.60  0  1  +  +  + 
working  81,755  0.62  0.68  0  1  +  +  + 
Need variables       
Chronic diseases  81,755  0.17  0.57  0  1  +  +  + 


















Disaggregation is a tool to reflect inequality (Boerma et al., 2014). In this study, as 
aforementioned, following the models on the whole, the population were further 
divided into four subpopulations by two dichotomies, i.e. east and inland provinces, 
and urban and rural communities. Consequently, there are four subpopulations, i.e. 
the urban east, the rural east, the urban inland and the rural inland, with 26, 49, 50 
and 96 communities at the aggregate level, respectively (Table 4.5). Then, four 
models, with the same structure and the same variables as the model on the whole, 
were fitted for the four subpopulations, respectively. 
 
Table 4.5 The numbers of communities and observations after disaggregation 
  East  Inland  Total 
Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural 
Communities  26  49  50  96  221 
Observations  9,365  17,470  19,585  35,335  81,755 
 
In principle, the early literature recommends a minimum number of 25 higher-level 
clusters (communities in this study) to obtain a precise estimate of between-unit 
variance (Paterson and Goldstein, 1991). Some later rules of thumb reduce this 
number to 15 (Centre for Multilevel Modelling, 2017). In any case, all subpopulations 
in this study meet this requirement. In terms of the effective number of within-cluster 
observations, there is another 25 as a rule of thumb (Paterson and Goldstein, 1991). 
The within-community individuals of this study are far more than enough: each 
community has about 70 individuals.  
Additionally, to examine the contextual effects of PHI on average utilisation and OOP 
payments in the community, the percentage of PHI enrolees in the community was 
calculated to indicate PHI’s coverage level in the community. For reference and 
control, SHI’s coverage level and the average health level in the community were also 
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calculated. All these newly-created community variables were added to the 
corresponding earlier models as additional independent variables, to investigate 
whether the effect of the health insurance scheme had extended from its enrolees to 
the entire local community. 
4.3.5 Model sensitivity tests 
Sensitivity tests were conducted to test the robustness of the coefficient estimates of 
the analytical models based on the whole sample, to alternations in the conditioning 
set of information. Except the analytical models, those that were almost the same as 
the analytical models but excluded demographic variables and socioeconomic 
variables, separately, were fitted as the test models to compare the coefficients of the 
variables of interest among the three. For full information, see Appendix B. Briefly 
speaking, for the models for PHI prevalence and financial risk, the coefficient profiles 
are almost similar in the analytical models and their corresponding test models. For 
the model for healthcare utilisation, despite differences in the substance of some 
variables between the analytical model and the test model excluding demographic 
variables and health status, significance and signs are basically unchanged. These 













This chapter investigates the prevalence of private health insurance (PHI) in line with 
the breadth dimension of the coverage model, i.e. the population or who is covered 
(Boerma et al., 2014). Indeed, the prevalence is the foundation of health insurance as 
it decides the extent to which the whole system is impacted. The advocates of PHI, 
who believe in its capacity for benefiting the health financing system and preventing 
financial risk for individuals (Preker, 2007: 6, Sekhri and Savedoff, 2007: 241-242), 
would be worried about a low prevalence of PHI along with a shortage of public 
coverage, which would mean a high level of dangerous out-of-pocket (OOP) 
payments. However, the main concern of PHI’s critics is that it tends to 
disproportionally cover rich or privileged people and transfer medical resource from 
those with the most needs to their affluent policyholders (Colombo, 2007: 225-226, 
Bos and Waters, 2008). 
Chinese policymakers have defined PHI as an important complement to the publicly-
run social health insurance (SHI) (State Council, 2014b, Xiang, 2014), which has 
expanded substantially during the health reforms, but which still leaves considerable 
gaps in coverage, especially in height and depth (Yip et al., 2012). Since 2000 in 
China, PHI insurers’ total premium income has increased year on year, supplying 
products ranging from substitutive to complementary or supplementary (EY, 2016b, 
Luo et al., 2016). Many academics believe that PHI can develop well with SHI and 
properly address the gaps left by SHI (Li, 2009, Lv, 2013, Zhu and Gui, 2014, Wang 
et al., 2015). 
PHI in China is nevertheless not immune from the two concerns presented in the first 
paragraph. The literature review of this thesis shows that PHI’s prevalence is low and 
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increases slowly on the one hand, and an unequal distribution of PHI in favour of the 
rich has been well documented on the other. The literature review also finds that the 
current body of literature relies heavily on provincial administrative data, which 
measure insurers’ total income from PHI premiums instead of real enrolment. By 
contrast, the more pertinent individual-level studies give mixed evidence. 
Consequently, so far it has been difficult to clarify the reasons for the slow growth of 
PHI prevalence, as well as the extent to which PHI has been distributed unequally. 
This impedes weighing the advantages and disadvantages of PHI in China’s UHC 
movement at the first step. 
To overcome these problems, this study uses large-scale individual-level data with 
longitudinal, multilevel analyses. It hopes to provide an innovative and comprehensive 
perspective to investigate PHI prevalence and its determinants, linking to policies to 
interpret the mechanisms behind the prevalence and its consequences for equity. The 
first section shows a step-by-step approach of adding individual (or household) 
variables to the longitudinal, mixed model, followed by section two, in which the 
community level is combined with aggregate variables. After establishing the 
multilevel model, the third section disaggregates the whole population to four 
subpopulations to examine the spatial inequality. The fourth section investigates the 
temporal change of the effects of PHI’s determinants, focusing on SHI. 
 
5.1 The individual‐level model 
This section starts with a descriptive analysis of the individual variables in the model. 
Afterwards, the model on PHI enrolment is fitted step by step.  
5.1.1 Descriptive analysis 
The binary variable indicating whether the individual had PHI at the time the survey 
proceeded is the dependent variable. The key independent variable is membership of 
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SHI, which is a categorical variable that consists of no SHI (reference), government 
employees’ Free Medical Scheme (FMS), urban SHI schemes and rural New 
Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS).23 As the summary of the model’s individual 
variables shows (Table 5.1), between 2000 and 2011 in general, about 5% of the total 
sample were covered by PHI, while 55.67% were covered by SHI. 
 
Table 5.1 Overview of individual model variables     
Variable  Description  Mean (S.D.)  Min./Max. 
Dependent Variable 
PHI  Whether was covered by private health insurance  0.05 (0.31)  0/1 
Independent Variable 
2004  The year 2004 or not  0.20 (0.40)  0/1 
2006  The year 2006 or not  0.20 (0.40)  0/1 
2009  The year 2009 or not  0.20 (0.40)  0/1 
2011  The year 2011 or not  0.20 (0.40)  0/1 
Age    Years old  48.10 (16.33)  18/112 
Gender  Male or not  0.48 (0.50)  0/1 
Chronic 
diseases   
Whether  had  a  history  of  chronic  diseases,  including 













Working  Whether was working    0.62 (0.68)  0/1 












Looking at the prevalence change of SHI as a whole and PHI over time (Figure 5.1), 
both stood at low levels in 2000. After a slow increase between 2000 and 2004, SHI 
experienced a rapid expansion between 2004 and 2009, reaching a very high 
population coverage in 2011. On the contrary, the prevalence of PHI greatly dropped 
between 2000 and 2004, and very slowly increased afterwards, from 2.47% in 2004 
to 3.59% in 2011, according to the CHNS data. From PHI advocates’ point of view, 
given the long-lasting insufficient benefits of SHI coverage by UHC’s standard, the lag 
in PHI prevalence needs policy attention (Gu, 2009b, Xiang, 2014), although for PHI 
sceptics this may not be a problem per se (Kutzin et al., 2016). 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Percentages of PHI enrolees and SHI enrolees as a whole  in  the population  in 
China over time. Data source: CHNS; N = 81,755. 
 
Before modelling, the correlation matrix describes the relations between PHI 
enrolment and individual variables (Table 5.2), based on the pooled data. Varying in 
strength, being male, having chronic disease history, with higher household gross 
income, being highly educated and presently working are positively correlated to PHI 
enrolment, while age, household size and rural hukou are negatively correlated to PHI 
enrolment. Paying attention to the three SHI schemes, the government’s FMS has a 
relatively strong positive correlation with PHI enrolment (r = 0.22), while the other 
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two’s correlations with PHI are weak (urban SHI: r = 0.02; NCMS: r = -0.04). In addition, 
the FMS and the urban SHI are correlated with higher socioeconomic status, such as 
a higher household income, a smaller household size and a higher education level, 
while the NCMS tends to have an opposite correlation with these socioeconomic 
variables, except household income. This suggests that compared to other SHI 






























Education  Working  Hukou  FMS  Urban SHI  NCMS 
PHI  1.00                       
Age  ‐0.04  1.00                     
Gender  0.01  ‐0.00  1.00                   
Chronic diseases  0.00  0.35  0.01  1.00                 
Household income  0.06  ‐0.07  0.01  0.01  1.00               
Household size  ‐0.05  ‐0.18  ‐0.00  ‐0.10  0.23  1.00             
Education  0.10  ‐0.40  0.15  ‐0.10  0.19  ‐0.03  1.00           
Working  0.03  ‐0.46  0.16  ‐0.23  0.14  0.09  0.17  1.00         
Hukou  ‐0.14  ‐0.11  ‐0.01  ‐0.13  ‐0.12  0.19  ‐0.30  0.24  1.00       
FMS  0.22  0.05  0.06  0.06  0.09  ‐0.08  0.17  ‐0.02  ‐0.27  1.00     
Urban SHI  0.02  0.14  0.02  0.13  0.20  ‐0.14  0.20  ‐0.13  ‐0.49  ‐0.13  1.00   













The following set of longitudinal, mixed-effect models has two levels: observations 
within individual at level one, and individuals at level two. As Table 5.3 shows, Model 
1 only includes the time variables, which shows that adjusting the longitudinal 
relationship between the observations and the individuals, the correlation of the 
survey year with PHI enrolment dramatically decreased between 2000 and 2004, but 
started to rise after 2004, in line with the trend in the descriptive chart (Figure 5.1). 
When counting in age (and squared age, as the literature suggests that the 
relationship between age and PHI enrolment is quadratic (Liu and Wang, 2012, Zang 
et al., 2012, Zhu and Yu, 2015, Yuan et al., 2014, Li et al., 2012a)) and gender, in 
Model 2, the significant time effect still exists, and age shows a negative quadratic 
relationship with PHI enrolment. Further, adding the chronic diseases variable to 
Model 3, all previously significant coefficients hold, and the new variable has a positive 
correlation with PHI enrolment. 
In Model 4 (Table 5.3), the effects of household income and the household size are 
both significant. The former is positively associated with PHI enrolment, while the 
latter is negatively associated with it. Given the household income, a larger household 
size means lower income per capita and hence a weaker ability to buy PHI. This is 
consistent with a large number of previous studies (Liu and Wang, 2012, Zang et al., 
2012, Liu et al., 2011b, Xu et al., 2013, Dong and Zhao, 2013, Wang et al., 2015, Zhu 
and Yu, 2015, Wang, 2011, Wang, 2009, Li et al., 2012a, Zhu and Gui, 2014). It is 
worth noting that adding the two variables reduces the coefficients of the time 
variables, especially 2009 and 2011, suggesting that the over-time variation in PHI 
appears to have been partly offset by rising affluence in the whole population. 




Model 5 continues to include the variables of education levels, working status and 
hukou, all demonstrating significant effects (Table 5.3). The first two are positively 
associated with PHI enrolment while the rural hukou is negatively associated with it. 
In addition, adding the new variables reduces the magnitude of the effect of chronic 
diseases. With reference to the correlation table (Table 5.3), the correlation between 
having a diagnostic history of chronic diseases and PHI enrolment may be partly 
explained by the working status and hukou. On top of these, overall, step-by-step 
adding variables hardly reduces the significance levels of old variables (except the 
significance value of the chronic diseases variable, which reduces from p≤0.01 to 
p≤0.10). 
Finally adding the SHI variable, compared to no SHI, all types of SHI schemes are 
significantly positively correlated with PHI enrolment (Table 5.3: Model 6). In addition, 
the result suggests that by comparison the FMS members had the highest association 
with PHI enrolment (OR = 7.38, 95% CI 6.27 – 8.66 ), and the rural NCMS members 
had higher association with PHI enrolment (OR = 5.80, 95% CI 4.87 – 6.91) than 
urban SHI members (OR = 2.74, 95% CI 2.23 – 3.36).24 This is inconsistent with the 
correlation table (Table 5.2), which shows higher PHI prevalence among the urban 
SHI members than among NCMS members. The possible explanation is that the 
relatively low prevalence of PHI within the NCMS members could be attributed to 
some associated individual characteristics, such as being younger, poorer and less 
educated than their urban counterparts. After controlling for these characteristics, the 
NCMS membership itself actually provided greater momentum to PHI enrolment than 
urban SHI schemes. 
Moreover, adding the SHI variable does not heavily impact the significance of most 
other independent variables, but reduces their magnitude because the SHI variable 
                                                
24 OR = odds ratio; CI = confidence interval 
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is more or less correlated to other variables in this model, and thus may partly explain 
the variation that could have been explained by them. The coefficient of working status 
becomes insignificant after adding the SHI variable. This could be attributed to the 
institutions of China’s SHI system, where occupation strongly determines which SHI 
scheme the individual belongs to (Liang and Langenbrunner, 2013) (for details see 
Section 1.2.1). 
In terms of random effects, variance at the individual level gradually reduces from 
Model 2 to Model 6 (from 1.86 to 0.74), which means that as new independent 
variables are added step by step, more and more variation at the individual level has 
been explained by the included variables. The individual-level variance partition 
coefficients (VPCs)25 are 0.35, 0.36, 0.36, 0.28, 0.22 and 0.18 from Model 1 to Model 
6, respectively, suggesting that the residual variation attributed to unobserved 
individual characteristics reduces from about 35% to 18% of total variation from Model 
1 to Model 6. As VPC starts to drop relatively fast after adding socioeconomic 
variables and the SHI variable, this suggests that these variables have relatively 

















Table 5.3 Individual‐level mixed‐effect models for PHI prevalence       
Model  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Fixed effect: coefficient (S.D.) 
Year  Reference = 2000
2004  ‐2.07(0.11)*** ‐2.12(0.11)*** ‐2.12(0.11)***  ‐2.22(0.11)*** ‐2.21(0.11)*** ‐2.25(0.11)***
2006  ‐2.06(0.09)*** ‐2.11(0.10)*** ‐2.11(0.09)***  ‐2.25(0.10)*** ‐2.23(0.10)*** ‐2.37(0.10)***
2009  ‐1.80(0.08)*** ‐1.86(0.08)*** ‐1.87(0.08)***  ‐2.18(0.09)*** ‐2.10(0.09)*** ‐2.49(0.10)***
2011  ‐1.65(0.08)*** ‐1.71(0.08)*** ‐1.72(0.08)***  ‐2.06(0.09)*** ‐1.99(0.08)*** ‐2.36(0.09)***
Age  0.10(0.01)*** 0.10(0.01)*** 0.08(0.01)*** 0.08(0.01)*** 0.06(0.01)***
Age2  ‐0.00(0.00)*** ‐0.00(0.00)***  ‐0.00(0.00)*** ‐0.00(0.00)*** ‐0.00(0.00)***
Gender  0.10(0.06) 0.09(0.06) 0.07(0.06) ‐0.04(0.06) ‐0.09(0.06)
Chronic diseases  0.31(0.07)*** 0.25(0.07)** 0.13(0.07)Ɨ 0.11(0.07)
Household income  0.53(0.03)*** 0.37(0.03)*** 0.28(0.03)***
Household size  ‐0.26(0.02)*** ‐0.16(0.02)*** ‐0.12(0.02)***
Education  Reference = no or primary school
Middle or tech    0.42(0.07)*** 0.28(0.07)***
University    0.86(0.10)*** 0.54(0.10)***
Working    0.20(0.07)** 0.06(0.07)














This section continues to model PHI enrolment by adding the community level and 
aggregate variables. It likewise starts with the descriptive analysis of aggregate-level 
factors. 
5.2.1 Descriptive analysis 
The community, or neighbourhood, is the primary sampling unit of the CHNS, where 
sampled individuals with their households are consistently clustered in the same 
communities during the five waves of survey26, as mobility leads to unit non-response. 
In this study, the community is selected as the top level of the model. 
Along with the community level are aggregate-level variables. One is the geography 
variable, indicating whether the east areas or the inland areas of China the community 
belongs to. Another is the community type variable, indicating whether it is an urban 
or rural community. Apart from these, there are three variables acting as the PHI-
prevalence-related community development indexes (all are continuous, ranging 
between 0 and 10), indicating levels of population density, social services and health 
infrastructure in the community, respectively. The choice and rationales for these 
variables are elaborated in Section 3.3.2. 
The three community development indexes are summarised in the crosstab of 
geographies and community types (Table 5.4). Most evidently, it is shown that they 
all tend to be the highest in the urban east and the lowest in the rural inland, except 
the level of social services, in which communities of the urban inland performed 
slightly better than their counterparts in the urban east. This suggests that in general 
the more affluent east and urban areas are also more developed than the inland and 
rural areas with respect to these indices. 





  East  Inland  Total 
Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural 
Population density  7.40(1.23)  5.95(1.17)  6.64(1.23)  5.30(1.32)  5.99(1.45) 
Social services  4.60(3.23)  2.50(2.50)  4.66(3.08)  2.30(1.97)  3.15(2.76) 
Health infrastructure  7.16(1.64)  5.47(2.28)  6.63(2.06)  4.76(2.53)  5.62(2.46) 
Data  source: CHNS  (2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, 2011); N = 80,471  (A  few communities have missing 






Furthermore, summarising PHI enrolment and SHI enrolment by the geography 
variable and the community type variable (Table 5.5), it can be seen that the 
distribution of PHI tilts towards east and urban areas. The enrolment rate of PHI in 
the urban east is five times greater than that in the rural inland. The enrolment rates 
of the FMS and the urban SHI are much higher in urban areas than in rural areas, 
while the NCMS members are concentrated in rural areas. Additionally, the enrolment 
rates of all SHI schemes tend to be higher in the east than inland. 
 
Table 5.5 The summary of SHI and PHI prevalence by geographies and community types 
  East  Inland  Total 
Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural 
PHI  0.10(0.00)  0.07(0.00)  0.08(0.00)  0.02(0.00)  0.05(0.00) 
FMS  0.15(0.00)  0.05(0.00)  0.13(0.00)  0.02(0.00)  0.06(0.00) 
Urban SHI  0.46(0.01)  0.16(0.00)  0.37(0.00)  0.05(0.00)  0.20(0.00) 








Adding the community level alone, as is shown in Model 7 (Table 5.6), magnitude of 
the effects of most existing variables in the two-level model reduce after adding the 
third level. This means that the effects of individual and time variations have been 
partially attributed to community-level variance. However, adding the third level does 
not impact the significance and direction of these individual variables, except the 
positive effect of the working status, which reaches significance again.  
Adding the variables of geographies and community types at the second step, the 
positive effects of eastern and urban communities on individuals’ PHI enrolment are 
both significant (east versus inland: OR = 2.33, 95% CI 1.72 – 3.17; urban versus 
rural: 2.84, 95% CI 2.05 – 3.94) (Table 5.6: Model 8). This means that for those living 
in the east and urban areas of China, the odds of being enrolled into PHI were 2.33 
and 2.84 times as large as the odds for those living in the inland and rural areas of 
China being enrolled into PHI, respectively. Corroborating the finding in the literature 
review (Section 2.3.2) with more sufficient evidence, this suggests that in addition to 
its well-known distribution in favour of high socioeconomic status, after controlling for 
individual characteristics, PHI distribution is still in favour of more affluent areas in 
China, even if SHI schemes generally have better coverage in these areas, too (Meng 
et al., 2012, Suo et al., 2015, Liang and Langenbrunner, 2013). 
Finally, the model includes the three community development indices. The 
community’s health infrastructure level has a significantly positive coefficient (OR = 
1.05, 95% CI 1.01 – 1.08). This suggests that better health infrastructure may facilitate 
the use of health services and hence raise the demand for PHI, to cover the rising 
costs. The community’s social services availability (including health insurance) has a 
marginally significantly negative correlation with PHI enrolment (OR = 0.98, 95% CI 
0.96 – 1.00) (Table 5.6: Model 9). This may be interpreted as meaning that the feeling 
of having better social security reduces the demand for PHI. The coefficient of the 
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community population density is not significant. After adding these aggregate 
variables, the coefficients of individual variables almost remain the same, except time 
effects, which slightly reduce, possibly because the development indices change over 
time. 
In terms of random effects, adding the community level more than halves variance at 
the individual level from 0.74 to 0.32, suggesting that the individual variance can be 
explained in part by the community variation. In addition, adding community variables 
such as geographies, community types and community development indices 
gradually reduces the community-level random effect, because some of the effect has 
been explained by these variables. According to Model 9 (Table 5.6), the complete 
three-level model, the community-level VPC equals 0.19 and the individual-level VPC 
equals 0.07, which means that finally in the model 19% and 7% of variation in PHI 




Model  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9 
Fixed effect: coefficient (S.D.) 
Year  Reference = 2000 
2004  ‐2.17(0.11)***  ‐2.16(0.11)***  ‐2.08(0.11)*** 
2006  ‐2.17(0.10)***  ‐2.16(0.10)***  ‐2.08(0.11)*** 
2009  ‐2.10(0.10)***  ‐2.09(0.10)***  ‐2.05(0.10)*** 
2011    ‐1.93(0.10)***  ‐1.91(0.10)***  ‐1.86(0.11)*** 
Age  0.05(0.01)***  0.05(0.01)***  0.05(0.01)*** 
Age2  ‐5.93e‐4(0.00)***  ‐5.88e‐4(0.00)***  ‐5.85e‐4(0.00)*** 
Gender  ‐0.06(0.06)  ‐0.06(0.06)  ‐0.06(0.06) 
Chronic diseases  0.06(0.07)  0.06(0.07)  0.06(0.07) 
Household income  0.21(0.03)***  0.20(0.03)***  0.20(0.03)*** 
Household size  ‐0.09(0.02)**  ‐0.09(0.02)**  ‐0.08(0.02)** 
Education    Reference = no or primary school 
Middle or tech  0.24(0.07)**  0.22(0.07)**  0.22(0.07)** 
University  0.43(0.10)***  0.40(0.10)***  0.40(0.10)*** 
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Working  0.18(0.07)**  0.19(0.07)**  0.19(0.07)** 
Hukou  ‐0.61(0.12)***  ‐0.52(0.12)***  ‐0.51(0.12)*** 
SHI    Reference = no SHI 
FMS  1.82(0.08)***  1.81(0.08)***  1.81(0.08)*** 
Urban SHI    0.61(0.11)***  0.59(0.11)***  0.60(0.11)*** 
NCMS  1.29(0.09)***  1.29(0.09)***  1.30(0.09)*** 
Aggregate variables 
East    0.84(0.15)***  0.85(0.16)*** 
Urban    1.04(0.17)***  1.05(0.18)*** 
Population density      ‐0.04(0.05) 
Social service        ‐0.02(0.01) Ɨ 
Health infrastructure      0.05(0.02)** 
Random effect: variance (S.D.) 
Community‐level    1.20(0.19)***  0.88(0.13)***  0.87(0.13)*** 





To examine spatial inequality, the same three-level model is fitted based on the four 
subpopulations of the urban east, the rural east, the urban inland and the rural inland, 
respectively (Table 5.7: Model 9a – 9d). In general, the profiles of significance and 
direction of coefficients of the four models are alike, suggesting that these 
determinants basically have similar effects on PHI enrolment across different areas 
in China. 
Notwithstanding the general similarity, a few differences emerge. First, magnitude of 
income and education coefficients is visibly greater in the poorest rural inland areas 
than in other areas, which possibly suggests that PHI’s distribution in poorer areas is 
more likely to be determined by individual socioeconomic factors than that in other 
areas, echoing a previous finding (Suo et al., 2015). Second, since an urban resident 
with a rural hukou typically indicates a rural-to-urban immigrant, the insignificant effect 
of the rural hukou in urban areas (Table 5.7: Model 9a and 9c) contradicts the findings 
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of two previously reviewed studies that suggest higher prevalence of PHI among 
urban immigrants (see Section 2.3.2). The possible explanation is that the rural hukou 
highly correlates to the NCMS membership in urban areas (Cramer’s V = 0.44, p < 
0.00), which has been taken into account in the models already. In the two urban 
models, the greater positive coefficients of the NCMS, relative to the urban SHI, 
suggest that the higher prevalence of PHI among immigrants relative to locals still 
exists. 
By contrast, in rural areas, the rural hukou has a significantly negative effect (Table 
5.7: Model 9b and 9d). A possible explanation is that the expansion of cities causes 
some urban hukou holders to live in suburbs that have been categorised as rural 
areas, who are more likely to be enrolled in PHI than real peasants, those living in 
rural areas with the rural hukou. Actually, in rural areas, the correlation between the 
urban hukou and the urban SHI membership (Cramer’s V = 0.48, p < 0.00) is much 
more positive than that between the urban hukou and the NCMS membership 
(Cramer’s V = -0.28, p < 0.00), suggesting that these rurally-living urban hukou 
holders tend to work in urban areas, join the urban SHI, and enjoy urban medical 
benefits. 
Looking at SHI schemes, the NCMS’s positive association with PHI enrolment is 
generally stronger than that of the urban SHI, especially in the two urban areas (in 
urban east, NCMS: OR = 7.07, 95% CI 4.34 – 11.55, urban SHI: OR = 2.15, 95% CI 
1.38 – 3.35; in urban inland, NCMS: OR = 3.91, 95% CI 2.52 – 6.08, urban SHI: OR 
= 2.58, 95% CI 2.00 – 3.34), as aforementioned. Because it is known that generosity 
of the NCMS reduces greatly outside of rural areas (Yip et al., 2012), the urban NCMS 
members, due to migration and the fact that they do not work in formal sectors (which 
offer urban SHI to employees), may have a greater demand for PHI to compensate 
for the shortage of insurance coverage. 
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In terms of community-level variables, the population density only has a significant 
positive association with PHI enrolment in the rural inland (Table 5.7: Model 9d). This 
suggests that in the poorest and most underpopulated regions, the population density 
matters for accessibility of PHI, due possibly to commercial insurers’ marketing 
strategies biased against remote rural places. The negative effect of the social service 
index is only significant in the rural east (Table 5.7: Model 9b), implying that only social 
services in the rural east are effective enough to reduce people’s feelings of insecurity, 
so as to reduce PHI prevalence. Moreover, the effect of the health infrastructure index 
is significant (or marginally significant) in all three regions except the rural inland, 
which suggests that health infrastructure in the rural inland may be too poor in quality 
or (hence) too under-resourced to influence the residents’ PHI enrolment. 
Regarding random effects (Table 5.7), for most subpopulations, the unobserved 
variation in PHI enrolment is attributable more to community variance than individual 
variance, except the rural inland population, where the variation is attributable more 
to individual variance (community-level VPC = 0.146; individual-level VPC = 0.155). 
This echoes the fixed effects: the effects of individual variables in determining PHI 
enrolment are more substantial in the rural inland than those in the other three. 
Additionally, the two urban subpopulations appear to have much smaller variances at 
both community and individual levels than those of two rural subpopulations. 
Altogether, these again suggest that, from the perspective of unobserved variation, 
the inequality of PHI prevalence in rural areas seems greater than in urban areas. 
The inequality is more likely to come from community variation in the rural east, but 
from individual variation in the rural inland. 
 
Table 5.7 The models on PHI enrolment based on subpopulations 
  Urban east  Rural east  Urban inland  Rural inland 





2004  ‐2.48(0.21)***  ‐1.91(0.17)***  ‐2.19(0.19)***  ‐2.04(0.26)*** 
2006  ‐3.08(0.29)***  ‐1.47(0.15)***  ‐2.34(0.20)***  ‐1.53(0.26)*** 
2009  ‐2.60(0.22)***  ‐1.55(0.17)***  ‐2.47(0.18)***  ‐1.64(0.29)*** 
2011  ‐2.87(0.27)***  ‐0.79(0.16)***  ‐2.55(0.20)***  ‐1.64(0.28)*** 
Age  0.05(0.02)*  0.04(0.02)*  0.04(0.02)**  0.05(0.03)* 
Age2  ‐6.23e‐4(0.00)**  ‐5.65e‐4(0.00)**  ‐4.97e‐4(0.00)**  ‐6.88e‐4(0.00)* 
Gender  0.06(0.12)  ‐0.04(0.09)  ‐0.12(0.10)  ‐0.09(0.13) 
Chronic diseases  0.01(0.14)  0.07(0.12)  0.04(0.12)  0.08(0.18) 
Household income  0.21(0.06)***  0.18(0.06)**  0.19(0.05)**  0.29(0.07)*** 
Household size  ‐0.10(0.05) Ɨ  ‐0.10(0.03)**  ‐0.07(0.04) Ɨ  ‐0.09(0.04)* 
Education  Reference = no or primary school 
Middle or tech  0.07(0.18)  0.16(0.10)  0.18(0.14)  0.38(0.15)* 
University  0.16(0.24)  0.29(0.23)  0.45(0.17)*  0.54(0.34) 
Working  0.19(0.14)  0.34(0.11)**  0.24(0.10)*  ‐0.08(0.15) 
Hukou  ‐0.18(0.27)  ‐0.56(0.14)***  ‐0.10(0.20)  ‐0.67(0.20)** 
SHI  Reference = no SHI 
FMS  1.95(0.17)***  1.52(0.16)***  1.77(0.12)***  2.41(0.24)*** 
Urban SHI  0.76(0.22)**  ‐0.46(0.18)*  0.95(0.13)***  1.40(0.28)*** 
NCMS  1.96(0.25)***  0.69(0.14)***  1.36(0.22)***  0.96(0.24)*** 
Aggregate variables 
Population  0.09(0.10)  ‐0.16(0.10) Ɨ  ‐0.04(0.08)  0.18(0.07)** 
Social services    0.02(0.03)  ‐0.06(0.02)*  0.01(0.02)  0.04(0.03) 
Health infrastructure  0.08(0.05) Ɨ  0.08(0.03)*  0.08(0.04)*  9.76e‐4(0.03) 
Random effect: variance (S.D.) 
Community‐level  0.59(0.21)**  1.72(0.46)***  0.52(0.18)**  0.69(0.18)*** 






These longitudinal models above estimate average effects across the whole period. 
However, if the relationship between an independent variable and the dependent 
variable experiences a significant change during the study period, the validity of the 
corresponding estimates should be questioned. Given the importance of SHI in this 
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study, it is particularly worth investigating whether the relationships between SHI and 
PHI significantly changed as health reforms proceeded. 
5.4.1 Over‐time descriptive analysis   
Before focusing on SHI, I descriptively explore the four typical determinants of PHI 
enrolment identified previously (Figure 5.2), i.e. household income (inflated to 2011 
CPI), hukou, the education level and the place of residence. According to the 
estimates of Model 9 (Table 5.6), compared to those without PHI, PHI enrolees tended 
to be wealthier, more educated, with an urban hukou, and living in east and urban 
areas. The following charts, which describe the temporal variations in relationships 
between these determinants and PHI enrolment, are all consistent with the model 
estimates. Although some differences between PHI enrolees and non-enrolees were 
narrower, such as in education levels, hukou status and the urban-rural dichotomy, 
PHI enrolees still maintained these characteristics (or advantages) against those 
without PHI in each study year. This suggests that relationships between these 









In terms of SHI, as Table 5.8 shows below, in 2000 the PH-enrolment rates among 
SHI enrolees, regardless of schemes, were much higher than the rate among those 
without SHI. However, this disparity dramatically reduced between 2000 and 2004, 
due to a great fall in these rates among SHI enrolees. Since then, as the PHI-
enrolment rate increased faster among those without SHI than among SHI enrolees, 
the relationship between SHI and PHI appeared to be reversed; in 2011, the PHI-
enrolment rate of those without SHI has been much higher than those of SHI enrolees.     
 
Table 5.8 PHI enrolment rates among SHI scheme enrolees 
SHI type  2000  2004  2006  2009  2011  Total    P value 
None  0.01(0.00)  0.02(0.00)  0.02(0.00)  0.09(0.01)  0.16(0.02)  0.03(0.00)  <0.001 
FMS  0.63(0.01)  0.04(0.01)  0.04(0.01)  0.05(0.01)  0.02(0.01)  0.24(0.01)  <0.001 
Urban SHI  0.47(0.02)  0.03(0.01)  0.03(0.01)  0.03(0.00)  0.03(0.00)  0.06(0.00)  <0.001 
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NCMS  0.53(0.02)  0.02(0.01)  0.02(0.00)  0.02(0.00)  0.02(0.00)  0.04(0.00)  <0.001 
Total  0.13(0.00)  0.02(0.00)  0.03(0.00)  0.03(0.00)  0.04(0.00)  0.05(0.00)   





Consequently, the descriptive analysis indicates that the model estimation of SHI’s 
effects may be at risk of losing too much information by averaging these effects across 
the period 2000-2011. In particular, the results of the previous models (Model 9 and 
backwards), which show a positive relationship between SHI membership and PHI 
enrolment compared to no SHI, may be predominantly influenced by the 2000 data. 
This calls for special attention paid to the period between 2000 and 2004. 
5.4.2 The change between 2000 and the years after 2000 
This section sets out to examine what happened to SHI’s effects between 2000 and 
other years in the survey by adding the interaction between the SHI variable and an 
indicator of time transition. 
Table 5.9 below shows that there was indeed a significant change in the effect of SHI 
on PHI enrolment between 2000 and the years after 2000. In 2000, the relationships 
between SHI schemes and PHI were all significantly positive (FMS: OR = 109.77, 95% 
CI 80.15 – 150.34; urban SHI: OR = 51.27, 95% CI 35.86 – 73.30; NCMS: OR = 54.10, 
95% CI 39.03 – 75.00); It means that, in 2000 for enrolees of FMS, urban SHI and 
NCMS, the odds of being enrolled into PHI were 109.77, 51.27 and 54.10 times as 
large as the odds for SHI non-enrolees being enrolled into PHI, respectively.  
However, the negative interactions with years after 2000 were so strong that they 
reverse the effects in magnitude of all SHI schemes after combining the main effects 
of SHI schemes and the corresponding interactions (from 2004 to 2011) (FMS: OR = 
0.40, 95% CI 0.29 – 0.55; urban SHI: OR = 0.34, 95% CI 0.28 – 0.42; NCMS: OR = 
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0.72, 95% CI 0.59 – 0.88). This suggests that from 2004 to 2011, for enrolees of FMS, 
urban SHI and NCMS, the odds of being enrolled into PHI sharply reduced to 0.40, 
0.34 and 0.72 times as large as the odds for SHI non-enrolees being enrolled into PHI, 
respectively. The trend prevails across the entire population and the four 
subpopulations. The Chow tests confirm that the coefficients of SHI schemes 
significantly differ between the two time periods for all populations.27 Importantly, the 
new finding demonstrates that the results of the previous models (Table 5.6 and 5.7) 




  Total  Urban east  Rural east  Urban inland  Rural inland 
Model  Model 10  Model 10a  Model 10b  Model 10c  Model 10d 
Coefficient (S.D.) 
Post‐2000‡  1.02(0.13)***  1.32(0.41)**  0.99(0.19)***  1.00(0.24)***  0.78(0.26)** 
SHI  Reference = no SHI 
FMS 4.70(0.00)***  5.24(0.45)***  4.01(0.26)***  4.74(0.25)***  5.37(0.38)*** 
Urban SHI 3.94(0.00)***  4.25(0.43)***  2.52(0.35)***  4.17(0.27)***  5.15(0.49)*** 
NCMS 3.99(0.00)***  5.95(0.62)***  2.93(0.23)***  4.57(0.49)***  6.70(0.50)*** 
Post‐2000×FMS  ‐5.62(0.24)***  ‐6.17(0.59)*** ‐4.73(0.37)*** ‐5.86(0.37)*** ‐6.13(0.66)*** 
Post‐2000×Urban SHI  ‐5.02(0.20)***  ‐5.55(0.50)*** ‐3.89(0.39)*** ‐5.25(0.33)*** ‐5.32(0.54)*** 
Post‐2000×NCMS  ‐4.32(0.19)***  ‐6.92(0.75)*** ‐3.34(0.26)*** ‐5.33(0.58)*** ‐7.14(0.55)*** 













To seek explanations for this change from related policy impacts, the most visible 
consequence of these policies is the expansion of the urban SHI and the NCMS, 
driving the total SHI coverage from around 20% in 2000 to more than 90% in 2011, 
according to the CHNS data (Figure 5.3). The expansion of SHI, especially the NCMS, 
enrolled more people of lower socioeconomic status, narrowing the compositional 
difference between SHI enrolees and non-enrolees (this will be further analysed later). 
As PHI enrolment is strongly associated with socioeconomic factors, the 
compositional change of SHI enrolees could result in changed relationships between 





Additionally, what the CHNS data cannot show is the gradually increasing SHI 
benefits, well-documented in the literature (Yip et al., 2012, Meng et al., 2012). Taking 
the NCMS as an example, from 2003 to 2010 the government subsidy per person 
rose from ¥20 to ¥120 (¥1≈ £0.11 or $0.14) (Dai et al., 2011), and doubled to ¥240 by 
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2012 (Liang and Langenbrunner, 2013). Theoretically, the generosity promotion could 
reduce the demand for PHI among SHI enrolees, compared to non-enrolees, due to 
the increasing overlap in coverage between SHI and PHI. 
Looking to the concurrence of the policy on PHI. Coincidentally, in 2003, the China 
Insurance Regulatory Commission published a regulation that banned a 
contemporarily popular type of PHI – participating PHI, a combination of health 
insurance and investment that not only paid indemnity for critical illnesses but also 
regularly yielded dividends, possibly in order to attract customers (Duan, 2008). 
Banning this type of PHI has plausibly contributed to the reduced prevalence of PHI 
between 2000 and 2004. It might also have especially influenced SHI enrolees’ 
demand for PHI, because at that time SHI enrolees, who were at higher 
socioeconomic status (see Figure 5.4 in Section 5.4.4), might have been more 
interested in these investment-like PHI products than those without SHI. 
5.4.3 Excluding the 2000 data 
The descriptive analysis above (Table 5.8) has just shown that information from 2000 
about the relationships between SHI membership and PHI enrolment appears so 
different from that from other years. Because a multitude of PHI enrolees are 
distributed in 2000 (Figure 5.3), information from the year 2000 substantially interferes 
with the related analysis of data from other years, when they are modelled together. 
To avoid this problem, this section sets out to exclude the 2000 data and fit the models 
based on the remaining data. 
Fitting the basic three-level model like Model 9 based on data excluding the year 2000 
(Table 5.10), as a result, exactly opposite to those from the whole 2000 – 2011 data, 
the effects of all SHI schemes become significantly negative, compared to no SHI 
(based on the whole population, FMS: OR = 0.29, 95% CI 0.20 – 0.44; urban SHI: OR 
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= 0.17, 95% CI 0.12 – 0.23; NCMS: OR = 0.31, 95% CI 0.23 – 0.41).28 It suggests 
that, contrary to what occurred in 2000, between 2004 and 2011 the correlations 
between enrolment into PHI and enrolment into all SHI schemes were significantly 
lower than those without SHI; for enrolees of FMS, urban SHI and NCMS, the odds 
of being enrolled into PHI were 0.29, 0.17 and 0.31 times as large as the odds for SHI 
non-enrolees being enrolled into PHI, respectively. Although the magnitude increases 
after excluding 2000 data compared to the interaction models with the whole data 
(Table 5.9), the results are basically consistent.   
Additionally, excluding the 2000 data has little impact on the relations between SHI 
schemes and between regions. For example, the odds ratios of the FMS and the 
NCMS are still higher than the urban SHI. The NCMS also has the highest effects 
among SHI schemes in the two urban subpopulations, still suggesting that the NCMS 
enrolees were more associated with PHI enrolment than other SHI enrolees in urban 
areas, due possibly to the reduced benefits of the NCMS in urban areas as 
aforementioned (Liang and Langenbrunner, 2013). 
 
Table 5.10 The models based on data excluding the year 2000   
  Total  Urban east  Rural east  Urban inland  Rural inland 
  Model 11  Model 11a  Model 11b  Model 11c  Model 11d 
Coefficient (S.D.) 
SHI  Reference = no SHI 
FMS ‐1.23(0.20)***  ‐1.41(0.36)***  ‐0.95(0.30)**  ‐1.36(0.30)***  ‐1.35(0.64)* 
Urban SHI ‐1.79(0.15)***  ‐1.85(0.27)***  ‐2.28(0.24)*** ‐1.62(0.23)***  ‐1.24(0.34)*** 











Notwithstanding the background factors that have been controlled for in the models, 
compositional influence still matters, given non-experimental data. As SHI non-
enrolees gradually reduced from a major part of the population to a minority (Figure 
5.3), their composition might experience some great transitions. and it is thus 
interesting to scrutinise the compositional change of SHI enrolees relative to SHI non-
enrolees, which would possibly provide an insight into the findings. 
First, the two typical socioeconomic factors and determinants of PHI’s prevalence, 
household income and the education level (Figure 5.5), are examined. In general, SHI 
enrolees were more socioeconomically advantaged than SHI non-enrolees in most 
periods, but this disparity has been greatly reduced after 2006. In terms of household 
income (the left chart), the household earnings of SHI non-enrolees were on average 
only about two-thirds of the earnings of SHI enrolees’ households from 2000 to 2004, 
while since 2006 the former quickly caught up, to around 90% of the latter from 2009 
to 2011. In terms of their education levels (the right chart), from 2000 to 2006, SHI 
non-enrolees had a higher proportion of the least educated (primary school or none), 
and a lower proportion of the most educated (university or higher), than SHI enrolees. 
However, since 2009, the educational gap between SHI enrolees and SHI non-






Figure  5.4:  Socioeconomic  compositions  of  SHI  enrolees  and non‐enrolees  during  2000  – 
2011: household income (A); the education level (B). Data source: CHNS; N = 81,745. 
 
Second, geographic difference and difference between the two hukou types are 
examined (Figure 5.6). From 2000 to 2004, the percentages of SHI enrolees were 
higher among east and urban populations than inland and rural populations (the left 
chart). Between 2004 and 2009, the SHI enrolment rates in two rural populations 
caught up and finally exceeded those in the urban populations. Between 2009 and 
2011, the varied SHI coverage rates converged, but were still slightly higher in rural 
populations than in urban populations. Additionally, the rural-hukou holders, once 
predominant among SHI non-enrolees and scarce among SHI enrolees (the right 
chart), have become the main body of SHI enrolees and only accounted for a small 






In sum, between 2000 and 2011, there is a clear tendency for the SHI coverage to 
become more equal among socioeconomic strata and spatially. Typical SHI non-
enrolees, in the earlier time of this period, were poorer, lower educated, living in rural 
and inland area, and more likely to be rurally registered in hukou, compared to SHI 
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enrolees. At the end of this period, these distinctions have been blurred, except hukou 
where SHI non-enrolees have been even more likely to be the advantaged urban 
hukou holders. These changes demonstrate that the SHI system, as a whole, has 
been more and more universal and equal. By comparison, this trend is much less 
likely for PHI, as has been shown before (Figure 5.2). 
This tendency towards more identical compositions of SHI enrolees and non-enrolees, 
and a higher percentage of urban hukou holders among SHI non-enrolees, has 
certainly underpinned the increased likelihood of SHI non-enrolees enrolling in PHI 
after 2000, as the previous models found. This has been because of the steady 
positive correlations between PHI enrolment and household income, education level, 
living in east and urban areas, and the urban hukou. 
 
Conclusion 
Overall, in China, the prevalence of PHI, after a fall between 2000 and 2004, has been 
gradually increasing, but very slowly. Individuals with higher socioeconomic status, 
represented by a greater household income, a smaller household size, being more 
educated and being registered in the urban hukou, were significantly associated with 
higher likelihoods of PHI enrolment. At the aggregate level, east and urban areas, and 
the level of community health infrastructure, were significantly associated with a 
higher PHI prevalence. 
The independent variables’ effects on PHI enrolment are mostly consistent across 
regions. However, some spatial differences exist. The positive effects of household 
income and the education level are relatively strong in the rural inland, suggesting 
socioeconomic status’s greater association with PHI enrolment in the poorer areas. 
The negative effect of the rural hukou only existed in rural areas, while in urban areas 
the effect was likely to be offset by the rural hukou’s correlation with the NCMS 
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membership (typically for immigrants), whose positive effect was relatively strong in 
urban areas. At the community level, the population density was only positive in the 
rural inland, implying commercial insurers’ prudence in the poor areas. Contrarily, the 
health infrastructure level was positive in all but the rural inland, due possibly to the 
very poor quality of health infrastructure in the rural inland. 
SHI schemes’ effects on PHI enrolment changed between 2000 and 2004. The 
correlations of PHI enrolment with SHI memberships were higher than that with those 
without SHI in 2000. After 2000 (2004 – 2011), the prevalent trend was for the 
correlations of PHI enrolment with SHI enrolees to be reversed, so that it was lower 
than that of SHI non-enrolees. This change may be explained by the combination of 
the exit of a contemporarily popular type of PHI in 2003, an increasing number of 
NCMS enrolees of low socioeconomic status, the overall generosity promotion of SHI, 
and the compositional transition, which eliminated SHI non-enrolees’ socioeconomic 




































This chapter focuses on examining the effect of private health insurance (PHI) on 
access to healthcare in China, where PHI can be complementary or supplementary 
to fill SHI’s inadequacies, while substitutive PHI plans are also available for those 
uncovered by SHI (Luo et al., 2016). Using the 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009 and 2011 data 
of the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), as operationalised in the methods 
chapter (Section 3.1.2 and 3.5.2), the generic utilisation of formal healthcare (whether 
the individual was treated by a health professional, regardless of outpatient care or 
inpatient care) has been used as the indicator of access to healthcare. 
In the literature review, most of previous related studies examined the effect of PHI 
on the utilisation of either inpatient care (Li et al., 2016, Jiao, 2015, Zang et al., 2012) 
or outpatient care (Yang, 2013, Qin et al., 2014, Yao et al., 2012, Zang et al., 2012, 
Zhu et al., 2008), and some found PHI’s positive correlation with the former. However, 
in practice, using inpatient care usually follows outpatient care, and the choice may 
be decided by doctors and distorted by the moral hazard. By contrast, generic 
utilisation may be more indicative of individuals’ primary healthcare-seeking 
behaviour driven by needs, but related studies on this give mixed results (Chai, 2013, 
You and Kobayashi, 2011, Jiao, 2015, Lam and Johnston, 2012). Evidence on the 
effect of dual insurance (SHI and PHI) on access to healthcare are also inadequate 
and ambiguous (Lam and Johnston, 2012, Chai, 2013, Wang, 2012). Additionally, the 
inequities in healthcare access related to PHI, such as unequal effects of PHI on 
healthcare utilisation among different populations and the impact of PHI at aggregate-
level utilisation, has been under-researched.    
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Following basic descriptive analyses, the first two sections of this chapter develop 
step by step the individual-level mixed-effect models that handle the longitudinal data, 
and then the three-level models with the community level. Based on the final three-
level model, from the third section until the end, the study populations are 
disaggregated for further investigations that highlight spatial inequalities. After a brief 
examination of the temporal variation of the effects of health insurance schemes in 
section four, the research proceeds to examine PHI’s and SHI’s effects, and their 
interaction, on utilisation under different levels of personal need. Finally, it investigates 
PHI’s and SHI’s contextual impacts on communities’ average utilisation. 
 
6.1 The individual‐level model 
The first section starts with the descriptive analysis of individual-level model variables, 
and then fits the model for healthcare utilisation. Like the last chapter, the longitudinal 
structure of the data is dealt with at first by the two-level mixed-effect model, where 
observations are nested within the individuals. Addition of independent variables 
proceeds step by step, starting with year dummies and demographic variables, then 
need variables, socioeconomic variables and finally health insurance variables. 
6.1.1 Descriptive analysis 
The dependent variable in this chapter is whether the individual had used formal 
healthcare in the past four weeks before the survey, regardless of outpatient or 
inpatient care. An individual’s enrolment into PHI, the dependent variable in the last 
chapter, is instead included in the model as a key independent variable. Moreover, 
the variable of health status, i.e. whether the individual was self-reportedly ill or injured 
in the past four weeks of this survey – which should not influence the status of PHI 
enrolment and hence is excluded from the models for PHI prevalence – is included 
as an independent variable in the models for utilisation, indicating the level of personal 
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need for healthcare. Except these above, most variables included in the models 
remain the same as previously (see Table 5.1). The summary of these new variables 
is presented in Table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1 Overview of newly‐added model variables 











PHI enrolment  Whether is covered by private health insurance  0.05(0.31)  0/1 
Data source: CHNS (2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, 2011); N = 81,755. 
 
Exploring correlations with demographic and socioeconomic variables (Table 6.2), 
healthcare utilisation is highly correlated with health status (r = 0.68) and moderately 
correlated with the diagnostic history of chronic diseases (r = 0.22) and age (r = 0.23), 
respectively. Since these variables typically indicate needs, it suggests that needs 
appear to play an important role in determining utilisation. In terms of socioeconomic 
factors, the utilisation appears to have very weak correlations with household income 
(r =-0.03), the household size (r = -0.02) and hukou (r = -0.02). The moderate negative 
correlations with the education level (r = -0.11) and working status (r = -0.15) may in 
part derive from their close relationships with age and health, because individuals who 
are better educated and working tend to be younger and healthier than those poorer 
educated and not working. The correlations between the utilisation and health 
insurance schemes are very weak as well (FMS: r = 0.01; urban SHI: r = 0.03; NCMS: 
r = 0.04; PHI: r = -0.01), which could be influenced by the correlations between 


















Education Working  Hukou  FMS  Urban 
SHI 
NCMS PHI 
Utilisation  1.00                           
Age    0.23  1.00                         
Gender  ‐0.04  ‐0.00  1.00                       
Chronic disease  0.22  0.35  0.01  1.00                     
Health status    0.68  0.23  ‐0.04  0.25  1.00                   
Household income  ‐0.03  ‐0.07  0.01  0.01  ‐0.03  1.00                 
Household Size  ‐0.02  ‐0.18  ‐0.00  ‐0.10  ‐0.04  0.23  1.00               
Education  ‐0.11  ‐0.40  0.15  ‐0.10  ‐0.10  0.19  ‐0.03  1.00             
Working  ‐0.15  ‐0.46  0.16  ‐0.23  ‐0.16  0.14  0.09  0.17  1.00           
Hukou  ‐0.02  ‐0.11  ‐0.01  ‐0.13  ‐0.13  ‐0.12  0.19  ‐0.30  0.24  1.00         
FMS  0.01  0.05  0.06  0.06  0.02  0.09  ‐0.08  0.17  ‐0.02  ‐0.27  1.00       
Urban SHI  0.03  0.14  0.02  0.13  0.05  0.20  ‐0.14  0.20  ‐0.13  ‐0.49  ‐0.13 1.00     
NCMS  0.04  0.05  0.01  ‐0.02  0.01  0.05  0.06  ‐0.17  0.10  0.46  ‐0.17 ‐0.32  1.00   









Descriptively presenting the utilisation (the percentage of formal healthcare users) 
over time, along with the prevalence of general SHI and PHI (Figure 6.1), we can see 
that the utilisation rapidly increased between 2000 and 2004, in line with the increase 
in SHI’s prevalence, but contradicting the drop in PHI’s prevalence. Afterwards, the 
utilisation rate kept stable, while SHI apparently accelerated its expansion rate. In 
addition, it is worth mentioning the steady increase in the average age of this 







The modelling starts with the random-effect model with only a series of year dummies 
as independent variables (Table 6.3: Model 1). Adjusting the longitudinal relationship 
between the observations and the individuals, a significant increase in the utilisation 
of healthcare was associated with years after 2000, and it then became relatively 
stable between 2004 and 2011, consistent with the descriptive result. The inclusion 
of age and gender remarkably reduces the effect of time (Table 6.3: Model 2). 
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However, further including chronic diseases and health status cuts the effect of age 
by half and slightly reduces the negative effect of gender (Table 6.3: Model 3). It 
suggests that a considerable part of over-time variation in the utilisation can be 
explained by a change in the need for healthcare. Remarkably, the variable of health 
status has a very strong association with the utilisation (Model 3), which accords with 
the outcome from the crosstabs of the descriptive analysis (Table 6.2). 
Afterwards, socioeconomic variables are added in two steps. First, the household 
income and the household size have opposite effects on the utilisation. The household 
income is negatively correlated with the utilisation, while the household size is 
positively correlated with the utilisation (Table 6.3: Model 4), just opposite to their 
correlations with household affluence and PHI enrolment. Second, adding education, 
working status and hukou, whose effects are all significant, the education level and 
employment are seen to be negatively correlated with the utilisation of healthcare, 
and the rural hukou is positively correlated (Table 6.3: Model 5).  
An interesting finding is that these above indicating high socioeconomic status are all 
negatively associated with the utilisation. Apart from health insurance variables and 
spatial variables which have not been included, a possible explanation is that those 
with higher socioeconomic status tend to be healthier and hence use less healthcare 
than those with lower socioeconomic status, given needs’ dominant influence on 
utilisation. Additionally, after counting education, employment and hukou, the 
household income loses significance and the effect of the household size reduces, 
suggesting close associations between these socioeconomic variables. However, the 
inclusion of socioeconomic variables has little impact on the coefficients of need 
variables, suggesting that needs are independent from socioeconomic factors in 
determining the utilisation of healthcare.  
The health insurance variables are finally added. Starting with SHI, except the urban 
SHI scheme, the government’s Free Medical Scheme (FMS) and the rural SHI 
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scheme (NCMS) have significant positive correlations with the utilisation of healthcare 
(FMS: OR = 1.30, 95% CI 1.08 – 1.56; urban SHI: OR = 1.04, 95% CI 0.89 – 1.21; 
NCMS: OR = 1.18, 95% CI 1.03 – 1.35) (Table 6.3: Model 6). Adding the SHI variable 
does not substantially affect most existing independent variables except the 
household income, which regains significance. By contrast, PHI does not have a 
significant correlation with the utilisation (OR = 1.11, 95% CI 0.86 – 1.41), and its 
inclusion hardly affects the coefficients of the other variables (Table 6.3: Model 7).  
Looking at random effects, the individual-level variance reduces significantly (from 
1.52 to 0.65) as time and need variables are added. As a result, variance partition 
coefficients (VPCs) drop (from 0.32 to 0.16), which means that the residual variation 
in healthcare utilisation that is attributed to unobserved between-individual 
characteristics reduces from 32% to 16%. By comparison, the inclusion of 
socioeconomic variables as well as health insurance variables together merely 
reduces the variance by a further 0.06, contributing to a 1% of decrease in VPC. This 
is in line with the finding of the fixed effects that the utilisation of healthcare is 
determined by demographic and need variables more than socioeconomic variables 









Table 6.3 Individual‐level mixed‐effect models for healthcare utilisation     
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Fixed effect: coefficient (S.D.) 
Year Reference = 2000
2004  0.97(0.07)*** 0.79(0.07)*** 0.61(0.09)*** 0.62(0.08)*** 0.61(0.08)*** 0.62(0.09)*** 0.63(0.08)***
2006  0.91(0.07)*** 0.65(0.07)*** 0.75(0.08)*** 0.76(0.07)*** 0.76(0.08)*** 0.74(0.08)*** 0.75(0.08)***
2009  1.07(0.06)*** 0.68(0.06)*** 0.69(0.07)*** 0.72(0.07)*** 0.70(0.07)*** 0.64(0.09)*** 0.66(0.08)***
2011  1.03(0.07)*** 0.55(0.07)*** 0.68(0.08)*** 0.72(0.08)*** 0.70(0.08)*** 0.64(0.09)*** 0.65(0.09)***
Age   0.04(0.00)*** 0.02(0.00)*** 0.02(0.00)*** 0.02(0.00)*** 0.01(0.00)*** 0.01(0.00)***
Gender   ‐0.27(0.03)*** ‐0.21(0.04)*** ‐0.20(0.04)*** ‐0.15(0.04)** ‐0.15(0.04)*** ‐0.15(0.04)***
Chronic diseases    0.44(0.05)*** 0.46(0.05)*** 0.48(0.05)*** 0.47(0.05)*** 0.47(0.05)***
Health status   4.25(0.06)*** 4.24(0.06)*** 4.24(0.06)*** 4.24(0.06)*** 4.24(0.06)***
Household Income    ‐0.07(0.02)*** ‐0.03(0.02) ‐0.04(0.02)* ‐0.04(0.02)*
Household Size    0.05(0.01)**  0.03(0.01)* 0.03(0.01)* 0.03(0.01)*
Education Reference = no or primary school
Middle or tech    ‐0.14(0.05)* ‐0.14(0.05)** ‐0.14(0.05)**
University    ‐0.23(0.11)* ‐0.25(0.12)* ‐0.26(0.12)*
Working   ‐0.17(0.05)** ‐0.18(0.05)*** ‐0.18(0.05)***
Hukou   0.29(0.05)*** 0.25(0.06)*** 0.25(0.06)***
SHI Reference = no SHI
FMS    0.26(0.09)** 0.25(0.09)**
Urban SHI    0.04(0.08) 0.03(0.08)
NCMS    0.17(0.07)* 0.16(0.07)*
PHI   0.10(0.12)
Random effect: variance (S.D.) 








This section continues by adding the community level and related aggregate variables 
to the individual-level mixed-effect model (Table 6.3: Model 7), after a brief descriptive 
analysis about these aggregate variables (for more Information about the community 
and the choice of aggregate variables see Section 3.3 and 3.5.4). 
6.2.1 Descriptive analysis 
Summarising the utilisation-related community indices in the crosstab of geographies 
and community types (Table 6.4), it can be seen that the three utilisation-related 
community indices tend to be the highest in the urban east and the lowest in the rural 
inland, except transportation, where urban inland communities performed slightly 
better than their east counterparts. The urban-rural disparities appear to be greater in 
magnitude than the east-inland disparities. The poorest rural inland one, which always 
lags behind the other three, deserves particular attention in research. 
 
Table 6.4 Summary of aggregate variables and their relationship 
  East  Inland  Total 
Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural 
Health infrastructure  7.16(1.64)  5.47(2.28)  6.63(2.06)  4.76(2.53)  5.62(2.46) 
Transportation  6.32(2.03)  5.67(2.42)  6.65(1.89)  4.93(2.42)  5.65(2.38) 
Economy  9.14(1.79)  5.83(3.13)  8.79(1.99)  4.44(2.84)  6.28(3.30) 
Data source: CHNS (2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, 2011); N = 80,471.29 
Two‐way ANOVA test shows that differences of  these  indices are all  significant across  the  four 
subpopulations (for all p<0.001).     
 
                                                
29  A few communities have missing values for community development indexes. Because the number 




Focusing on health insurance, the dependent variable and two health insurance 
variables are simultaneously summarised for each subpopulation (Table 6.5). As the 
prevalence of SHI and PHI tends to be greater in the urban and east areas than in the 
rural and inland areas, the spatial differences in the utilisation of healthcare are not 
as visible as those in health insurance prevalence, although there are significant 
spatial differences in all the three. The utilisation in urban areas appears to be slightly 
greater than in rural areas, consistent with the distribution of SHI and PHI.   
 
Table 6.5 Summary of aggregate variables and their relationships 
  East  Inland  Total 
Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural 
Utilisation  0.13(0.00)  0.12(0.00)  0.13(0.00)  0.12(0.00)  0.13(0.00) 
SHI  0.69(0.01)  0.64(0.00)  0.56(0.00)  0.48(0.00)  0.57(0.00) 






Adding the community level to the established individual-level model with no new 
variable introduced, household income, the household size and university education 
lose significance (Table 6.6: Model 8). Apart from these, all the effects of the other 
variables remain almost unchanged. This result suggests that these individual 
socioeconomic characteristics appear to in part influence healthcare utilisation 
through their association with where the individual resides. 
Subsequently, adding the geography and community type variables (Table 6.6: Model 
9), both the newly-added variables are significant. Interestingly, unlike the result of 
the descriptive analysis, after adjusting all other factors in the model, east and urban 
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areas, typical the more affluent, were associated with a lower average utilisation of 
healthcare than their inland and rural counterparts, respectively. Few coefficients of 
the existing variables change, except hukou, because hukou, as a residence 
registration institution, is closely associated with actual residence. Echoing the 
findings in the individual-level model, this suggests that affluence at both levels was 
not associated with higher generic utilisation of formal healthcare, which to large 
extent was determined by personal needs.  
Further, adding the three community indices has little impact on the existing 
coefficients either (Table 6.6: Model 10). Only the index of community health 
infrastructure is significant, but negative, which means a community with better health 
infrastructure is contrarily associated with a lower average utilisation of healthcare. 
This is possibly because of the correlation between health infrastructure and a higher 
price of local health services in the community. In addition, this may again be partly 
attributed to the index’s higher values in east and urban areas (see Table 6.4). 
In terms of random effects, after both individual-level and community-level variables 
have been included in Model 10 (Table 6.6), the individual-level variation (variance = 
0.48) is far greater than the community-level variation (variance = 0.11). The VPCs, 
based on the variances, signify that 3% of the residual variation in the utilisation 
comes from the community, while 12% of that comes from individual characteristics. 
This suggests that, overall, the unobserved variation in the utilisation of healthcare is 
determined more by personal factors than by environmental factors. 
Adding the community level and all these aggregate variables into the model slightly 
increases the magnitude of the coefficients of SHI schemes and PHI but has no 
impact on significance (FMS: OR = 1.37, 95% CI 1.13 – 1.65; urban SHI: OR = 1.11, 
95% CI 0.95 – 1.30; NCMS: OR = 1.18, 95% CI 1.02 – 1.35; PHI: OR = 1.14, 95% CI 
0.89 – 1.46). In sum, according to the complete three-level model (Model 10), only 
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the government FMS and the rural NCMS were significantly associated with the 
utilisation of healthcare compared to no SHI; For the FMS enrolees and the NCMS 
enrolees, the odds of using formal healthcare were 1.37 and 1.18 times as large as 
the odds for SHI non-enrolees using formal healthcare. PHI and the urban SHI 
enrolees were not significantly associated the utilisation compared to those without 
PHI and those without SHI, respectively. 
 
Table 6.6 Three‐level models on healthcare utilisation   
Model  Model 8  Model 9  Model 10 
Fixed effect: coefficient (S.D.) 
Year  Reference = 2000 
2004  0.64(0.08)***  0.63(0.08)***  0.62(0.09)*** 
2006  0.75(0.08)***  0.74(0.08)***  0.72(0.08)*** 
2009  0.64(0.09)***  0.62(0.09)***  0.63(0.09)*** 
2011  0.63(0.09)***  0.61(0.09)***  0.60(0.09)*** 
Age  0.01(0.00)***  0.02(0.00)***  0.02(0.00)*** 
Gender  ‐0.16(0.04)***  ‐0.17(0.04)***  ‐0.17(0.04)*** 
Chronic diseases  0.49(0.05)***  0.50(0.05)***  0.50(0.05)*** 
Health status  4.22(0.06)***  4.22(0.06)***  4.22(0.06)*** 
Household income  ‐0.02(0.02)  ‐0.02(0.02)  ‐0.01(0.02) 
Household Size  0.01(0.02)  0.01(0.02)  0.01(0.02) 
Education  Reference = no or primary school 
Middle or tech  ‐0.12(0.05)*  ‐0.10(0.05) Ɨ  ‐0.10(0.05) Ɨ 
University  ‐0.12(0.12)  ‐0.10(0.012)  ‐0.10(0.12) 
Working  ‐0.20(0.05)***  ‐0.21(0.05)***  ‐0.21(0.05)*** 
Hukou  0.19(0.06)**  0.08(0.07)  0.07(0.07) 
SHI  Reference = no SHI 
FMS  0.29(0.10)**  0.32(0.10)**  0.31(0.10)** 
Urban SHI  0.08(0.08)  0.11(0.08)  0.10(0.08) 
NCMS  0.16(0.07)*  0.16(0.07)*  0.16(0.07)* 
PHI  0.11(0.12)  0.13(0.12)  0.13(0.12) 
Aggregate variables 
East      ‐0.27(0.06)***  ‐0.25(0.06)*** 
Urban    ‐0.27(0.09)**  ‐0.23(0.09)* 
Health infrastructure      ‐0.03(0.01)* 
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Transportation      ‐0.01(0.01) 
Economic activity      0.00(0.01) 
Random effect: variance (S.D.) 
Community‐level  0.12(0.02)***  0.11(0.02)***  0.10(0.02)*** 





In this section the study population is disaggregated into four subpopulations – the 
urban east, the rural east, the urban inland and the rural inland, respectively. Based 
on each of these the final three-level model (Table 6.6: Model 10) is fitted again. In 
addition, for the models on subpopulations, not only are random-intercept models 
fitted, but models with a random slope of PHI are tried, to explore how PHI’s effect 
varies among communities. 
After disaggregation (Table 6.7: Model 10a-10d), a notable difference in time effect 
emerges across these subpopulations. The positive effects of the years after 2000 
are all significant in the inland but generally weaker in the east. This possibly suggests 
that the health reforms were more inclined to promote utilisation in the inland than in 
the east after the year 2000. This is in line with the official statistics, which show 
quicker increases in hospital admissions and outpatient utilisation in western and 
central China (the inland) compared to in the east from 2003 to 2011 (Meng et al., 
2012). 
The significance of the effects of needs-related variables such as age, chronic 
diseases and health status, in general holds in all subpopulations. This suggests that 
needs are a very essential, invariant drive for healthcare. Socioeconomic variables, 
such as household income, the household size, education level and hukou remain 
insignificant. What is interesting is that the positive coefficient of household income 
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and the negative coefficient of household size in the rural inland are exactly reversed 
in their signs, compared to those in other regions. This implies that in the poorest rural 
inland, individuals’ utilisation appeared to be more dependent on economic affluence 
than in other regions. Besides, working status’s negative effect is only significant in 
two rural regions. As this negative effect should be in part attributed to employment’s 
close correlation with younger and healthier status, this may also imply that rural areas’ 
relatively weak social security systems prevent working people, likely to be an 
essential income source for households, from stopping to see doctors. 
Focusing on health insurance, the effect of SHI compared to no SHI varies heavily 
between regions and schemes. For urban areas, only the coefficient of government’s 
FMS reaches or approaches significance (in the urban east, FMS: OR = 1.41, 95% 
CI 0.94 – 2.12; in the urban inland, FMS: OR = 1.40, 95% CI 1.04 – 1.89). For rural 
areas, all SHI schemes’ coefficients are significant in the east (FMS: OR = 1.70, 95% 
CI 1.10 – 2.64; urban SHI: OR = 1.58, 95% CI 1.10 – 2.27; NCMS: OR = 1.43, 95% 
CI 1.11 – 1.85), but only the coefficient of the NCMS is significant in the inland (OR = 
1.26, 95% CI 1.02 – 1.55).  
This suggests that the FMS has wider effectiveness, possibly associated with its more 
comprehensive benefits, compared to other SHI schemes (Liang and Langenbrunner, 
2013). The NCMS, the rural SHI with population coverage that in effect has greatly 
extended to urban areas due to rural-to-urban migration, was only correlated with the 
utilisation in rural areas, thanks possibly to its compensation being largely restricted 
to rural clinics (Yip and Hsiao, 2009b). In addition, the urban SHI was not significantly 
correlated with the utilisation in urban areas. A possible explanation is that unlike the 
NCMS enrolees receiving primary care in local clinics, Chinese urbanites tend to seek 
all kinds of healthcare in hospitals, many of which are too busy to provide convenient 
services, compromising the effect of the urban SHI on utilisation (Yip and Hsiao, 2014). 
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The effect of PHI is not significant for all subpopulations after disaggregation, 
compared to no PHI (urban east: OR = 1.04, 95% CI 0.65 – 1.66; rural east: OR = 
1.12, 95% CI 0.78 – 1.63; urban inland: OR = 1.20, 95% CI 0.85 – 1.68; rural inland: 
OR = 1.13, 95% CI 0.63 – 2.02). One explicit reason for this is that many PHI policies 
focus on some critical diseases and complementing SHI (Liu et al., 2011b, EY, 2016b), 
so that their effects on promoting utilisation in the general population is very limited. 
Possibly, when the individual’s need level for healthcare increases and thereby 
likelihood of receiving financial compensation from PHI increases, the effect of PHI 
on healthcare utilisation would change. This will be explored later in this chapter.    
At the aggregate level, the effects of the three community indices are all weak for 
these subpopulations. Only the negative effect of health infrastructure on utilisation 
reaches marginal significance in the rural inland. Maybe in poor areas, since better 
health infrastructure means pricier medicine and medical services, the locals are less 
able to afford healthcare.  
In terms of random effects, the community-level variances of utilisation (the random 
intercept) are significant for the two inland subpopulations, and much smaller and 
insignificant for the two east subpopulations, while the individual-level variances of 
intercept among the four subpopulations are all significant and stronger than the 
community-level variances. This suggests that for unobserved variation in healthcare 
utilisation, while personal factors still dominated in all regions, community-level 
heterogeneity was greater in the inland than in the east. 
Trying to explore whether the effect of PHI was different across communities (the 
random slope), the coefficient of PHI is allowed to vary between communities in Model 
11a – 11b (Table 6.7). As a result, the coefficients of the random slope are 
insignificant in all four subpopulations. Moreover, the effects of other independent 
variables almost hold the same after adding the random slope. This suggests that the 
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simpler random-intercept model (Model 10a-10b) seems preferable to the random 
slope model (Model 11a-11b), for the sake of efficiency.30 
Notwithstanding this, the values of the random effect of PHI coefficient still give 
information. By comparing their substances, the effect of PHI is seen to vary heavier 
among communities in the rural areas, especially in the rural inland (the random slope 
variance = 0.13 for the rural east and 0.50 for the rural inland), compared to the two 
urban areas (the random slope variance = 0.05 for the urban east and 0.06 for the 
urban inland). This suggests that the effects of PHI on healthcare utilisation are more 
homogenous across communities in urban areas than in rural areas, especially the 
poorest rural inland. This may be related to the relative concordance in the urban 
healthcare systems, on which PHI’s performance must depend, compared with the 
uneven quality and quantity levels within the rural healthcare systems. 
  
                                                
30  In principle,  the  conclusion  should be made with  the outcome of  a  likelihood  ratio  test, which, 





  Urban east  Rural east  Urban inland  Rural inland 
Model  Model 10a  Model 11a  Model 10b  Model 11b  Model 10c  Model 11c  Model 10d  Model 11d 
Fixed effect: coefficient (S.D.) 
Year  Reference = 2000 
2004  0.24(0.25)  0.24(0.25)  0.45(0.18)*  0.45(0.18)*  0.63(0.15)***  0.63(0.15)***  0.77(0.11)***  0.77(0.11)*** 
2006  0.36(0.25)  0.36(0.25)  0.26(0.20)  0.27(0.21)  0.88(0.14)***  0.88(0.14)***  0.85(0.11)***  0.85(0.12)*** 
2009  0.40(0.28)  0.40(0.28)  0.29(0.18)  0.29(0.18)  0.75(0.15)***  0.75(0.15)***  0.62(0.14)***  0.63(0.14)*** 
2011  0.87(0.30)**  0.87(0.30)**  0.32(0.19) Ɨ  0.32(0.19)  0.66(0.17)***  0.66(0.17)***  0.46(0.14)**  0.46(0.14)** 
Age  0.02(0.01)**  0.02(0.01)**  0.01(0.00)*  0.01(0.00)*  0.02(0.00)***  0.02(0.00)***  0.01(0.00)***  0.01(0.00)*** 
Gender  ‐0.19(0.12)  ‐0.19(0.12)  ‐0.29(0.09)**  ‐0.29(0.09)**  ‐0.12(0.08)  ‐0.12(0.08)  ‐0.15(0.06)*  ‐0.15(0.06)* 
Chronic diseases  0.48(0.12)***  0.48(0.12)***  0.49(0.11)***  0.50(0.11)***  0.48(0.10)***  0.48(0.10)***  0.57(0.09)***  0.57(0.09)*** 
Health status  4.16(0.16)***  4.16(0.16)***  4.35(0.12)***  4.35(0.12)***  4.00(0.10)***  4.00(0.10)***  4.38(0.09)***  4.39(0.09)*** 
Household income  ‐0.03(0.06)  ‐0.03(0.06)  ‐0.05(0.05)  ‐0.05(0.05)  ‐0.05(0.04)  ‐0.05(0.04)  0.03(0.03)  0.03(0.03) 
Household size  0.07(0.05)  0.07(0.05)  0.02(0.03)  0.02(0.03)  0.03(0.03)  0.03(0.03)  ‐0.02(0.02)  ‐0.02(0.02) 
Education  Reference = no or primary school 
Middle or tech  0.01(0.16)  0.01(0.16)  0.06(0.10)  0.06(0.10)  ‐0.20(0.11) Ɨ  ‐0.20(0.11) Ɨ  ‐0.15(0.08) Ɨ  ‐0.15(0.08) Ɨ 
University  ‐0.05(0.25)  ‐0.05(0.25)  ‐0.28(0.27)  ‐0.28(0.28)  ‐0.17(0.16)  ‐0.17(0.16)  ‐0.38(0.32)  ‐0.36(0.32) 
Working  ‐0.10(0.15)  ‐0.10(0.15)  ‐0.36(0.11)**  ‐0.36(0.11)**  ‐0.14(0.09)  ‐0.14(0.09)  ‐0.24(0.07)**  ‐0.24(0.07)** 
Hukou  0.29(0.25)  0.29(0.25)  0.05(0.15)  0.05(0.15)  0.05(0.15)  0.05(0.15)  ‐0.12(0.12)  ‐0.11(0.12) 
SHI  Reference = no SHI 
FMS  0.34(0.21) Ɨ  0.34(0.21) Ɨ  0.53(0.22)*  0.53(0.22)*  0.34(0.15)*  0.34(0.15)*  0.08(0.27)  0.07(0.27) 
Urban SHI  0.06(0.17)  0.06(0.17)  0.46(0.18)*  0.46(0.18)*  0.07(0.11)  0.07(0.11)  ‐0.01(0.18)  ‐0.01(0.18) 
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NCMS  0.35(0.25)  0.35(0.25)  0.36(0.13)**  0.36(0.13)**  0.18(0.19)  0.18(0.19)  0.23(0.11)*  0.22(0.11)* 
PHI  0.03(0.24)  0.02(0.25)  0.12(0.19)  0.10(0.20)  0.18(0.17)  0.16(0.18)  0.12(0.29)  0.06(0.34) 
Aggregate variables 
Health infrastructure  ‐0.02(0.04)  ‐0.02(0.04)  ‐0.04(0.03)  ‐0.04(0.03)  0.02(0.03)  0.02(0.03)  ‐0.03(0.01) Ɨ  ‐0.03(0.01) Ɨ 
Transportation  ‐0.01(0.04)  ‐0.01(0.04)  ‐0.00(0.02)  ‐0.00(0.02)  ‐0.02(0.03)  ‐0.02(0.03)  ‐0.00(0.02)  ‐0.00(0.02) 
Economic activity  ‐0.03(0.03)  ‐0.03(0.03)  0.03(0.02)  0.03(0.02)  0.02(0.02)  0.02(0.02)  0.00(0.01)  0.00(0.01) 
Random effect: variance (S.D.) 
Community‐level   
Cons  0.07(0.05)  0.07(0.05)  0.05(0.03)  0.05(0.03)  0.11(0.05)*  0.11(0.05)*  0.11(0.03)***  0.11(0.03)*** 
PHI    0.05(0.16)    0.13(0.27)    0.06(0.12)    0.50(0.60) 
Individual‐level   







Because the method of handling longitudinal data involves pooling them within 
individuals, as in the last chapter, this section checks whether the health insurance 
variables vary in their effects on healthcare utilisation over time, in case valuable 
information is masked by average effects. For simplicity and abased on background 
knowledge, two ends of this study period, i.e. 2000 and 2011, are examined compared 
to other years.   
As a result, between the year 2000 and the post-2000 years (2004 – 2011), no 
significant interaction between the time transition and any health insurance scheme 
has been found in the models based on the whole population and the four 
subpopulations, while the Chow tests show a significant change in coefficients of PHI 
and SHI schemes between the two time periods for the whole population, the urban 
inland and rural inland (Table 6.8).31 Between the years 2000 – 2009 and the year 
2011, only the interaction between the time transition and the urban SHI is significant 
based on the whole population (OR = 1.72, 95% CI 1.05 – 2.81), while there is no 
significant interaction in the models based on subpopulations. The Chow tests show 
a significant change in coefficients of PHI and SHI schemes between the two time 
periods for the whole population, the urban east and urban inland (Table 6.9).  
Taken together, the outcomes of the Chow test suggest splitting the data by time 
would be suitable for estimating the effects of PHI and SHI on healthcare utilisation 
due to the temporal change. However, first, slitting data by time is essentially not very 
appropriate for longitudinal data, in which data collected in different years are 
correlated to each other if they belong to the same individual or group. Second, the 
Chow test only examines an overall coefficient pattern of the set of health insurance 
                                                




schemes. Regarding particular interactions, few of them are significant, and there is 
no such widespread, uniform change as those in the impacts of SHI on PHI enrolment 
between 2000 and the years after 2000 (Section 5.4.2). On balance, this study does 
not split the longitudinal data in this chapter.    
            
Table 6.8 Difference of insurance effect on utilisation between 2000 and later years   
  Total  Urban east  Rural east  Urban inland  Rural inland 
Model  Model 12  Model 12a  Model 12b  Model 12c  Model 12d 
Post‐2000‡  0.70(0.09)***  0.31(0.31)  0.37(0.20) Ɨ  0.75(0.16)***  0.83(0.11)*** 
SHI  Reference = no SHI 
FMS  0.28(0.11)*  0.38(0.24)  0.59(0.27)*  0.31(0.17) Ɨ  ‐0.04(0.28) 
Urban SHI    0.08(0.07)  0.22(0.17)  0.42(0.18)*  0.07(0.11)  ‐0.18(0.17) 
NCMS  0.12(0.07) Ɨ  0.43(0.28)  0.36(0.12)**  0.15(0.18)  0.04(0.08) 
Post‐2000×FMS  ‐0.06(0.23)  ‐0.14(0.50)  0.50(0.59)  ‐0.05(0.33)  ‐0.20(0.58) 
Post‐2000×Urban SHI    0.11(0.25)  0.03(0.50)  0.77(0.62)  0.10(0.35)  ‐0.04(0.68) 
Post‐2000×NCMS  ‐0.42(0.26)  ‐0.11(0.71)  0.13(0.35)  ‐0.53(0.75)  ‐0.97(0.70) 
PHI  0.05(0.17)  0.17(0.33)  0.05(0.24)  0.16(0.25)  ‐0.18(0.38) 










  Total  Urban east  Rural east  Urban inland  Rural inland 
Model  Model 13  Model 13a  Model 13b  Model 13c  Model 13d 
Post‐2009‡  0.42(0.21) Ɨ  0.76(0.54)  ‐0.33(0.59)  0.46(0.29)  0.50(0.36) 
SHI  Reference = no SHI 
FMS  0.33(0.10)**  0.39(0.21) Ɨ  0.57(0.23)*  0.41(0.15)**  0.16(0.28) 
Urban SHI    ‐0.05(0.09)  0.04(0.19)  0.25(0.18)  ‐0.01(0.13)  ‐0.09(0.21) 
NCMS  0.22(0.07)**  0.45(0.27) Ɨ  0.38(0.14)**  0.32(0.22)  0.23(0.11)* 
Post‐2009×FMS  ‐0.13(0.29)  ‐0.13(0.72)  0.11(0.88)  ‐0.35(0.41)  ‐0.57(0.75) 
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Post‐2009×Urban SHI    0.54(0.25)*  0.13(0.53)  1.08(0.65)  0.39(0.32)  0.15(0.42) 
Post‐2009×NCMS  0.04(0.23)  ‐0.42(0.70)  0.48(0.60)  ‐0.19(0.46)  ‐0.04(0.37) 
PHI  0.06(0.13)  ‐0.08(0.26)  0.01(0.22)  0.09(0.19)  0.18(0.30) 










A goal of national health insurance is to protect access for those in need of healthcare 
(Scheil-Adlung, 2013: 14). As the theoretical frame suggests (Section 1.3.2), health 
insurance coverage could generate sub-optimal additional utilisation due to price 
reduction, that is, the moral hazard (Pauly, 1968). However, if the additional utilisation 
is predominately consumed by those who are ill (hence in need of healthcare), it 
should result from a social-welfare-gain transfer of income from the healthy to the ill 
more than the inefficient moral hazard (Nyman, 2006). From a health policy point of 
view, it is also good to see more people is consuming needed healthcare.  
The variable called health status in this study, indicating whether the individual 
considers him/herself ill or injured in the past four weeks of the survey, plausibly 
reflects whether the individual has developed a physiological or psychological 
condition in greater need of medical attention in this period, compared to those who 
consider themselves not ill or injured. In theory, the additional utilisation attributable 
to those who are ill or injured are in general more efficient than that attributable to 
those who are not. For terminological simplicity, I call the former the high-need group 
and the latter the low-need group. It would be interesting to explore the interactions 
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between the need level and enrolment into health insurance schemes on healthcare 
utilisation. 
The interactions between PHI and the need level are all positive and significant for 
the whole and marginally significant for the urban east, the rural east and the urban 
inland, except the rural inland (Table 6.10). This suggests that PHI was more 
associated with the utilisation for the high-need group than it was for the low-need 
group. Considering magnitude, this shows a pattern – in the high-need group, those 
with PHI were significantly more associated with the utilisation of healthcare than 
those without PHI (based on the whole population, OR = 1.45, 95% CI 1.06 – 1.99), 
but there was no such difference between PHI status in the low-need group (based 
on the whole population, OR = 0.83, 95% CI 0.56 – 1.22).  
By contrast, most interactions between the need level and SHI schemes are negative 
and significant for many (Table 6.10). Combined with the positive main effects of SHI 
schemes, this suggests that in the low-need group SHI enrolees were more 
associated with using healthcare than those without SHI (based on the whole 
population, FMS: OR = 1.68, 95% CI 1.27 – 2.22; urban SHI: OR = 1.65, 95% CI 1.39 
– 1.97; NCMS: OR = 1.29, 95% CI 1.09 – 1.52), while in the high-need group the 
difference in the utilisation between SHI enrolees and non-enrolees significantly 
reduced (based on the whole population, FMS: OR = 1.14, 95% CI 0.90 – 1.45; urban 
SHI: OR = 0.80, 95% CI 0.66 – 0.96; NCMS: OR = 1.09, 95% CI 0.91 – 1.31). 
 
Table 6.10 Interaction between health insurance and the personal need level 
  Total    Urban east  Rural east    Urban inland  Rural inland 
Model  Model 14  Model 14a  Model 14b  Model 14c  Model 14d 
Need‡  4.45(0.08)***  4.43(0.30)***  4.77(0.19)***  4.11(0.15)***  4.61(0.12)*** 
SHI  Reference = no SHI 
FMS  0.52(0.14)***  0.65(0.34) Ɨ  0.99(0.32)**  0.30(0.21)  0.26(0.34) 
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Urban SHI    0.50(0.09)***  0.37(0.30)*  1.08(0.24)***  0.29(0.14)*  0.42(0.20)* 
NCMS  0.25(0.08)**  0.41(0.37)  0.62(0.17)***  0.10(0.25)  0.38(0.12)** 
Need×FMS  ‐0.39(0.18)*  ‐0.48(0.41)  ‐0.77(0.42) Ɨ  ‐0.07(0.28)  ‐0.46(0.45) 
Need×Urban SHI    ‐0.73(0.10)***  ‐0.50(0.34)  ‐1.10(0.26)***  ‐0.41(0.18)*  ‐0.88(0.27)** 
Need×NCMS  ‐0.17(0.10) Ɨ  ‐0.02(0.55)  ‐0.43(0.21)*  0.20(0.33)  ‐0.36(0.14)* 
PHI  ‐0.19(0.20)  ‐0.57(0.45)  ‐0.27(0.31)  ‐0.22(0.31)  0.12(0.35) 








A possible explanation is that PHI, often as complementary insurance, provides more 
generous compensation than SHI, along with a higher threshold of making claims, 
however (EY, 2016b). On the contrary, SHI, focusing on basic benefits, has a 
relatively low threshold of compensation (Liang and Langenbrunner, 2013). According 
to Nyman (2006), theoretically in China PHI appeared less vulnerable to the moral 
hazard than SHI schemes, because PHI appeared more responsive to illness (and 
hence health need) than SHI. Furthermore, for the ill or injured whose needs for 
healthcare were unmet by SHI, PHI might be able complement SHI in promoting 
utilisation. 
The same interactions based on the four subpopulations have similar patterns to 
those based on the whole population (Table 6.10), suggesting that the phenomenon 
is widespread across the country. On the public side, the negative interaction between 
an SHI scheme and the need level is generally weaker in urban areas, especially in 
the urban east (all negative interactions between SHI scheme and the need level are 
not significant), compared to the rural areas, especially the rural inland, possibly 
because SHI coverage is more generous in more affluent urban areas than in poorer 
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rural areas.  On the private side, magnitude of the interaction between PHI and the 
need level is the greatest in the urban east (OR = 2.64, 95% CI 0.95 – 7.34), followed 
by the rural east and the urban inland (OR = 1.96, 95% CI 0.90 – 4.26; OR = 1.92, 
95% CI 0.96 – 3.85, respectively), with marginal significance for the three, but it is 
very little in the poorest rural inland (OR = 1.05, 95% CI 0.40 – 2.77). It suggests that 
PHI appeared more responsive to the need in the more affluent areas than the poorer 
areas in China.  
Finally, it is worth noting that the findings themselves cannot lead to causal inferences 
that health insurance coverage impacted healthcare utilisation, due to the limitation of 
the study design. Instead, they are just associations. Further interpretation about 




Because people can have SHI and PHI at the same time, how the two work together 
and influence each other deserves examination. In addition, it is worth exploring a 
more complex three-way interaction between PHI, SHI and the need level. In practice, 
because membership of SHI schemes is correlated to urban/rural residence, for 
subpopulations, an extremely small number of observations may occur for some 
combinations of an SHI scheme, PHI and the high need, consequently leading to 
failure of model convergence. To address this problem, this section replaces the 
categorical SHI variable with a simplified binary variable indicating membership of any 
SHI scheme. The compromise should be worthwhile, given the similar patterns of SHI 
schemes’ effects in many cases. 
201 
 
The result is presented in the following table (Table 6.11). For the models with only 
the two-way interaction between PHI and SHI, the interaction is insignificant for the 
whole population and the four subpopulations (Table 6.11: Model 15, 15a – 15d). The 
three-way interaction between PHI, SHI and the need level is positive and significant 
for the whole population (OR = 3.38, 95% CI 1.45 – 7.82) (Table 6.11: Model 16). This 
suggests that, overall, for the high-need group, the correlations of SHI and PHI with 
the utilisation were mutually enhancing, but they were not for the low-need group. 
Importantly, it is worth noting that after adding the three-way interaction, the two-way 
interaction between PHI and the need level loses significance and turns negative, 
which means that PHI’s positive correlation with the utilisation for the high-need group 
actually relied greatly on SHI’s existence. 
For the three-way-interaction models based on the subpopulations (Table 6.11: Model 
16a – 16d), the three-way interactions are all positive and that in the rural east reaches 
marginal significance, and the two-way interactions between PHI and the need level 
are positive in the urban areas and negative in the rural areas, suggesting that PHI’s 
positive correlation with the utilisation relied more on SHI in the rural areas. In terms 
of magnitude, for the high-need group, the combination of SHI and PHI was all more 
associated with the utilisation compared to no insurance coverage (based on the 
whole population, OR = 1.66, 95% CI 1.14 – 2.41), and the association was on 
average higher than that of the single coverage of either PHI (OR = 0.79, 95% CI 0.47 
– 1.33) or SHI (OR = 0.93, 95% CI 0.80 – 1.08).  
Likewise, in terms of magnitude, the associations with the utilisation of the 
combination of SHI and PHI are  relatively smaller in the poorest rural inland (OR = 
1.19, 95% CI 0.47 – 3.00) than that in the urban east (OR = 1.77, 95% CI 0.84 – 3.68), 
the rural east (OR = 2.05, 95% CI 1.06 – 4.01) and the urban inland (OR = 1.93, 95% 







  Total  Urban east  Rural east  Urban inland  Rural inland 
Model  Model 15  Model 16  Model 15a  Model 16a  Model 15b  Model 16b  Model 15c  Model 16c  Model 15d  Model 16d 
Need  4.22(0.06)***  4.47(0.08)*** 4.16(0.15)*** 4.48(0.27)*** 4.34(0.12)*** 4.81(0.20)***  3.99(0.11)*** 4.13(0.15)*** 4.38(0.09)*** 4.62(0.12)*** 
SHI  0.14(0.06)*  0.37(0.07)*** 0.16(0.15)  0.48(0.27) Ɨ  0.40(0.13)** 0.78(0.18)***  0.13(0.09)  0.28(0.13)*  0.20(0.10) Ɨ  0.38(0.11)** 
PHI  ‐0.06(0.24)  0.14(0.34)  ‐0.09(0.51)  ‐0.20(1.02)  0.04(0.36)  0.33(0.64)  ‐0.06(0.36)  ‐0.19(0.69)  0.24(0.48)  0.56(0.48) 
PHI×SHI 0.27(0.24)  ‐0.41(0.36)  0.22(0.59)  ‐0.39(1.16)  0.10(0.39)  ‐0.75(0.72)  0.37(0.40)  ‐0.07(0.72)  ‐0.21(0.56)  ‐0.72(0.65) 
Need×SHI   ‐0.45(0.08)***   ‐0.51(0.32)    ‐0.70(0.20)**    ‐0.30(0.17) Ɨ    ‐0.44(0.14)** 
Need×PHI   ‐0.37(0.38)    0.19(1.17)    ‐0.52(0.76)    0.15(0.73)    ‐0.81(0.87) 















A persistent concern about PHI is that it may benefit its members at the expense of 
others by allocating health resources depending on membership rather than needs 
(Colombo, 2007). On the contrary, to contribute to UHC, an insurance programme 
needs to do well enough to upgrade the efficiency of the whole system (Kutzin, 2013). 
From this point of view, a primary question arises: how the health insurance scheme 
impacts, as a contextual effect, individuals’ healthcare utilisation in surrounding areas 
on average. 
To investigate the contextual effect following the existing method (Schempf and 
Kaufman, 2012), this section introduces a new community-level variable, PHI 
prevalence level, which indicates the prevalence of PHI in the community by 
computing the proportion of PHI enrolment within the community in each survey wave. 
Using the same method, it also introduces the community’s SHI prevalence level 
(combining all SHI schemes together) for reference, and the community’s need level 
(the proportion of the community residents who were ill or injured) as a control. The 
three variables, and the interactions between the PHI prevalence level and the need 
level, and between the SHI prevalence level and the need level, are introduced into 
the model successively (Table 6.12). 
As a result, based on the whole population, all coefficients of the PHI prevalence level 
are insignificant, while the SHI prevalence level (OR = 0.67, 95% CI 0.51 – 0.87) and 
the interaction between the SHI prevalence level and the need level (OR = 0.07, 95% 
CI 0.02 – 0.35) are significantly negative (Table 6.12: Model 17 and Model 18). This 
suggests that the prevalence of PHI in the community had little association with the 
average utilisation in the community, whereas the SHI prevalence level was 
negatively associated with the average utilisation in the community; a one unit 
increase in the SHI prevalence level led to a 0.67 time reduction in the community 
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average odds of using formal healthcare. As the need level increased, the negative 
contextual effect of SHI was enhanced. 
As aforementioned, a possible explanation for this result is that, while SHI expanded 
and increased its members’ access to healthcare, the provision resources did not 
increase at the same rate, resulting in a rising strain on local healthcare delivery that 
actually prevented other residents from accessing healthcare. A vivid example is 
public hospitals’ congestion and rising charges (Yip and Hsiao, 2014), more or less 
intensified by the expansion of SHI, which may reduce locals’ willingness to go to 
hospital on average. 
Looking at the disaggregated subpopulations, for the two east subpopulations, the 
model coefficient profiles are similar, as the effects of the three newly-introduced 
variables are all negative, but hardly reach significance (Table 6.12: Model 17a and 
17b). The interactions between the PHI prevalence level and the need level are 
substantially positive, approaching significance in the rural east, but the two main 
effects are still negative (Table 6.12: Model 18a and 18b). This suggests that in the 
east the PHI prevalence level was increasingly associated with higher average 
utilisation in the community as the community need level increased; in east China, 
PHI tends to contribute to equity of utilisation, since it was increasingly associated 
with higher average utilisation in response to increasing average needs in the whole 
community. By contrast, the interaction between the SHI prevalence level and the 
need level is weak. 
The patterns for the two inland subpopulations are different from each other and from 
the east. Both coefficients of the PHI prevalence level in the inland are not significant. 
By contrast, the effect of the SHI prevalence level is significantly negative in the urban 
inland (OR = 0.52, 95% CI 0.29 – 0.93), but small in the rural inland (Table 6.12: 
Model 17c and 17d). This indicates that in the urban inland the higher prevalence of 
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SHI was associated with lower average utilisation in the community, similar to the east. 
The interactions between the PHI prevalence level and the need level, and between 
the SHI prevalence level and the need level, are both negative, especially in the rural 
inland, where both interactions are significant (for PHI: OR = 7.29*10-11, 95% CI 
2.12*10-19 – 0.03; for SHI: OR = 0.14, 95% CI 0.02 – 0.94) (Table 6.12: Model 18c 
and 18d). This indicates that in the inland as the need level increased, the prevalence 
of both SHI and PHI was increasingly associated with lower average utilisation in the 
community, seemingly making healthcare utilisation more inequitable. 
In sum, the analysis offers an insight into healthcare utilisation inequity associated by 
the contextual effects of health insurance in China. A clear pattern is that both SHI’s 
and PHI’s contextual effects seem more pro-equity in the east than in the inland. This 
possibly relates to local health resources, richer in the more affluent east. In areas 
where heath resources are insufficient, typically poorer inland villages, the increased 
level of insurance coverage, which encourages the enrolees to use healthcare, 
intensifies resource strain, and the tighter market of healthcare could raise the local 
level of medical bills (Babiarz et al., 2010, Fu et al., 2014, Jing et al., 2013), preventing 














  Total  Urban east  Rural east  Urban inland  Rural inland 
Model  Model 17  Model 18  Model 17a Model 18a  Model 17b  Model 18b Model 17c  Model 18c  Model 17d  Model 18d 
PHI level  0.02(0.31)  0.25(0.53)  ‐0.11(0.72) ‐1.41(1.24)  ‐0.17(0.44)  ‐1.29(0.80) 0.84(0.68)  1.22(1.10)  ‐0.06(1.16)  2.59(1.40) Ɨ 
SHI level  ‐0.41(0.13)**  ‐0.05(0.18)  ‐0.25(0.48) ‐0.19(0.64)  ‐0.06(0.28)  0.25(0.35)  ‐0.66(0.30)*  ‐0.12(0.42)  0.01(0.23)  0.22(0.29) 
Need level  ‐0.21(0.30)  1.64(0.57)**  ‐0.67(0.85) ‐1.22(2.51)  ‐0.95(0.55) Ɨ  ‐0.28(1.36) ‐0.20(0.58)  1.98(1.30)  1.15(0.45)*  2.71(0.76)** 
PHI level×need level    ‐1.70(2.32)    11.50(8.79)    5.60(3.25) Ɨ   ‐3.18(5.32)    ‐23.34(9.92)* 

















Based on the general population, enrolment into PHI was not correlated with the 
utilisation of formal healthcare. By contrast, enrolment into some SHI schemes, 
including the FMS and the NCMS, was significantly associated with a utilisation 
increase, compared to those without SHI. Health insurance’s effects on utilisation 
were basically steady over time. The increase of the personal need level (falling ill or 
injured) significantly enhanced the positive association between PHI and the 
utilisation to reach significance, but significantly reduced the positive correlations 
between all SHI schemes and the utilisation so as to lose significance. Further 
analysis finds that PHI’s association with utilisation for the high-need group only 
happened in the presence of SHI. PHI seems to be complementing SHI in promoting 
utilisation for enrolees in need of healthcare. 
In terms of spatial differences, for the high-need group the effects of PHI as well as 
the effects of dual insurance of PHI and SHI on utilisation tended to be weaker in the 
poorer rural inland than in other areas. Furthermore, PHI’s effect on healthcare 
utilisation varied among communities remarkably more in rural areas, especially the 
rural inland, than in urban areas. Unequal effects on utilisation also exist in SHI: the 
government’s FMS was widely associated with healthcare utilisation, except in the 
rural inland; the NCMS was only associated with healthcare utilisation in rural areas, 
although it also covered considerable urban residents; the urban SHI had little effect 
at all. From the low-need group to the high-need group, SHI’s correlation with the 
utilisation reduced further in rural areas than in urban areas, implying poorer SHI 
benefits coverage in rural areas. Therefore, PHI has not complemented the spatial 
inequality of utilisation that SHI made and might have rather increased it.      
In terms of the contextual effects of health insurance on the community’s average 
utilisation, in the east, the PHI prevalence level was increasingly associated with 
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higher average utilisation in the community as the community need level increased; 
contrarily, in the inland as the need level increased, the prevalence of both SHI and 
PHI was increasingly associated with lower average utilisation in the community. This 
suggests a pattern whereby both SHI and PHI are more pro-equity in the east than in 
the inland, due possibly to an unequal richness of local health resources, in favour of 


















The final results chapter presents the investigation into the financial protection of 
private health insurance (PHI), in comparison with social health insurance (SHI) in 
China. Data for the analysis are still extracted from the five waves of the China Health 
and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) dataset from 2000 to 2011. Financial protection of a 
health insurance scheme, as formulated in Chapter 3, is indicated by the scheme’s 
impact on out-of-pocket (OOP) payments for healthcare, a widely-used measure of 
financial risk caused by healthcare utilisation in the literature. 
In theory, using costly healthcare does not necessarily raise financial risk, which can 
be prevented by insurance compensation. Rather, it is OOP expenditure, the 
payments net of insurance reimbursement, that decides financial risk (Van Doorslaer 
et al., 2007), and also influences health inequity by preventing the poor from using 
needed healthcare (Krutilova and Yaya, 2012). For a health system, the share of OOP 
payments needs to stay below 15-20% of total health expenditure, to effectively 
control the incidence of financial risk, according to the World Health Organisation 
(WHO, 2010a). In China, this proportion has lingered at 30% or more, despite the 
rapid scale up of SHI (National Health and Family Planning Commission, 2013). As a 
consequence, the incidence of overall Chinese households experiencing catastrophic 
health expenditure persists at above 12% (Meng et al., 2012), worse than most 
developing countries (Li et al., 2012d). 
Though it has been often suggested as a promising solution to SHI’s inadequacy (Gu, 
2009a, Xiang, 2014, Blomqvist, 2009), PHI’s financial protection is controversial 
internationally (Bos and Waters, 2008, Holst and Gericke, 2012, Salti et al., 2010). 
The literature review of this thesis shows little evidence for PHI’s financial protection 
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in China as well. In addition, some international studies have questioned PHI’s role in 
financial equity (Su et al., 2006, Xu et al., 2006, Onwujekwe et al., 2014, Sekhri and 
Savedoff, 2005), while there is a lack of evidence about PHI’s impact at the system 
level in China, thanks to the scarce and fragmented studies in the literature. 
What is more, technically, modelling health expenditure is not straightforward due to 
the zero-piled and highly-skewed data distribution (O'Donnell et al., 2008: 131-145). 
At the beginning of this chapter, I try to justify my choice of models by presenting the 
pros and cons of the candidates and analysing the degree to which the method 
satisfies my research purpose. Following the justification of the selected models are 
descriptive statistics. In the remaining sections, the outcomes of the Heckman models 
and the ZINB models, with independent variables added step by step, are presented 
and interpreted, followed by disaggregation in the same way as in the last two 
chapters. After these, temporal variation, interactions between SHI and PHI, as well 
as the contextual effects of health insurance schemes, are examined. 
 
7.1 Justification for modelling health expenditure 
A linear estimator is not an appropriate method for modelling health expenditure data 
(O'Donnell et al., 2008: 131-145). The reason for this, first of all, is the fact that, for 
standard household surveys, during a short recall period (latest four weeks in the 
CHNS dataset) health expenditures are often unobserved or recorded as zero simply 
because of no utilisation (for details see Table 7.2). Treating values of these cases to 
be either missing or zero, ordinary least square (OLS) estimates on the whole sample 
are very likely to violate the basic assumption of error normality, and hence result in 
estimation bias (Wooldridge, 2015: 47, Wooldridge, 2002: 560-566). 
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To overcome this problem, hurdle models such as the Two-Part model, the Tobit 
model and the sample-selection model are popular for modelling health expenditure 
data (O'Donnell et al., 2008: 131-145). By contrast, the Tobit model and the Two-Part 
models, which separate zeros from positive values of the dependent variable, are not 
very appropriate for this case, because in the CHNS dataset some people paid zero 
for healthcare due to the coverage of health insurance. The meaning of zero payment 
to healthcare users is different from that to non-users. 
Other than the former two, the sample selection, or Heckman model, selects cases 
depending on the value of another variable rather than the value of the dependent 
variable itself (Heckman, 1979). Regarding this research, the Heckman model can 
select cases based on utilisation at the first step, not mixing zero OOP payments from 
healthcare users and non-users, and at the second step it can model health 
expenditure solely on the users. Additionally, unlike the Two-Part model, the 
Heckman model assumes that the two steps, i.e. the decision to utilise and the 
decision to spend in this study, are correlated (Heckman, 1979). This makes sense 
for the process of healthcare utilisation (O'Donnell et al., 2008: 131-145), especially 
in the case of China, where OOP payments may be considerable enough to impact 
the decisions to use healthcare (Liu et al., 2011a, You and Kobayashi, 2011). 
The second equation of the original Heckman model uses an OLS estimator. Although 
the first step has eliminated a number of zeros, the remaining healthcare users’ zeros 
due to health insurance coverage and the heavily right-skewed distribution of positive 
values may still cause the OLS estimator to struggle. An arguable coping strategy is 
adding a small positive number to replace zero and then log-transforming the 
expenditure data. However, the validity of this method and even log-transformation 
itself have been long questioned as it significantly reduces data variability, making 
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estimation non-comparable to the original one and difficult to interpret (Linders and 
De Groot, 2006, Sileshi, 2006, Changyong et al., 2014). 
An alternative method is recoding the continuous expenditure variable to a categorical 
variable (Saei et al., 1996) and previously used in modelling Chinese health 
expenditure data (Fang et al., 2012). Accordingly, the estimator of the second 
equation of the Heckman model is altered from OLS to probit. There are reasons for 
this choice. First, a well-defined threshold of health expenditure should be able to 
signify financial risk by an incidence, just like the method used to define catastrophic 
health expenditure (Xu et al., 2007). Second, this method does not rigidly separate 
zeros from positive values, which seems plausible from the economic prospective. 
For instance, the difference in the financial impact between zero and a small payment 
like ¥10 (¥1≈ £0.11 or $0.14) is negligible, and far less significant than the difference 
between two positive payments such as ¥100 and ¥1000. Third, technically, the 
Heckman-probit estimator has been well established and is easily realised in 
statistical packages.32 
Notwithstanding these advantages, the Heckman-probit model oversimplifies 
expenditure information by transforming continuous data to binary data. An alternative 
is a zero-inflated count model, with either an assumption of Poisson distribution (ZIP) 
or negative binomial distribution (ZINB), which is able to unbiasedly model 
expenditure without substantial artificial transformation (Min and Agresti, 2002). With 
a simple requirement of rounding health expenditure values to integers33 to treat 
expenditure as count data, count models are effectively immune from 
heteroskedasticity and normality assumptions of errors, which would undermine linear 
                                                
32  There is another potential choice called the Heckman‐Poisson model (Miranda and Rabe‐Hesketh, 
2005), which has not yet been officially built in the statistical package that I can access. 




models (Tran et al., 2012, Gould, 2011). Particularly, zero-inflated models assume 
that for the dependent variable a certain proportion of values are necessarily zero, 
while the rest still follow a distribution with a positive probability of zero (Lambert, 1992, 
Hall, 2000). This assumption well matches the fact of the research data, in which most 
people necessarily spent zero due to no utilisation, while some healthcare users 
possibly spent zero due to insurance coverage. Between ZIP and ZINB, the latter is 
preferable to the former for this research, because negative binomial distribution is 
more suitable for over-dispersed data like health expenditure (Min and Agresti, 2002). 
It is worth noting that while using any of the models mentioned above, it is technically 
difficult to maintain the multilevel structure used before. As far as I know, no previous 
studies have developed either Heckman models or ZINB models with multilevel 
structures. A basic obstacle would be, mathematically, how to treat the correlation 
between two equations’ errors within the model. In practice, it is unfeasible to realise 
the model by using built-in commands in statistical packages. Additionally, in terms of 
standard survey datasets, compared to the whole, the sample size of OOP payers for 
healthcare often reduces significantly, possibly causing trouble for multilevel 
modelling. Actually, the literature review shows that many previous studies on health 
expenditure based on Chinese survey data simply used single-level models (Chen et 
al., 2009, You and Kobayashi, 2011, Liu et al., 2011a, Fang et al., 2012). Taking all 
the factors discussed previously together, for the sake of model validity, it may be 
more beneficial to use the Heckman model or the ZINB model than to use the ordinary 
modelling method with a multilevel structure. 
Giving up the multilevel structure does not mean ignoring the longitudinal data 
structure. The modelling, based on maximal likelihood estimation with variance 
component estimation (VCE) in which observations cluster in the individual is applied 
(cluster-robust standard errors), is able to take the within-individual correlation of 
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longitudinal data into account. In terms of the nested-in relationship between 
individuals and communities, although there is a lack of the community level in the 
model, community-level indices indicating the health-related development of the 
community are included in the model as variables. They more or less bring in 
information about the community variation, hopefully mitigating the negative impact of 
the absence of the community level. 
In this study, both the Heckman-probit models and the ZINB models are used for 
cross-reference. Before presenting the model outcomes, there is a section that 
generally describes the origin of the model dependent variables, OOP health 
payments, and its relationships with independent variables, to provide an overview of 
the correlations between the expenditure and its determinants. Then, the research 
proceeds to the Heckman models, to examine the effects of health insurance on the 
incidence of exceeding the 50th percentile of OOP health payments data (medium risk) 
and the incidence of exceeding the 90th percentile of OOP health payments data (high 
risk). The presentation of the Heckman model results is followed by the section about 
the ZINB models, which directly estimate the effects of health insurance on the 
amount of OOP health payments. Like the last chapter, the remaining part of this 
chapter also sets out to disaggregate the population and then examine the temporal 
variation of the health insurance effect, dual insurance of PHI and SHI, and the 





Table 7.1 presents the summary of the dependent variables for the Heckman model 
and the ZINB model, respectively. 34  For the Heckman model, the variable of 
healthcare utilisation, the dependent variable in the last chapter, serves as the 
dependent variable for the first equation of the model. The two binary variables 
indicate whether the amount of OOP health payments exceeded the median level and 
the 90th percentile level are the dependent variables for the second equation to 
indicate the medium level and high level of financial risk, respectively. For the ZINB 
model, the binary variable indicates whether the OOP payment was zero for the first 
equation, and the amount of OOP payments as a count for the second equation. More 
details are presented later, along with the corresponding analyses. 
 
Table 7.1 Overview of dependent variables for the Heckman model and ZINB model 
















Payment = 0  Whether the OOP payment for healthcare is zero  0.16(0.53)  0/1 
Payment  as 
a count Ɨ   












Before going into the transformed dependent variables, the following part of this 
section briefly explores the original OOP health payments (inflated to 2011 consumer 
price index, or CPI), as a prelude to the analyses. At first glance, these OOP payments 
are characterised by a number of zeros (Table 7.2: left hand): based on the whole 
population, the value at the 75th percentile is still zero in all five survey years. This 
makes sense, because most people did not use healthcare at all in the recall period 
(last four weeks) as they simply had no need to do so. Nonetheless, the remaining 
ten percentiles see the value of health payment quickly rises from the 90th percentile 
to the 99th percentile. 
Taking into account utilisation35, the average OOP expenditure of healthcare non-
users is low, while, by contrast, the average OOP expenditure of healthcare users is 
substantially higher and fluctuates over time (Table 7.2: right hand). Notably, it 
reached a relatively high level in 2011, even if the SHI system meanwhile achieved 
the greatest population coverage (Meng et al., 2012). The summary of expenditure 
percentiles for healthcare users shows an evidently right-skewed distribution. Some 
users reported zero OOP payment (more than 10% except in 2004). The median 
expenditure, and even the 75th percentile expenditure, are less than the mean, but 
they increase quickly at the 90th percentile onwards. This suggests that most users 
paid little or a moderate amount, while a few bore extremely high payments and thus 
were vulnerable to financial catastrophe. In sum, this result appears to underpin my 
justification of the model choice. 
 
 
                                                








Mean  Percentiles  Non‐users  Users  Percentiles (Users) 
50%  75%  90%  95%  99%  Mean  10%  25%  50%  75%  90%  95% 
2000  96.95(31.95)  0  0  0  44.25  1370.35 5.81(3.61)  1417.56(470.55)  0  21.06  130.84 617.63 2348.58 4838.98
2004  185.71(21.24)  0  0  95.23  394.29 3746.09 29.78(4.55) 1163.21(153.43)  2.96  29.03  132.76 529.43 2093.44 4648.89
2006  129.57(14.26)  0  0  66.27  294.12 2474.20 18.30(3.80) 859.48(107.05)  0  20.51  107.38 420.42 1465.39 3158.76
2009  164.15(22.46)  0  0  100.93 391.84 3270.96 22.27(3.89) 979.73(149.64)  0  22.86  126.72 502.63 1809.32 3830.34
2011  200.91(26.13)  0  0  88.15  438.69 3998.23 29.44(5.64) 1219.96(178.66)  0  13.59  115.30 572.45 2296.09 4773.51














Cross-tabulating the whole population and the population of healthcare users by SHI 
and PHI memberships and summarising OOP payments (Table 7.3), we find that the 
PHI enrolees paid on average more than those without PHI, regardless of whether 
they were part of the whole population or users. In addition, the standard deviations 
for PHI enrolees were substantially greater than those for the non-enrolees, 
suggesting that the effect of PHI on OOP payments appeared to vary considerably. 
On the SHI side, only the urban scheme has a similar pattern to PHI, compared to 
those without SHI, while the FMS and the NCMS appear to be correlated to lower 
average OOP payments than those without SHI among the users. Those with both 
PHI and a SHI scheme paid less than those with only PHI, but they paid more than 
those with only the corresponding SHI scheme, especially for the users. In sum, those 
with PHI appeared to bear higher OOP payments than those without it, while 
enrolment into SHI had the reverse relationship.  
Briefly exploring correlations between OOP health payments and remaining 
individual-level independent variables (Table 7.4), OOP payments have positive 
relationships with age, the diagnostic history of chronic diseases and health status, 
and negative relationships with other variables. This profile is very similar to the 
correlations between healthcare utilisation and these individual variables (Table 6.2). 
Except health status, which strongly determines utilisation, the correlations with most 
variables are all weak, for the reason that this computation is based on the whole 
population, among whom most individuals spent zero on healthcare. The descriptive 























  No PHI  PHI  Total  No PHI  PHI  Total 
No SHI  132.41(12.35)  233.31(176.01)  135.19(12.97)  1150.87(120.18)  1942.44(1728.26)  1172.39(124.11) 
FMS  200.02(66.03)  128.80(131.28)  183.28(54.48)  1104.38(422.66)  1207.14(1331.10)  1121.21(381.52) 
Urban SHI  214.61(31.04)  234.33(318.99)  215.84(37.60)  1273.20(205.37)  1648.37(2262.34)  1295.41(258.89) 
NCMS  137.69(13.85)  184.37(105.87)  139.51(13.09)  855.65(94.90)  1370.17(906.28)  872.48(89.01) 



















OOP  1.00                   
Age    0.05  1.00                 
Gender  ‐0.00  ‐0.00  1.00               
Chronic diseases  0.07  0.35  0.01  1.00             
Health status  0.15  0.23  ‐0.04  0.25  1.00           
Household income  ‐0.00  ‐0.07  0.01  0.01  ‐0.03  1.00         
Household size  ‐0.01  ‐0.18  ‐0.00  ‐0.10  ‐0.04  0.23  1.00       
Education  ‐0.02  ‐0.40  0.15  ‐0.10  ‐0.10  0.19  ‐0.02  1.00     
Working  ‐0.05  ‐0.46  0.16  ‐0.23  ‐0.16  0.14  0.09  0.17  1.00   








As discussed above, this section sets out to employ the Heckman-probit model and 
the ZINB model, successively, with their specified dependent variables transformed 
from the original OOP payment for healthcare. The independent variables are added 
step by step as previously. Estimation with cluster-robust standard errors is used to 
deal with the longitudinal data structure, instead of multilevel modelling. 
7.3.1 The Heckman model: two levels of financial risk 
The Heckman models estimate the incidence of individuals spending over the 50th 
percentile and the 90th percentile of health expenditure among all formal healthcare 
users, respectively. This study defines spending over the median as medium financial 
risk, and spending over the 90th percentile as high financial risk. 36  Table 7.5 
summarises the two dependent variables depending on SHI and PHI coverage status. 
For the incidence of medium risk, enrolees of SHI schemes, especially the 
government’s FMS and the rural NCMS, appeared to have a lower chance of the 
incidence than those without SHI on average, while enrolees of PHI have a just slightly 
lower chance of the incidence than those without PHI. For the incidence of high risk, 
the difference between SHI status almost diminished, while enrolees of PHI even 




  No PHI  PHI  Total  No PHI  PHI  Total 
No SHI  0.54(0.50)  0.52(0.50)  0.54(0.50)  0.11(0.31)  0.11(0.32)  0.11(0.31) 
FMS  0.44(0.50)  0.45(0.50)  0.44(0.50)  0.09(0.29)  0.12(0.33)  0.10(0.29) 
Urban SHI  0.52(0.50)  0.49(0.50)  0.52(0.50)  0.12(0.33)  0.12(0.32)  0.12(0.33) 
                                                
36  The median and the 90th percentile are derived from data across all years rather than one for each 




NCMS  0.46(0.50)  0.46(0.50)  0.46(0.50)  0.08(0.28)  0.16(0.37)  0.09(0.28) 
Total  0.50(0.50)  0.48(0.50)  0.50(0.50)  0.10(0.30)  0.13(0.34)  0.10(0.30) 
Data source: CHNS (2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, 2011); N = 81,755. 
FMS = government employees’ scheme; NCMS = rural SHI schemes. 
Computation  is  based  on  only  healthcare  users  and  estimates  are  derived  from  means  of  all 
imputation. Significance tests for difference are not feasible for this case.   
 
After the brief descriptive analysis, independent variables are added step by step into 
the model. As aforementioned, the Heckman model has two equations. The model 
first estimates the probability of healthcare utilisation based on the whole population 
(the selection equation), and then the probability of exceeding the threshold based on 
the selected sample (the outcome equation). Although the incidences of medium risk 
and high risk are estimated separately in two models, their selection equations are in 
effect identical. 
Additionally, the Heckman model mathematically requires the selection equation to 
include at least one variable not included in the outcome model. These variables are 
expected to be relevant to the selection process but irrelevant to the second outcome 
equation (Heckman, 1979). In this case, health status is selected to play this role, for 
the reason that theoretically, health status decides whether or not a patient sees a 
doctor, but may have relatively little influence on OOP payments for healthcare, which, 
instead, is more likely to be determined by the result of diagnosis, the doctor, the 
patient’s affluence and insurance coverage.37 
Since utilisation was investigated in the last chapter, the following analysis focuses 
only on the second equation. Model 1 (Table 7.6) initially includes year dummies to 
capture unobserved variations related to time, referring to 2000. These effects are in 
general little, except the negative effect of the year 2006 on high financial risk, 
                                                
37  Based on the study sample, the correlation between health status and utilisation is 0.72, and the 




possibly related to the expansion of the rural NCMS since 2004 (Yip et al., 2012). 
From Model 2 to Model 4, background variables are added, from demographic ones 
to socioeconomic ones, step by step. The effects of the history of chronic diseases, 
the household size and working status are significant on both levels of financial risk. 
Adding new background variables generally has only a small impact on the 
coefficients of existing ones, except the effect of age, which rises to significance 
(marginal significance for high financial risk) in Model 4, due possibly to its correlation 
with non-working status. 
Model 5 (Table 7.6) includes the SHI variable. For medium financial risk, all SHI 
schemes have significant negative effects compared to no SHI (FMS: OR = 0.69, 95% 
CI 0.60 – 0.79; urban SHI: OR = 0.84, 95% CI 0.74 – 0.95; NCMS: OR = 0.79, 95% 
CI 0.72 – 0.87); In terms of magnitude, the government’s FMS is the most effective 
and the urban SHI schemes are the least; this means that for the enrolees of FMS, 
urban SHI and NCMS, the odds of encountering medium financial risk were 0.69, 0.84 
and 0.79 times as large as the odds for those without SHI encountering medium 
financial risk, respectively, when they used formal healthcare.   
For high financial risk, only the rural NCMS has a significantly negative effect (OR = 
0.83, 95% CI 0.72 – 0.96) and the effect of FMS is marginally significant (OR = 0.84, 
95% CI 0.69 – 1.02), both with lowered magnitude, while urban SHI has little effect 
(OR = 0.94, 95% CI 0.79 – 1.11). This suggests that SHI’s financial protection against 
OOP payments seems overall more effective in preventing medium financial risk than 
high financial risk.  
By contrast, in terms of PHI, it shows no significant effect on both levels of financial 
risk (for medium risk, OR = 1.04, 95% CI 0.88 – 1.22; for high risk, OR = 1.16, 95% 
CI 0.92 – 1.47), and adding it has little impact on the existing variables (Model 6). This 
suggests that enrolment in PHI may have little effect on reducing the financial risk 
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related to healthcare utilisation. This result is consistent with the outcome of the 
descriptive analyses (Table 7.3 and 7.5). 
After including all individual variables, the geography variable and the community type 
variable are added into the model (Table 7.6: Model 7). Only the former is significant 
for medium financial risk, suggesting that living in the east was positively associated 
with the occurrence of medium financial risk caused by using healthcare, while they 
are both not significant for the occurrence of high financial risk. Adding the two 
variables likewise has little impact on existing individual variables. 
Finally, five community development indices are added (Table 7.6: Model 8), which 
measure the levels of health infrastructure, transportation infrastructure, economy 
activity, social services and population density in the community, respectively. They 
help to control unobserved community variation to compensate the impact of the lack 
of a community level in the model. For those reaching significance, the index of 
transportation and the index of social services (marginally) have positive correlations 
with medium financial risk, while the population density has a negative correlation with 
it. For high financial risk, only the population density has a marginally significant 
negative effect. In addition, taking into account the community-level measurements, 
the model coefficient profile almost holds the same, which suggests that community 
factors may not seriously interfere with the individual ones and thus the influence from 




Model  Model 1a  Model 1b  Model 1c  Model 2a  Model 2b  Model 2c  Model 3a  Model 3b  Model 3c 
Equation  Selection  >50%  >90%  Selection  >50%  >90%  Selection  >50%  >90% 
Fixed effect: coefficient (S.D.) 
Year  Reference = 2000 
2004 0.38(0.04)***  0.06(0.06)  ‐0.02(0.09)  0.36(0.04)***  0.06(0.06)  ‐0.02(0.09)  0.37(0.04)***  0.06(0.06)  ‐0.03(0.09) 
2006 0.47(0.03)***  ‐0.03(0.06)  ‐0.18(0.09)* 0.42(0.03)***  ‐0.04(0.06)  ‐0.19(0.09)*  0.43(0.03)***  ‐0.03(0.06)  ‐0.19(0.09)* 
2009 0.47(0.03)***  0.02(0.06)  ‐0.09(0.08)  0.39(0.03)***  0.01(0.06)  ‐0.11(0.08)  0.41(0.03)***  0.02(0.06)  ‐0.12(0.09) 
2011 0.49(0.03)***  ‐0.03(0.06)  0.02(0.08)  0.38(0.03)***  ‐0.05(0.06)  ‐0.01(0.08)  0.40(0.03)***  ‐0.04(0.07)  ‐0.00(0.08) 
Age        0.01(0.00)***  ‐0.00(0.00)  ‐0.00(0.00)  0.01(0.00)***  ‐0.00(0.00)  ‐0.00(0.00) 
Gender        ‐0.10(0.02)***  ‐0.04(0.03)  0.03(0.04)  ‐0.10(0.02)***  ‐0.03(0.03)  0.03(0.04) 
Chronic diseases        0.22(0.02)***  0.22(0.04)***  0.23(0.05)*** 0.23(0.03)***  0.21(0.04)*** 0.22(0.05)*** 
Household income              ‐0.04(0.01)***  0.01(0.02)  0.02(0.02) 
Household size              0.03(0.01)***  ‐0.04(0.01)**  ‐0.03(0.01)* 





Model  Model 4a  Model 4b  Model 4c  Model 5a  Model 5b  Model 5c  Model 6a  Model 6b  Model 6c 





2004 0.36(0.04)***  0.05(0.07)  ‐0.04(0.09)  0.37(0.04)*** 0.04(0.07)  ‐0.04(0.09)  0.37(0.04)*** 0.04(0.07)  ‐0.02(0.09) 
2006 0.43(0.03)***  ‐0.04(0.06)  ‐0.20(0.09)*  0.42(0.03)*** ‐0.02(0.06)  ‐0.18(0.09)*  0.43(0.03)*** ‐0.01(0.06)  ‐0.16(0.09) Ɨ 
2009 0.40(0.03)***  0.02(0.07)  0.12(0.09)  0.37(0.04)*** 0.11(0.08)  ‐0.05(0.10)  0.38(0.04)*** 0.12(0.08)  ‐0.03(0.10) 
2011 0.40(0.04)***  ‐0.04(0.07)  ‐0.01(0.08)  0.37(0.04)*** 0.06(0.08)  0.05(0.09)  0.37(0.04)*** 0.06(0.08)  0.08(0.09) 
Age  0.01(0.00)***  ‐0.00(0.00)*  ‐0.00(0.00) Ɨ  0.01(0.00)*** ‐0.00(0.00)*  ‐0.00(0.00)  0.01(0.00)*** ‐0.00(0.00)*  ‐0.00(0.00) Ɨ 
Gender  ‐0.07(0.02)***  ‐0.02(0.03)  0.05(0.05)  ‐0.07(0.02)*** ‐0.01(0.04)  0.05(0.05)  ‐0.07(0.02)*** ‐0.01(0.03)  0.06(0.05) 
Chronic diseases  0.24(0.03)***  0.18(0.04)*** 0.19(0.05)*** 0.24(0.03)*** 0.19(0.04)***  0.20(0.05)*** 0.24(0.03)*** 0.19(0.04)*** 0.20(0.05)*** 
Household income ‐0.02(0.01) Ɨ  0.01(0.02)  0.02(0.02)  ‐0.02(0.01)*  0.03(0.02) Ɨ  0.03(0.02)  ‐0.02(0.01)*  0.03(0.02) Ɨ  0.03(0.02) 
Household size  0.02(0.01)*  ‐0.03(0.01)** ‐0.03(0.01)*  0.02(0.01)*  ‐0.04(0.01)**  ‐0.03(0.01)*  0.02(0.01)*  ‐0.04(0.01)** ‐0.03(0.01)* 
Education  Reference = no or primary school 
Middle or tech ‐0.06(0.03)*  0.04(0.04)  0.06(0.05)  ‐0.07(0.03)*  0.06(0.04)  0.06(0.06)  ‐0.07(0.03)** 0.06(0.04)  0.06(0.06) 
University ‐0.09(0.05) Ɨ  ‐0.07(0.08)  0.08(0.11)  ‐0.10(0.06) Ɨ  ‐0.02(0.08)  0.09(0.11)  ‐0.10(0.06) Ɨ  ‐0.02(0.08)  0.09(0.11) 
Working  ‐0.08(0.02)***  ‐0.20(0.05)*** ‐0.26(0.06)*** ‐0.09(0.02)*** ‐0.19(0.05)***  ‐0.25(0.06)*** ‐0.09(0.02)*** ‐0.19(0.05)*** ‐0.25(0.06)*** 
Hukou  0.13(0.02)***  ‐0.08(0.04) Ɨ  ‐0.03(0.05)  0.12(0.03)*** ‐0.08(0.05)  0.01(0.06)  0.12(0.03)*** ‐0.08(0.05)  0.02(0.06) 
SHI  Reference = no SHI 
FMS       0.13(0.04)**  ‐0.37(0.07)***  ‐0.18(0.10) Ɨ  0.12(0.05)**  ‐0.38(0.07)*** ‐0.20(0.10) Ɨ 
Urban SHI       0.02(0.4)  ‐0.18(0.06)**  ‐0.07(0.09)  0.02(0.04)  ‐0.18(0.06)** ‐0.07(0.09) 
NCMS       0.08(0.03)*  ‐0.23(0.05)***  ‐0.18(0.07)*  0.08(0.03)*  ‐0.23(0.05)*** ‐0.19(0.07)** 
PHI              0.05(0.06)  0.03(0.08)  0.15(0.12) 







Model  Model 7a  Model 7b  Model 7c  Model 8a  Model 8b  Model 8c 
Equation  Selection  >50%  >90%  Selection  >50%  >90% 
Fixed effect: coefficient (S.D.) 
Year  Reference = 2000 
2004  0.37(0.04)***  0.04(0.07)  ‐0.02(0.09)  0.39 (0.04)***  0.02(0.07)  ‐0.05(0.09) 
2006  0.42(0.03)***  ‐0.00(0.06)  ‐0.16(0.09) Ɨ  0.44(0.04)***  ‐0.03(0.07)  ‐0.20(0.09)* 
2009  0.36(0.04)***  0.13(0.08) Ɨ  ‐0.02(0.10)  0.40(0.04)***  0.10 (0.08)  ‐0.07(0.10) 
2011  0.36(0.04)***  0.08(0.08)  0.08(0.09)  0.38(0.04)***  0.06(0.08)  0.05(0.10) 
Age  0.01(0.00)***  ‐0.00(0.00) Ɨ    ‐0.00(0.00) Ɨ  0.01(0.00)***  ‐0.00(0.00) Ɨ  ‐0.00(0.00) 
Gender  ‐0.08(0.02)***  ‐0.00(0.03)  0.06(0.05)  ‐0.08(0.02)***  ‐0.00(0.03)  0.06(0.05) 
Chronic diseases  0.25(0.03)***  0.18(0.04)***  0.19(0.05)***  0.25(0.03)***  0.18(0.04)***  0.19(0.05)*** 
Household income  ‐0.02(0.01) Ɨ  0.02(0.02)  0.03(0.02)  ‐0.01(0.01)  0.02(0.02)  0.02(0.02) 
Household size  0.01(0.01)*  ‐0.04(0.01)**  ‐0.03(0.01)*  0.01(0.01) Ɨ  ‐0.03(0.01)**  ‐0.03(0.01) Ɨ 
Education  Reference = no or primary school 
Middle or tech  ‐0.06(0.03)*  0.06(0.04)  0.06(0.06)  ‐0.05(0.03)*  0.05(0.04)  0.06(0.06) 
University  ‐0.10(0.06) Ɨ  ‐0.02(0.08)  0.09(0.11)  ‐0.08(0.06)  ‐0.02(0.08)  0.09(0.11) 
Working  ‐0.09(0.02)***  ‐0.19(0.05)***  ‐0.25(0.06)***  ‐0.10(0.02)***  ‐0.18(0.05)***  ‐0.24(0.06)*** 
Hukou  0.07(0.03)*  ‐0.07(0.06)  0.02(0.07)  0.04(0.03)  ‐0.03(0.06)  0.05(0.07) 
SHI  Reference = no SHI 
FMS  0.14(0.05)**  ‐0.38(0.07)***  ‐0.20(0.10) Ɨ  0.14(0.05)**  ‐0.39(0.07)***  ‐0.20(0.10) Ɨ 
Urban SHI  0.05(0.04)  ‐0.20(0.07)**  ‐0.08(0.08)  0.06(0.04)  ‐0.20 (0.06)**  ‐0.08(0.08) 
NCMS  0.09(0.03)**  ‐0.26(0.05)***  ‐0.20(0.07)**  0.09(0.03)**  ‐0.26(0.05)***  ‐0.21(0.07)** 
PHI  0.06(0.06)  0.03(0.08)  0.15(0.12)  0.07(0.06)  0.02(0.08)  0.15(0.12) 
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Health status  2.20(0.02)***      2.20(0.02)***     
Aggregate variables 
East  ‐0.12(0.02)***  0.10(0.04)*  0.05(0.06)  ‐0.11(0.02)***  0.11(0.04)**  0.07(0.06) 
Urban    ‐0.07(0.03)*  ‐0.01(0.05)  ‐0.02(0.06)  ‐0.03(0.03)  ‐0.05(0.06)  ‐0.04(0.07) 
Health infrastructure        ‐0.01(0.00)*  0.01(0.01)  0.00(0.01) 
Transportation        ‐0.01(0.00)  0.02(0.01)*  0.02(0.01) 
Economic activity          0.00(0.00)  0.01(0.01)  0.01(0.01) 
Social services        ‐0.02(0.00)***  0.01(0.01) Ɨ  0.01(0.01) 







In this section, the ZINB model is applied to estimate effects on OOP payments 
rounded to be integers. The ZINB model also consists of two equations. The first logit 
equation estimates the occurrence of zero values, and the second negative binomial 
equation estimates OOP payments as count data. To be consistent and comparable, 
basically the same regressors were included as in the Heckman model38, despite no 
such mathematical requirement being specified for the ZINB model. 
The ZINB model and the Heckman model look alike in terms of structure and the 
modelling process. However, the coefficient interpretations are different. As well as 
their dissimilar second equations as aforementioned, the first equations of the two 
models also provide distinct information: the Heckman model estimates the utilisation 
of healthcare, while the ZINB model estimates the occurrence of zero OOP payment 
for healthcare. Since zero expenditure in a large part correlates with no utilisation, the 
signs of the variable coefficients in the two first equations should be opposite to each 
other if their estimations are consistent. But we need to bear in mind that using 
healthcare does not necessarily lead to an OOP payment in the presence of health 
insurance. 
Moving on to the results of the ZINB models, from Model 9 to Model 12 (Table 7.7), 
as expected, the coefficient signs of the background variables in the logit equation are 
generally opposite to those in the selection equation of the Heckman model (Table 
7.6). This means that factors that increase the utilisation of healthcare in the Heckman 
model indeed reduce the occurrence of zero OOP payment in the ZINB model. The 
estimations of the two models therefore seem basically consistent. In terms of the 
                                                
38  This means that the variable of health status is included in the logit equation, but not included in 
the count equation of the ZINB model. The same logic as that used in the Heckman model could be 





second equation, the results are generally similar to those of the Heckman model as 
well. The history of chronic diseases and working status are positively and negatively 
correlated to the amount of OOP health payments, respectively. Moreover, like the 
Heckman model on the high risk, the year 2006 is associated with a lower OOP 
payment in the ZINB model.  
With respect to health insurance, compared to no SHI, the government’s FMS and 
the rural NCMS are significantly positively correlated to the occurrence of zero OOP 
payment (FMS: OR = 1.44, 95% CI 1.10 – 1.89; urban SHI: OR = 1.08, 95% CI 0.93 
– 1.25; NCMS: OR = 1.18, 95% CI 1.01 – 1.39), while the effects of all SHI schemes 
on the amount of OOP payments, although negative, are not significant; the effects of 
urban SHI schemes are weaker than the other two in both cases (Table 7.7: Model 
13); it means that for the enrolees of the FMS and NCMS, the odds of paying zero 
OOP for healthcare were 1.44 and 1.18 times as large as the odds for those without 
SHI paying zero OOP for healthcare. Together with previous findings of SHI schemes’ 
positive correlations with healthcare utilisation, this suggests that SHI offered some 
forms of healthcare free of charge (likely to be lower-end basic services and medicine), 
in comparison with those without SHI; once OOP payments happened (more 
advanced care was used), SHI was not able to effectively compensate the costs to 
reduce the amount of OOP payments.   
In contrast, PHI is negatively associated with the occurrence of zero OOP payment 
with marginal significance (OR = 0.76, 95% CI 0.54 – 1.05), and has an insignificant 
correlation with the amount of OOP payments (Table 7.7: Model 14). This suggests 
that maybe PHI promoted the utilisation of healthcare not fully covered by health 
insurance (hence likely to be advanced medical services or medicine), and thus 
increase the probability of positive OOP payments, in comparison with no PHI. This 
contrast between SHI and PHI is in line with the argument made in the last chapter 
that SHI focuses on basic benefits while PHI often operates as complementary or 
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supplementary insurance. From a different perspective, PHI seemingly managed to 
increase utilisation without significantly increasing OOP payments caused by 
utilisation. 
Additionally, since the second equation of the Heckman model is conditional on the 
utilisation of healthcare, while the ZINB model is not, it would be interesting to add the 
utilisation variable as an independent variable into the ZINB model. As a result, it is 
significant in both equations, as expected correlated to the lower probability of zero 
OOP payment and the higher amount of OOP payments. After controlling utilisation, 
the positive effects of SHI schemes on the occurrence of zero OOP payment are 
strengthened (FMS: OR = 2.19, 95% CI 1.57 – 3.06; urban SHI: OR = 1.24, 95% CI 
1.01 – 1.52; NCMS: OR = 1.36, 95% CI 1.10 – 1.67), while little change happens to 
their effects on the amount of OOP payments. However, PHI loses the marginal 
significance of its negative effect on the occurrence of zero OOP payment (OR = 0.82, 
95% CI 0.57 – 1.17) (Table 7.7: Model 15). This outcome supports the inference that 
PHI may increase the occurrence of positive OOP payments due to boosting 
(advanced) utilisation, while SHI may increase (basic) utilisation and fully compensate 
some of them so as to increase the occurrence of zero OOP payment. 
After the geographic variable and the community type variable are added into the 
model (Table 7.7: Model 16), both are not significant for the two equations, having 
little impact on the existing variables. Finally, the community development indices are 
included (Table 7.7: Model 17). Health infrastructure, transportation (marginally) and 
population density have significantly negative correlations with the occurrence of zero 
OOP payment. Transportation (marginally) and social services have significantly 
positive correlations, and population density has a marginally significantly negative 
correlation, with the amount of OOP payments. The effects of the community indices 
on the amount of OOP payments in the ZINB model (Table 7.7: Model 17b) match 
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well with the result of the Heckman model on medium financial risk (Table 7.6: Model 








Model  Model 9a  Model 9b  Model 10a  Model 10b  Model 11a  Model 11b  Model 12a  Model 12b 
Equation  %Zero  Count  %Zero  Count  %Zero  Count  %Zero  Count 
Fixed effect: coefficient (S.D.) 
Year  Reference = 2000 
2004  ‐3.29(0.26)***  ‐0.29(0.32)  ‐3.27(0.27)***  ‐0.28(0.25)  ‐3.27(0.27)***  ‐0.28(0.26)  ‐3.27(0.27)***  ‐0.29(0.25) 
2006  ‐3.20(0.26)***  ‐0.52(0.30) Ɨ  ‐3.13(0.27)***  ‐0.57(0.25)*  ‐3.14(0.28)***  ‐0.57(0.25)*  ‐3.15(0.27)***  ‐0.61(0.26)* 
2009  ‐3.19(0.26)***  ‐0.38(0.28)  ‐3.05(0.27)***  ‐0.46(0.25) Ɨ  ‐3.07(0.28)***  ‐0.46(0.25) Ɨ  ‐3.09(0.28)***  ‐0.47(0.24) Ɨ 
2011  ‐2.97(0.26)***  ‐0.08(0.31)  ‐2.77(0.27)***  ‐0.17(0.28)  ‐2.79(0.27)***  ‐0.16(0.27)  ‐2.80(0.27)***  ‐0.15(0.28) 
Age      ‐0.01(0.00)***  0.01(0.00) Ɨ  ‐0.01(0.00)***  0.01(0.00) Ɨ  ‐0.01(0.00)**  ‐0.00(0.01) 
Gender      0.27(0.05)***  0.08(0.12)  0.27(0.05)***  0.08(0.12)  0.24(0.06)***  0.13(0.12) 
Chronic diseases      ‐0.77(0.06)***  0.64(0.12)***  ‐0.77(0.06)***  0.63(0.12)***  ‐0.74(0.06)***  0.59(0.12)*** 
Household income          0.03(0.02)  0.01(0.05)  0.04(0.03)  0.04(0.05) 
Household size          0.01(0.02)  ‐0.02(0.03)  0.00(0.02)  ‐0.03(0.03) 
Education  Reference = no or primary school 
Middle or tech              0.07(0.06)  ‐0.00(0.13) 
University              ‐0.09(0.12)  0.07(0.33) 
Working              0.15(0.07)*  ‐0.65(0.15)*** 
Hukou              0.13(0.06)*  0.03(0.10) 







Model  Model 13a  Model 13b  Model 14a  Model 14b  Model 15a  Model 15b  Model 16a  Model 16b  Model 17a  Model 17b 
Equation  %Zero  Count  %Zero  Count  %Zero  Count  %Zero  Count  %Zero  Count 
Fixed effect: coefficient (S.D.) 
Year  Reference = 2000 
2004 ‐3.28(0.25)***  ‐0.31(0.25)  ‐3.30(0.27)*** ‐0.27(0.24)  ‐1.62(0.10)*** ‐0.08(0.23)  ‐1.63(0.10)*** ‐0.08(0.23)  ‐1.65(0.11)*** ‐0.16(0.23) 
2006 ‐3.19(0.25)***  ‐0.60(0.25)*  ‐3.20(0.27)*** ‐0.57(0.24)*  ‐1.47(0.12)*** ‐0.40(0.23) Ɨ  ‐1.48(0.12)*** ‐0.38(0.24)  ‐1.51(0.12)*** ‐0.49(0.24) Ɨ 
2009 ‐3.18(0.25)***  ‐0.44(0.27)  ‐3.18(0.28)*** ‐0.40(0.26)  ‐1.55(0.14)*** ‐0.22(0.24)  ‐1.57(0.14)*** ‐0.21(0.24)  ‐1.53(0.14)*** ‐0.29(0.25) 
2011 ‐2.91(0.25)***  ‐0.13(0.29)  ‐2.90(0.27)*** ‐0.07(0.28)  ‐1.22(0.14)*** 0.14(0.26)  ‐1.24(0.14)*** 0.16(0.27)  ‐1.26(0.15)*** 0.129(0.27) 
Age  ‐0.01(0.00)***  ‐0.00(0.01)  ‐0.01(0.00)*** ‐0.00(0.01)  ‐0.00(0.00)  ‐0.00(0.01)  ‐0.00(0.00)  ‐0.00(0.01)  ‐0.00(0.00)  ‐0.00(0.01) 
Gender  0.24(0.06)***  0.14(0.12)  0.24(0.06)*** 0.14(0.12)  0.20(0.06)**  0.17(0.11)  0.19(0.06)**  0.18(0.11)  0.18(0.06)**  0.17(0.11) 
Chronic diseases  ‐0.75(0.06)***  0.61(0.12)*** ‐0.75(0.06)*** 0.60(0.12)*** ‐0.52(0.07)*** 0.50(0.11)*** ‐0.51(0.07)*** 0.50(0.11)*** ‐0.50(0.07)*** 0.49(0.11)*** 
Household income  0.03(0.02)  0.05(0.06)  0.03(0.03)  0.05(0.05)  ‐0.01(0.04)  0.05(0.04)  ‐0.01(0.04)  0.04(0.05)  ‐0.00(0.04)  0.04(0.04) 
Household size  0.01(0.02)  ‐0.03(0.03)  0.00(0.02)  ‐0.03(0.03)  0.04(0.02) Ɨ  ‐0.04(0.03)  0.04(0.02) Ɨ  ‐0.04(0.04)  0.04(0.02) Ɨ  ‐0.03(0.03) 
Education  Reference = no or primary school 
Middle or tech  0.06(0.06)  0.02(0.13)  0.06(0.06)  0.00(0.13)  0.01(0.07)  0.04(0.12)  0.02(0.07)  0.04(0.12)  0.05(0.07)  0.03(0.11) 
University  ‐0.13(0.12)  0.11(0.32)  ‐0.11(0.12)  0.06(0.30)  ‐0.12(0.15)  0.18(0.26)  ‐0.11(0.15)  0.19(0.27)  ‐0.07(0.15)  0.16(0.26) 
Working  0.14(0.07) Ɨ  ‐0.63(0.14)*** 0.14(0.07) Ɨ  ‐0.65(0.14)*** 0.05(0.08)  ‐0.58(0.13)*** 0.05(0.08)  ‐0.58(0.14)*** 0.03(0.08)  ‐0.56(0.14)*** 
Hukou  0.11(0.06) Ɨ  0.05(0.14)  0.10(0.06)  0.07(0.13)  0.29(0.07)*** 0.02(0.13)  0.24(0.09)**  0.03(0.16)  0.13(0.09)  0.06(0.16) 
SHI  Reference = no SHI 
FMS  0.36(0.14)*  ‐0.16(0.22)  0.36(0.13)**  ‐0.19(0.22)  0.79(0.18)*** ‐0.13(0.24)  0.79(0.17)*** ‐0.16(0.21)  0.78(0.17)*** ‐0.17(0.21) 
Urban SHI  0.07(0.07)  ‐0.08(0.21)  0.07(0.08)  ‐0.07(0.19)  0.19(0.11) Ɨ  ‐0.07(0.18)  0.21(0.10)*  ‐0.10(0.17)  0.23(0.10)*  ‐0.11(0.17) 
NCMS  0.17(0.08)*  ‐0.13(0.19)  0.17(0.08)*  ‐0.14(0.18)  0.29(0.11)**  ‐0.19(0.17)  0.30(0.10)**  ‐0.20(0.16)  0.27(0.11)*  ‐0.22(0.16) 
PHI      ‐0.28(0.16) Ɨ  0.28(0.31)  ‐0.30(0.25)  0.39(0.43)  ‐0.20(0.18)  0.28(0.30)  ‐0.17(0.18)  0.28(0.30) 
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Utilisation          ‐4.23(0.09)*** 1.26(0.11)*** ‐4.23(0.09)*** 1.27(0.10)*** ‐4.26(0.09)*** 1.27(0.10)*** 
Health status  ‐16.73(15.30)    ‐21.14(13.27)   ‐20.78(15.98)   ‐4.26(0.10)***   ‐4.25(0.10)***  
Aggregate variables 
East              0.06(0.06)  0.08(0.10)  0.01(0.07)  0.16(0.11) 
Urban              0.08(0.08)  0.01(0.15)  0.04(0.08)  0.01(0.16) 
Health infrastructure                  ‐0.06(0.01)*** 0.00(0.02) 
Transportation                  ‐0.03(0.01) Ɨ  0.04(0.02) Ɨ 
Economic activity                    0.01(0.01)  0.00(0.02) 
Social services                  ‐0.01(0.01)  0.04(0.02)* 















In this section, the study population is disaggregated into the four subpopulations of 
the urban east, the rural east, the urban inland and the rural inland, as is in the last 
two chapters, applied to both the Heckman model and the ZINB model. Their 
dependent variables are summarised based on the subpopulations (Table 7.8). All 
three dependent variables, since they are derived from the same expenditure variable, 
tend to be greater in the east and urban areas than in inland and rural areas, 
respectively. Thus, they are the greatest in the urban east and the least in the rural 
inland, suggesting that those living in more affluent areas appeared to spend more 
out of pocket on healthcare on average. 
 
Table 7.8 Summary of dependent variables based on subpopulations 
  Urban east  Rural east  Urban inland  Rural inland 
Payment>50%*  0.55(0.50)  0.53(0.50)  0.47(0.50)  0.46(0.50) 
Payment>90%*  0.12(0.33)  0.11(0.31)  0.09(0.31)  0.09(0.28) 








Moving on to disaggregated Heckman models (Table 7.9), the coefficients of 
background variables notably vary between the four subpopulations. For two east 
subpopulations, nearly all demographic and socioeconomic variables are not 
significant. By contrast, for the two inland subpopulations, the coefficients of chronic 
diseases and working status reach significance in most cases. The effect of the 
household size is only significant in the rural inland in the model for medium financial 
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risk, while the effect of age loses significance in all. The possible reason for this 
change is that, on the one hand, disaggregation reduces the sample sizes, so that 
statistical significance tends to fall. On the other hand, it suggests that factors affecting 
the financial risk vary spatially. For example, because the positive effect of chronic 
diseases is only significantly for the two inland subpopulations, it suggests that chronic 
diseases seemed more likely to trigger financial risk in the inland than in the east, due 
possibly to different levels of financial protection and chronic disease management 
between the east and the inland of the country.  
Focusing on health insurance, PHI, again, fails to have a significant effect on both 
levels of financial risk for all subpopulations. By contrast, SHI schemes appeared to 
perform better than PHI. Like the outcome based on the whole population, SHI 
schemes’ negative associations with medium financial risk are still stronger than those 
with high financial risk for all subpopulations. In terms of medium financial risk, SHI’s 
associations are generally the strongest in the richest urban east and the weakest in 
the poorest rural inland. For the latter, only the NCMS was significantly negatively 
associated with the risk occurrence (OR = 0.80, 95% CI 0.68 – 0.93), not as much as 
it was in the rural east (OR = 0.75, 95% CI 0.60 – 0.93). However, in terms of high 
financial risk, only the NCMS’s negative effect reaches marginal significance in the 
rural east (OR = 0.77, 95% CI 0.59 – 1.02) and the rural inland (OR = 0.81, 95% CI 
0.64 – 1.04). This suggests that for those living and also using healthcare in rural 
areas, the NCMS’s risk reduction was relatively comprehensive. Comparatively, the 




Population  Urban east  Rural east  Urban inland  Rural inland 
Model  Model 18b  Model 18c  Model 19b  Model 19c  Model 20b  Model 20c  Model 21b  Model 21c 
Risk level  >50%  >90%  >50%  >90%  >50%  >90%  >50%  >90% 
Fixed effect: coefficient (S.D.) 
Year  Reference = 2000 
2004  0.01(0.22)  0.00(0.27)  0.13(0.13)  ‐0.15(0.19)  0.03(0.13)  0.15(0.22)  ‐0.06(0.09)  ‐0.13(0.12) 
2006  ‐0.01(0.21)  ‐0.14(0.30)  0.21(0.14)  ‐0.08(0.20)  ‐0.00(0.13)  ‐0.07(0.21)  ‐0.18(0.10) Ɨ  ‐0.32(0.13)* 
2009  0.08(0.25)  ‐0.00(0.32)  0.24(0.14) Ɨ  ‐0.06(0.19)  0.13(0.13)  0.15(0.20)  ‐0.02(0.13)  ‐0.19(0.18) 
2011  ‐0.09(0.23)  ‐0.10(0.31)  0.32(0.15)*  0.15(0.21)  0.00(0.16)  0.16(0.21)  ‐0.04(0.14)  0.01(0.17) 
Age  ‐0.01(0.00)  ‐0.01(0.01)  ‐0.00(0.00)  ‐0.00(0.00)  ‐0.00(0.00)  ‐0.00(0.00)  ‐0.00(0.00)  ‐0.00(0.00) 
Gender  ‐0.04(0.10)  ‐0.00(0.14)  0.01(0.07)  0.09(0.10)  ‐0.02(0.07)  0.04(0.10)  0.01(0.05)  0.06(0.08) 
Chronic diseases  0.06(0.10)  0.06(0.13)  0.12(0.08)  0.13(0.11)  0.19(0.08)*  0.21(0.09)*  0.22(0.06)***  0.24(0.07)** 
Household income  ‐0.01(0.05)  ‐0.06(0.07)  0.02(0.03)  0.00(0.05)  0.02(0.03)  0.05(0.04)  0.03(0.02)  0.05(0.04) 
Household size  ‐0.03(0.03)  ‐0.03(0.05)  ‐0.04(0.03)  ‐0.03(0.03)  ‐0.03(0.02)  ‐0.04(0.03)  ‐0.03(0.01)**  ‐0.03(0.02) 
Education  Reference = no or primary school 
Middle or tech  ‐0.07(0.12)  ‐0.02(0.16)  0.03(0.08)  0.02(0.11)  ‐0.01(0.08)  0.00(0.13)  0.12(0.06)*  0.12(0.08) 
University  ‐0.22(0.20)  0.04(0.26)  ‐0.12(0.20)  0.05(0.27)  ‐0.06(0.13)  ‐0.02(0.20)  0.32(0.23)  0.32(0.28) 
Working  ‐0.10(0.14)  ‐0.16(0.21)  ‐0.14(0.08) Ɨ  ‐0.12(0.13)  ‐0.18(0.11)  ‐0.26(0.13)*  ‐0.20(0.06)**  ‐0.30(0.08)*** 
Hukou  0.09(0.21)  0.20(0.26)  0.06(0.12)  0.13(0.14)  ‐0.02(0.11)  0.07(0.15)  ‐0.04(0.09)  0.06(0.11) 
SHI  Reference = no SHI 
FMS  ‐0.47(0.18)*  ‐0.13(0.23)  ‐0.39(0.19)*  ‐0.45(0.31)  ‐0.41(0.10)***  ‐0.18(0.18)  ‐0.19(0.22)  ‐0.18(0.27) 
Urban SHI  ‐0.29(0.15) Ɨ  ‐0.05(0.23)  ‐0.30(0.13)*  ‐0.15(0.19)  ‐0.20(0.10) Ɨ  ‐0.10(0.11)  ‐0.03(0.13)  0.07(0.18) 
NCMS  ‐0.48(0.22)*  ‐0.19(0.32)  ‐0.30(0.12)*  ‐0.27(0.14) Ɨ  ‐0.29(0.16) Ɨ  ‐0.30(0.22)  ‐0.22(0.08)**  ‐0.21(0.12) Ɨ 
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PHI  ‐0.05(0.19)  ‐0.11(1.16)  ‐0.09(0.34)  0.05(0.38)  0.16(0.28)  0.11(0.38)  0.10(0.41)  ‐0.66(1.82) 
Aggregate variables 
Health infrastructure  ‐0.02(0.03)  ‐0.01(0.04)  0.02(0.02)  0.00(0.02)  0.02(0.02)  0.02(0.02)  0.01(0.01)  0.00(0.01) 
Transportation  ‐0.00(0.02)  ‐0.02(0.03)  0.05(0.02)**  0.04(0.03)  0.02(0.02)  ‐0.00(0.02)  0.01(0.01)  0.02(0.02) 
Economic activity    ‐0.01(0.03)  ‐0.01(0.04)  ‐0.01(0.02)  0.01(0.02)  0.02(0.02)  0.00(0.03)  0.01(0.01)  0.01(0.01) 
Social services  0.01(0.02)  ‐0.00(0.02)  0.02(0.02)  0.02(0.02)  0.01(0.01)  0.01(0.02)  0.02(0.01)  0.02(0.02) 







Like the Heckman models on the subpopulations, in the ZINB models (Table 7.10), 
the chronic diseases variable only significantly correlates to an increase in the amount 
of OOP payments for the two inland subpopulations, while it is significantly negatively 
associated with the occurrence of zero OOP spending for all. This corroborates the 
inference from the Heckman models that chronic diseases were more associated with 
increased financial risk in the poorer inland than in the east. Likewise, the significantly 
negative effect of the year 2006 on the amount of OOP payments only happens in the 
rural inland (Table 7.10: Model 25b) as it does in the Heckman model on high risk 
(Table 7.9: Model 21c). The negative effect of working status on the amount of OOP 
payments is generally similar between the two types of models as well: it is mainly 
significant in the rural inland and insignificant in the urban east. All in all, these suggest 
that in terms of control variables, the Heckman model and the ZINB model are 
basically consistent. 
In terms of SHI, the FMS is significantly positively correlated to the occurrence of zero 
payment in all but the rural inland (urban east: OR = 3.25, 95% CI 1.81 – 7.01; rural 
east: OR = 2.09, 95% CI 1.11 – 4.56; urban inland: OR = 1.79, 95% CI 1.17 – 2.57; 
rural inland: OR = 1.38, 95% CI 0.61 – 3.12). Comparatively, the urban SHI again has 
the worst performance of all. The NCMS only has such effect in rural areas, significant 
in the rural east (OR = 1.39, 95% CI 1.02 – 1.88) and marginally significant in the rural 
inland (OR = 1.38, 95% CI 1.00 – 1.91) (Table 7.10: Model 23a and 25a). Regarding 
the effect on the amount of OOP payments, the negative effect of the NCMS is 
marginally significant in the rural east, but insignificant in the rural inland (Table 7.10: 
Model 23b and 25b). These suggest that the NCMS might increase the probability of 
zero OOP payment (by offering free basic care) and tend to directly reduce OOP 
payments (by effectively compensating the costs of advanced care) in the rural east, 
but only increase the probability of zero OOP payment in the rural inland. 
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PHI still has no significant association with either the occurrence of zero OOP 
payment or the amount of OOP payments in all areas. In terms of coefficient 
magnitude, there is a pattern that PHI has greater positive effects on the amount of 
OOP payments in the east than the inland. However, the standard deviations for these 
effects are all so high that they prevent them from reaching statistical significance. By 
comparison, the standard deviations for effects of SHI schemes are less than PHI’s 
in most cases, which is also true for the Heckman models. This suggests that it is 





Population  Urban east  Rural east  Urban inland  Rural inland 
Model  Model 22a  Model 22b  Model 23a  Model 23b  Model 24a  Model 24b  Model 25a  Model 25b 
Equation  %Zero  Count  %Zero  Count  %Zero  Count  %Zero  Count 
Fixed effect: coefficient (S.D.) 
Year  Reference = 2000 
2004  ‐1.82(0.36)***  ‐0.16(0.63)  ‐2.17(0.24)*** ‐0.22(0.47)  ‐1.45(0.22)*** 0.07(0.38)  ‐1.62(0.15)*** ‐0.17(0.29) 
2006  ‐1.84(0.44)***  ‐0.32(0.61)  ‐1.86(0.27)*** ‐0.4(0.51)  ‐1.32(0.21)*** ‐0.17(0.37)  ‐1.44(0.17)*** ‐0.68(0.29)* 
2009  ‐1.6(0.41)***  ‐0.2(0.59)  ‐1.98(0.27)*** ‐0.18(0.46)  ‐1.3(0.24)***  0.21(0.39)  ‐1.43(0.23)*** ‐0.52(0.38) 
2011  ‐1.07(0.47)*  ‐0.29(0.58)  ‐1.53(0.29)*** 0.25(0.51)  ‐0.93(0.24)*** 0.47(0.37)  ‐1.56(0.25)*** ‐0.1(0.41) 
Age  0.00(0.01)  0.00(0.01)  0.00(0.01)  0.00(0.01)  ‐0.01(0)  0.00(0.01)  0.00(0.00)  0.00(0.01) 
Gender  0.11(0.14)  0.07(0.23)  0.30(0.12)*  0.19(0.17)  0.2(0.13)  0.14(0.21)  0.11(0.09)  0.13(0.13) 
Chronic diseases  ‐0.33(0.16)*  0.34(0.24)  ‐0.79(0.14)*** 0.32(0.19) Ɨ  ‐0.38(0.13)**  0.53(0.17)** ‐0.48(0.15)**  0.6(0.14)** 
Household income  0.06(0.08)  0.02(0.11)  ‐0.01(0.06)  0.06(0.08)  0.01(0.06)***  0.01(0.07)  ‐0.05(0.05)  0.06(0.06) 
Household size  0.07(0.07)  ‐0.04(0.09)  0.12(0.05)*  0(0.06)  0.05(0.04)  ‐0.05(0.05)  0(0.03)  ‐0.05(0.04) 
Education  Reference = no or primary school 
Middle or tech  0.08(0.22)  0.07(0.3)  0.01(0.13)  ‐0.01(0.21)  0.16(0.15)  ‐0.1(0.22)  0.04(0.11)  0.15(0.15) 
University  ‐0.04(0.32)  ‐0.29(0.38)  ‐0.12(0.34)  0.25(0.49)  0.04(0.22)  ‐0.02(0.38)  ‐0.11(0.42)  0.51(0.41) 
Working  0.00(0.17)  ‐0.40(0.32)  0.07(0.14)  ‐0.55(0.19)**  0.10(0.14)  ‐0.39(0.26)  ‐0.01(0.12)  ‐0.64(0.17)***
Hukou  0.05(0.28)  0.36(0.53)  ‐0.02(0.16)  0.43(0.24) Ɨ  ‐0.01(0.2)  0.08(0.28)  0.09(0.16)  ‐0.1(0.21) 
SHI  Reference = no SHI 
FMS  1.18(0.36)**  ‐0.08(0.4)  0.74(0.37)*  ‐0.67(0.5)  0.58(0.22)*  ‐0.05(0.34)  0.32(0.45)  ‐0.3(0.41) 
Urban SHI  0.07(0.21)  ‐0.1(0.33)  0.39(0.2) Ɨ  ‐0.18(0.31)  0.21(0.14)  ‐0.21(0.21)  0.11(0.26)  0.15(0.32) 
NCMS  0.42(0.39)  ‐0.45(0.55)  0.34(0.15)*  ‐0.53(0.25) Ɨ  0.36(0.27)  0.14(0.41)  0.32(0.17) Ɨ  ‐0.12(0.21) 
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PHI  ‐0.63(0.39)  0.35(0.78)  0.11(0.46)  0.38(0.66)  ‐0.24(0.42)  0.09(0.66)  ‐0.01(0.7)  0.06(0.86) 
Utilisation  ‐3.61(0.26)***  1.32(0.24)*** ‐4.23(0.19)*** 1.39(0.17)***  ‐3.84(0.17)*** 1.4(0.18)*** ‐4.71(0.13)*** 1.1(0.16)*** 
Health status  ‐3.97(0.27)***    ‐4.22(0.17)***   ‐4.31(0.21)***   ‐4.34(0.13)***  
Aggregate variables 
Health infrastructure  ‐0.08(0.05)  0.02(0.05)  ‐0.12(0.03)*** ‐0.01(0.04)  ‐0.07(0.03)*  ‐0.01(0.04)  ‐0.03(0.02)  0.01(0.03) 
Transportation  0.03(0.04)  ‐0.04(0.06)  ‐0.05(0.03) Ɨ  0.07(0.04) Ɨ  ‐0.03(0.03)  ‐0.01(0.06)  ‐0.02(0.02)  0.05(0.03) 
Economic activity    ‐0.03(0.05)  ‐0.05(0.08)  0.02(0.03)  0.01(0.04)  0(0.03)  ‐0.04(0.04)  0.02(0.02)  0.01(0.03) 
Social services  0.01(0.03)  0(0.04)  ‐0.04(0.03) Ɨ  0(0.03)  0.01(0.02)  0.06(0.03)*  ‐0.03(0.03)  0.06(0.03) Ɨ 








As in the last two chapters, this section is developed to check if insurance financial 
protection has changed over time, in case valuable information is hidden by pooling 
data. Likewise, the examinations primarily focus on differences between the two ends 
of this study period, i.e. 2000 and 2011, and other years, respectively.   
Between the year 2000 and other years afterwards, for the Heckman model based on 
the whole population (Table 7.11), the interactions between SHI schemes and the 
time transition, are all not significant, while there is a marginally significantly positive 
interaction between PHI and the time transition in the model on medium financial risk 
(OR = 1.35, 95% CI 0.96 – 1.90). This suggests that while SHI’s financial protection 
remained unchanged, enrolment into PHI tended to become more associated with the 
occurrence of medium financial risk since 2004, compared to 2000. For 
subpopulations, PHI showed the same trend across most areas, except the poorest 
rural inland, though insignificant. Additionally, the NCMS has a marginally significantly 
positive interaction in the rural inland for high financial risk (OR = 30.17, 95% CI 0.65 
– 1405.54), suggesting that its correlation with lower risk weakened since 2004 
compared to 2000. Overall, the Chow tests do not find any significant difference in the 
effects of PHI and SHI between the two periods.39   
The ZINB models have a similar profile where most of these interactions are 
insignificant (Table 7.12). A difference is that for the whole population and the urban 
inland , the time transition has a significantly positive interaction with the urban SHI 
(OR = 2.31, 95% CI 1.33 – 4.00; OR = 2.13, 95% CI 1.15 – 3.95, respectively), and a 
marginally significantly positive interaction with the FMS, on the occurrence of zero 
OOP payment (OR = 2.22, 95% CI 0.93 – 5.34; OR = 1.98, 95% CI 0.95 – 4.13). This 
suggests that since 2004 the FMS and the urban SHI overall have become more likely 





to ensure zero OOP payment, particularly in the urban inland. In addition, consistent 
with the results of the Heckman models, though insignificant, PHI demonstrates the 
trend of being less associated with zero OOP payment since 2004 and more 
associated with an increased amount of OOP payments, and this trend is also 
relatively weak in the rural inland. The Chow tests find a significant change in the 
coefficients of PHI and SHI between the two periods on the occurrence of zero OOP 
payment for all the populations but no significant change on the amount of OOP 
payments. 
Between the years 2000-2009 and the year 2011, both the Heckman models and the 
ZINB models do not find any significant interaction between a health insurance 
scheme and the time transition, based on either the total population or the 
disaggregated populations (Table 7.13 and 7.14). The Chow tests do not find any 
significant difference as well. This suggests that the policy change during this period, 
when the 2009 health reforms theoretically promoted SHI coverage, did not 
significantly influence financial protection of SHI schemes and PHI.   
Taking together, the temporal changes in financial protection of PHI and SHI were 
generally moderate. For PHI, although there are some patterns that show its effects 
might change between 2000 and 2004 and afterwards, these are not statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level. Neither are SHI schemes in most cases. The Chow test 
of overall different effects of health insurance schemes is only significant on the 
occurrence of zero OOP payment. There is no dramatic reversal like what occurred 
to the correlation between SHI enrolment and PHI enrolment (Section 5.4). The 





Population  Total  Urban east  Rural east  Urban inland  Rural inland 
Model  Model 26a  Model 26b  Model 27a  Model 26b Model 28a  Model 28b Model 29a  Model 29b Model 30a  Model 30b 
Risk level  >50%  >90%  >50%  >90%  >50%  >90%  >50%  >90%  >50%  >90% 
Fixed effect: coefficient (S.D.) 
Post‐2000‡  ‐0.03(0.07)  ‐0.13(0.09)  0.06(0.31)  0.04(0.38) 0.17(0.16)  ‐0.16(0.20) ‐0.08(0.14)  ‐0.01(0.20) ‐0.11(0.09)  ‐0.21(0.12) Ɨ 
SHI  Reference = no SHI 
FMS  ‐0.34(0.08)***  ‐0.18(0.12)  ‐0.47(0.19)* ‐0.12(0.24) ‐0.35(0.18) Ɨ ‐0.36(0.29) ‐0.35(0.11)**  ‐0.17(0.18) ‐0.19(0.23)  ‐0.17(0.29) 
Urban SHI  ‐0.16(0.06)**  ‐0.02(0.08)  ‐0.33(0.15)* ‐0.10(0.23) ‐0.22(0.13)  ‐0.01(0.18) ‐0.16(0.09) Ɨ  ‐0.05(0.11) 0.03(0.13)  0.16(0.16) 
NCMS  ‐0.20(0.04)***  ‐0.15(0.06)  ‐0.46(0.20)* ‐0.20(0.31) ‐0.24(0.11)* ‐0.16(0.14) ‐0.26(0.15) Ɨ  ‐0.25(0.23) ‐0.18(0.06)**  ‐0.13(0.08) Ɨ 
Post‐2000×FMS  0.06(0.19)  ‐0.10(0.24)  ‐0.01(0.42)  ‐0.12(0.51) ‐0.34(0.54)  ‐0.35(0.70) 0.22(0.28)  ‐0.06(0.47) ‐0.28(0.59)  ‐0.44(0.57) 
Post‐2000×Urban SHI  ‐0.10(0.20)  0.08(0.26)  ‐0.69(0.51)  ‐0.40(0.53) ‐0.14(0.57)  ‐0.19(0.69) 0.22(0.35)  0.68(1.44) 0.18(0.61)  2.89(2.44) 
Post‐2000×NCMS  0.15(0.18)  0.01(0.25)  ‐0.08(0.58)  ‐0.53(0.65) ‐0.09(0.27)  0.19(0.42) 0.49(0.58)  2.57(2.36) 0.59(0.58)  3.41(1.85) Ɨ 
PHI  0.14(0.11)  0.27(0.14) Ɨ  0.11(0.24)  0.20(0.30) 0.13(0.17)  0.34(0.22) 0.15(0.21)  0.23(0.23) 0.04(0.28)  0.12(0.39) 











Population  Total  Urban east  Rural east  Urban inland  Rural inland 
Model  Model 31a  Model 31b Model 32a  Model 32b Model 33a  Model 33b  Model 34a  Model 34b Model 35a  Model 35b 
Equation  %Zero  Count  %Zero  Count  %Zero  Count  %Zero  Count  %Zero  Count 
Fixed effect: coefficient (S.D.) 
Post‐2000‡  ‐1.62(0.10)***  ‐0.29(0.23)  ‐1.89(0.38)*** ‐0.25(0.78)  ‐2.06(0.28)***  ‐0.34(0.54)  ‐1.46(0.19)***  ‐0.12(0.38)  ‐1.53(0.14)*** ‐0.34(0.29) 
SHI  Reference = no SHI 
FMS  0.85(0.19)*** ‐0.09(0.22) 1.28(0.36)  ‐0.08(0.40) 0.78(0.36)*  ‐0.60(0.52)  0.65(0.23)**  0.03(0.32) 0.30(0.44)  ‐0.31(0.43) 
Urban SHI  0.36(0.11)**  ‐0.02(0.15) 0.36(0.18) Ɨ  ‐0.13(0.35) 0.55(0.20)**  ‐0.01(0.30)  0.38(0.14)*  ‐0.04(0.21) 0.13(0.25)  0.17(0.32) 
NCMS  0.40(0.09)*** ‐0.15(0.14) 0.52(0.36)  ‐0.41(0.56) 0.50(0.15)**  ‐0.43(0.23) Ɨ 0.51(0.26) Ɨ  ‐0.35(0.44) 0.37(0.12)** ‐0.13(0.14) 
Post‐2000×FMS  0.68(0.37) Ɨ  0.08(0.72) 0.23(0.91)  0.06(1.07) 0.45(1.68)  ‐0.34(1.32)  0.80(0.44) Ɨ  0.09(0.95) ‐0.19(1.49)  ‐0.50(0.94) 
Post‐2000×Urban SHI  0.84(0.28)**  0.26(0.73) 0.94(0.63)  0.01(0.95) 0.67(0.85)  0.51(1.20)  0.76(0.31)*  0.33(0.93) 0.85(0.90)  1.32(1.19) 
Post‐2000×NCMS  ‐0.57(0.68)  ‐0.14(0.81) ‐0.24(1.42)  ‐1.00(1.50) 0.22(0.64)  0.41(0.83)  ‐0.46(1.58)  0.90(1.60) ‐0.96(1.45)  1.39(0.98) 
PHI  ‐0.22(0.21)  0.40(0.35) ‐0.36(0.34)  0.32(0.51) ‐0.03(0.27)  0.35(0.41)  ‐0.21(0.34)  0.50(0.61) ‐0.25(0.51)  0.07(0.67) 











Population  Total  Urban east  Rural east  Urban inland  Rural inland 
Model  Model 36a  Model 36b  Model 37a  Model 36b Model 38a  Model 38b Model 39a  Model 39b Model 40a  Model 40b 
Risk level  >50%  >90%  >50%  >90%  >50%  >90%  >50%  >90%  >50%  >90% 
Fixed effect: coefficient (S.D.) 
Post‐2009‡  0.14(0.15)  0.30(0.21)  0.18(0.46)  0.11(0.55)  0.06(0.43)  0.60(0.52)  ‐0.01(0.21)  0.13(0.25)  0.32(0.31)  0.40(0.39) 
SHI  Reference = no SHI 
FMS ‐0.38(0.08)***  ‐0.20(0.10) Ɨ  ‐0.47(0.18)**  ‐0.12(0.21) ‐0.39(0.17)*  ‐0.42(0.27) ‐0.42(0.11)*** ‐0.20(0.17) ‐0.22(0.22)  ‐0.11(0.25) 
Urban SHI ‐0.13(0.07) Ɨ  ‐0.05(0.09)  ‐0.26(0.15) Ɨ  ‐0.05(0.21) ‐0.20(0.14)  ‐0.11(0.21) ‐0.15(0.10)  ‐0.05(0.12) ‐0.03(0.17)  0.03(0.19) 
NCMS ‐0.23(0.05)***  ‐0.21(0.07)**  ‐0.50(0.20)*  ‐0.15(0.29) ‐0.24(0.10)*  ‐0.22(0.13) ‐0.33(0.17) Ɨ  ‐0.19(0.27) ‐0.18(0.06)**  ‐0.23(0.10)* 
Post‐2009×FMS ‐0.02(0.24)  ‐0.05(0.33)  ‐0.46(0.65)  ‐0.85(1.74) 0.64(0.65)  0.12(0.74)  0.12(0.34)  0.14(0.43)  0.32(0.67)  ‐0.16(0.73) 
Post‐2009×Urban SHI ‐0.20(0.17)  ‐0.20(0.23)  ‐0.30(0.46)  ‐0.18(0.56) ‐0.01(0.46)  ‐0.31(0.54) ‐0.11(0.21)  ‐0.13(0.28) ‐0.17(0.39)  ‐0.14(0.50) 
Post‐2009×NCMS ‐0.11(0.16)  ‐0.15(0.22)  ‐0.14(0.59)  ‐0.03(0.80) 0.09(0.44)  ‐0.41(0.53) 0.04(0.29)  ‐0.33(0.47) ‐0.34(0.31)  ‐0.21(0.41) 
PHI  0.01(0.09)  0.18(0.12)  ‐0.02(0.20)  0.21(0.23)  0.05(0.18)  0.36(0.23)  ‐0.02(0.14)  ‐0.04(0.23) ‐0.00(0.24)  0.05(0.35) 











Population  Total  Urban east  Rural east  Urban inland  Rural inland 
Model  Model 41a  Model 41b  Model 42a  Model 42b Model 43a  Model 43b  Model 44a  Model 44b Model 45a Model 45b 
Equation  %Zero  Count  %Zero  Count  %Zero  Count  %Zero  Count  %Zero  Count 
Fixed effect: coefficient (S.D.) 
Post‐2009‡  ‐0.08(0.24)  0.72(0.39) Ɨ  0.52(0.65)  0.50(1.00)  0.18(0.57)  1.07(0.86)  0.04(0.29)  0.65(0.46)  ‐0.63(0.49) 0.32(0.73) 
SHI  Reference = No SHI 
FMS  0.73(0.17)*** ‐0.20(0.26)  1.31(0.33)*** ‐0.05(0.37) 0.72(0.35)*  ‐0.67(0.50)  0.52(0.21)*  ‐0.11(0.36) 0.30(0.41)  ‐0.39(0.44) 
Urban SHI  0.05(0.11)  ‐0.12(0.16)  0.09(0.19)  ‐0.07(0.31) 0.25(0.20)  ‐0.21(0.30)  0.12(0.14)  ‐0.05(0.21) 0.06(0.29)  ‐0.10(0.34) 
NCMS  0.13(0.09)  ‐0.27(0.15) Ɨ  0.44(0.39)  ‐0.34(0.58) 0.09(0.14)  ‐0.52(0.21)* 0.38(0.34)  0.39(0.54)  0.12(0.13)  ‐0.33(0.17) Ɨ 
Post‐2009×FMS  0.83(0.59)  0.13(0.71)  0.21(1.26)  ‐0.97(1.46) 1.09(1.62)  0.02(1.23)  0.92(0.74)  0.34(0.90)  0.52(1.21)  0.54(1.16) 
Post‐2009×Urban SHI  0.49(0.30)  ‐0.34(0.44)  0.06(0.68)  ‐0.69(0.96) 0.19(0.61)  ‐0.44(0.96)  0.39(0.36)  ‐0.46(0.56) 0.31(0.57)  0.24(0.82) 
Post‐2009×NCMS  0.18(0.25)  ‐0.37(0.41)  ‐0.18(0.95)  ‐0.49(1.27) 0.23(0.63)  ‐0.72(0.91)  ‐0.03(0.58)  ‐0.70(0.80) 0.59(0.49)  0.09(0.73) 
PHI  0.19(0.18)  0.34(0.34)  0.16(0.30)  0.38(0.46)  0.30(0.27)  0.41(0.47)  0.20(0.24)  0.13(0.53)  0.20(0.52)  ‐0.03(0.51) 










Examining the interactions between SHI schemes and PHI to explore the dual 
insurance effect, neither the Heckman models nor the ZINB models find any 
significant interactions between any SHI scheme and PHI, based on either the total 
population or the subpopulations after disaggregation (Table 7.15 and 7.16). 
Moreover, adding the interactions has no notable impact on the main effects of SHI 
schemes and PHI.   
Furthermore, for the ZINB model, a three-way interaction among PHI, SHI and 
utilisation is made to explore whether there is a difference in health insurance’s effects 
between healthcare users and non-users. 40  Again, a simplified binary variable 
indicating membership of any SHI scheme is used as a substitute for the categorical 
SHI variable, for the same reason of increasing observations for categories that has 
been stated in the last chapter (Section 6.6). As a result, neither the two-way 
interaction between SHI and PHI nor the three-way interaction between SHI, PHI and 
utilisation is significant for all populations (Table 7.17).  
Taken all together, this suggests that there was no mutually additional (or detrimental) 
effect on financial protection for those covered by both SHI and PHI, regardless of 
utilisation. This result implies that in China the compensation procedures of SHI and 
PHI may be so separate from each other that they have little impact on each other’s 
effect on OOP payments. 
Interestingly, in these three-way-interaction models on the occurrence of zero OOP 
payment, both the interactions between SHI and utilisation (OR = 3.96, 95% CI 2.54 
– 6.19), and between PHI and utilisation (OR =5.63, 95% CI 1.12 – 28.20), are 
significantly positive for the whole population (Table 7.17: Model 46a). Taking the 





main effects and interactions together, these indicate that among healthcare users 
SHI enrolees and PHI enrolees were positively associated with the occurrence of zero 
OOP payment compared to those without SHI and those without PHI, respectively 
(SHI: OR = 4.85, 95% CI 3.07 – 7.65; PHI: OR = 3.89, 95% CI 0.80 – 18.87, with 
marginal significance p<0.1). For SHI, the positive interaction also applies to all 
disaggregated subpopulations, though they are significant only for the two inland ones. 
This supports a previous inference (in Section 7.3.2) that SHI offered some basic 
services for free to users, especially in the inland areas. For PHI, however, the 
interactions for the subpopulations are too mixed to have a pattern, with none being 
significant, possibly because the coverage foci of PHI policies are not as uniform as 




Population Total  Urban east Rural east  Urban inland Rural inland
Model  Model 36a  Model 36b  Model 37a  Model 36b  Model 38a  Model 38b  Model 39a  Model 39b  Model 40a  Model 40b 
Risk level  >50%  >90%  >50%  >90%  >50%  >90%  >50%  >90%  >50%  >90% 
Fixed effect: coefficient (S.D.) 
SHI  Reference = no SHI 
FMS ‐0.37(0.08)***  ‐0.20(0.11) Ɨ  ‐0.47(0.18)* ‐0.13(0.23)  ‐0.39(0.19)* ‐0.45(0.31)  ‐0.41(0.10)***  ‐0.18(0.18)  ‐0.19(0.22)  ‐0.18(0.27) 
Urban SHI ‐0.18(0.06)**  ‐0.06(0.09)  ‐0.29(0.15) Ɨ  ‐0.05(0.23)  ‐0.30(0.13)* ‐0.15(0.19)  ‐0.20(0.10) Ɨ  ‐0.10(0.11)  ‐0.03(0.13)  0.07(0.18) 
NCMS ‐0.22(0.05)***  ‐0.20(0.07)**  ‐0.48(0.22)* ‐0.19(0.32)  ‐0.30(0.12)* ‐0.27(0.14) Ɨ  ‐0.29(0.16) Ɨ  ‐0.30(0.22)  ‐0.22(0.08)**  ‐0.21(0.12)Ɨ 
PHI  0.11(0.17)  0.14(0.23)  ‐0.00(0.43)  ‐0.11(1.16)  ‐0.09(0.34)  0.05(0.38)  0.16(0.28)  0.11(0.38)  0.10(0.41)  ‐0.66(1.82) 
FMS×PHI ‐0.12(0.25)  ‐0.00(0.33)  ‐0.19(0.54)  0.25(1.24)  0.30(0.62)  0.45(0.67)  ‐0.16(0.35)  ‐0.13(0.61)  0.27(0.83)  1.51(2.02) 
Urban SHI×PHI ‐0.06(0.21)  ‐0.07(0.32)  0.04(0.53)  0.07(1.35)  0.19(0.48)  0.25(0.62)  ‐0.18(0.35)  ‐0.04(0.50)  0.17(0.59)  ‐0.34(2.52) 






Population Total  Urban east Rural east  Urban inland Rural inland
Model  Model 41a  Model 41b  Model 42a  Model 42b  Model 43a  Model 43b  Model 44a  Model 44b Model 45a  Model 45b 
Equation  %Zero  Count  %Zero  Count  %Zero  Count  %Zero  Count  %Zero  Count 
Fixed effect: coefficient (S.D.) 
SHI  Reference = no SHI 
FMS 0.79(0.18)***  ‐0.14(0.24)  1.18(0.36)** ‐0.08(0.4)  0.74(0.37)*  ‐0.67(0.5)  0.58(0.22)* ‐0.05(0.34) 0.32(0.45)  ‐0.30(0.41) 
Urban SHI 0.23(0.11)*  ‐0.08(0.18)  0.07(0.21)  ‐0.10(0.33)  0.39(0.2) Ɨ  ‐0.18(0.31)  0.21(0.14)  ‐0.21(0.21) 0.11(0.26)  0.15(0.32) 
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NCMS 0.26(0.11)*  ‐0.20(0.17)  0.42(0.39)  ‐0.45(0.55)  0.34(0.15)*  ‐0.53(0.25) Ɨ  0.36(0.27)  0.14(0.41) 0.32(0.17) Ɨ  ‐0.12(0.21) 
PHI  ‐0.25(0.25)  0.38(0.43)  ‐0.63(0.39)  0.35(0.78)  0.11(0.46)  0.38(0.66)  ‐0.24(0.42)  0.09(0.66) ‐0.01(0.7)  0.06(0.86) 
FMS×PHI ‐0.03(0.40)  ‐0.33(0.90)  0.82(1.01)  ‐0.34(1.26)  0.54(1.11)  0.02(0.95)  ‐0.12(0.61)  ‐0.1(1.15) ‐0.04(1.03)  0.14(1.21) 
Urban SHI×PHI  0.10(0.33)  ‐0.28(0.61)  0.66(0.67)  ‐0.44(0.99)  ‐0.36(0.79)  ‐0.08(1.05)  0.32(0.51)  0.22(0.8)  ‐0.63(0.98)  ‐0.66(1.13) 






Population  Total  Urban east  Rural east  Urban inland  Rural inland 
Model  Model 46a  Model 46b  Model 47a  Model 47b  Model 48a  Model 48b  Model 49a  Model 49b  Model 50a  Model 50b 
Equation  %Zero  Count  %Zero  Count  %Zero  Count  %Zero  Count  %Zero  Count 
Fixed effect: coefficient (S.D.) 
Utilisation  ‐5.28(0.20)*** 1.33(0.17)*** ‐4.64(0.68)*** 1.50(0.40)*** ‐4.92(0.49)*** 1.36(0.36)*** ‐4.92(0.44)*** 1.40(0.24)*** ‐5.59(0.29)***  1.25(0.26)*** 
SHI  0.20(0.09)*  ‐0.09(0.20)  0.21(0.23)  0.01(0.46)  0.35(0.15)*  ‐0.44(0.39)  0.20(0.14)  ‐0.13(0.28)  0.10(0.16)  0.11(0.33) 
PHI  ‐0.37(0.24)  0.15(0.65)  ‐0.68(0.40) Ɨ  0.46(1.03)  ‐0.03(0.45)  0.06(1.09)  ‐0.34(0.41)  ‐0.13(0.76)  ‐0.24(0.72)  ‐0.54(1.46) 
PHI×SHI 0.20(0.28)  ‐0.14(0.95)  0.78(0.60)  ‐0.80(1.32)  ‐0.11(0.58)  ‐0.26(1.26)  0.20(0.46)  0.45(1.16)  ‐0.12(0.81)  ‐0.21(1.51) 
SHI×utilisation 1.38(0.23)***  ‐0.11(0.20)  1.25(0.76)  ‐0.25(0.51)  0.79(0.51)  0.01(0.42)  1.44(0.49)** 0.02(0.35)  1.37(0.32)***  ‐0.27(0.34) 
PHI×utilisation 1.73(0.81)*  0.25(0.99)  ‐3.26(7.99)  ‐0.21(1.59)  1.72(1.54)  0.36(1.24)  0.71(4.29)  0.28(1.12)  ‐0.38(44.63)  0.64(1.81) 







To explore the contextual financial impacts of health insurance, the SHI prevalence 
level and the PHI prevalence level, which indicate the percentage of SHI enrolees and 
PHI enrolees in a community, respectively, are introduced to both the Heckman and 
the ZINB models. Moreover, the utilisation level as the percentage of healthcare users 
in the community is controlled for. Admittedly, without the community level in the 
model, the estimation, especially the standard error, is likely to be compromised 
(Jones et al., 2012), especially involving the group-mean variables like these 
contextual variables (Krull and MacKinnon, 2001). However, this still deserves to be 
tried but interpreted with caution, since the outcome may help to understand the 
impacts of health insurance on equity.  
For both the Heckman models and the ZINB models, most coefficients of the SHI 
prevalence level and the PHI prevalence level are not significant (Table 7.18 and 7.19), 
except in the urban east where the PHI prevalence level is significantly positively 
associated with the occurrence of zero OOP payment in the community (OR = 15.46, 
95% CI 2.30 – 103.86) (Table 7.19: Model 57a). The insignificant coefficients of these 
contextual variables suggest that the corresponding health insurance scheme in the 
community did not impact residents’ financial risk caused by using healthcare on 
average. 
The significantly positive contextual effect of PHI on the occurrence of zero OOP 
payment in the urban east is theoretically good for equity. Literally, it means a one 
unit increase in the PHI prevalence level led to a 15.46-time increase in the odds of 
the occurrence of zero OOP payment in the community on average. It is also 
interesting that only in the urban east the utilisation level is also, though insignificant, 
positively correlated with the occurrence of zero OOP payment, while the correlation 
is negative in other areas (Table 7.19: Model 57a – 60a). It appears that in the urban 
east, the most affluent areas in China, there is an association between the higher PHI 
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prevalence level and the higher probability of free healthcare for all. However, whether 
this should be attributed to PHI needs further research, maybe beyond information 










Population    Total  Urban east  Rural east  Urban inland  Rural inland 
Model  Model 51a  Model 51b  Model 52a  Model 52b  Model 53a  Model 53b  Model 54a  Model 54b  Model 55a  Model 55b 
Risk level  >50%  >90%  >50%  >90%  >50%  >90%  >50%  >90%  >50%  >90% 
Fixed effect: coefficient (S.D.) 
PHI Level  0.18(0.23)  0.34(0.27)  ‐0.79(0.55)  ‐0.17(0.68)  0.41(0.34)  0.40(0.43)  ‐0.08(0.45)  0.19(0.65)  0.78(0.85)  1.26(0.97) 
SHI Level  0.02(0.09)  0.10(0.14)  ‐0.09(0.39)  0.27(0.48)  ‐0.12(0.21)  ‐0.15(0.30)  0.02(0.19)  0.18(0.31)  0.01(0.17)  0.05(0.24) 








Population    Total  Urban east  Rural east  Urban inland  Rural inland 
Model  Model 56a  Model 56b  Model 57a  Model 57b Model 58a  Model 58b  Model 59a  Model 59b  Model 60a  Model 60b 
Equation  %Zero  Count  %Zero  Count  %Zero  Count  %Zero  Count  %Zero  Count 
Fixed effect: coefficient (S.D.) 
PHI Level  0.55(0.41)  0.51(0.65)  2.74(0.97)**  0.89(1.24)  0.14(0.69)  0.08(0.86)  0.21(0.77)  ‐0.26(1.38)  1.02(2.03)  2.04(2.27) 
SHI Level  ‐0.21(0.17)  0.17(0.27)  ‐0.18(0.45)  0.32(0.76)  ‐0.03(0.32)  ‐0.37(0.53)  ‐0.18(0.40)  0.76(0.51)  ‐0.25(0.34)  ‐0.04(0.38) 






Although this chapter focuses on the change of OOP payments for healthcare, the 
widely-used indicator of financial protection, it does not reflect the impacts on living 
standards, other element of the concept of financial protection (WHO, 2018). To 
complement the insufficiency, at the end this study adds an additional analysis of the 
relationship between health insurance and living standards, indicated by individuals’ 
average grams of daily protein intake in past three days (for the reasons see Section 
3.5.3). This study assumes that, in China, on average, the more grams of protein the 
individual consumes daily, the higher living standard he/she enjoys.    
Table 7.20 descriptively explores daily protein intake among different insurance status. 
Based on the CHNS data, between 2000 and 2011, in China the average daily protein 
that an adult consumed was 66.01 grams, lower than the world average in 2001 – 
75.8 grams (Zhu et al., 2005). Relating to health insurance status, there is a general 
pattern that those covered by SHI or/and PHI consumed more protein daily than those 
uncovered by SHI or PHI. This suggests that SHI and PHI enrolees appeared to enjoy 
higher living standards than the non-enrolees. 
 
Table 7.20 Summary of daily protein intake by insurance status 
  No PHI  PHI  Total 
No SHI 64.39(38.17)  68.66(34.57)  64.52(39.44) 
FMS 69.18(32.04)  70.38(32.01)  69.46(30.21) 
Urban SHI 68.50(29.44)    73.61(29.32)  68.82(29.55) 
NCMS 65.37(29.87)  72.02(29.70)    65.63(30.27) 









Fitting three-level linear models on daily protein intake (Table7.21)41, demographically, 
being male and younger were significantly associated with higher daily protein intake. 
The negative effects of time passing are possibly attributable to age-related factors 
because participants get older year after year in longitudinal data. Health-related 
variables are significantly correlated with lower daily protein intake overall, but most 
these correlations are not significant abased on disaggregated populations. 
Importantly, there is a clear pattern that individuals with higher household income, 
lower household sizes, middle-level schooling (comparing to none or primary 
schooling) and working, were significantly associated with higher daily protein intake. 
At the aggregate level, local population density and economic activity were generally 
significantly associated with higher daily protein intake, especially in the poorest rural 
inland areas. Taken together, this demonstrates that other things being equal, in 
China protein intake was indeed associated with socioeconomic status and hence 
living standards likely. 
After adjusting these demographic, socioeconomic and aggregate variables, based 
on the whole population, there is a marginally significant positive correlation between 
PHI enrolment and daily protein intake (Table 7.21). In addition, coverage of all SHI 
scheme has a significant positive correlation with daily protein intake. In terms of 
magnitude, being enrolees of PHI consumed 1.05 (95% CI -0.13 – 2.24) grams of 
protein more than those without PHI; being enrolees of FMS, urban SHI and NCMS 
consumed 1.29 (95% CI 0.27 – 2.32), 2.87 (95% CI 2.07 – 3.67) and 3.49 (95% CI 
2.85 – 4.13) grams of protein more than those without SHI, respectively.  
Furthermore, the disaggregation analysis shows that the positive correlations 
between health insurance schemes and daily protein intake were generally 
widespread across the country. It is noted that the correlation strengths of PHI with 
                                                
41   Unlike  OOP  payments,  the  individuals’  daily  protein  intake  data  basically  follow  a  normal 
distribution, and thus the OLS estimator is selected.       
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daily protein intake were lower than those of SHI schemes in most areas except the 
rural east, where the positive effect of PHI is significant (coef. = 2.36, 95% CI 0.55 – 
4.17) while among SHI schemes only the positive effect of urban schemes is 
significant (coef. = 1.97, 95% CI 0.20 – 3.74). All together, these findings suggest that 
other thing being equal, health insurance coverage was associated with higher living 
standards. Comparatively, in most areas except the rural east, SHI schemes 
appeared to have stronger correlations with higher living standards than PHI.     
 
Table 7.21 The three‐level models on daily protein intake 
  Total    Urban east  Rural east    Urban inland  Rural inland 
Model  Model 61  Model 61a  Model 61b  Model 61c  Model 61d 
Fixed effect: coefficient (S.D.) 
Year  Reference = 2000 
2004  ‐0.48(0.32)  ‐2.55(1.01)*  ‐1.25(0.68) Ɨ  0.01(0.74)  0.09(0.44) 
2006  ‐1.92(0.38)***  ‐2.79(1.17)*  3.08(0.78)***  ‐4.46(0.72)***  ‐2.92(0.54)*** 
2009  ‐3.53(0.46)***  ‐5.58(1.34)***  1.24(0.88)  ‐5.15(0.83)***  ‐4.91(0.71)*** 
2011  ‐5.29(0.46)  ‐7.38(1.27)***  ‐1.46(0.84) Ɨ  ‐6.43(0.92)***  ‐6.44(0.77)*** 
Age  ‐0.21(0.01)***  ‐0.22(0.03)***  ‐0.21(0.03)***  ‐0.19(0.02)***  ‐0.21(0.01)*** 
Gender  9.76(0.23)***  10.41(0.77)***  11.23(0.50)***  9.22(0.46)***  9.17(0.31)*** 
Chronic diseases  ‐0.21(0.01)***  0.11(0.73)  ‐0.54(0.63)  ‐0.30(0.53)  ‐0.18(0.47) 
Health status  ‐0.79(0.31)*  ‐0.70(0.84)  0.00(0.64)  ‐0.83(0.60)  ‐1.08(0.43)* 
Household income 1.61(0.12)***  1.55(0.35)***  1.91(0.25)***  1.30(0.21)***  1.72(0.15)*** 
Household size  ‐0.69(0.09)***  ‐0.43(0.32)  ‐0.93(0.18)***  ‐0.73(0.17)***  ‐0.63(0.10)*** 
Education    Reference = no or primary school 
Middle or tech  0.88(0.24)***  2.00(0.88)*  ‐0.04(0.58)  1.64(0.62)**  0.87(0.36)* 
University  0.22(0.58)  1.57(1.26)  ‐1.74(1.37)  1.36(0.89)  ‐0.54(1.40) 
Working  2.69(0.28)***  2.35(0.86)**  3.23(0.56)***  2.29(0.51)***  2.81(0.36)*** 
Hukou  0.11(0.41)  0.96(1.39)  0.03(0.76)  ‐0.02(0.95)  0.24(0.60) 
SHI  Reference = no SHI 
FMS  1.29(0.51)*  2.97(1.08)**  ‐1.50(1.25)  2.04(0.78)*  0.49(1.11) 
Urban SHI  2.87(0.40)***  3.45(0.91)***  1.97(0.89)*  3.47(0.63)***  2.79(0.85)** 
NCMS  3.49(0.32)***  5.83(1.29)***  1.05(0.66)  3.40(1.00)**  4.02(0.52)*** 
PHI  1.05(0.59) Ɨ  ‐1.51(1.21)  2.36(0.91)*  0.44(0.87)  1.52(1.27) 
Aggregate variables 
East  4.88(0.87)***         





‐0.01(0.06)  0.74(0.23)**  0.02(0.12)  ‐0.25(0.13) Ɨ  ‐0.08(0.07) 
Transportation  ‐0.06(0.06)  ‐0.26(0.19)  0.02(0.13)  ‐0.26(0.15) Ɨ  0.04(0.07) 
Economy  0.22(0.06)**  0.24(0.19)  0.16(0.13)  ‐0.09(0.12)  0.28(0.08)** 
Social service  0.02(0.06)  ‐0.17(0.14)  ‐0.18(0.11)  ‐0.04(0.10)  0.41(0.09)*** 
Population density  1.42(0.23)***  2.35(0.51)***  2.26(0.50)  0.68(0.36) Ɨ  1.42(0.32)*** 
Random effect: variance (S.D.) 
Community‐level    33.26(85.71)  31.74(85.96)  63.91(113.46)  18.60(69.74)  28.03(79.34) 






Due to the vulnerability of health expenditure data to violation of OLS’s assumption of 
error distribution, this study applies the Heckman model to model the incidence of the 
OOP payments over the median (medium financial risk) and the incidence of the OOP 
payments over the 90th percentile (high financial risk), respectively. The ZINB model 
is employed to model the OOP payments data as counts. Because a multilevel 
structure is not compatible with either the Heckman model or the ZINB model in the 
statistical package, this study uses the single-level structure with cluster-robust 
standard errors to handle the longitudinal data instead. 
The findings show that the results of the two models are generally consistent. Based 
on the whole population, PHI enrolment neither had a significant correlation with a 
changed chance of financial risk for healthcare users, nor affected the amount of the 
OOP payments. It rather tended to correlate to a higher probability of positive OOP 
payments. After disaggregation, PHI also had no significant effects in all models 
based on the subpopulations. 
By contrast, enrolment into all SHI schemes was significantly associated with a lower 
chance of medium financial risk and a higher probability of zero OOP payment. Except 
269 
 
the urban SHI, enrolment of the NCMS and the FMS (marginally) was significantly 
associated with a lower chance of high financial risk. In the two east areas and the 
urban inland, all SHI schemes were associated with a lower chance of medium 
financial risk (with significance or marginal significance), but in the rural inland only 
the NCMS was. The NCMS were associated with a higher probability of zero OOP 
payment in the two rural areas (significantly for the rural east and marginally 
significantly for the rural inland), and with a lower amount of OOP payments in the 
rural east with marginal significance.  
There is no evidence that dual insurance of PHI and SHI had an additional effect on 
financial protection. Among healthcare users SHI enrolees and PHI enrolees were 
associated with a higher chance of zero OOP payment compared to those without 
SHI and those without PHI, respectively, but unlike SHI schemes, PHI’s such effect 
become mixed and insignificant after disaggregation. There were moderate changes 
in financial protection of SHI and PHI over time, but in most cases the changes were 
not significant. While most of the contextual effects of SHI and PHI are insignificant, 
in the urban east the PHI prevalence level in a community was associated with a 
higher average probability of zero OOP payment.  
Finally, in terms of the impacts on living standards, indicated by individuals’ daily 
protein intake, health insurance coverage was generally associated with higher living 
standards. Comparatively, in most areas except the rural east, SHI schemes 
































This chapter summarises the findings from all three results chapters, individually and 
collectively, and discusses them in the context of existing knowledge and academic 
debate. Specifically, the first section summarises the key findings of this study and 
interprets them in the light of the literature review. The second section explores the 
contribution of this thesis to various academic debates, including issues about the 
inequalities that arise from private health insurance (PHI) and the appropriate role of 
PHI in efforts to achieve Universal Health Coverage (UHC). This is followed by a 
consideration of the methodological contributions the study provides in this area. The 
third section situates the analyses above in terms of national and global-level policy 
discussions. Finally, the chapter outlines the limitations of the study and makes 
suggestions for future research.      
 
8.1 Summary and interpretations 
In the first chapter of this thesis I raised the over-arching research question: what role 
has private health insurance played in meeting universal health coverage goals in 
China during the period of the scale up of social health insurance? By reference to 
the World Health Organisation (WHO)’s three-dimensional model of health coverage 
(WHO, 2008: 23-28), I subsequently break this question down into three groups of 
subsidiary questions, about the prevalence of PHI, its effect on access to healthcare 
and its financial protection. The study continues to follow this structure, presenting the 
results of the three corresponding results chapters (Chapters 5-7). This section sets 
out to summarise the key findings and carefully interpret them to show the extent to 
which these subsidiary research questions have been addressed, the extent to which 
272 
 
the related research gaps identified by the literature review have been filled, and 
finally, what the general answer is to the over-arching research question.   
8.1.1 The prevalence of PHI 
There are four subsidiary questions about the prevalence of PHI, from descriptive to 
inferential. The interpretations focus on the unequal distribution of PHI and its 
relationship with SHI.   
1) How has the prevalence of PHI changed over time? 
This study shows that after a significant fall between 2000 and 2004, the prevalence 
of PHI, indicated by the proportion of PHI enrolees in the population, continuously 
grew from 2004 to 2011, but very slowly, especially in contrast to the rapid expansion 
of SHI (see Figure 5.1). Although this is just a simple descriptive analysis, few 
reviewed studies explored PHI prevalence over long time scales using individual-level 
survey data. Most related studies instead referred to the administrative statistics of 
total PHI premium income (China Insurance Regulatory Commission, 2014).     
The prevalence fall between 2000 and 2004, rarely mentioned in the literature, 
coincided with a government policy issued in 2003 that abolished participating health 
insurance42, which accounted for a considerable share of the PHI market at the time 
(Duan, 2008). Notably, the prevalence change does not accord with the monotonical 
increase of PHI premium income since 2000 in the administrative statistics (China 
Insurance Regulatory Commission, 2014). This difference may be caused by 
changing prices and population growth, so that PHI premium income cannot exactly 
indicate its prevalence. Only looking at the PHI income data would incur the risk of 
leading to an over-estimated conclusion about PHI prevalence. Additionally, PHI was 
mixed with life insurance in Chinese official statistics until the mid-2000s (Gu, 2009a, 
                                                
42  A combination of health insurance and investment that not only paid indemnity for critical illnesses 
but also regularly yielded dividends to attract consumers.       
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Duan, 2008), and there might therefore be inconsistent definitions for PHI between 
the two datasets at the early stage.  
Notwithstanding the difference between 2000 and 2004, both sources of data show 
that PHI prevalence gradually grew since 2004. This process can be explained by 
overall economic growth, the increasing numbers of PHI suppliers and products (EY, 
2016b), the dissemination of knowledge about PHI (Van de Ven, 2013: 51), and 
rapidly rising out-of-pocket (OOP) health expenditure (Figure 1.1), which led to the 
expectation of greater financial loss for using healthcare on average and thus resulted 
in a greater demand for PHI (Pauly, 2007: 28-31). However, the growth rate has 
disappointed advocates of PHI, not only for lagging far behind SHI in population 
coverage but also for still staying at a low level of the share in national health 
expenditure (Figure 1.2). Based on the debatable idea that PHI can help with 
insufficient SHI coverage, this is actually a standpoint calling for policy interventions 
for engaging PHI in China (Gu, 2009b, Xiang, 2014).       
2) What are the individual and regional determinants of the prevalence of PHI and how have 
they impacted on the distribution of PHI? 
This study identifies individual factors such as age, household income and size, 
personal education level, working status, hukou43 and SHI membership, which were 
significantly associated with enrolment in PHI. In addition, the geographical location 
(east/inland), the type of community (urban/rural) and the development level of 
community health infrastructure were the aggregate factors that were significantly 
associated with enrolment in PHI.  
It is worth noting that the findings based on the regression models are associational 
rather than causal. However, this does not mean it is impossible to discuss the 






causality here. First and importantly, these identified factors are theoretically 
determinants of PHI enrolment, because they mostly belong to the theoretical model 
of healthcare utilisation determinants (Andersen and Newman, 1973, Andersen and 
Newman, 2005), and utilisation and the financial loss related to utilisation are key to 
the demand for PHI (Nyman, 2006). Second, these factors, as characteristics of 
individuals and their residence, exist before PHI enrolment. Third, these variables that 
correlate with both these characteristics and the purchase of PHI, such as the 
economic status and health status, as the theories show (Einav and Finkelstein, 2018, 
Sekhri and Savedoff, 2006, Arrow, 1963, Cutler and Reber, 1998), are taken into 
account in the models. Taken together, they are plausibly the determinants of PHI 
prevalence.  
The findings show that PHI enrolment was significantly associated with individuals of 
higher socioeconomic status, represented by a greater household income, smaller 
household size, and who are educated and registered with urban hukou. At the 
aggregate level, the distribution of PHI was also associated with more affluent 
communities, i.e. those in the east of China, in urban areas, and with higher levels of 
health infrastructure, particularly strengthening the evidence for the spatially unequal 
distribution of PHI in favour of more affluent areas, for which the literature review gives 
weak evidence.     
According to the findings, more affluent eastern and urban areas exhibited higher PHI 
prevalence, compared to poorer inland and rural areas, even controlling for individual 
factors. This suggests that, in addition to those residents’ characteristics that 
potentially lower the prevalence of PHI in the poorer areas, these areas themselves 
possess some features that negatively influence PHI prevalence. There may be, for 
example, fewer PHI selling agencies, lower popularisation of PHI information, and 
poorer cooperation between insurers and healthcare providers. Consequently, the 
unequal distribution of PHI in China has been multilevel, in favour not only of more 
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affluent people but also more affluent areas. Conversely, poorer people living in 
poorer areas would be the least covered by PHI. 
The associations between PHI enrolment and traditional socioeconomic factors such 
as income and education suggest that the distribution of PHI in China shares a similar 
pattern to the rest of the world, where socioeconomic factors are strong determinants 
of PHI purchase (Colombo, 2007: 223). What is more, the China-specific hukou 
system, where urban hukou is associated with privilege in other crucial respects (Liu, 
2005), also contributes to this inequality. Theoretically, socioeconomic characteristics 
facilitate utilisation as the enabling factors, according to the classic health utilisation 
model (Andersen and Newman, 2005). The positive relationships between PHI 
enrolment and higher socioeconomic status may have in effect strengthened the 
substance of the enabling factors in determining utilisation. This is inconsistent with 
the equity of access principle, which emphasises needs-based utilisation instead 
(O'Donnell and Wagstaff, 2008: 1). 
3) Have the effects of these determinants varied across China and in what patterns? 
This study further finds that some identified determinants of PHI enrolment have 
uneven effects across the four areas types in China, i.e. the urban east, the rural east, 
the urban inland and the rural inland, which few studies in the literature have explored. 
The positive effects of household income and education level, the two typical 
indicators of socioeconomic status, were relatively strong in substance in the poorest 
rural inland area compared to others, suggesting the unequal distribution of PHI 
between people of different socioeconomic status was greater in poor areas.  
Additionally, community population density was significantly associated with 
increased prevalence of PHI in rural inland areas but with reduced one or had 
insignificant effects in other wealthier regions. This possibly suggests the relatively 
prudent marketing strategies of commercial insurers in the poor areas, where 
consumption is lower, residential communities are often remote and settlements are 
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widely scattered. Therefore, insurers may tend to concentrate on more populous 
communities to market their products in order to reduce costs. There is a little 
evidence that Insurers’ risk aversion against poor areas in China in the literature (Liu 
and Wang, 2012, Qu and Wang, 2010), and deserves more attention in the future. 
Besides this, the health infrastructure level of the community was significantly or 
marginally significantly associated with increased PHI enrolment in all but rural inland 
areas. It may relate overall to such a poor quality of health infrastructure in these 
areas, that a slight change did not substantially impact utilisations and costs, and thus 
had little influence on PHI prevalence.  
In addition to the individual and aggregate determinants, the model unobserved 
variation in PHI prevalence (i.e. residuals not explained by the model variables but 
captured as random effects) was greater in rural areas than urban areas. Regarding 
rural areas, the variation is attributed more to the community difference in the more 
affluent rural east, but more to the individual difference in the poorer rural inland. 
Together with the above findings, PHI distribution appeared in general more equal 
across individuals and communities in more affluent areas, while in the poorer area, 
it appeared more inclined to be determined by unsystematic, individual factors.  
4) What are the relationships between enrolment under an SHI scheme and PHI enrolment, and 
how have these relationships changed with the growth of SHI? 
This study finds that those with SHI were more associated with enrolment into PHI 
than those without SHI in 2000. However, this correlation fundamentally changed; 
from 2004 to 2011, those with SHI in general became less associated with enrolment 
into PHI than those without SHI. This pattern was prevalent, found not only among 
the whole study population, but also among all four subpopulations after 
disaggregation, and between all SHI schemes and PHI. This finding may help to 
address an important gap in the literature, which gives mixed evidence about the 
impact of SHI coverage (and expansion) on PHI enrolment.   
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To interpret this result, first of all, as SHI increased its coverage from a small 
proportion to most of the population, the socioeconomic difference between SHI 
enrolees and non-enrolees diminished. As this study also demonstrates, in the early 
2000s, relative to SHI enrolees, non-enrolees of SHI were on average poor, with a 
low level of education, living in rural and inland areas and with rural hukou 
registrations, which were also typical of PHI non-enrolees relative to PHI enrolees. 
However, at the end of this period, these distinctions became obscure, except for 
hukou where SHI enrolees were even more likely to be registered in rural areas than 
SHI non-enrolees. As a result, SHI enrolees’ likelihood of PHI enrolment compared to 
that of SHI non-enrolees was bound to reduce, as the former’s socioeconomic 
advantages over the latter reduced.   
Second, it is worth discussing the impact of SHI coverage itself on PHI enrolment, 
although the findings are not causal due to the limitations of the study design. 
Because enrolment into SHI in China, including those so-called “voluntary” schemes 
like NCMS, is strongly driven by political targets rather than individuals’ demand 
(Liang and Langenbrunner, 2013), its enrolment is not likely to be affected by PHI. In 
addition, the common individual and aggregate characteristics, as the potential 
causally prior variables, have been controlled for in the models to some degree. Thus, 
the association between SHI and PHI possibly suggests that SHI coverage impact 
enrolment in PHI, rather the other way around.  
From this point of view, the change in the relationship between SHI and PHI may 
relate to the increasing benefit coverage of SHI. SHI enrolees’ falling association with 
PHI enrolment against those without SHI happened along with the former’s access to 
an increase in the benefits offered by SHI (Liang and Langenbrunner, 2013, Yip et al., 
2012, Meng et al., 2012), which the latter did not enjoy at all. This suggests that there 
may be a negative relationship between the benefits individuals receive from SHI and 
their likelihood of PHI enrolment. It is in line with the theory that as SHI benefits 
become more and more widespread and generous, room for the PHI market 
278 
 
diminishes as many of its benefits are available more cheaply via SHI (Barros and 
Siciliani, 2012). This will be discussed in detail later (Section 8.2.2).    
However, in 2000, when health financing had been long dominated by OOP payments 
in China, the introduction of SHI might have increased the take-up of PHI through a 
number of theoretically-possible mechanisms, including SHI-driven popularisation of 
knowledge about health insurance (Van de Ven, 2013: 50-52), increases in household 
disposable income, from which funds to buy PHI could be sourced (Liu et al., 2011b), 
the increased incentive for commercial insurers to attract consumers from across 
different socioeconomic groups as SHI ate into their market share (Barros and Siciliani, 
2012), and increased governmental capacity to establish regulations that enhanced 
and stabilised the health insurance market (Zweifel and Pauly, 2007: 117-121). What 
is more, at that time, SHI benefit coverage in China was too limited to encroach much 
on PHI’s niche.   
It is worth noting that the literature review gives strong evidence that at the macro 
level SHI expansion is positively associated with the rise of total PHI premium income 
(Li, 2009, Wang, 2009, Wang, 2011, Zhu and Gui, 2014, Wang et al., 2015, Zheng 
and Hua, 2013, Lv, 2013). It appears to disagree with the finding based on the 
individual-level data. However, as I argue in the literature review, PHI income is not 
only correlated with prevalence, but also determined by other factors such as the price 
of PHI, population structure, economy and so on (Li, 2009, Wang et al., 2015). Thus, 
examining only the macro income data might lead to a one-sided conclusion about 
the relationship between SHI and PHI.     
8.1.2 The effects on access to healthcare 
There are four subsidiary research questions under this topic. They begin with the 
effect of PHI on its enrolees’ access to healthcare and complement to SHI. They then 
extend to interrogate the spatial inequality in the effect and the contextual effect on 




Access to healthcare is mainly indicated by utilisation. The literature review finds 
mixed evidence for the impact of PHI on the generic utilisation of healthcare (a 
combination of outpatient and inpatient care) and little evidence for its impact on 
outpatient healthcare. This study found little difference in the association with generic 
utilisation between PHI enrolees and those without PHI in the general population. 
Narrowing the population to the high-need group (those who were self-reportedly ill 
or injured at that time), PHI enrolees’ association with utilisation substantially 
increased against those without PHI and reach significance. On the contrary, SHI 
enrolment was significantly associated with higher utilisation in the general population, 
but this association significantly reduced within the high-need group.  
It is noteworthy that, based on the research methods, the findings about the 
relationships between insurance and utilisation are associational rather than causal. 
However, there are reasons for discussing causality. First, in theory, coverage of 
health insurance is an enabling factor in the classic utilisation determinants model 
(Andersen and Newman, 1973, Andersen and Newman, 2005), facilitating healthcare 
utilisation by reducing financial barriers (Arrow, 1963, Pauly, 1968, De Meza, 1983, 
Nyman, 2006). Second, in terms of the CHNS measurement, utilisation is whether the 
event occurred in past four weeks, while enrolment in insurance is contemporary 
status, entrance into which was possible but not likely to happen within recent weeks. 
Thus, joining health insurance programmes generally happened prior to using 
healthcare. Third, while enrolment in SHI is compulsory or semi-compulsory (Liang 
and Langenbrunner, 2013), the potential causally prior variables for PHI enrolment 
and utilisation are specified according to the theory (Andersen and Newman, 1973, 
Andersen and Newman, 2005) and controlled for in the analytical models, to some 
degree. To sum up, it is reasonable to cautiously discuss the impacts of SHI and PHI 
on healthcare utilisation.  
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To interpret the results from the perspective of the theory that health insurance affects 
utilisation by making healthcare more financially affordable (Musgrove, 2007: 171-
172), it is necessary to relate to the compensation policies of SHI and PHI. As 
previously mentioned, in China SHI focuses on basic coverage (Yip et al., 2012), 
commonly offering payment of the fees for seeing doctors, basic health services and 
generic drugs, with deductibles and co-payment varying across schemes and regions 
(Liang and Langenbrunner, 2013). By contrast, PHI policies increasingly concentrate 
on complementing or supplementing SHI (Xiang, 2014), thanks to government 
guidance and the strategies of commercial insurers in coping with SHI expansion. 
Thus, PHI policies usually include partly compensating treatment for a few major 
diseases (Liu et al., 2011b), filling the uncovered part of SHI, especially for extended 
inpatient care (EY, 2016b), or even giving a one-off payment if a critical illness is 
diagnosed (Ng et al., 2012).       
In the general population, among whom most are healthy and hence the average 
expectations of needed healthcare and financial loss are low, compensation from SHI, 
rather than PHI, is more likely to happen. As a result, on average only SHI significantly 
reduced the expected loss and hence increased utilisation. However, when shifting to 
the high-need group, who, driven by need, were already very likely to use healthcare 
regardless of health insurance, the influence of SHI on utilisation was comparatively 
reduced, due to its limited benefits. Instead, PHI began to come into play because the 
high-need group’s average expectation of needed healthcare and financial loss were 
substantially higher than that in the general population; high enough to expect 
compensation from PHI so as to reduce the expected financial loss.  
6) How has PHI  ‘complemented’ SHI  in terms of providing additional access to healthcare for 
covered individuals? 
When taking the dual insurance of SHI and PHI into account, PHI was found to be 
associated with utilisation in the high-need group only when SHI was present. The 
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possible explanation is that the combination of SHI and PHI was effective to 
substantially reduce the expected (not real) OOP spending on healthcare, and hence 
increased utilisation. Before taking dual insurance into account, the significant 
association with utilisation of PHI occurs because a considerable proportion of PHI 
enrolees also had SHI. This suggests that SHI plays a very fundamental role in 
facilitating utilisation, though it appears not to help those in high need sufficiently, 
while PHI can complement SHI for their enrolees in the high-need group.  
This finding should contribute to fill the gap in the literature. According to the literature 
review, most previous studies did not particularly discuss the combination of SHI and 
PHI, possibly because their data involving dual insurance cases were scarce (Qin et 
al., 2014, Chai, 2014, Chau, 2010, Zang et al., 2012). Two studies looking at the 
combination did not find any significant advantage of dual insurance over any kind of 
single insurance regarding utilisation, but did not give an explanation for their results 
(Lam and Johnston, 2012, Chai, 2013, Yang, 2013). Their inconsistencies with the 
findings of this study may be attributed to sampling differences. Both studies used 
cross-sectional data and only examined one city or two provinces. In contrast, this 
study uses multi-provincial, longitudinal data, with a much larger sample size.  
7) How do the effects of PHI on healthcare access vary across regions? 
This study finds that the association of PHI with the utilisation of healthcare varied 
spatially. First, for the high-need group, PHI’s association with  utilisation was less in 
rural inland areas than in other wealthier areas. Second, cross-community variation 
in the effect of PHI on utilisation was eight to ten times as high in the rural inland as it 
was in urban areas, and close to four times as high as it was in the rural east. This 
suggests that the performance of PHI on utilisation in poorer areas was more unequal 
across communities than it was in more affluent areas.            
In fact, SHI also showed unequal associations with utilisation, not only among 
schemes but also among areas. For example, the government’s Free Medical 
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Scheme (FMS) was significantly associated with utilisation in all but the rural inland; 
the New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS), only had such association in rural 
areas though it also covered considerable urban residents (most registered with rural 
hukou); the urban SHI (combination of employees’ and residents’) had little such 
association at all. Shifting from the whole to the high-need group, and compared with 
those without SHI, the utilisation-association of SHI reduced more in rural areas than 
in urban areas, suggesting poorer realisation of SHI benefits in rural areas.   
The literature review gives weak evidence by one study based on the 2008 two-
province data that PHI is more likely to increase utilisation in urban areas than in rural 
areas. The present study not only gives supporting evidence based on broader and 
longitudinal data, but also adds that PHI’s such effect is even more variant in rural 
areas than in urban areas. Taken the results of SHI above together, this study shows 
that in terms of spatially unequal performance on utilisation, PHI has not 
complemented the inequality that SHI made and might have rather increased it. 
To explore the reasons for the inequality, for SHI it is plausibly attributed to the 
fragmentation in pooling, funding, and administration (Meng et al., 2015). However, 
for PHI, whose products are mainly managed by large national or international 
insurers (Gu, 2009b), this phenomenon may be attributed more to China’s unequal 
distribution of healthcare resources instead (Yip and Hsiao, 2014), because PHI relies 
heavily on the cooperation of local healthcare supplies (Colombo, 2007: 229-230). In 
China, that eastern, urban areas are significantly more developed and wealthier than 
inland, rural areas is a long-lasting source of inequality (Liu, 2005, Liu et al., 2003, 
Shi et al., 2010). Specifically, in urban areas, healthcare supplies tend to be abundant 
and well-distributed, whereas in rural areas, especially the remote, less-advanced 
rural inland, supplies are often limited and scattered (Blumenthal and Hsiao, 2005). 
As a result, unequal availability of health resources and access to them contribute to 
PHI’s unequal associations with utilisation across these areas. Besides this, in rural 
areas, the locations of residential communities are less concentrated and therefore 
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the residents of different communities have more varying distances to travel to health 
facilities than those in urban areas, also contributing to the larger cross-community 
variations in PHI’s effect on utilisation in rural areas. These above of course contribute 
to SHI’s such unequal associations with utilisation as well.         
8) What is the impact of PHI on average access to healthcare in each local context? 
This study finds a pattern that, in the east, the PHI prevalence level in the community 
was increasingly associated with higher average utilisation as the average need level 
increased. On the contrary, inland, under the same conditions, the prevalence of both 
SHI and PHI in the community was increasingly associated with lower average 
utilisation, especially in rural areas. The literature review does not find any previous 
study that examine PHI in China from this perspective.  
The common explanation for the negative contextual effect is that health insurance 
distorts the allocation of resources in favour of membership rather than needs (Kutzin, 
2013). When health resources are limited, which is more likely to happen in poorer 
areas, health insurance reallocates resources to let its enrolees enjoy more 
healthcare, but in effect this deprives others of access to it. This makes the health 
system more ineffective, because it is not to meet needs, which consequently reduces 
average utilisation in the whole community (Colombo, 2007: 229-230). For the 
concept of UHC, this is in conflict with the equity principle (Kutzin, 2013), but was 
observed in many health systems (Colombo, 2007: 223-224, Kutzin et al., 2016). On 
the contrary, the positive contextual effect in the east indicates that the health 
insurance programme benefits the whole community’s utilisation, therefore 
contributing to health equity. For SHI, as its coverage becomes universal, the 
importance of the contextual impact relatively reduces. However, for PHI, since it only 
coverages a small number of people, likely the more affluent, inequity of access from 




There are also four subsidiary questions about the financial protection provided by 
PHI. The first two questions are concerned with the financial protection of PHI 
enrolees and its financial complement to SHI. The remaining two shift attention to 
inequities that PHI has caused.  
9) Has PHI reduced the financial risk incurred by using healthcare for its enrolees?     
This study finds that PHI enrolment was not significantly associated with the financial 
risk caused by using healthcare in China, no matter which indicators of the financial 
risk were used. This is consistent with the result of the literature review but based on 
more reliable methods. A plausible explanation is that PHI caused higher gross health 
expenditure – not measured in this study but sufficiently attested to in the literature 
(Wang et al., 2010, Chen et al., 2009, Yuan et al., 2014, Fang et al., 2012, Chai, 2013) 
– because PHI increased the utilisation of healthcare for those in need (as this study 
suggests) and also possibly allowed its members to use a larger amount of 
unnecessary services due to moral hazard in some cases (Musgrove, 2007: 171-172, 
Pauly, 1968). Meanwhile, most PHI policies still consist of deductibles, co-payments 
and a compensation cap like SHI (Blomqvist, 2009), also resulting in OOP payments. 
Taken together, PHI may push up gross health expenditure on the one hand, and 
partially reimburse it on the other, consequently leading to an overall insignificant 
change in OOP payments.  
By contrast, SHI demonstrated the negative association with the occurrence of 
financial risk. In terms of significance of the associations, it suggests that SHI 
schemes were more effective at reducing medium financial risk (defined as the OOP 
payment for healthcare exceeding the median of the sample OOP payments in this 
study) than high financial risk (the OOP payment for healthcare exceeding the 90th 
percentile of the sample OOP payments). In addition, SHI schemes were associated 
with the occurrence of zero OOP payment for healthcare, and these effects occurred 
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particularly along with utilisation of healthcare, but had little direct impact on the 
amount of OOP payments, suggesting that SHI schemes may have offered enrolees 
free healthcare, probably very basic services or medicines, but could not effectively 
control OOP payments once they had happened. In one word, SHI may reduce OOP 
payments, which was restricted to a low level, however.  
The additional analysis finds that PHI coverage was marginally significantly 
associated with higher daily protein intake, and all SHI schemes were significantly 
associated with higher daily protein intake. Because the acknowledged relationship 
between daily protein intake and living standards, especially in Asian developing 
countries (Zhu et al., 2005, Zhen et al., 2010), this suggests that coverage of health 
insurance may have a positive impact on living standards, other things being equal. 
This correlation was reported previously in China (Xie and Han, 2015, Wu et al., 2016).  
The possible explanation is that although coverage of health insurance in effect had 
a limited effect on OOP payments for healthcare as this study found, it indeed reduced 
insurance enrolees’ expectation of OOP payments and hence increased their 
expenses on everyday living including consumption of better food (more protein 
intake). On top of these, because of the limitation of the study design, selection of 
enrolees of health insurance, especially PHI as this study shows (PHI enrolees have 
relatively high socioeconomical status), might contribute to the relationships. Taken 
together, coverage of health insurance possibly helped to improve living standards, 
where the performance of PHI was also inferior to SHI.        
10) How has PHI complemented SHI in terms of financial protection for covered individuals? 
Given the finding that PHI has not been associated with reduction of OOP payments, 
PHI has not complemented SHI in financial protection for covered individuals. 
Furthermore, this study does not find that dual insurance additionally influences the 
financial risk, no matter whether the examination focused on the general population 
or just healthcare users. In addition, adding their interaction had little impact on the 
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effects of the SHI and PHI in the model, which implies that the compensation 
procedures of SHI and PHI may be so separate from each other, that they barely 
impacted each other’s performance. For a better complementary role of PHI as the 
government expects (Xiang, 2014), more effort would be needed to promote the 
public-private cooperation in financial protection. Notwithstanding the neutral result, 
the finding may contribute to the literature with new evidence as the literature review 
finds no study explored this before. 
11) Has PHI provided spatially unequal financial protection? 
This study finds no significant association of PHI with OOP payments based on the 
whole population or subpopulations after disaggregation, and it is also hard to find 
any meaningful pattern across different areas of China. This is possibly because of, 
first, the spatially-varied effects of PHI on the utilisation of healthcare, and second, 
the different prices of healthcare across these areas (Yip and Hsiao, 2009a), 
consequently resulting in mixed, insignificant PHI financial protection across these 
areas.  
Comparatively, SHI shows a pattern where its schemes’ financial protection was likely 
to be relatively weak in the poorest rural inland areas. Concretely, compared to the 
other three regions, where all SHI schemes were significantly negatively associated 
with the occurrence of medium financial risk, only the NCMS was in the rural inland. 
The FMS was significantly associated with the occurrence of zero OOP payments in 
all but the rural inland. The NCMS was significantly associated with the occurrence of 
zero OOP payment in all rural areas. It was also marginally significantly associated 
with the reduced amount of OOP payments once they happened in the rural east, but 
it was not in the rural inland.   
In terms of the impact on living standards for subpopulations, the association between 
PHI and daily protein intake was only significant and positive in the rural east areas, 
and the associations between SHI schemes and daily protein intake were relatively 
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weak in the areas. It is possibly because compared to other areas in China, people in 
the rural east have higher expectation of PHI compensation, but lower expectation of 
SHI compensation, implying greater market potential of PHI in the rural east.      
12) What is the impact of PHI on the average level of financial risk in a local context? 
Like its effect on the enrolees, the associations of PHI with the community’s average 
financial risk were also insignificant in most areas. The only exception is the urban 
east, where the PHI prevalence level in the community was significantly associated 
with the occurrence of zero OOP health payment to a community member and thus 
appeared to have contributed to the equity ideal of UHC. However, it does not seem 
convincing enough to attribute this to PHI itself, since the prevalent cost-sharing 
policies of PHI inevitably cause OOP payments (Blomqvist, 2009). It may be related 
to a combination of lower utilisation and higher PHI prevalence in the urban east, 
compared to other areas, as this study found (Table 5.6 and Table 6.6). In addition, 
possibly, in the most affluent areas, there is an association between the higher PHI 
prevalence level and the higher probability of free healthcare, related to some 
unknown aggregate-level characteristics; this needs further research.    
Despite the unclear mechanisms, this finding provides a new insight into financial 
inequities of PHI in China. Echoing this finding, one provincial-level study reported 
that the PHI development level44 was significantly associated with lower per-capita 
health expenditure in eastern China (but with higher such expenditure in inland China), 
but did not give a clear explanation for this (Suo et al., 2015). In the literature review, 
most related studies focused on the vertical equity of PHI to evaluate its financing 
distribution across income quintiles, reporting very mixed results. However, due to the 
limited pooling level of PHI in China, unlike SHI, the vertical equity for PHI is in effect 
not very telling.    






The findings of the analyses have given answers to all of the subsidiary research 
questions and helped to address these research gaps identified by the literature 
review in Chapter 2. These answers are combined here to give a fuller account of the 
role that PHI plays in China’s progress to UHC.  
In China, to its enrolees – a small proportion of the population – PHI was likely to offer 
potential for increased access to healthcare when needed and increased living 
standards, without raising the related financial risk (OOP payments for healthcare). 
However, PHI was unequally distributed, with enrolment higher among individuals of 
higher socioeconomic status and, at the aggregate level, in the more affluent eastern 
and urban areas than in the poorer inland and rural areas. Its utilisation-promotion 
effect also tended to be stronger and more homogeneous among communities in 
these wealthier areas. In addition, it benefited whole communities in the more 
developed east but have an opposite effect in the less-developed inland areas. From 
2004 to 2011, PHI prevalence grew very slowly, comparing with the booming SHI, 
and individuals with coverage under SHI became less likely to have PHI than those 
without SHI. 
In short, PHI contributes slightly to health coverage by benefiting a minority of the 
population, but systematically causes socioeconomic and spatial inequalities in 
insurance coverage and access to healthcare. As SHI expands, its importance as a 
source of coverage in effect reduces. 
 
8.2 Associations with theory and recent developments 
After relating the findings to the research questions, this section sets out to interpret 
the findings under the established theoretical frame (for details see Section 1.3). 
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Additionally, it extends the interpretation by connecting them with the recent 
developments in PHI and SHI after 2011.   
8.2.1 Association with the theoretical frame 
In terms of prevalence of PHI, high OOP payments for healthcare45 and individuals’ 
risk-aversion theoretically underlie the demand for PHI (Pauly et al., 2009), but the 
market forces, the market failures as well as poor regulations in the developing 
countries impede its coverage expansion (Arrow, 1963, Van de Ven, 2013: 51, Cutler 
and Reber, 1998, Zweifel and Pauly, 2007: 117). This study suggests that although 
healthcare-related financial risk has been high for many people in China for some 
time (Meng et al., 2012), a factor that should support demand for PHI, institutional 
impediments may dominate the market, resulting in very slow growth and unequal 
distribution of PHI prevalence. In addition, as SHI expands, OOP payments for 
healthcare reduce (or perceptually reduce among SHI enrolees), undermining the 
demand for PHI.  
Regarding access, health insurance theoretically confers greater access to healthcare 
mainly by lowering the costs of utilisation (Andersen and Newman, 1973, Aday and 
Andersen, 1974, Van de Ven, 2013: 51-52). Although selection of enrolees may 
confound the correlation between insurance coverage and healthcare utilisation, the 
findings of this study accords with the theory, plausibly suggesting that the individual 
characteristics that determine insurance enrolment have been fairly controlled for in 
the models. Furthermore, the insurance-related additional utilisation is theoretically 
more efficient when it happens to satisfy unmet needs for those who are ill (Nyman, 
2006). Otherwise, it could be sub-optimal consumption due to the moral hazard (Pauly, 
1968, Einav and Finkelstein, 2018).  The findings of this study suggest that the 
additional utilisation associated with PHI may be less likely to be attributable to the 





moral hazard than that associated with SHI schemes, because the former is more 
responsive to high-need status (being ill or injured) than the latter.           
The degree of financial protection provided by health insurance, principally in terms 
of reduction in OOP payments for healthcare, can be difficult to assess due to the fact 
that reduced financial barriers to access afforded by insurance are likely to push up 
demand and thereby prices, some of which will be borne by consumers in the form of 
higher co-payments or deductibles (Pauly, 1968, De Meza, 1983), but do not 
comprehensively compensate costs of healthcare on the other (WHO, 2010b), 
especially in developing countries (Pauly et al., 2009). In fact, it may be access to 
healthcare rather than financial protection that is playing a central role in the demand 
for health insurance (Nyman, 2006). Thus, it is not theoretically surprising that this 
study does not find a significant association between PHI enrolment on OOP 
payments. Regarding the impact on living standards, the other aspect of the concept 
of financial protection, the positive relationship between coverage of health insurance 
including PHI and living standards possibly reflects the feelings of financial security 
among enrolees, so that they spend more in improving quality of life, although in 
reality the feelings may not be true considering OOP payments.  
8.2.2 Interpretation under recent developments 
Due to the limitation of data availability and time schedule, the analytical part of this 
study examines data collected between 2000 and 2011. But in the final discussion it 
is worth surveying the findings with the recent developments in China. Since 2011 the 
economy continues to grow fast, guaranteeing sustainable money injected into the 
employment-based UEBMI and the tax-funded FMS and steadily increasing 
subsidisation of the residence-based NCMS and URBMI (Liang and Langenbrunner, 
2013). For example, from 2013 to 2016, the per-capita contribution to the UEBMI 
revenue increased by 35.2% from ¥2573 to ¥3479; the per-capita individual 
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contribution to the NCMS revenue increased by 50.7% from ¥371 to ¥559 (National 
Health Commission, 2018).   
While the SHI coverage breadth has been fairly high in 2011 (Meng et al., 2012), the 
government continues to strengthen the coverage depth by adding more drugs and 
services into the list of SHI reimbursement items and the coverage height by 
increasing the reimbursement ratios and caps (Liu et al., 2017, Meng and Xu, 2014). 
As a result, the share of insurance expenditure (predominantly SHI) in total health 
expenditure rose from 30.7% in 2011 to 42.3% in 2017 (National Health Commission, 
2018). Relating to the findings of this study, as SHI was associated with greater 
utilisation of healthcare and moderate financial protection, the recent efforts would 
reinforce the efficacy of SHI.    
However, from other viewpoint, the recent developments in SHI suggests that the 
additional utilisation and financial protection associated with SHI coverage found by 
this study was not considered enough by policy makers. In fact, from 2011 to 2017, 
although the share of OOP payments in total health expenditure reduced from 34.8% 
to 28.8% (National Health Commission, 2018), it is still higher than the maximum rate 
of 15-20% above which financial catastrophe is unlikely to be effectively prevented 
according to the WHO (2010a). Additionally, the reduction rate slows down in last 
three years to 2017: the share of OOP payments reduced by less than one percentage 
point, while the absolute value of OOP payments increased by 26.2% (National Health 
Commission, 2018), suggesting that the financial risk that result from high OOP 
payments is not going away anytime soon.  
As the result of the persistently high OOP payments due to the insufficient coverage 
of SHI, the demand for PHI is likely to be sustainable. From 2011 to 2017 the PHI 
premium income grew from 69.2 billion yuan to 438.9 billion yuan (China Insurance 
Regulatory Commission, 2018). However, in terms of enrolment, neither the latest 
2013 NHSS data nor the newly-published 2015 CHNS data show the percentage of 
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PHI enrolees in the whole population increasing compared to the last survey wave 
(National Health and Family Planning Commission, 2015a). Especially, regarding the 
CHNS data, the overall percentage of PHI enrolees reduces from 4.20% in 2011 to 
2.67% in 2015. As the prevalence of PHI stagnates, the increase of total premium 
income may be attributable partly to the fast-increasing total health expenditure, which 
more than doubled from 2011 to 2017 (National Health Commission, 2018), 
consequently increasing the average price of premium. The inconsistency in growth 
between PHI prevalence and total premium income also implies that China’s PHI 
market is moving upmarket, raising prices but narrowing the range of customers. This 
trend derives from the target of complementing SHI for UHC.   
These updates primarily show once more the difference between the macro-level 
income data and the micro-level enrolment data of PHI, and the merit of the studies 
on the latter, considering that most related studies focused on the former. This also 
attests the finding of this study which suggests that PHI prevalence would not 
substantially increase partly attributable to the negative impacts of SHI memberships 
on enrolment into PHI as SHI expands. Since 2016 the individual-income-tax (IIT) 
break policy for promoting PHI has been gradually introduced. Its impacts on PHI 
prevalence is subject to examination and its rationality will be discussed in more 
details in the later policy implication section. Except income or enrolment data, in 
these common statistics or surveys there still lacks more informative data about PHI, 
especially about its benefit coverage after 2011, preventing deeper understanding 
about PHI.  
 
8.3 Academic contributions 
This section highlights the potential contributions of this study to the corpus of 
academic knowledge. Above all, it is the first comprehensive investigation of PHI from 
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the perspective of UHC objectives in China that is based on empirical data rather than 
theoretical analysis. It offers an interrogation of PHI’s impact on equity and establishes 
a reconsideration of PHI’s role in the UHC project. Additionally, it gives methodological 
advice for those who are going to use the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) 
dataset, one of the most popular longitudinal household survey datasets about health 
in China.  
8.3.1 Extending knowledge about inequalities that arise from PHI 
PHI has long been criticised for being a source of inequity (Kutzin et al., 2016, 
Colombo, 2007: 223, 232). Unlike typically progressive SHI with compulsory (or semi-
compulsory) enrolment and income-related contributions, PHI enrolment is voluntary 
and contributions are risk-related (Sekhri and Savedoff, 2006), unless it is heavily 
regulated (Enthoven and van de Ven, 2007). The ability to pay is the precondition for 
the purchase of PHI (Van de Ven, 2013: 51). Due to information asymmetry, adverse 
selection occurs as commercial insurers tend to set premiums higher to prevent 
unknown risk, and under laissez-faire policies, adverse selection can lead to such 
high prices that only affluent people can afford PHI (Sekhri and Savedoff, 2006). 
Furthermore, the risk selection of insurers causes premiums for older and unhealthier 
people to be even higher (Pauly et al., 2012).  
In theory, therefore, PHI disproportionately enrols high-income earners, and PHI 
brokers cluster in areas where the affluent are concentrated (Zweifel et al., 2007: 94). 
Most international (Salti et al., 2010, Barros et al., 2011, Sekhri and Savedoff, 2005, 
Mills et al., 2012) and domestic studies (Liu and Wang, 2012, Zang et al., 2012, Dong 
and Zhao, 2013, Yue and Zou, 2014) gave the individual-level evidence for this. The 
current study goes further, showing that in China PHI is unequally distributed, tilting 
not only towards individuals with higher socioeconomic status (higher household 
income, smaller household size, better educated and registered with urban hukou), 
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but also the more affluent areas like the eastern and urban areas, controlling for 
individual characteristics.   
The multilevel unequal distribution of PHI has three implications. First, PHI increases 
inequality in access to healthcare: its enrolment is in part positively correlated with 
affluence, and therefore lets the more affluent potentially gain more health resources, 
given its potential utilisation-promotion effect. Second, inequality emerge not only on 
the demand side but also on the supply side: insurers are inclined to market PHI 
harder in more affluent areas, as described above (Zweifel et al., 2007: 94). Third, 
people living in poor areas therefore have lower access to PHI than those of similar 
affluence, and poorer people in poorer areas, who should be key targets of the UHC 
programme, are especially neglected by PHI.    
Apart from unequal distribution, PHI causes other inequalities. This study shows that 
in China the effects of PHI can vary heavily among the regions: its association with 
utilisation was higher and more equally among communities in the more affluent areas, 
typically the urban east, than the poorer ones, typically the rural inland. In addition, 
PHI was relatively more associated with the benefits of the whole local community in 
the east, especially the urban east, which suggests that PHI appears even more 
equitable in more affluent areas than poorer areas in China. These differences may 
be attributable to the unequal abundances of local health resources, as discussed in 
the preceding section.     
In contrast to PHI, SHI, whose enrolment was unequal and socioeconomically biased 
when it was initiated, nevertheless, became progressively more equal and even 
equitable. As this study shows, in 2011 the socioeconomic disparities between the 
enrolees and non-enrolees of SHI have almost been eliminated. In particular, the 
privileged urban hukou, once associated with a much higher rate of SHI enrolment, 
became associated with a lower rate of SHI enrolment than the rural hukou (see 
Section 5.4.4). Other than prevalence, this study nonetheless finds that inequality in 
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SHI benefits in utilisation and financial protection persists among SHI schemes and 
between the more affluent east, urban areas and the poorer inland, rural areas. Those 
who receive the poorer SHI benefits, such as those without SHI and urban NCMS 
enrolees, were more likely to have PHI since 2004 than other SHI enrolees (Section 
5.4.3), suggesting that the SHI’s among-scheme inequality may be reduced by the 
complement of PHI. Contrarily, the spatial inequality of SHI may be intensified by 
PHI’s pro-wealth distribution.  
In conclusion, in a large and unequal country like China, concerns about inequality 
issues should be indispensably extended from the individual-level factors such as 
income and education to the aggregate level, involving at least geo-economic factors. 
A key reason is that these aggregate differences are not completely reflected in 
individual differences. Instead, they may be embodied in insurers’ marketing actions, 
which influence access to PHI selling in certain areas, as well as local health supplies 
that facilitate PHI application. Poor individuals are likely to cluster economically 
undeveloped regions, where PHI insurers neglect the market and the local health 
delivery system responds poorly to PHI. Consequently, the inequality problems 
caused by PHI in the whole system could be far more serious than estimations based 
on considering individual-level factors.  
8.3.2 Rethinking the role of PHI in progress to UHC 
UHC is central to all health reforms (WHO, 2013), but there is no single, optimal path 
for moving systems towards this target (WHO, 2010a). Evidence shows that countries 
which have approached UHC effectively rely almost completely on dominant public 
sectors with various mechanisms (Musgrove et al., 2002). However, for those still on 
the path – mostly developing countries – limited government revenue can be a critical 
impediment to UHC.  
It is argued that PHI could relieve the fiscal burden of government as “a critical pillar 
of a robust health financing system” (Preker, 2007: 6), as it replaces the OOP payment, 
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which is the cause of household financial risk (Sekhri and Savedoff, 2005). 
Notwithstanding this, the inherent features of PHI markets, such as voluntary 
enrolment, adverse selection, ‘cream skimming’, and moral hazard, fundamentally 
prevent PHI from universal coverage, especially under laissez-faire policies (Sekhri 
and Savedoff, 2006). As a result, public-private mix financing methods are often 
prescribed for developing countries (Scheil-Adlung, 2013: 36), where in principle SHI 
should serve as the main financial source and voluntary insurance, such as PHI, 
should be secondary in global terms (Fuenzalida-Puelma et al., 2013: 500-501). 
A concern about this idea is that SHI may crowd out PHI making the mix unstable. 
The original observation of the crowding-out effect traces back to data arising from 
the expansion of Medicaid in the US between 1987 and 1992 (Cutler and Gruber, 
1996). Since then, dozens of studies in the US reported the crowding-out effect, in 
which the expansion of public insurance programmes reduced the coverage of PHI, 
prevailed in the poor’s Medicaid (Cutler and Gruber, 1996, Dubay and Kenney, 1997, 
Shore-Sheppard et al., 2000) and Children’s SCHIP (Shone et al., 2008, Bansak and 
Raphael, 2007), and lasted for a long time (Gruber and Simon, 2008).  
However, the modality of the mix in China is different from that of the US. The US 
public programmes like Medicaid, which provide comprehensive coverage, are a 
substitute for PHI; some of those eligible for the public programme drop PHI to join it 
(Cutler and Gruber, 1996). SHI in China, as in many low- or middle-income countries, 
emphasises universality but cannot provide comprehensive benefits coverage, 
therefore it is compatible with PHI which offers complementary coverage. 
Notwithstanding the different contexts, this study finds a similar pattern in China to 
that in the US: between 2004 and 2011, those with coverage under SHI were less 
likely to have PHI than those without SHI. It suggests that even if there is no such 
either-or choice between SHI and PHI, SHI still reduces, or indeed crowds out, the 
take-up of PHI.  
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A theory that explains the phenomenon is that the crowding-out effect is essentially 
the duplication of benefits, and is dependent on coverage of the public programme 
(Barros and Siciliani, 2012: 955-956). A universal and comprehensive public 
programme can completely crowd out the PHI market; it can also reduce its coverage 
to leave room for the development of PHI.    
Taking the findings of this study together, the public-private mix does not appear to 
be a promising way to achieve UHC. Under universal but insufficient SHI coverage, 
the realisation of UHC, in theory, has to look to universal enrolment of complementary 
PHI or at least a tendency in this direction. However, this study finds that PHI’s current 
prevalence is too low to substantially contribute to the progress of UHC. Dynamically, 
the growth of prevalence is also too slow to reach a qualitative change of its 
importance in health financing in the short term, and it would be even slower as SHI 
continues to expand. At this rate, realising UHC by engaging the private sector to 
complement the public sector is unlikely to happen. 
Government interventions may help to break the impasse. The first possibility is 
changing the features of PHI. For example, in countries like Uruguay and Switzerland 
the governments mandate the purchase of PHI (Sekhri and Savedoff, 2005), and in 
the Netherlands and Chile, the pricing of some PHI products is income-related rather 
than risk-related (Enthoven and van de Ven, 2007, Sekhri and Savedoff, 2005). The 
second is defining the mandated benefits package. In the Netherlands, South Africa, 
and the US after recent health reforms, the government requires insurers to provide 
some basic packages that are open to everyone or to some government-qualified 
groups (Enthoven and van de Ven, 2007, Mills et al., 2012, White, 2012). Third, 
government may simply subsidise PHI purchase, such as in the US, Ireland, and 
recently China (Oberlander, 2012, Nolan, 2006, EY, 2016b). In fact, many heavily-
regulated PHI products commonly receive subsidies as well (Enthoven and van de 
Ven, 2007, Sekhri and Savedoff, 2006). 
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A key rationale for government subsidies to PHI is that with the same coverage gain 
government can save money by shifting funds from public insurance to PHI subsidies, 
because government subsidies, if not the full price, encourage people to pay more for 
their insurance, thereby mobilising more private funds to finance healthcare 
(Musgrove, 2007: 174). First, however, this objective can also be achieved by 
partially-subsidised SHI schemes. China’s NCMS and Rwanda’s community-based 
health insurance are successful models, in which the governments contribute a large 
part of the public funds and the enrolees voluntarily contribute the rest, quickly raising 
national insurance coverage (Kutzin et al., 2016).  
Second, importantly, as a crucial principle of UHC, it is problematic if government 
subsidises a health programme that damages equity (Nolan, 2006, Kutzin, 2013). 
Since PHI has been associated with unequal distributions in favour of the more 
affluent, subsidising PHI would be at the risk of in effect shifting money from the poorer 
to the better-off. Arguably, a well-designed subsidisation targeting poor people or poor 
regions could be put in place. However, the mechanisms through which PHI causes 
inequalities are multiple, as this study shows. Simply subsidising the poor to buy PHI 
cannot reduce the disparities in health resources that allow people in affluent areas 
to benefit more from PHI. Thus, without the strong assumptions such as spatially 
equally-distributed resources across the country and well-designed subsidisation in 
favour of the poor, government interventions to promote complementary PHI may in 
fact be detrimental to UHC. 
Consequently, the role of PHI in the UHC project currently seems to be double-edged 
and potentially intractable. It indeed enhances overall coverage and access by 
providing its enrolees with benefits, but the benefits mainly flow to the more affluent 
groups, which is inconsistent with equity of coverage and access goals. Its 
relationship with SHI has decided that it would be hard to achieve UHC by expanding 
SHI as well as engaging PHI under the laissez-faire market, but government 




This study’s methodological contributions mainly relate to application of the CHNS 
dataset, which is very popular for studies of China’s health. First, in the present study, 
three-level modelling – rarely used in the other related studies – is applied to most 
analyses. With the three-level structure, the model fits precisely into the observation-
individual-community-nested relationship of the CHNS dataset. This is also a 
theoretically better solution for dealing with the unbalanced longitudinal data than a 
simple pooling strategy (Peugh and Heck, 2017). Moreover, this matches the 
sampling strategy of the CHNS very well, as it treats the community as the primary 
sampling unit (PSU). Because the CHNS does not provide any weight for research 
(Popkin, 2014), setting the PSU as a level in the modelling may help to improve the 
representativeness of the data.  
Second, missingness is a considerable problem for the CHNS data, which consists of 
all kinds of missingness: wave non-responses/attrition, unit non-responses and item 
missingness (Carpenter and Plewis, 2011). Unlike most of the previous studies, which 
used the complete case analysis (CCA) that simply listwise excludes missing data, 
this study adopts the multiple imputation method to handle the problem. Additionally, 
to take into account within-individual correlation of the longitudinal data, this study 
uses the wide-form format to impute missing values for every individual in the five 
waves of the study. The sensitive test shows that the coefficients of the imputed model 
and the CCA model are basically consistent. This suggests that while multiple 
imputation does not significantly change conclusions, it takes advantage of more 
information from the available data than the CCA.  
Finally, this study applies both the Heckman-probit model and the ZINB model to 
model health expenditure data, which were at best log-transformed and modelled by 
the Heckman-linear model or the two-part model in other related studies (Chen et al., 
2009, You and Kobayashi, 2011, Liu et al., 2011a, Fang et al., 2012). However, these 
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methods have also been criticised for their drawbacks by some academics (Linders 
and De Groot, 2006, Sileshi, 2006, Changyong et al., 2014). This study takes a new 
approach. Adopting the Heckman structure first, it transforms the continuous variable 
to a pair of binary variables, thereby circumventing the issues of heavily-skewed data 
and log-transformation. However, this is at the cost of information loss. To 
compensate for this loss, the study also adopts the ZINB model to treat expenditure 
as counts, an approach that has become increasingly popular but has not been used 
on the CHNS health expenditure data before this study, as far as the author knows. 
As a result, the two types of models are in general accord with each other, which 
suggests that the ZINB model would be a good choice for future studies.  
 
8.4 Implications for policy making   
Based on analyses of Chinese data, the conclusions of this study are hopefully useful 
for China’s central and local government policy making on health financing. 
Additionally, as the world’s most populous country and its second largest economy, 
the implications of this study are relevant for global development, especially for low- 
or middle-income countries that are seeking pathways towards UHC.     
8.4.1 For domestic policy making 
Will PHI help to complete the remaining steps towards UHC in China? There are three 
implications from this study.      
First, achieving UHC through the public-private mix would be unlikely to happen in 
China’s current policy context. Basically, the PHI market in China possesses the major 
features of a laissez-faire insurance market, such as voluntary enrolment, risk-related 
pricing, lack of mandated packages, no government subsidies (at least until very 
recently), and importantly the inequalities, as this study finds, that indicate insufficient 
regulations. On one hand, these features themselves automatically restrict PHI’s 
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growth in prevalence (Sekhri and Savedoff, 2006). On the other, competition from SHI 
schemes, which offer increasingly duplicated benefits at cheaper costs due to 
subsidisation (see Section 1.2.1), suppresses the take-up of PHI. As long as SHI 
continues to expand, the demand for PHI will correspondingly reduce, though SHI 
coverage has yet to be sufficient. Given its small population coverage and slow growth, 
if the current policies are not significantly changed, PHI is unlikely to substantially 
grow to address the gaps left by SHI.      
Furthermore, as SHI gradually eats into PHI’s space, the untapped potential of 
complementary PHI would diminish, and the market could substantially turn to the 
higher end, providing luxury benefits beyond the standards of UHC. China’s economic 
inequality and PHI’s pro-wealth enrolment are supposed to foster this trend. 
Consequently, the domestic PHI market would continue to grow, but the increase of 
premium income would hide the structural change under which complementary PHI 
may have been replaced by supplementary PHI. Even if UHC could be achieved in 
the future, it would be attributable to the exclusive contribution of SHI rather than the 
public-private mix of SHI and PHI.   
Second, subsidising PHI is very likely to risk damaging equity in China. A tax-break 
policy has been piloted in some central cities such as Beijing and Shanghai. It allows 
up to ¥2400 (¥1≈ £0.11 or $0.14) per year individual income tax (IIT) deduction for 
purchasing qualified PHI products (EY, 2016a). However, not everyone has an equal 
chance of receiving the benefit. According to a report, only a small proportion of 770.4 
million working population in China are paying IIT (Goldman Sachs, 2016). Some who 
do not pay IIT simply do not earn enough (less than ¥3500 per month), while more 
than 200 million people working in the informal sector or informally employed (Liang 
and Langenbrunner, 2013) are also unlikely to pay IIT, regardless of actual income. 
As a result, the typical beneficiaries of the IIT tax-break policy are urban higher-
income, formal sector employees.    
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PHI has disproportionately benefited the wealthy and those living in more affluent 
areas, and the IIT tax-break policy would, if fully implemented, continue to increase 
PHI prevalence among them by reducing their financial burden of purchasing PHI. 
Since IIT is earmarked for nationwide redistribution, the current IIT deduction policy 
is in effect shifting money from poorer people and regions to subsidise wealthy 
urbanites. It is unlikely to be an efficient way of increasing insurance coverage either, 
because among the policy-targeting group, the prevalence of PHI is already higher 
than low-income and rural (inland) residents, who are in greater need of increasing 
insurance coverage but are not eligible for the IIT tax-break policy.  
Third, the inequality of SHI may be easier to handle than that of PHI. For example, as 
this study finds, the government FMS had advantages over other schemes in 
promoting access and financial protection; the NCMS basically only worked in the 
rural areas, and they all tended to perform worse in the poorest rural inland areas than 
other areas. However, unlike PHI, SHI’s problems have been well stated in the 
literature and clearly attributed to different contribution mechanisms and different 
administrative agencies among schemes (Liang and Langenbrunner, 2013), as well 
as local pooling and managing institutions (Meng et al., 2015) in China. In a word, it 
is fragmentation that causes SHI’s compensation policies to vary scheme by scheme 
and county by county.  
Recent times have seen a tendency to consolidate these fragmented SHI schemes, 
guided by the State Council (the central government)’s Opinion on consolidating 
urban and rural residents' basic medical insurance (State Council, 2016). Some areas 
have piloted a consolidation of the NCMS, URBMI 46  and UEBMI 47  in various 
modalities (Meng et al., 2015). Moreover, the privileged FMS has been gradually 





scaled down by shifting its members to the UEBMI during the health reforms 
(Daemmrich, 2013).  
Apart from these, there is little unequal prevalence of SHI as a whole at present, 
because it has approached universal population coverage well (Meng et al., 2012). In 
addition, because of income-related contributions and the subsidisation of local and 
central governments with pro-poor mechanisms (Yip et al., 2012, Liang and 
Langenbrunner, 2013) (see Section 1.2.1), SHI institutions are financially progressive; 
inequity reduction of SHI as a whole is well documented (Liu and Zhao, 2014, Zhou 
et al., 2014, Zhang et al., 2015). These arguments dispel the misgivings about inequity 
that result from subsidising SHI. In contrast, engaging PHI faces the dilemma between 
the slow growth of prevalence without subsidisation and the increase of inequity under 
subsidisation.    
Taken all together, Chinese decision-makers may need to rethink whether it is 
beneficial for UHC to shift funds from public to private. According to the analysis above, 
compared to engaging PHI, continuously increasing funding for SHI to improve its 
generosity and consolidating fragmented SHI schemes to reduce inequality would be 
a conservative but sound path towards UHC. As previously stated, the prerequisites 
of putatively equitable PHI should be pro-poor subsidisation mechanisms at both the 
individual and aggregate levels, and government trying its best to distribute health 
resources more equally and enhance public-private cooperation in less developed 
areas. These requirements seem quite ambitious to government administration, 
however. Besides, stricter regulations such as government-defined benefit packages, 
mandatory risk-unrelated pricing, open enrolment and even mandatory purchase 
might be useful, according to international experience (Sekhri and Savedoff, 2006), 




The WHO plays a leading role in technically supporting countries that have adopted 
UHC as a national aspiration in policy making and progress monitoring, in partnership 
with many organisations (WHO, 2016), including the World Bank, which provides 
technical assistance and capital financing to governments (World Bank, 2017). The 
WHO generally recognises PHI as a form of prepayment and pooling that is preferable 
to OOP payments, but warns that it will tend to lead to gaps in healthcare coverage 
unless there is extensive government regulation, including compulsory purchase and 
subsidisation (WHO, 2018). For countries with inadequate public financing, mostly 
low- and middle-income countries, World Bank authors have recommended a 
pluralistic multi-pillar healthcare insurance system with a primary public sector and a 
secondary private sector (van Duin, 2013: xix).  
The lessons from China in this study may help these global development agencies to 
develop more informed policy advice concerning the role of PHI in the healthcare 
system and changes over time as mainstream UHC efforts focused on public 
financing are advanced. It may also be valuable for countries with similar economic 
development and healthcare institutional settings to China in their policy making.       
One lesson of this study is that the PHI market is unlikely to grow sufficiently enough 
to fill the gaps left by SHI without direct policy interventions to encourage it. Economic 
growth may be a necessary condition for such growth, but it is not sufficient, as this 
study suggests. As one of many determinants, the growth of SHI reduces the take-up 
of PHI as the breadth, depth and height of the coverage it provides are enhanced. 
The crowding-out effect of public schemes as alternatives to PHI has been well 
documented (Cutler and Gruber, 1996, Gruber and Simon, 2008); where there is a 
complementary relationship between SHI and PHI, as long as the government uses 
the benefits of economic growth to increase all of the coverage dimensions of SHI, 
the demand for PHI to complement SHI reduces, so gaps may still exist.      
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Another lesson is that for countries with considerable spatial disparities, spatial 
inequalities in PHI enrolment and effectiveness are likely. As this study finds, 
controlling for individual/household characteristics, the inland and rural areas of China 
were commonly associated with lower PHI prevalence, and PHI was less effective in 
promoting access to healthcare in these areas than in the eastern and urban areas. 
These outcomes are, perhaps, related to limited insurance supply in poorer areas, 
since commercial insurers focus their marketing and investment strategies on the 
more affluent urbanised districts. In addition, poorer areas may have relatively limited 
healthcare supply and inefficient regulations, which weaken the effect of PHI on 
access. Accordingly, a focus on PHI as a means of enhancing coverage is likely to 
further deepen spatial inequalities in prevalence and access unless, for example, a 
combination of compulsory purchase and subsidies (on PHI purchase and healthcare 
supply) are used. Where PHI is identified as a promising route forward, technical 
assistance may be required to build domestic capacity to implement such regulations 
and ensure compliance. 
 
8.5 Limitations 
This study seeks to produce reliable results by carefully designing the research 
framework, using a reliable dataset, and employing suitable statistical techniques. 
Notwithstanding, there remain some limitations, most of which are associated with the 
dataset, the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS). Furthermore, some other 
methods could have been applied to analyses, but this has not been done due to 
technical restrictions. Based on these limitations, the desirable next steps in the 




Subject to the CHNS dataset, the study looked at the period between 2000 and 2011. 
The first SHI scheme was launched in 1998 (State Council, 1998). Because this study 
focuses on PHI in the context of the expansion of SHI in China, the 2000 data, next 
to the last CHNS survey wave in 1997, covers information about the beginning of the 
reformed SHI system well. However, the contemporarily available CHNS data when 
this research was undertaken ends at the 2011 wave. Since then, the PHI market 
continues to grow in terms of its premium income (China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission, 2014) and public funding for SHI is improving year on year as well (Meng 
et al., 2015).  
It is regrettable, but unavoidable, to exclude these data from the study scope. At the 
beginning of this research in 2014-2015, I did not expect publication of the next wave 
of the CHNS data, the 2013/2015 survey, would be as delayed as it was. In a reply to 
my enquiry about this, the director of the CHNS informed me that the new data would 
come out in 2017. As it was still unavailable in September 2017, I could not afford to 
wait to include the new data in my study (the 2015 CHNS data were finally released 
in April 2018 and there were no 2013 data).  
On the positive side, policies on health financing between 2011 and 2017 were largely 
a continuation of those reforms in the 2000s. On the one hand, reforming the SHI 
institutions and enlarging population coverage has been gradually replaced by 
benefits promotion since 2007 when the last SHI institution was introduced (Meng et 
al., 2015, Meng et al., 2012), and the focus of recent reforms has been mostly shifted 
to the delivery side (Yip and Hsiao, 2014). On the other hand, there have been few 
long-established substantive preferential policies on the PHI market (Xiang, 2014, EY, 
2016a). The data from 2000 to 2011 provides abundant information for the study’s 
purposes, and since the basic policy context remains unchanged, the results of this 
study are still relevant to current policy-making.    
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One alternative dataset of increasing popularity is the China Health and Retirement 
Longitudinal Study (CHARLS). However, its first nationwide sampling started in 2011, 
when the major scaling-up of SHI coverage was completed with a very small 
proportion of people uncovered (Meng et al., 2012). Accordingly, the dataset misses 
the information about the intense reforms of the 2000s, and is therefore particularly 
unsuitable for the evaluation of SHI’s impact on the prevalence of PHI. Nonetheless, 
since the CHARLS has steadily published data every two years since 2011 and 
samples more comprehensively, it will be very useful for future research.  
8.5.2 The effect of health insurance coverage 
In the models employed by this study, the only variable about PHI is binary, indicating 
membership, either “on” or “off”. The categorical SHI variable can be in effect broken 
down into three binary variables, too. The basic problem of these binary indicators is 
that they assume that the same type of health insurance programmes exert the same 
effect on the dependent variable.  
SHI schemes are pooled and managed locally. In 2012, there were roughly 333 
UEBMI schemes, 333 URBMI schemes and 2852 NCMS schemes (Meng et al., 2015). 
The compensation policies of the same type of SHI vary among counties and urban 
prefectures. For PHI, because it is generally pooled nationally, the spatial variation in 
compensation policies is small. However, as there are thousands of PHI products in 
China (Xiang, 2014), the across-product variation exists.  
However, the binary variables are the choice that most previous studies have had to 
adopt (Zang et al., 2012, Lam and Johnston, 2012, Qin et al., 2014, Chai, 2014, Chau, 
2010, Liu and Wang, 2012, Dong and Zhao, 2013, Yang, 2013, Yue and Zou, 2014), 
due to lack of detailed information about insurance policies in these popular datasets 
such as the CHNS. It seems difficult in practical terms for such large-scale household 
surveys to record the detailed PHI policy from every PHI member. Comparatively, it 
would be easier to collect data about SHI compensation policies, which should be 
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aggregate data at the county level or the prefecture level. We hope to see the 
improvement in future datasets.  
Notwithstanding the compromise, this study tried to reflect the variations in other 
approaches. First, multilevel modelling with the community at the highest level has 
basically taken into account all among-community variations including that of 
insurance policies. Second, the year dummies and the community development 
indexes can partly capture unobserved variation in insurance policies across time and 
among communities. Third, the study population is disaggregated according to major 
geo-economic factors, in order to directly compare the differences in effect of these 
insurance programmes across regions in China.  
In terms of variations among PHI products, it is hoped that in the future, more specific 
information about PHI would be collected by surveys. Some information such as the 
types of PHI (complementary or supplementary, consumption or investment, whether 
covering outpatient care, etc.), the insurer’s name, the cap, the deductibles, and the 
cost-sharing proportion would be valuable for research.      
8.5.3 The indicators of utilisation and financial protection 
The utilisation of healthcare can be indicated by its frequency and intensity of use 
(Hou et al., 2014). In the CHNS dataset, there are specific variables indicating the use 
of outpatient care, the use of inpatient care, and the length of hospital stay. However, 
for the latter two, the numbers of valid observations are too small to be 
computationally sufficient for the multilevel modelling of longitudinal data and 
disaggregation. After a trade-off, I combined the use of outpatient care and inpatient 
care to form the dependent variable, as opposed to self-healthcare and no utilisation. 
Admittedly, this method does not provide full information about frequency and 
especially intensity.  
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A similar situation occurs with the dependent variables of financial protection. The 
OOP payment for healthcare is a commonly-used indicator of financial risk in the 
literature (Van Doorslaer et al., 2007, Fang et al., 2012, You and Kobayashi, 2011). 
Besides this, many international studies embrace the incidence of catastrophic health 
expenditure (Xu et al., 2007). Although the working definitions of catastrophic health 
expenditure vary among studies, none of them is calculatable using the CHNS dataset 
(see Section 3.5.3).  
However, the influence of this on the realisation of the research purpose should be 
limited. The first reason is that the selected variables in this study are still widely 
accepted and have been used in a number of studies. Second, importantly, the focus 
of this study is PHI (SHI is of less importance), rather than exact measurements of 
utilisation or financial risk, which are not research objects per se, but serve as tools 
for indicating the effects of health insurance. Notwithstanding this, existing and future 
studies on PHI using other indicators would be valuable complements.  
8.5.4 Modelling health expenditure 
Finally, the multilevel modelling method is not employed to model financial risk. This 
is a compromise between feasibility and precision. Abandoning the multilevel 
structure undoubtedly reduces the capability of the model in comprehending the data 
structure. However, this compromise should be acceptable, since a number of 
previous studies on health expenditure based on Chinese survey data, simply 
adopted individual-level models (Chen et al., 2009, You and Kobayashi, 2011, Liu et 
al., 2011a, Fang et al., 2012). In this study, in the absence of the multilevel structure, 
the method of cluster-robust standard errors is applied to deal with the within-
individual correlation of longitudinal data. Moreover, a group of community-level 
indexes indicating the health-related development of the community are included, to 
provide the models with information about the communities that individuals reside in.  
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Apart from this, modelling health expenditure would have been improved by 
employing the Heckman-Poisson model; however, it was not built in Stata until the 
recently-released version 15. In theory, this model can overcome the selectivity of 
healthcare users with the two-equation structure, while it properly handles the non-
normal distribution of health expenditure data by assuming a Poisson distribution. 
Therefore, it should be able to provide more information than the Heckman-probit 
model that this study uses. There is a user-written Heckman-Poisson model command 
“ssm” based on an algorithm of generalized linear latent and mixed models (gllamm) 
(Miranda and Rabe-Hesketh, 2005), but this failed to converge with the study 
population when I attempted it. This study uses the ZINB model instead, as it can 
directly estimate health expenditure data (Lambert, 1992, Hall, 2000) to complement 
the Heckman-probit model, trying to provide as much information as possible. 
Nonetheless, if Stata 15 is available, the Heckman-Poisson model deserves to be 
tried.    
Notwithstanding these efforts, admittedly, information loss happens during the 
transformation of the health expenditure variable. Basically, health expenditure is 
originally a continuous variable, which means it could have an infinite number of 
values, while they must be non-negative. For the Heckman-probit model, transforming 
the continuous variable into two binary variables in effect reduces the potentially 
infinite number into three, undoubtedly losing substantial information that the 
expenditure data contain, which I have recognised at the beginning of Chapter seven. 
To compensate the loss, I additionally used the ZINB model, which treats the health 
expenditure data as counts. So does the potentially useful Heckman-Poisson model 
as mentioned above. However, in a count model, the health expenditure data are 
required to be discrete integers and hence have a finite number of values within a 
certain range (Meyer et al., 1985). Therefore, although this is better than the binary 
variable, information is also lost when the potentially infinite number of values are 
integrated into a finite number of values. The loss is especially serious when the range 
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of values is small, which means only a small number of integers that belong to this 
range are modelled.            
 
8.6 Conclusion 
This study demonstrates that PHI is distributed unequally in favour of those in higher 
socioeconomic groups and more affluent areas. PHI has a positive effect on access 
to healthcare for those in need, particularly so for those who live in more affluent 
districts – such that, compared to those without PHI, those with PHI in need of 
healthcare used it more frequently; however, this was especially the case in the more 
affluent eastern and urban areas; and this effect relied on the presence of SHI. 
Additionally, PHI prevalence and its effect on access to healthcare varied among 
communities more in rural areas than urban areas, and PHI tended to increase a 
community’s average access to healthcare and financial protection in the east, but 
reduce access in the inland areas.       
These findings help to deepen the insights into the inequalities that arise from PHI, 
which are extended from those between individuals of different socioeconomic status 
to those between geo-economic regions; from those in PHI prevalence to those in its 
effectiveness; and from those upon the single PHI enrolee to those upon the whole 
community. It is shown that PHI prevalence, its effectiveness and even its impacts on 
a community are considerably unequal, invariably in favour of the more affluent 
individuals or areas. In a word, the inequalities caused by PHI are not single-faceted 
but systematic and pluralistic, and they require strict regulation by government.   
This study also shows that from 2000 to 2004 and afterwards, as SHI coverage 
expanded to cover more of the population against more of the cost of healthcare, and 
for more treatment types, individuals with coverage under SHI became less likely to 
hold a PHI product than those without SHI coverage, suggesting that the use of PHI 
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as a means of contributing to UHC efforts is unlikely to be realised without additional 
government interventions aimed at its promotion. Such interventions – most likely, 
efforts to encourage purchase such as making it compulsory and enhancing the ability 
to pay through subsidies (or tax relief) – need domestic capacity to implement and 
would have the effect of making PHI very similar to SHI in many respects. Hence, the 
benefit of doing this from a policy perspective, i.e. in the context of strong and 





























adults’  PHI  enrolment  compared  to  no  SHI, 
especially in higher income group, but negatively 





















Prevalence  Employees  in  private  enterprises  or  the  self‐
employed  were  positively  associated  with  the 









Migrants  were  more  associated  with  being 
uninsured or having PHI only. None of SHI, PHI or 
both  were  associated  with    use  of  outpatient 
care in 30 days or inpatient care in 12 months. No 
different  in  any  kind  of  health  insurance's 
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with  the  occurrence  of  gross  medical  expense 



















Prevalence  SHI  (NCMS,  URBMI,  UEBMI)  enrolment  was 
negatively  associated  with  PHI  enrolment 
compared  to  no  SHI.  After  aggregating,  the 
association  only  happened  in  urban  areas. 
Compared  to  NCMS,  URBMI  was  negatively 
associated with PHI enrolment, but UEBMI and no 
SHI  were  associated  with  PHI  enrolment. 
Compared  to  urban  residents,  the  rurally‐
registered were negatively associated with having 
PHI,  or  both  SHI  and  PHI,  but  also  negatively 
















Prevalence  The  expansion  of  urban  URBMI  (focused  on 
unemployed),  indicated  by  interaction  between 
years  and  treatment  group  (areas  with  high 











Access  Based  on  the  rural  sample,  compared  to  no 
insurance,  enrolment  of  PHI  was  negatively 













Higher  income  earners  were  both  more 



































The  percentage  of  individuals  in  a  rural  county 





















children's  difficulty  in  access  to  healthcare  and 














PHI  was more  associated  with  using  outpatient 
care,  awareness  of  ownership  of  healthcare 
provider, and using healthcare in public hospitals; 
however, supplemental health  insurance had no 

























































In  2002,  in  both  cities  and  villages,  PHI  was 
progressive;  compared  to  rural  areas,  PHI  was 















progressive  in  villages;  in  2007,  PHI  was 
progressive  in  cities,  while  it  was  regressive  in 
villages. 




(Lv, 2013)  State statistics  2005‐2011  Nationwide  Provincial  Degree of coupling 
referring to coupling 
theory in Physics 
Prevalence  There  was  coupling  relationship  with moderate 
strength  between  the  PHI market  (indicated  by 
income, expenditure, claim ratio, etc.) and rural 
NCMS  development  (indicated  by  income, 





















Prevalence  The  degree  of  coordination  between  total  SHI 
funding and PHI premium income was moderate 
in most provinces, good in four provinces (three 













NCMS  and  other  public  health  insurance  were 
negatively  associated  with  PHI  enrolment 
compared  to  no  SHI.  PHI  was  associated  with 
increased total health expenditure for the whole. 









Prevalence  NCMS  was  negatively  associated  with  PHI 















group,  SHI  (all  type)  enrolment  was  negatively 
associated with PHI purchase compared to no SHI, 












no  SHI.  In  urban  areas  students  were  more 





CHNS  2006  9 provinces  Individual  Bivariate probit models 
for both PHI enrolment 
and NCMS enrolment 
Prevalence  NCMS  was  associated  with  PHI  enrolment 










Prevalence  The  average  compensation  from  UEBMI  and 






Provincial  Fixed effects models  Prevalence  The percentage of enrolment of all SHI schemes 










Provincial  Linear models  Prevalence  PHI  development,  indexed  by  insurance 
penetration,  insurance  density  and  market 
concentration  rate,  was  more  likely  to  have 
positive  correlations  with  richness  of  public 
health  resources,  indicated  by  the  number  of 
physicians (per 1000 people) and beds (per 1000 








Individual  Probit models  Prevalence  No  SHI  was  negatively  associated  with  the 
willingness  to  buy  PHI  compared  to  all  SHI 
schemes, among which no difference was found. 
Under the incentive of income tax break migrants 
were  negatively  associated  with  willingness  to 
buy PHI compared to local residents. Government 



























































For  the  whole  population,  PHI  and  SHI  had  a 
positive relationship with using  inpatient care  in 
last one year or outpatient care in last month, but 
had  a  significant  negative  interaction  between 
them.  In  urban  areas,  both  increases  were 
significant  and  negative  interaction  was  not 
significant;  in  rural  areas,  all  were  insignificant. 












positively  associated with  the average  length of 
hospitalisation. But PHI depth's  interaction with 
























Between  2000  and  2004,  PHI  was  positively 




positively  associated  with    the  proportion  of 
OOP  payment  for  treatment.  2000‐2004  and 
2006‐2009,  PHI  was  negatively  associated  with 
the proportion of OOP payment for preventative 
care.  2000‐2004,  PHI  was  positively  associated 
with  high‐income  people's  proportion  of  OOP 
payment for treatment, but negatively associated 
with  that  for  preventative  care.  2006‐2009,  PHI 
was negatively associated with both low‐income 










2007, 2008  9 cities  Individual  Probit models  Access  There  was  a  positive  relationship  between  PHI 
enrolment  and  using  inpatient  care  in  last  one 













PHI  had  no  significant  association  with  OOP 
expenditure;  but  PHI  as  the  main  payment 





















































Per‐capita  PHI  premium  spending  had  a 












Comparing the complete three-level analytical model on PHI prevalence and the 
same model excluding the group of demographic variables and the same model 
excluding the group of socioeconomic variables, the profiles of their outcomes are 
very similar, especially the effects of the key independent variables, i.e. health 
insurance variables (Table A2.1). It suggests that the models for PHI prevalence 
appear to be robust. 
 
Table A2.1 Test on the models on PHI prevalence   
Model  Analytical model  Test model 1  Test model 2 
Coefficient (S.D.) 
Year  Reference = 2000 
2004  ‐2.08(0.11)***  ‐2.07(0.11)***  ‐2.01(0.11)*** 
2006  ‐2.08(0.11)***  ‐2.09(0.11)***  ‐1.98(0.10)*** 
2009  ‐2.05(0.10)***  ‐2.07(0.10)***  ‐1.89(0.10)*** 
2011    ‐1.86(0.11)***  ‐1.90(0.11)***  ‐1.69(0.10)*** 
Age  0.05(0.01)***    0.05(0.01)*** 
Age2  ‐5.85e‐4(0.00)***    ‐6.82e‐4(0.00)*** 
Gender  ‐0.06(0.06)    0.02(0.06) 
Chronic diseases  0.06(0.07)    0.06(0.07) 
Household income  0.20(0.03)***  0.20(0.03)***   
Household size  ‐0.08(0.02)**  ‐0.08(0.02)**   
Education    Reference = no or primary school 
Middle or tech  0.22(0.07)**  0.36(0.07)***   
University  0.40(0.10)***  0.54(0.10)***   
Working  0.19(0.07)**  0.35(0.06)***   
Hukou  ‐0.51(0.12)***  ‐0.51(0.12)***   
SHI    Reference = no SHI 
FMS  1.81(0.08)***  1.75(0.07)***  2.03(0.08)*** 
Urban SHI    0.60(0.11)***  0.58(0.11)***  0.77(0.11)*** 




East  0.85(0.16)***  0.85(0.16)***  1.02(0.17)*** 
Urban  1.05(0.18)***  1.06(0.18)***  1.45(0.18)*** 
Population  ‐0.04(0.05)  ‐0.05(0.05)  ‐0.04(0.05) 
Social services    ‐0.02(0.01) Ɨ  ‐0.02(0.01) Ɨ  ‐0.02(0.01)* 
Health infrastructure  0.05(0.02)**  0.05(0.02)**  0.05(0.02)** 
Random effect: Variance (S.D.) 
Community‐level  0.87(0.13)***  0.88(0.14)***  1.05(0.16)*** 




In following Table A2.2, while the outcomes of the analytical model for healthcare 
utilisation and the test models excluding demographic and socioeconomic variables, 
respectively (Test model 3 and Test model 5), are mostly similar, the most visible 
difference occurs between the analytical model and the model excluding demographic 
variables and current health status (Test model 4). Removing current health status 
strengthens the effects of most individual variables as well as the random effects at 
the two levels, because of the strong explanatory power of the health status for 
utilisation. However, although substance has changed, the conclusions derived from 
the models barely change, especially on the effects of health insurance schemes, 
because the significances and signs are basically maintained. In sum, it suggests that 
the findings related to PHI and SHI from the analytical models should be robust.   
   
Table A2.2 Test on the model on healthcare utilisation 
Model  Analytical model  Test model 3  Test model 4  Test model 5 
Coefficient (S.D.) 
Year  Reference = 2000 
2004  0.62(0.09)***  0.64(0.09)***  0.88(0.07)***  0.62(0.09)*** 
2006  0.72(0.08)***  0.78(0.08)***  0.75(0.07)***  0.72(0.08)*** 
2009  0.63(0.09)***  0.74(0.09)***  0.80(0.08)***  0.61(0.09)*** 
2011  0.60(0.09)***  0.75(0.09)***  0.71(0.08)***  0.58(0.09)*** 
Age  0.02(0.00)***      0.02(0.00)*** 
Gender  ‐0.17(0.04)***      ‐0.22(0.04)*** 
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Chronic diseases  0.50(0.05)***      0.51(0.05)*** 
Health status  4.22(0.06)***  4.35(0.05)***    4.23(0.06)*** 
Household income  ‐0.01(0.02)  ‐0.01(0.02)  ‐0.02(0.02)   
Household size  0.01(0.02)  ‐0.01(0.02)  ‐0.03(0.01) Ɨ   
Education  Reference = no or primary school 
Middle or tech  ‐0.10(0.05) Ɨ  ‐0.39(0.05)***  ‐0.67(0.04)***   
University  ‐0.10(0.12)  ‐0.47(0.12)***  ‐0.77(0.08)***   
Working  ‐0.21(0.05)***  ‐0.47(0.04)***  ‐0.71(0.03)***   
Hukou  0.07(0.07)  0.06(0.07)  ‐0.04(0.06)   
SHI  Reference = no SHI 
FMS  0.31(0.10)**  0.43(0.10)***  0.52(0.08)***  0.26(0.10)* 
Urban SHI  0.10(0.08)  0.16(0.08)*  0.29(0.06)***  0.06(0.08) 
NCMS  0.16(0.07)*  0.17(0.07)*  0.26(0.06)***  0.16(0.07)* 
PHI  0.13(0.12)  0.09(0.12)  0.18(0.08)*  0.11(0.12) 
Aggregate variables 
East    ‐0.25(0.06)***  ‐0.20(0.06)**  ‐0.10(0.07)  ‐0.27(0.07)*** 
Urban  ‐0.23(0.09)*  ‐0.15(0.09)  ‐0.06(0.09)  ‐0.26(0.09)** 
Health infrastructure  ‐0.03(0.01)*  ‐0.02(0.01)*  ‐0.02(0.01)*  ‐0.03(0.01)* 
Transportation  ‐0.01(0.01)  ‐0.01(0.01)  ‐0.02(0.01)*  ‐0.01(0.01) 
Economic activity  0.00(0.01)  0.00(0.01)  0.02(0.01)**  0.00(0.01) 
Random effect: Variance (S.D.) 
Community‐level  0.10(0.02)***  0.10(0.02)***  0.18(0.02)***  0.10(0.02)*** 




The following Table A2.3 and Table A2.4 compare the Heckman analytical models 
and the ZINB analytical models on the financial risk with their corresponding test 
models, respectively. The outcomes suggest that excluding demographic variables or 
socioeconomic variables make slight change to substance of the effects of remaining 
variables, but their significance and signs almost hold. They suggest that both the 










Model  Analytical model Test model 6 Test model 7
Equation  >50%  >90%  >50%  >90%  >50%  >90% 
Coefficient (S.D.) 
Year  Reference = 2000 
2004  0.02(0.07)  ‐0.05(0.09)  0.01(0.07)  ‐0.06(0.09)  0.03(0.07)  ‐0.04(0.02) Ɨ 
2006  ‐0.03(0.07)  ‐0.20(0.09)*  ‐0.04(0.07)  ‐0.20(0.09)*  ‐0.02(0.07)  ‐0.19(0.09) 
2009  0.10 (0.08)  ‐0.07(0.10)  0.09(0.08)  ‐0.07(0.10)  0.10(0.07)  ‐0.06(0.10) 
2011  0.06(0.08)  0.05(0.10)  0.05(0.08)  0.05(0.10)  0.06(0.08)  0.06(0.10) 
Age  ‐0.00(0.00) Ɨ  ‐0.00(0.00)      ‐0.00(0.00)  ‐0.00(0.00) 
Gender  ‐0.00(0.03)  0.06(0.05)      ‐0.02(0.03)  0.04(0.04) 
Chronic diseases  0.18(0.04)***  0.19(0.05)***      0.19(0.04)***  0.20(0.05)*** 
Household income  0.02(0.02)  0.02(0.02)  0.02(0.02)  0.03(0.02)     
Household size  ‐0.03(0.01)**  ‐0.03(0.01) Ɨ  ‐0.03(0.01)**  ‐0.03(0.01) Ɨ     
Education  Reference = no or primary school 
Middle or tech  0.05(0.04)  0.06(0.06)  0.07(0.04)*  0.08(0.05)     
University  ‐0.02(0.08)  0.09(0.11)  ‐0.00(0.08)  0.12(0.11)     
Working  ‐0.18(0.05)***  ‐0.24(0.06)***  ‐0.17(0.04)**  ‐0.23(0.05)***     
Hukou  ‐0.03(0.06)  0.05(0.07)  ‐0.04(0.06)  0.04(0.07)     
SHI  Reference = no SHI 
FMS  ‐0.39(0.07)***  ‐0.20(0.10) Ɨ  ‐0.38(0.07)***  ‐0.19(0.10) Ɨ  ‐0.35(0.07)***  ‐0.18(0.10) Ɨ 
Urban SHI  ‐0.20 (0.06)**  ‐0.08(0.08)  ‐0.19(0.07)**  ‐0.07(0.08)  ‐0.17(0.06)**  ‐0.07(0.08) 
NCMS  ‐0.26(0.05)***  ‐0.21(0.07)**  ‐0.26(0.05)***  ‐0.20(0.07)**  ‐0.27(0.05)***  ‐0.21(0.07)** 
PHI  0.02(0.08)  0.15(0.12)  0.02(0.08)  0.14(0.12)  0.02(0.08)  0.14(0.12) 
Aggregate variables 
East  0.11(0.04)**  0.07(0.06)  0.13(0.04)**  0.08(0.07)  0.14(0.04)**  0.09(0.06) 
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Urban    ‐0.05(0.06)  ‐0.04(0.07)  ‐0.05(0.06)  ‐0.04(0.07)  ‐0.01(0.05)  ‐0.02(0.06) 
Health infrastructure  0.01(0.01)  0.00(0.01)  0.01(0.01) Ɨ  0.01(0.01)  0.02(0.01)*  0.01(0.01) 
Transportation  0.02(0.01)*  0.02(0.01)  0.02(0.01)*  0.02(0.01) Ɨ  0.02(0.01)**  0.02(0.01) Ɨ 
Economic activity    0.01(0.01)  0.01(0.01)  0.01(0.01)  0.01(0.01)  0.01(0.01)  0.01(0.01) 
Social services  0.01(0.01) Ɨ  0.01(0.01)  0.01(0.01) Ɨ  0.02(0.01)  0.02(0.01)*  0.02(0.01) 






Model  Analytical model Test model 8 Test model 9
Equation  %Zero  Count  %Zero  Count  %Zero  Count 
Effect  Coefficient (S.D.) 
Year dummies  Reference = 2000 
2004  ‐1.65(0.11)***  ‐0.16(0.23)  ‐1.63(0.10)***  ‐0.18(0.26)  ‐1.65(0.11)***  ‐0.15(0.22) 
2006  ‐1.51(0.12)***  ‐0.49(0.24) Ɨ  ‐1.51(0.12)***  ‐0.49(0.26) Ɨ  ‐1.51(0.12)***  ‐0.47(0.26) Ɨ 
2009  ‐1.53(0.14)***  ‐0.29(0.25)    ‐1.54(0.14)***  ‐0.32(0.25)  ‐1.52(0.15)***  ‐0.30(0.27) 
2011  ‐1.26(0.15)***  0.129(0.27)  ‐1.30(0.14)***  0.11(0.29)  ‐1.26(0.14)***  0.08(0.29) 
Age  ‐0.00(0.00)  ‐0.00(0.01)      ‐0.00(0.00)  0.00(0.00) 
Gender  0.18(0.06)**  0.17(0.11)      0.19(0.06)**  0.11(0.10) 
Chronic diseases  ‐0.50(0.07)***  0.49(0.11)***      ‐0.51(0.07)***  0.52(0.11)*** 
Household income  ‐0.00(0.04)  0.04(0.04)  ‐0.01(0.04)  0.05(0.05)     




Middle or tech  0.05(0.07)  0.03(0.11)  0.13(0.07) Ɨ  0.04(0.11)     
University  ‐0.07(0.15)  0.16(0.26)  0.05(0.15)  0.15(0.25)     
Working  0.03(0.08)  ‐0.56(0.14)***  0.13(0.07)  ‐0.58(0.11)***     
Hukou  0.13(0.09)  0.06(0.16)  0.13(0.10)  0.02(0.16)     
SHI  Reference = no SHI 
FMS  0.78(0.17)***  ‐0.17(0.21)  0.75(0.17)***  ‐0.12(0.21)  0.73(0.17)***  ‐0.17(0.22) 
Urban SHI  0.23(0.10)*  ‐0.11(0.17)  0.21(0.10)*  ‐0.08(0.17)  0.18(0.10) Ɨ  ‐0.10(0.16) 
NCMS  0.27(0.11)*  ‐0.22(0.16)  0.28(0.10)**  ‐0.19(0.16)  0.31(0.10)**  ‐0.21(0.16) 
PHI  ‐0.17(0.18)  0.28(0.30)  ‐0.18(0.18)  0.25(0.30)  ‐0.19(0.18)  0.25(0.30) 
Utilisation  ‐4.26(0.09)***  1.27(0.10)***  ‐4.30(0.09)***  1.31(0.11)***  ‐4.25(0.09)***  1.29(0.11)*** 
Health status  ‐4.25(0.10)***    ‐4.31(0.10)***    ‐4.26(0.10)   
Aggregate variables 
East  0.01(0.07)  0.16(0.11)  ‐0.03(0.07)  0.17(0.11)  ‐0.02(0.07)  0.17(0.10) 
Urban  0.04(0.08)  0.01(0.16)  0.01(0.08)  0.01(0.17)  ‐0.02(0.08)  0.03(0.15) 
Health infrastructure  ‐0.06(0.01)***  0.00(0.02)  ‐0.06(0.01)***  ‐0.00(0.02)  ‐0.06(0.01)***  0.01(0.02) 
Transportation  ‐0.03(0.01) Ɨ  0.04(0.02) Ɨ  ‐0.03(0.01)*  0.04(0.02)  ‐0.03(0.01)*  0.04(0.02) Ɨ 
Economic activity    0.01(0.01)  0.00(0.02)  0.01(0.01)  0.00(0.02)  0.01(0.01)  0.01(0.02) 
Social services  ‐0.01(0.01)  0.04(0.02)*  ‐0.01(0.01)  0.05(0.02)*  ‐0.01(0.01)  0.05(0.02)* 














For simplicity, Table 5.10 in Chapter 5 only shows the result about SHI schemes, 
whose effects on PHI enrolment experience a dramatic reversal after excluding the 
2000 data from the whole. This appendix expands the table to provide full information 
about the models based on data excluding 2000, in order to scrutinise effect changes 
of other independent variables 
Coefficients of most these independent variables are generally maintained at the 
similar level after excluding the 2000 data (Table 5.10). One of the most visible 
variation happens to age, which loses significance, plausibly because the average 
age of the longitudinal data substantially increases by excluding 2000. The 
coefficients of year dummies change, just because the reference point has shifted 
from 2000 to 2004. Only is the reversed effect of the aggregate variable of the 
community health infrastructure level hard to explain, mainly driven by data from the 
rural east. In addition, excluding the 2000 data increases magnitude of random effects, 
especially the individual-level variance. It suggests that unobserved variation in PHI 
prevalence increased after 2000, attributed predominantly to the individual level. For 
the disaggregated populations, the greatest community-level variance and the 
greatest individual-level variance still exist in the rural east and the rural inland, 
respectively, the same as those including the 2000 data. Likewise, the unobserved 
variation continues to be attributed more to the community level in the east, and more 
to the individual level in the inland.  
In sum, the coefficient profiles of the models including or excluding the 2000 data are 
in effect more similar than different. It suggests that effects of most determinants of 
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PHI prevalence did not significantly change between 2000 and 2004, except the 
remarkably reversed SHI effects. Thus, for most determinants it is basically 
appropriate to fit such models based on the pooled longitudinal data, but the changing 
effects of SHI would be hidden. Separating some data from others by time, though 
essentially more suitable for cross-sectional data than longitudinal data, is a 




  Total    Urban east  Rural east  Urban inland  Rural inland 
  Model 11  Model 11a  Model 11b  Model 11c  Model 11d 
Coefficient (S.D.) 
SHI  Reference = No SHI 
FMS  ‐1.23(0.20)***  ‐1.41(0.36)***  ‐0.95(0.30)**  ‐1.36(0.30)*** ‐1.35(0.64)* 
Urban SHI  ‐1.79(0.15)***  ‐1.85(0.27)***  ‐2.28(0.24)*** ‐1.62(0.23)*** ‐1.24(0.34)*** 
NCMS  ‐1.18(0.14)***  ‐1.18(0.48)*  ‐1.40(0.20)*** ‐1.20(0.34)*** ‐1.63(0.28)*** 
Year  Reference = 2004 
2006  0.28(0.14)*  ‐0.62(0.33) Ɨ  0.89(0.21)*** ‐0.02(0.21)  0.88(0.34)* 
2009  1.00(0.15)***  0.36(0.30)  1.42(0.24)*** 0.56(0.22)*  2.13(0.38)*** 
2011  1.27(0.17)***  0.22(0.35)  2.25(0.23)*** 0.52(0.28) Ɨ  2.31(0.39)*** 
Age  0.01(0.02)  ‐0.00(0.05)  0.01(0.03)  0.03(0.03)  ‐0.02(0.04) 
Age2  ‐3.50e‐4(0.00) Ɨ  ‐0.00(0.00)  ‐0.00(0.00)  ‐0.00(0.00)  ‐0.00(0.00) 
Gender  ‐0.19(0.11) Ɨ  ‐0.14(0.22)  ‐0.08(0.14)  ‐0.26(0.19)  ‐0.24(0.19) 
Chronic diseases  0.21(0.12) Ɨ  0.34(0.29)  0.11(0.19)  0.19(0.20)  0.28(0.23) 
Household 
income 
0.36(0.06)***  0.48(0.11)***  0.28(0.08)**  0.37(0.09)*** 0.36(0.10)** 
Household size  ‐0.13(0.04)**  ‐0.20(0.10)*  ‐0.15(0.05)**  ‐0.14(0.06)*  ‐0.09(0.05) Ɨ 
Education  Reference = None or primary school 
Middle or tech  0.29(0.12)*  0.22(0.32)  0.11(0.17)  0.38(0.25)  0.43(0.22)* 
University  0.62(0.17)***  0.29(0.41)  0.47(0.32)  0.79(0.33)*  0.88(0.48) Ɨ 
Working  0.24(0.11)*  0.45(0.25) Ɨ  0.27(0.17)  0.29(0.18)  ‐0.04(0.20) 
Hukou  ‐0.41(0.15)*  0.07(0.43)  ‐0.45(0.22)*  ‐0.04(0.25)  ‐0.55(0.27) Ɨ 
Aggregate variables 
East  1.07(0.21)***         
Urban  0.91(0.26)***         
Population  0.05(0.07)  0.29(0.17) Ɨ  0.20(0.13)  ‐0.05(0.13)  0.02(0.10) 
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Social services    0.03(0.02) Ɨ  0.05(0.04)  0.01(0.03)  0.01(0.03)  0.06(0.05) 
Health 
infrastructure 
‐0.07(0.02)**  ‐0.02(0.08)  ‐0.14(0.05)**  ‐0.00(0.06)  ‐0.04(0.04) 
Random effect: Variance (S.D.) 
Community‐level  1.34(0.21)***  0.88(0.13)***  2.26(0.60)*** 0.99(0.35)**  0.88(0.33)** 
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